


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
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A HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE
OF THE
WORK OF CHRIST



A
HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE
OF THE
WORK OF CHRIST

IN ITS ECCLESIASTICAL DEVELOPMENT

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Vexilla regis prodeunt
Fulget crucis mysterium

IN TWO VOLUMES


VOL. I

2) HODDER AND STOUGHTON#

1) LONDON NEW YORK TORONTO
#



THIS BOOK IS
DEDICATED
TO MY
FATHER



PREFACE

It is stated in the Introduction to this work (cf. Vol. I, p. 2), that its purpose is to trace the antecedents of the modern doctrine of the work of Christ. The result of my investigation is to show that this doctrine in its most typical form, as developed by Schleiermacher and Ritschl, is no arbitrary opinion on the subject, but that the whole course of doctrinal development has led to it by an immanent necessity.

This course of development has its nodal points in the four great syntheses (cf. Vol. I, pp. 5-8) in which the various factors that have contributed to the doctrine of the work of Christ have from time to time found a relative settlement. Into these syntheses the threads of doctrine are gathered up, and out of them again they diverge. The gist of my book is accordingly to be found in the sections which treat of these syntheses (Vol. I, pp. 1-8, pp. 258-262, 298-300, 440-444, Vol. II, pp. 5-7, 364-370): in order however to apprehend the full significance of these highly condensed summaries, the rest of the book must be read.

In my research for material I have naturally been greatly indebted to the two chief works dealing with the whole of my subject: Baur, "Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung von der ältesten Zeit bis auf der neueste" (1838); and Ritschl, "Die christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung"

tigung und Versöhnung, Erster Band, Die Geschichte der Lehre" (3rd ed. 1889). As regards the modern period I also owe guidance particularly to Kattenbusch, "Von Schleiermacher zu Ritschl" (3rd ed. 1903); Tulloch, "Movements of Religious Thought in Britain during the Nineteenth Century" (1885); and Scott Lidgett, "The Spiritual Principle of the Atonement" (2nd ed. 1898). I have, however, everywhere, except in a very few less important instances, investigated the original sources for myself: this was the more necessary as my purpose to treat the special doctrine of the work of Christ from the point of view of the whole of theology (cf. Vol. I, p. 2f.) involved in many cases a fresh selection of material.

In order to enable the reader to get as near as possible to the original writers, I have included a good deal of quotation and translation. The translations, except where it is otherwise stated, are my own. In quotations I have not thought it necessary always to reproduce the exact orthography of the writers, which is very various, especially in eighteenth century works.

As regards the theological principles which have guided me I owe special gratitude to Weisse, "Philosophische Dogmatik oder Philosophie des Christenthums" (1855-1862); Harnack, "Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte" (4th ed. 1909-1910); Kaftan, "Dogmatik" (3rd and 4th ed. 1901); and, last but not least, to Heim, "Das Gewissheitsproblem in der systematischen Theologie bis zu Schleiermacher" (1911).

The reason why I have attempted no construction at the end of my work is the same as the reason given in the Introduction (Vol. I, p. 2) why I have omitted from it any account of the Biblical material of the subject:

each would demand greater fullness of treatment than belongs to the scale of my history.

I take this opportunity of acknowledging the valuable help in the final preparation of my book for the press of the Rev. H. Morgan, M.A., and the late Rev. A. Gaunt, M.A., B.Litt.

ROBERT S. FRANKS.

WESTERN COLLEGE, BRISTOL.



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PART III

THE OLDER PROTESTANT THEOLOGY


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INTRODUCTION

IN the present treatise the doctrinal title, the Work of Christ, is used to include the saving effects of Christ's Incarnation, Life, Passion, Death, and Resurrection. It has been employed in the course of history, both in a narrower and in a wider sense than the above. It has at times been limited to the effects simply of Christ's Passion and Death. On the other hand, it has sometimes besides the points first named included the operation of the pre-incarnate Logos and the expected results of Christ's Second Advent. Our definition steers its course therefore midway between a more limited and a broader significance. All that belongs to the narrowest conception of the work of Christ will of course be necessarily included in the following pages, but it will appear in a wider setting. On the other hand, the largest significance of the subject extends beyond what I purpose here to present. I shall enlarge my scope so as to take in this extended significance only where this seems necessary in order not to break up the unity of some coherent historical statement.

The justification of the above delimitation of my subject must lie in its practical utility. On the one hand, there would seem to be at the present time a consensus of opinion that Christ's work in His Passion and Death is not to be properly understood except as it is included in the total effect of His whole historical manifestation upon the earth. On the other hand, it is doubtful whether modern theology would at all admit

the rightfulness of the inclusion under the head of the work of Christ of the operation of the pre-incarnate Logos ; while the expected results of His Second Advent would nowadays be remitted to the head of Eschatology. Thus the definition with which we began means that it is proposed to trace the historical antecedents of the modern doctrine of the work of Christ.

I limit my subject also to the ecclesiastical doctrine of the work of Christ, thereby excluding the Biblical material. This raises the question whether the latter ought not to be included. It may be argued that as there is no break in the historical continuity between the Scriptural and the ecclesiastical doctrine, a separation of them seems arbitrary. Moreover, the natural starting-point of the history appears to be abandoned, with the result that the whole development is left hanging unsupported. These arguments have weight.

On the other hand, however, the Biblical material cannot be regarded merely as the historical starting-point of Christian doctrine, but from its position in the Canon forms the chief basis of doctrinal proof. It appears therefore to demand a special treatment, involving questions of detailed exegesis and interpretation, that would not arise apart from its peculiar position ; as mere hints and suggestions of doctrine, which we should elsewhere pass over lightly, necessarily assume, when occurring in the Canon, an importance beyond their face-value. On the whole therefore, in spite of the difficulties involved, it seems better to reserve the Scriptural material for special treatment. Such a treatment I have given, though on a small scale, in a previous work.¹

Before concluding this introductory paragraph, I should like to explain the particular interest which has

¹ "The N.T. Doctrines of Man, Sin, and Salvation," 1908.

guided me in the selection of the historical material which I offer to the reader. It is that of system and method in theology. In the first place, my interest is in system. I wish to concentrate attention, not on those writers, who have, it may be, in large abundance put forth a multitude of different views of the work of Christ with little attempt at coherence, but rather upon those who have endeavoured to reduce the doctrine to systematic unity. It will of course be impossible to avoid including for the sake of historical continuity some account of the former class of writers. But I shall constantly distinguish between true systematic work and mere exposition and comment upon Biblical passages or homiletical amplifications upon our theme. In the second place, my interest is in method. I wish to bring out the different principles upon which the attempt to systematize the theological material has proceeded, both the principles of exposition and those of proof. I shall endeavour, on the one hand, to bring out the different influences which have guided the different attempts of theologians to form a system, whether historical, as for instance that of the Apostles' Creed or of the Epistle to the Romans, or philosophical, as for instance that of the dialectical method of Hegel. On the other hand, I wish to observe the different methods and bases which have been employed for the proof of doctrine, whether authority, reason, or experience, or two or more of these factors in some particular interrelation. To sum up, it is the genuine theological work on our subject to which I wish to direct attention, that earnest wrestling with a historically given and often apparently most intractable matter, with a view to bring into it order, light, and clearness. Such theological work may often be despised and unfavourably contrasted by warm and ardent spirits with the immediate and living expression of religious emotion

in all its native fulness and incoherence. Nevertheless it is the necessary basis of all religious education and training which endeavours to impart the sacred truths of Christianity in a form easily apprehensible and that has due relation to the needs of a particular stage of general culture. Inestimable, therefore, have been the benefits conferred upon the Church by those who in any age have enabled it to know its own mind and to handle with certainty and mastery the deposit of truth committed to it by the past, so as successfully to meet its own present needs. In order then to make clear the progress of theology in our subject, I shall as far as possible adhere to the original order and disposition of such systematic work upon it as may come before us ; and, when it is necessary for the purpose of exposition to introduce an artificial order into unsystematized thought, I shall endeavour to make plain that the order is mine and not original. To follow closely the original systematic forms may at first perhaps to the modern reader seem a little tedious ; but it is the only way in which a real understanding of theological advance can be obtained. Only thus can the emergence and the endeavours after the solution of the various theological problems be rightly apprehended.

Finally, be it observed that to study a particular doctrine like that of the work of Christ from the standpoint of system and method means to study the particular from the point of view of the whole. But this is precisely the only method of study in the history of doctrine which corresponds to the present position of theological science. Harnack's great "History of Dogma" marked an epoch just because it parted finally and thoroughly with the local method of the history of doctrine and proceeded to treat the whole of doctrine as one organism. If then, even yet for practical reasons, there still has to be a return at times to the local method, and a single

doctrine has to be studied apart from others, this must not be done without constantly keeping, as far as may be, the whole in view, and indicating in outline at least the relation of the part we are studying to the total organism.

In the case of the doctrine of the work of Christ such treatment "*aus dem Ganzen*" is both particularly necessary and especially desirable. For where in the whole doctrinal system is there any single doctrine which is more a microcosm of the whole? The doctrine of "the saving effects of Christ's Incarnation, Life, Passion, Death, and Resurrection," is indeed in miniature the whole of Christianity, and has indeed more than once in the history of the Church been treated so as to include practically the whole of Christianity: I need only refer to Athanasius' "*De Incarnatione*," Anselm's "*Cur Deus Homo*," Ritschl's "*Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*".

To write the history of the subject in the broad spirit which characterizes the above-named great works is then the programme which I have set before me: whether I can successfully carry it out, the following pages must decide.

I will, however, briefly indicate the lines along which I propose to treat my subject so as to present it as a microcosm of Christian doctrine. There are in history, as it appears to me, four principal syntheses or total views of Christian doctrine. The first is that of the Greek theology, the second that of Mediaeval scholasticism, the third that of the Protestant orthodoxy, and the fourth that of modern Protestant theology. These must be the points round about which our historical study must turn, and towards which and from which it must work. Now in these various syntheses the formal doctrine of the work of Christ is in very different degrees conceived from the point of view of the whole. In the

Greek theology almost the whole of Christianity is on its practical side expressed in the conception of Christ's work, the different aspects of the doctrine co-operating to express the complete ethico-religious character of the Christian religion. Faith in the doctrine and its theological and Christological implicates—the Greek doctrine of the work of Christ is essentially the practical aspect of the Greek Christology—must, indeed, be accompanied by the participation of the fruits of the work of Christ through the sacraments, and must be completed by good works. We hardly, however, find in the Greek theology a developed doctrine of the sacraments or of good works, but rather only an indication of the importance of these elements as completing the practical view of the Christian religion.

In the Mediaeval theology, however, the elements of the Greek synthesis are broken up, and recombined in a great new synthesis, which is also an analysis. Here accordingly the formal doctrine of the work of Christ is no longer conceived, so as even approximately to contain the whole of Christianity, but needs for its complement many other doctrines, apart from which it ceases to be practically significant. The mediaeval equivalent of the Greek doctrine of the work of Christ is not merely the doctrine formally stated under this head, but includes the doctrines of the law and of grace; while the religious views supplementing in Greek theology the doctrine of the work of Christ so as to express the whole practical aspect of Christianity are now elaborated into formal doctrines of the sacraments and of merit. Hence the pursuit of our theme through the mediaeval period requires a transgression beyond its apparent limits into these surrounding fields of doctrine. Apart from such treatment neither is the mediaeval doctrine of the work of Christ properly in-


telligible in itself; nor yet can there be any true comparison between it and the preceding Greek theology—we fall into the error of comparing names and not things, and the supposed history of our doctrine becomes a mere collection of matters incommensurable and disparate. The reader must therefore be prepared for a considerable extension of material in the mediaeval period with a view to the necessary completeness of view and to the possibility of comparison with what precedes. Of course, since what we have in view is the work of Christ, a complete treatment of auxiliary themes is not to be looked for.

The necessity of the extended treatment above indicated is once more apparent when we come to the transition from the mediaeval to the Protestant theology. For the essence of Protestantism is that faith in Christ alone achieves what in the mediaeval system is accomplished by the whole series of doctrines, which has just been named. Moreover, faith is so conceived as to reduce the sacraments to a position of secondary importance, and as to relegate the doctrine of good works, except so far as polemic against Catholicism is concerned, to the sphere of Christian ethics. In Protestantism accordingly the doctrine of the work of Christ, when it has finally reached its full development, even more than in the Greek theology, is the practical summary of the whole Christian religion, the different parts of the doctrine once more co-operating to express the total ethico-religious character of Christianity. Our theme, therefore, after that once for all the transition from Catholicism to Protestantism has been explained, shrinks back to narrower limits than those defining it at the outset: indeed, for the rest of our work it becomes simply co-extensive with the doctrinal title of the Work of Christ. For the modern Protestant synthesis differs only from

that of the older Protestantism in that it seeks to make more plain the inner unity of Christian doctrine ; and accordingly seeks to reduce the orthodox Protestant doctrine of the work of Christ itself to simpler terms.

Such, then, is the outline of the study before us. Many points in it will, however, only become clear in virtue of the detailed work still to be undertaken. It is only to be added that, since the doctrine of the Protestant churches is taken as the goal, the above scheme accordingly implies that the history of doctrine in the Greek and Roman communions is not pursued further than is necessary to understand the Protestant doctrine.

PART I
THE PATRISTIC THEOLOGY



CHAPTER I

THE SUB-APOSTOLIC AGE

THE first period of our doctrine stretches as far as Irenæus. Its general characteristic is a freedom of development, due to two important facts, that separate it from all later ages of the Church. The first was the existence of a charismatic ministry, whose utterances were regarded as possessing the value of inspiration. Such utterances were naturally influenced and guided by apostolic tradition ; but the tradition was not regarded as altogether limiting and determining the free utterances of the spirit. The second fact was that the written revelation, originally employed by Jesus and the Apostles for the proof of doctrine, was the Old Testament ; while the Scriptures of the New Testament, though read in the churches for edification, were not yet generally recognized as canonic in the same sense with the Old. The Old Testament was a pillar of monotheism. But beyond this it was hardly calculated to restrict the development of Christian doctrine ; which, however, on the other hand it might assist, inasmuch as there had been handed down along with it from the Apostles the allegorical exegesis and the method of proof from prophecy, which made it serviceable for Christian purposes.

It is not surprising therefore that we find a great variety of doctrinal positions in the primitive Church. We shall adequately cover the ground, so far as our

particular subject is concerned, by distributing the material according to the following scheme :—

(1) The original form of the Apostles' Creed (from A.D. 100-150).

(2) The Apostolic Fathers (A.D. 90-140), with a particular reference to Ignatius.

(3) The Apologists of the second century, especially Justin (*ob. c.* A.D. 165).

(4) The Gnostics of the first and more particularly the second century, including Marcion (*fl. c.* A.D. 140).

§ 1. THE APOSTLES' CREED

We take as our first testimony as to the doctrine of the work of Christ existing in the early Church the original form of the Apostles' Creed (A.D. 100-150), which is known to us in the third century as the creed of the Roman Church, but may have originated either in Rome (Kattenbusch, Harnack) or in Asia Minor (Zahn, Loofs). There is some uncertainty as to the exact wording of the oldest form of the creed, but that doubt does not touch the point with which we are here concerned, viz. that the Second Article appended to the name of Jesus Christ a recital of the facts of His Incarnate life from His birth to His ascension concluding with the assertion of His present exaltation and of His future coming to judgment. This passage ran as follows :—

“Who was born of Holy Ghost and Mary the Virgin, who was crucified under Pontius Pilate and was buried, and on the third day rose again from the dead, who ascended into heaven, and sitteth at the right hand of the Father, whence He cometh to judge the quick and the dead.”¹

Upon the theological significance of this passage I will let Kattenbusch speak.

¹ See Loofs, D.G.⁴, p. 88 n.

“As regards its positive content, I feel compelled to understand the Roman Creed as a kind of positive precipitate of Paulinism. This is clearest in the Christological portion. For here Jesus is spoken of as though He was born, only to die and to enter into His glory. All that which according to the evangelists filled the earthly life of Jesus till His death is wanting. There is not a word on His preaching ministry, His miracles, His inner character. Nevertheless the Roman Creed also reminds us of the Gospels, above all the Synoptic Gospels. It operates like these, through the mere narrative recital. No theory of the ‘work’ of Jesus is given. No word of interpretation accompanies the reference to what befel Him. As in the Gospels a picture of Him is brought before our eyes. His history appears to be intended to operate immediately like a sermon upon Him.”¹

§ 2. THE APOSTOLIC FATHERS

Our second witness as to the doctrine of the early Church upon the work of Christ comes from the writings of the so-called “Apostolic Fathers” (A.D. 90-140). Under this head are included the Epistle of the Roman Church to the Corinthians (First Epistle of Clement), the seven genuine letters of Ignatius, the Epistle of Polycarp to the Philippians, the doctrinal work known as the Epistle of Barnabas, the Shepherd of Hermas (an apocalypse), the homily known as the Second Epistle of Clement, and since its publication in A.D. 1883, the Didache or Teaching of the Twelve Apostles. If we except the case of Ignatius, presently to receive special treatment, the theological elements to be found in the Apostolic Fathers are so germinal and sporadic that the

¹ “Der geschichtliche Sinn des apostolischen Symbols,” in “Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche,” 1901, Heft 5, p. 416.

following summary of their teaching may well produce the impression of a more developed doctrine than really exists in their writings. The Christianity which these represent is of a simple and untheological type. The fundamental conception of the Christian religion to be found in them is that it includes the knowledge of God (*γνῶσις*), and of His law (*νόμος*), along with the promise of immortality (*ζωή, ἀφθαρσία*), all these being revealed by Jesus Christ.¹

As passages typical of this point of view may be cited the following :—

1 Clem. xxxvi. 2 : “By Him we look steadfastly unto the heights of heaven. By Him we behold, as in a mirror, His immaculate and most excellent visage. By Him the eyes of our hearts were opened. By Him our foolish and darkened understanding blossoms up anew towards His marvellous light. By Him the Lord has willed that we should taste of immortal knowledge.”

Didache ix. 3 : “We give thanks unto Thee, our Father, for the life and knowledge, which Thou hast made known unto us through Jesus Christ, Thy servant”.

2 Clem. xx. 5 : “To the only invisible God, the Father of truth, who sent forth unto us the Saviour, the leader of our incorruption, through whom also He manifested unto us truth and heavenly life, to Him be the glory for ages of ages”.

Hermas, “Sim.” V, vi. 3 : “He therefore having cleansed the sins of the people, showed them the paths of life, giving them the law, which He received from His Father”.

The above point of view of the Apostolic Fathers may be generally described as a Christian moralism. Their doctrine is, however, not a pure moralism, but has

¹ Cf. Harnack, D.G.⁴, I. 188-91, 220-1 ; Loofs, D.G.⁴, 90-3.

in it a mystical element. For one thing a certain vagueness attaches to the idea of revelation by Jesus Christ, in so far as the Christological idea of the Apostolic Fathers includes both the historical Jesus and the spiritual Christ, without the establishment of any very clear relation between the two.¹ Again, the complete knowledge of God is conceived as very closely associated with eternal life. Compare the above quotations from the *Didache* and 2 Clement, also the phrase "immortal knowledge" in the quotation from 1 Clement.² On the whole then, out of the different New Testament types of doctrine, it is the Johannine with which the Christianity of the Apostolic Fathers has most affinity, only that it is altogether less theological and more elementary.

The above view does not, however, exhaust all that the Apostolic Fathers have to say of the work of Christ. We find also the thought, though very indistinctly expressed, that Christ did not merely promise eternal life, but procured it by His Incarnation and Passion.

Cf. Barnabas v. 6: "But He Himself, that He might bring to nought death and manifest the resurrection from the dead, because it was necessary that He should be manifested in the flesh, endured". Here we have a hint of the (ultimately Pauline) type of doctrine presently to be more fully studied in Ignatius.

Moreover, in addition, the idea of Christ's death as a sacrifice and ransom is well represented in the Apostolic Fathers, but it is not expressed with any great distinctness. We appear to be dealing here mainly with an imperfectly assimilated tradition. Even the Epistle of Barnabas, which deals with this subject at considerable length from the point of view of the correspondence of Christ's death with Old Testament types, shows no real

¹ Cf. Seeberg, D.G. i.², pp. 112 f.

² See also Harnack, D.G. i.⁴, p. 189, n. 1.

insight into the matter. "Barnabas" says, however, (v. 1):—

"For to this end the Lord endured to give up the vessel of His flesh to corruption, that we might be sanctified through the remission of sins, which is effected through His blood of sprinkling".

Cf. also vii. 3: "He Himself purposed to offer the vessel of the Spirit as a sacrifice for our sins".

vii. 5: "When I shall offer My flesh for the sins of My new people".

Very similar to these passages in Barnabas is Hermas, "Sim." V, vi. 2.

"He Himself made purification of their sins, having laboured much, and undergone many labours."

The above passages have affinity in the New Testament with the Epistle to the Hebrews. The parallel doctrine of 1 Clement on the other hand closely resembles the "Paulinism" of 1 Peter.

Cf. 1 Clem. XLIX. 6: "Through the love He had for us Christ our Lord gave His blood for us by the will of God, and His flesh for our flesh, and His soul for our souls".

1 Clem. vii. 4: "Let us gaze upon the blood of Christ and recognize how precious it is to God His Father, because it was shed for our salvation and obtained for all the world the grace of repentance".

Harnack¹ says on 1 Clem. vii. 4: "The transformation of 'the forgiveness of sins' into 'the grace of repentance' shows clearly that the special value put upon the death of Christ for the procuring of salvation is with Clement a mere matter of tradition; for it is hardly possible to deduce the grace of repentance from the blood of Christ". But clearly what we have here is just as in 1 Peter² a practical and untheological echo of Paulinism,

¹ D.G. I.⁴, p. 222 n.

² Cf. "Man, Sin, and Salvation," pp. 143-4.

which, passing over the intervening links, directly connects the moral results of the death of Christ with His sacrifice.

3. IGNATIUS

In the Ignatian epistles we find a somewhat more developed view of the work of Christ, which I will give in the words of Loofs, who has given so admirable and succinct a statement of it that it must be given intact.

"In the centre of this general view of Christianity, which has exercised very great influence on the later development (though only in small degree by the direct effect of the Ignatian letters), stands Christ as (the Revealer of God and as) the Beginner of a new humanity, stands the dispensation whose end is the new man.¹ Before Christ humanity (or indeed the world) was under the power of Satan, the ruler of this present age,² and under the dominion of death.³ But in silence God was preparing the new dispensation⁴—Judaism believed on Christianity⁵—and without the prince of this world surmising the meaning of what was taking place, with the earthly life—lying between the virgin birth and the death on the cross—of Jesus, who became perfect man,⁶ begins the destruction of death.⁷ Its accomplishment takes place in the bodily resurrection of Christ. As the Risen One, as He, who even after His resurrection is in the flesh,⁸ Christ is the Beginner of a new humanity, the Founder of a community, which possesses incorruption."⁹

With this passage, however, is to be taken another in which Loofs develops more fully another aspect of the view of Ignatius, which in it is only just indicated.

¹ Eph. xx. 1.

² *Ibid.* xix. 1.

³ *Ibid.* xix. 3.

⁴ *Ibid.* xix. 1-3.

⁵ Magn. x. 3.

⁶ Smyrn. iv. 2; cf. Eph. x. 3; xx. 1.

⁷ Eph. xix. 3.

⁸ Smyrn. iii. 1.

⁹ Eph. xvii. 1; Loofs, D.G. p. 99.

This is the aspect of his teaching which resembles the common view of the Apostolic Fathers.

"The work of Christ is the mediation of knowledge and incorruption. He is the Knowledge of God, the Counsel of the Father.¹ It is He in whom God reveals Himself, and breaks His silence; who is His Word proceeding from silence,² the Mouth without falsehood, in whom the Father hath truly spoken.³ This knowledge of God brought by Christ is itself (as in Jn. xvii. 3) thought of as a doctrine of incorruption."⁴

Taking the doctrine of Ignatius altogether as represented in these passages from Loofs, we have in it a suggestive and interesting combination of the Pauline idea of Christ as the Founder of a new humanity with the Johannine conception of the revelation of God and the bringing of life and light by the Incarnation. This is what gives it importance in the history of doctrine. It must be pointed out, however, that the above systematization of the ideas of Ignatius is due to Loofs, not to Ignatius himself; and it is a question whether it would have been made without the knowledge of the fuller and clearer presentation of the same type of doctrine in the later Greek theology. If we look back from this more developed statement to Ignatius, the outlines of it are plain enough in his epistles; they would not be so clear otherwise. This observation explains the position taken up by Harnack relatively to Loofs' construction of the theology of Ignatius. He admits that we have in the Ignatian epistles the first attempt in the post-apostolic literature closely to combine the historical propositions of the creed with the blessings which Jesus has brought. But he doubts "if one can at all assign to this pathetic confessor any clearly conceived doctrine," and says that

¹ Eph. xvii. 2; iii. 2.

² Magn. viii. 2.

³ Rom. viii. 2.

⁴ Magn. vi. 2; cf. Eph. xvii.; *ibid.* p. 101.

"only the will of the writer is here clear, all the rest is in confusion".¹ The truth then would seem to be that Ignatius is important as manifesting a tendency in the sub-apostolic age to the development of a type of doctrine afterwards formulated by Irenæus and his successors. His letters explain the character of the tradition under the influence of which Irenæus worked; but it was Irenæus in whose mind the tradition crystallized into definite form.

Before parting with Ignatius, let me call attention to the fact that in what he says about the destruction of death beginning in the silence of God, without the prince of this world understanding what was taking place, we have at least a suggestion of the later idea that the devil was deceived by God in the economy of redemption. I may also point out the existence in the Ignatian letters of the doctrine of the descent into hell, which is connected in his mind with the idea that Christ is our life.

"How can we live without Him, whom also the Prophets, His disciples in the Spirit, expected as Teacher? And therefore He, for whom they righteously waited, is come, and has raised them from the dead."²

§ 4. THE APOLOGISTS

By the Apologists the conception of the work of Christ as a revelation is further defined and related to the idea of revelation in general. Already in the Apostolic Fathers we meet with the point of view that the revelation made in Christ does but confirm that already given in the Old Testament.³ But by the Apologists this revelation is identified, not only with that made in the Old Testament, especially through the prophets, but

¹ See D.G.⁴, I. p. 221, n. 1.

² Magn. ix. 2, 3.

³ Cf. Loofs, D.G. I.⁴, p. 92.

also with the revelation in the general reason of man. The combining idea is that of the Logos. The Logos or Reason of God is immanent in every man. The prophets spoke by His inspiration. In Jesus Christ He became incarnate ; but He brings no new revelation. He does but confirm the revelation already made from the beginning in man's reason, but beclouded by the demons who have led men astray into idolatry and superstition, and enslaved them under the dominion of the senses. The prophets renewed this revelation in its pristine clearness. Jesus Christ finally completes their work by guaranteeing its truth. This He not merely does, however, by repeating the prophetic revelation of God, the essence of which is the knowledge of God and His law along with the promise of immortality ; but also, by the actual correspondence of the historical events of His life with the predictions of the prophets, He gives the final proof of the truth of their doctrine.

This is practically the whole view of the Apologists with regard to the work of Christ. Only Justin Martyr forms some exception to the general rule. His main view indeed is essentially the same as that of the rest.

“According to the *Apology* and *Dialogue* of Justin, Christ accomplishes the conversion and restoration of humanity to its destination by His teaching as to the worship of the true God and a virtuous life in faith in the eternal reward of immortality, which He will bestow at His second coming.”¹

Nevertheless we find also in Justin ideas that resemble the doctrine of Ignatius as to a Divine economy in the Incarnation whose purpose is the overthrow of death and Satan.

“(Christ) having been made flesh submitted to be born of the Virgin, in order that through this dispensation the

¹Thomasius, D.G.², I. p. 394, note by Bonwetsch.

Serpent, who at the first had done evil, and the angels assimilated to him might be put down and death might be despised.”¹ In fact we find in Justin clear indications of the presence to his mind of the recapitulation theory, afterwards more fully developed by Irenæus, according to which Christ becomes a new head of humanity, undoes the sin of Adam by reversing the acts and circumstances of his disobedience, and finally communicates to men immortal life. Compare the sentence quoted by Irenæus from Justin’s treatise against Marcion, “The only-begotten Son came to us, recapitulating His creation into Himself”.² Compare also the following passage :—

“He became man through the Virgin, in order that in the way that the transgression took its beginning from the Serpent, through that same way it might also take its destruction.”³

Apart from these passages in Justin, where as in Ignatius a Pauline element enters, the theology of the Apologists has again more affinity with the Johannine than with any other type of New Testament doctrine. Their central conception of the Logos they have in common with Jn. I. 1-18, as also the way in which they apply it to unite the pre-Christian revelation with that made in Christ. That their working out of the Logos doctrine in detail differs considerably from that of the Gospel of John is of importance in connexion with the doctrine of the Person of Christ, but has no special significance for us. On the other hand, however, we are concerned with another difference between John and the Apologists, viz. that they simply identify Christianity with the prior Divine revelation, whereas John points out

¹ “Dial.” 45.

² Irenæus, “Adv. Hær.” IV. 6, 2, Harvey’s edition, II. p. 159.

³ “Dial.” 100.

the contrast between the two.¹ It is part of the same difference of view that the Apologists fail to supplement the Logos doctrine, as John supplements it, with the intuitive contemplation of Jesus Christ in His historical life. Moreover, whereas the Apologists regard the revelation of the Logos as containing the knowledge of God and His law and the promise of immortality, the Johannine mysticism views immortality as already communicated to the believer by faith in Christ,² and views the keeping of Christ's commandment as involved in abiding in Him.³ The doctrine of the Apologists is then purely moralistic, without the mysticism which balances the ethical interest in John.⁴ There is here a retrogression in content from, if an advance in science upon the doctrine of the Apostolic Fathers in general, to say nothing in particular of Ignatius. The Apologists have in fact brought Christianity in its practical aspect down to the level of the philosophical Hellenism of their time, for which, just as for Pharisaism among the Jews, the idea of God as the Creator and Rewarder seemed to sum up the whole of religion. Compare my article "Merit" in Hastings' "Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels," Vol. II, p. 168, and for the antecedents of this view in Greek religion my essay "The Idea of Salvation in the Theology of the Eastern Church".⁵

§ 5. GNOSTICISM

The Gnostics regarded Christianity as primarily the revelation to the spiritual portion of humanity of their true nature and destiny as akin to the supreme God of the universe, and their deliverance by this knowledge from the dominion of the lower powers who rule this

¹ Jn. I. 17.

² *Ibid.* III. 36 ; XVII. 3.

³ *Ibid.* xv. 1-10.

⁴ "Man, Sin, and Salvation," pp. 167, 168.

⁵ "Mansfield College Essays," 1909, pp. 254, 259 f.

present world. To these powers, the chief among them being the Creator-God of the Jews, belongs the world of sense in opposition to the world of spirit, which appertains to the supreme God and the higher powers who emanate directly from Him. In the most highly developed Gnostic systems the lower powers themselves also emanate from the supreme God, but by means of a disruption in the world of spirit or a fall from it. The same pre-temporal fall of spirit into the realm of matter is also the cause of the imprisonment of the spiritual humanity in the present world. Those who compose it are partly of an earthly and partly of a heavenly origin. Their redemption consists in the deliverance of the spirit within them, from matter as well as from the powers that rule the material sphere. The knowledge by which they are delivered includes an ethic, usually an asceticism intended to wean the spirit from matter; but also various magic formulas or charms by which the power of the world rulers is broken.

It is evident that Christianity has here been very much philosophized. The conception of it as a redemption from the powers that rule this present world indeed plays a great part in the theology of Paul; but the dualism of spirit and matter, and the notion that the lower powers are emanations from the supreme God carries us altogether outside the borders of New Testament Christianity, dominated as it is by the monotheism of Israel. In these respects Gnosticism has amalgamated fresh elements drawn from the Hellenistic-Oriental syncretism of the age with the original Christian stock, elements which could only be incorporated by the expulsion of much that was fundamental in primitive Christianity.

In accordance with the main tendency of Gnosticism the work of Christ is construed as the bringing of the

redeeming knowledge. This view is, however, accompanied by a peculiar theory of the Incarnation, which involves a very limited valuation of the humanity of Christ as regards His work. The Gnostics in general regard the Incarnation as the manifestation of an *Æon* or Spirit, who belongs to the upper world, in the man Jesus, who belongs to the world of sense. Since, however, their fundamental dualism allows of no real union between spirit and matter, the Gnostics either regarded the humanity of Jesus as only temporarily indwelt by the Divine Saviour, who descended upon it at the Baptism, but departed before the Crucifixion; or else they viewed the human Jesus as simply an appearance assumed by the Saviour for the end of Revelation. In consequence of these views, they could of course assign little significance to the sufferings and death of Jesus. Such as they had was only typical or symbolical. Either, as with Basilides, who deliberately denied that one man could suffer for another, they were typical of the purifying sufferings which all spiritual men must undergo.¹ Or else, as with the Valentinians, they symbolized the condescension of the spiritual Christ to the sphere of matter, in that just as Jesus was extended over the Cross, so the Spiritual Christ extended Himself over the *Æon* Horos, or *Stauros*, that divided the upper from the lower world.²

§ 6. MARCION

The only Gnostic, who in spite of its inconsistency with his dualistic Christology still conserved a doctrine of redemption through the sufferings of Jesus, was the Paulinist Marcion, who was indeed a Gnostic so far as his metaphysical dualism was concerned, but not in so

¹ See "Real-Encyclopædie", II. p. 434.

² Baur, "Die christliche Gnosis," 1835, p. 140.

far as in dependence upon Paul he viewed the work of redemption as no mere communication of knowledge. Marcion made the supreme God a God of love. Below Him, however, was the Creator-God, the giver of the Jewish law, who as a God of righteousness had to be satisfied by the death of Jesus before men could be redeemed from His power. Marcion's exact conception of redemption cannot now be with certainty established in detail. As represented by the Marcionite in the "*Dialogus de recta in deum fide*," 2 (in the works of Origen) the theory passes over into the notion that the Demiurge was deceived in the transaction.

"The Demiurge, seeing the Good One undoing his law, took counsel against him, not knowing that the death of the Good One was the salvation of men."¹

According to Esnik, an Armenian bishop of the fifth century, the Marcionite view was as follows:—

"The Demiurge, since he had attacked the innocent Christ, and so had transgressed his own law, must give Christ satisfaction. He says: 'Inasmuch as I have erred and in ignorance put Thee to death, because I knew not that Thou wert God, I give Thee as satisfaction all those who will believe on Thee, to lead them whither Thou wilt'. Christ therefore delivers Paul and sends him to preach that we are redeemed with a price, and that every one who believes upon Jesus is ransomed from the Righteous One to the Good God."²

There is no doubt that the above passages give at least the general drift of Marcion's doctrine, which is a natural development enough from Paulinism, when once by the acceptance of the Gnostic dualism the constraint of Paul's Jewish monotheism had been removed. Paul himself represents the death of Christ as a ransom price.³

¹ Origen's "*Opera*," ed. Lommatzsch, xvi. p. 304.

² Seeberg, D.G.², I. p. 252, n. 1.

³ 1 Cor. vi. 20; vii. 23.

Moreover, in Col. II. 14-15, he views it as annulling the bond of ordinances, by which the angels of the law¹ had power over men. This last idea is explained by Gal. IV. 1-5, 8-10, and Col. II. 16-20, where all ceremonials, whether Jewish or pagan, are regarded as being enforced by angelic powers, to which God gave authority over men till the coming of Christ, and which, as opposed to Christ, who shares the life of God,² belong to this temporal world. It is only the firm monotheism in the background of Paul's thought that divides these conceptions from the doctrine of Marcion.

Finally, it may be pointed out that in 1 Cor. II. 8 we have the idea that the rulers of the world³ crucified Christ in ignorance of the mystery of redemption, a thought which explains not only the Marcionite doctrine in the "Dialogus," but also the Ignatian idea of the devil's being surprised by the Conception, Incarnation and Crucifixion of Christ. For the Pauline angels of the law easily pass over in thought from a middle position like that of the Demiurge, to that of malignant demons. They are in fact Divinely appointed till the coming of Christ as the guardian spirits of the present order of the world; but when Christ comes they stand in the way of His kingdom, and their power has to be destroyed.⁴

§ 7. THE TRANSITION TO THE FURTHER THEOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT: THE QUESTION OF THE PROOF OF DOCTRINE

If we now review the situation in the early Church as represented by the above delineated types of doctrine, we see that great doctrinal variety reigned in it; as indeed in view of the existence of a charismatic ministry

¹Gal. III. 19.

²Col. III. 1-3.

³Undoubtedly spiritual powers, cf. Eph. VI. 12.

⁴1 Cor. XV. 24-25; Rom. VIII. 38-39.

was naturally to be expected. Nevertheless, in the midst of this variety are clearly discernible already the shapes of the fundamental types of doctrine destined to rule in the Ancient Catholic Church during the following centuries. These are three in number: (1) There is the idea of the work of Christ as revelation. He brings the knowledge of God and of His law, and the promise of immortality. This is the common doctrine alike of the Apostolic Fathers including Ignatius, of the Apologists, and of the Gnostics. (2) There is next the conception of the destruction of death and the endowment of humanity with immortal life through the Incarnation, Death, and Resurrection of Christ (Barnabas, Ignatius, Justin). (3) Finally there is the idea of Christ's death, either as a sacrifice to God (the Apostolic Fathers), or as a ransom from the spiritual power opposed to Him (Marcion), with suggestions that the opposing power (the Devil, or the Demiurge) was in some way deceived in the economy of redemption (Ignatius, Marcion).

There is then undoubtedly a common drift in the post-apostolic development of doctrine in spite of its charismatic variety. On the other hand, however, in spite of this common drift, there was also a drift apart upon one of the most important points in connexion with the doctrine of the work of Christ. This was with regard to the ultimate value for doctrine of the historical events of the life of Jesus. While the Creed, though giving no interpretation of these events, plainly presupposed that they are the very foundation of the Christian gospel, and Ignatius endeavoured to incorporate them into a theology, the Apologists gave them no direct value for salvation, and the Gnostics regarded them as of no saving value at all.

At this point our subject touches the general question

of the significance of Gnosticism in early Christianity. This question we must now discuss, even if the discussion carries us temporarily away from our main theme; since no otherwise is it possible properly to apprehend the general conditions of the further development of doctrine. The advent of Gnosticism among the other types of Christianity precipitated a crisis.

Gnosticism, like the cuckoo in the sparrow's nest, tended first to grow big at the expense of the other occupants, and then remorselessly to shoulder out the original possessors. In other words, it was a doctrinal development of Christianity which threatened to destroy the foundations of Christianity. All other types of doctrine left standing these foundations, viz. on the one hand the Old Testament and monotheism, and on the other the historical statements summed up in the Creed. Even the doctrine of the Apologists, though it made nothing of the Gospel facts except a confirmation of the doctrine of the prophets, did not touch them. But the Gnostics both attacked the Old Testament and sublimated the articles of the creed. The question of the proof of doctrine, therefore, became urgent. It was not enough to appeal to the inspiration of the Spirit. There were many spirits in the Church. How was the true Spirit to be known? The Gnostics themselves led the way in the matter. In the first place, they criticized the Old Testament, the original basis of proof of Christian doctrine. A good example of their method is given in the famous letter of the Valentinian Ptolemæus to Flora. Ptolemæus recognizes three fundamental powers, the supreme God, who is perfect, the Devil, who is evil, and the Demiurge, who is of an imperfect righteousness, midway between them. From the last emanates the law of Moses, which contains three different strata :—

(1) That which in itself is perfect, and which Christ

did not destroy, but fulfilled, e.g. the decalogue or pure moral law.

(2) The law, that is mixed with evil, which Christ has abolished, e.g. the *lex talionis*.

(3) That which is typical, i.e. the ceremonial law, of which Christ has brought out the true meaning.¹

In the second place, however, the Gnostics began to appeal definitely to other sources of proof than the Old Testament. One was tradition. The appeal to tradition was indeed as old as Paul ;² but the Gnostics gave it a new meaning. They propounded the doctrine of a secret tradition from the Apostles in excess of the common faith of the Church. This secret tradition the Gnostic teachers claimed as their own peculiar inheritance through various disciples of the Apostles. Its content was the very Gnosis or higher wisdom which they taught was the means of redemption. For the initiated or "spiritual" Christians it replaced the common faith.

Their third appeal was to the Christian Scriptures, which were already being read for edification in the churches, but had not previously been definitely utilized as a doctrinal standard. In the Gnostic schools began the work of commenting upon and interpreting some of these writings ; while Marcion actually formed a canon of Pauline Scriptures. The Gnostics found their doctrines in our present New Testament Scriptures, especially in the parables of Jesus, by means of an allegorical exegesis.³ They in fact Gnosticized the original Christian tradition in the same way as the Church had already Christianized the Old Testament. They also, however, made use of scriptures themselves of a Gnostic tendency.⁴

Such then altogether was the elaborate system of

¹ See "Real-Encyclopædie,"³ xx. pp. 405 f.

² 1 Cor. xv. 3.

³ Cf. Irenæus, "Adv. Hær." i. 1, 5 ; i. 3, 1 ; i. 8, 4.

⁴ *Ibid.* i. 20, 1.

proof established by the Gnostics. It is clear that in opposition to it the old method of appealing on the one hand to the Old Testament and on the other to the Spirit in the Church was insufficient. For the Gnostics by their method put the Old Testament almost altogether out of court: moreover, they claimed the Spirit pre-eminently for themselves. They declared in fact that they had the final revelation beyond even that given by the Apostles or Christ himself. "For even the Apostles, they say, had mixed what belongs to the law with the words of the Saviour: and not only the Apostles, but even the Lord Himself, now spoke by inspiration of the Demiurge, now again by that of the middle powers, sometimes again by that of the Highest: they themselves, however, know infallibly and without contamination and purely the hidden mystery: which is nothing else but in the most impudent way to blaspheme their Creator."¹ The battle of the Church with the Gnostics had therefore to be joined on other than the old grounds.

It was the work of the great "Anti-Gnostic" Fathers at the end of the second century, above all of Irenæus, next to him of Tertullian, to meet the Gnostic attack, subversive as it was of the original foundations of Christianity, and at the same time to establish upon new foundations more definite than those of the past the doctrine of the Catholic Church, as the Church of the great body of Christians, opposed to Gnosticism, now came to be called.

(1) The new appeal was in the first place to the creed, which now first became definitely a standard of doctrine.² The creed presupposed by both Irenæus and Tertullian is essentially the Roman (or Apostles') Creed.

¹ Irenæus, III. 2, 2.

² *Ibid.* "Adv. Hær." ed. Harvey, I. 10, 1; I. 21, 5; III. 4, 1. Tertullian, "De præscr. hæreticorum," c. 13.

(2) In the second place, while the Old Testament was retained as the foundation of monotheism (the Gnostic criticism, as we shall presently see, was met by a theory of the historical development of revelation), a definitely Christian standard of doctrine, fuller than the creed, was established by the formation of the Canon of the New Testament. The fact that the Canon was not entirely fixed in all details as at present till long after the time of Irenæus and Tertullian does not here concern us. The Four Gospels and the Pauline Epistles, the most fundamental sources of Christian doctrine, composed the body of the Canon from the first. The only work of first-rate doctrinal importance afterwards added to the Canon was the Epistle to the Hebrews, which was accepted (as Pauline) in the East by Clement, with reservations by Origen, then by Athanasius and the later Greek Fathers, but in the West was not so accepted till the time of Augustine and Jerome.

(3) The third appeal was to the bishops of the Apostolic Churches, (a) as the holders of the true tradition from the Apostles in opposition to the Gnostic secret tradition,¹ (b) as themselves, in opposition to the Gnostic teachers, the supreme repository of the *charisma certum veritatis*.² This last criterion, the appeal to the bishops, is of the greatest importance, as it put out of court the Gnostic allegorization of the statements either of the creed or of the New Testament. It meant that not a Gnostic but a "Catholic" Anti-Gnostic interpretation was to be placed upon these statements.

Upon these principles then, or a development of them, the dogmatic work of the Ancient Catholic Church proceeded. It was not indeed all at once

¹ Irenæus, "Adv. Hær." III. 2, 2; III. 3, 1; III. 3, 4; III. 4, 1; IV. 33, 8. Tertullian, "De præscr." cap. 21, 32.

² *Ibid.* IV. 26, 2; cf. also IV. 26, 5.

even among orthodox Christians that these principles were fully accepted. With Clement of Alexandria, for example, the rule of faith is the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament only, not the Scriptures and the creed, while the true leader of the Church is not the bishop but the (true) Gnostic. Origen follows Clement, approximating, however, somewhat nearer to the Catholic view. He has prefixed to his great systematic work an extended Rule of Faith ("De principiis," præf.). But by the end of the third century or the beginning of the fourth the Catholic Church became a firm reality in all parts of the Roman Empire through the acceptance of the three norms of the Creed, the Scriptures, and the consensus of the Church. Only in general, however, was this system of authority established. The exact relation of its elements to one another remained uncertain.

(1) The Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments possessed a unique authority. From them every doctrine must be proved. Nothing that could not be proved from Scripture was universally regarded as a necessary part of the faith. To stand upon the Scripture alone was not in itself an uncatholic position.¹

(2) But the essential content of the Scriptures was held to be contained in the creed. In the West the creed always meant from Tertullian onwards the Apostles' Creed. In the East, before the Council of Nicæa, it meant the baptismal confession of the particular Church (Jerusalem, Antioch, Cæsarea, etc.). After the Council of Nicæa it meant above all the Nicene Creed, till later on its place as the chief symbol was taken by the Nicæno-Constantinopolitanum. In the West correspondingly, while the Apostles' Creed remained, as above stated, the fundamental creed, first

¹ Cf. Harnack, D.G., II. 70.

the Creed of Nicæa and later the Nicæno-Constantinopolitanum became its authoritative interpretation.¹

(3) The doctrine of Irenæus that the bishops of the Apostolic Churches were the repositories of the true tradition, and at the same time the possessors of the *charisma certum veritatis*, developed on the one hand into the general appeal to tradition (the Fathers), and on the other hand into the belief in the infallible authority of the great œcumenical councils from Nicæa onwards.²

In this way then the Church solved the problem as to the proof of doctrine, which had been so sharply formulated by the Gnostics. It is evident that the conditions of doctrinal development in the Catholic Church from Irenæus and Tertullian onward were very different from those of the charismatic post-apostolic Christianity. In the earlier age the source of doctrinal development had been either the free play of the mind of the Spirit, as is illustrated in Ignatius, or else the free exercise of reason, as is exemplified in the Apologists: the check of authority (the incipient creed, the incipient canon, tradition in general) was only very slightly felt. From Irenæus onwards, however, we have instead the endeavour rationally to systematize and comprehend a solid body of authoritative tradition, and as a consequence in the ensuing Catholic doctrine a more or less marked opposition of authority and reason. As, however, the exact relation between authority and reason varies from one theologian to another, any detailed study of this subject is best left to the following sections which deal in turn with the different doctors of the Ancient Church.

¹ Cf. Harnack, D.G.⁴, II. 87 ff.

² *Ibid.* 91 ff.

CHAPTER II

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE GREEK THEOLOGY

§ 1. IRENÆUS

IRENÆUS (*ob. c.* 200 A.D.) is in every way the founder of the Greek system of theology, alike in principles, method, and matter. We have already seen how in opposition to the Gnostics he appealed to the Creed, the New Testament Scriptures, and the bishops of the Apostolic Churches. His theological method follows from this establishment of principles, but introduces a further point of view, in that it determines the way in which these norms of doctrine are to be applied in theology.

Irenæus starts first of all from the creed, taken in the sense of Catholic tradition ("Adv. Haer." III. 4, 1). He then proceeds to prove it point by point from the New Testament Scriptures, at the same time both refuting Gnostic perversions of the truth, and expanding the brief statements of the creed into a fuller theology, partly indeed derived from the Scripture proofs adduced, but partly going beyond the text of Scripture and developed upon its basis in original theological views of his own. Of these views Irenæus himself has nowhere given a single comprehensive statement, showing how they are finally to be joined together. They have indeed a strong family resemblance, and are almost even as they stand parts of a system. But they just fall short of absolute systematic unity. For one thing, we find the same theological view repeated again and again, yet

with slight differences. For another, some links needful to a complete system are wanting. The reason is that the argument of Irenæus is determined primarily not so much by the direct endeavour to expand the creed into a theology, as by the attempt upon the basis of it and of the Scriptures to refute the Gnostics. The presentation of his own theology therefore tends to follow the form of the doctrines refuted rather than to take its own natural lines. Nevertheless Irenæus is so much a theologian by nature, and so naturally inclined to see the whole in the parts, and the parts through the whole, that in spite of all we almost have a system in the end. It is to be observed, however, that the following account of his doctrine of the work of Christ represents a considerable systematization of the material, although that material falls naturally into the arrangement adopted.

We find, in fact, in Irenæus the threefold type of doctrine which we have already noted as characteristic of the Ancient Catholic Church. Moreover, its outlines are much more firmly drawn in his theology than in that of the previous age.

(1) In the first place then Christ appears, just as in the doctrine of the Apologists, as the Incarnate Logos, who brings to men the knowledge of God and of His law and the promise of immortality.

“By this means the immeasurable and inapprehensible and invisible God gave Himself to the faithful, being seen and apprehended and measured, that He might give life to those who received Him and saw Him through faith.”¹

“The manifestation of the Father, which is through the Word, gives life to those who see God.”²

“The Son is the measure of the Father, since He also contains Him.”³

¹ “Adv. Hær.” iv. 20, 5.

² *Ibid.* 20, 7.

³ *Ibid.* 4, 2.

Irenæus, however, has developed the doctrine of the revelation of God by the Logos in such a form as to distinguish more effectively than the Apologists had been able between the different stages of the revelation in nature, in the Old Testament, and in the New Testament. This part of his doctrine is of the greatest importance. Not only did it overcome the Gnostic separation of the Creator from the Redeemer and the Gnostic criticism of the Old Testament, but it also laid the foundations for all further theological development.

Irenæus distinguishes three covenants :—

(a) The first was that of the original law of nature, which included the love of God and of our neighbour, and was essentially one with the content of the decalogue.¹

(b) This law was renewed and embodied in a positive form in the decalogue, to which, however, on account of the sensuous nature of the people of Israel, the ceremonial precepts of the Jewish law were added. "They received a servitude suitable to their lust, not indeed separating them from God, but governing them by the yoke of slavery."² Under this covenant, however, the prophets foretold the Advent of Christ and the final revelation of God in Him.³

(c) In the third covenant Christ has renewed the original moral law of love.⁴ The symbols of the Old Testament are done away in Christ, but not the moral law. This covenant is related to that of the Old Testament as freedom to bondage, and as fulfilment to prophecy. It is, however, not merely a renewal of the moral law of love, but adds to the natural law a fresh law of faith. Christians in fact have a severer law to obey than Jews ; for they have more to believe. They have not

¹ "Adv. Hær." 13, 4.

³ *Ibid.* 23, 1.

² *Ibid.* 15, 1.

⁴ *Ibid.* 12, 2, 5.

only to believe in God the Father, but also in the Son, who has now appeared.¹

It is to be observed that Irenæus in all this not only opposes the Gnostics, but also corrects the Apologists. It is made clear that the Incarnation did not merely confirm an existing revelation, but brought a further revelation beyond that of nature.

(2) If Irenæus in the doctrine of revelation is constructive of foundations for the future, he is even more so in what is as much his own central doctrine, as it is that of the Greek theology in general, viz. the doctrine of the destruction of death and the communication to humanity of immortality by the Incarnation. We come here to the famous Irenæan doctrine of Recapitulation (*ἀνακεφαλαίωσις*). The conception is that of Christ as the Second Adam, or second head of humanity, who not only undoes the consequences of Adam's fall, but also takes up the development of humanity broken off in him, and carries it to completion, i.e. to union with God and consequent immortality.

The general outlines of the idea are defined in III. 13, 7: "It was God recapitulating the ancient creation of man in Himself, that He might slay sin, and annul death, and give life to man". Also III. 18, 1: "The Son of God, when He was incarnate and was made man, recapitulated in Himself the long line of men, giving us salvation compendiously (*in compendio*), so that what we had lost in Adam, viz. that we should be after the image and similitude of God, this we should receive in Jesus Christ".

Absolutely fundamental to Irenæus is the notion of humanity as an organism into which Christ enters, and in which all that He is and all that He does are as a leaven permeating the mass. Hence He gives us by

¹ "Adv. Hær." 28, 2.

His presence in humanity salvation *in compendio*. He Himself is *Salus, et salvator, et salutare* (III. 10, 3).

We must now, however, examine more in detail the two aspects of the *recapitulatio*. There is on the one hand the undoing of the consequences of Adam's fall, and on the other hand the communication to humanity of immortal life.

(a) We shall consider first the latter aspect, which is the more fundamental of the two. Christ by His very Incarnation communicates immortal life to our corruptible humanity. Here we meet with the conception of "deification," so characteristic of the Greek theology. Its strict meaning is not that man is made God, but rather that he is made Divine, or a participator of immortality. Compare the following passages: "Unless man had been united to God, he could not have been made partaker of incorruptibility" (III. 18, 7).

"For in no other way could we receive incorruption and immortality, except first we had been united to incorruption and immortality" (III. 19, 1). This deification then was the purpose of the Incarnation.

"Jesus Christ because of His immeasurable love was made what we are, that He might make us completely what He is" (v. Præf.).

"How could we be joined to incorruption and immortality, unless first incorruption and immortality had become what we were, so that the corruptible might be swallowed up by incorruption, and the mortal by immortality, that we might receive the adoption of sons?" (III. 19, 1).

Irenæus, however, by no means thinks only of a "physical" redemption; he thinks of the gift of immortality as included in the gift of life in a wider sense. "Life" also involves the knowledge of God. For the close association of the knowledge of God with im-

mortality, cf. iv. 36, 7: "The knowledge of the Son of God, which is incorruption". Cf. also iv. 20, 2: "That in the flesh of our Lord that light of the Father may meet us, and from His ruddy flesh may come to us, and thus man may attain to incorruption, surrounded with the light of the Father".

So also Irenæus like Ignatius¹ thinks of Christ as bringing life to the Old Testament saints by His descent into Hades, when He preached to them the Gospel and manifested Himself to them (iv. 22, 1).

But again the gift of life through the Incarnation has an ethical aspect. The notion of the ethical renewal of humanity by the Incarnation is not so clearly developed by Irenæus. It appears, however, in the famous passage (ii. 22, 4): "He came to save all through Himself: all, I say, who through Him are renewed unto God, infants, and little children, and boys and young men and older men. Therefore He passed through every age, and was made an infant for infants, sanctifying infants: among the little ones He was made a little one, sanctifying those having this very age, and at the same time being made an example to them of piety and righteousness and obedience: among young men He was made a young man, becoming an example to young men, and sanctifying them to the Lord. So also He was made an older man among the older men, that He may be the perfect master in all things, not only according to the exposition of the truth, but also according to the condition of age, thus also sanctifying equally those who are older, becoming an example to them also: finally He came even to death, that He may be the first-born from the dead, Himself holding the primacy in all things, the prince of life, first of all, and before all."

¹ "Magn." ix. 3; cf. also Justin, "Dial." 72.

In connexion with the above passage there are two things to be noted. The first is that the notion of moral renewal which it contains is naturally connected not merely with the Incarnation itself, but with all the subsequent stages of the life of Christ. The second is that it very readily passes over simply into the idea of example. The fact that Irenæus, however, includes the case of infancy in the list of the sanctifying effects of the Incarnation shows that his idea is not merely that of example; as does also the mention of Christ's resurrection at the close of the list. Neither Christ's infancy nor His resurrection can sanctify by example, but only in some more occult and mysterious way.

(b) We pass on to the second aspect of the idea of Recapitulation, viz. that Christ makes good Adam's fall. This Irenæus connects first of all with the temptation. Christ's victory here over the devil involves the victory over him of the human race. His obedience undoes the effects of Adam's disobedience.

Cf. v. 21, 2 (In the temptation) "the transgression of the commandment, which had taken place in Adam, was paid for (*soluta*) by the commandment of the law, which the Son of man kept, not transgressing the commandment of God."

But the death of Christ also is an act of obedience, which counteracts the transgression of Adam, and reconciles men to God.

"In the first Adam we had offended God, not doing His commandment; but in the second Adam we were reconciled, being made obedient unto death. For we were debtors to no other, but to Him, whose precept we had transgressed from the beginning" (v. 16, 3).

"For this reason in the last times the Lord restored us to friendship with God by His Incarnation, being made a mediator between God and man: on the one

hand propitiating on our behalf the Father against whom we had sinned, and having mitigated (*consolatus*) our disobedience by His obedience; on the other hand giving us intercourse with our Maker and obedience" (v. 17, 1).

In this connexion the recapitulation theory is worked out into curious parallels between the tree by which Adam fell, and the tree by which Christ has redeemed us (v. 16, 3; v. 17, 3, 4), and again between Eve and Mary.

"What the virgin Eve bound by means of incredulity, this the virgin Mary loosed by faith" (III. 22, 4).

Fantastic as these parallels appear upon the surface, they nevertheless reflect clearly an important thought of Irenæus, viz. that the work of Christ was the exact undoing of the sin of Adam.

(3) This leads us to the last point of view from which Irenæus treats the work of Christ, that is the legal. Irenæus recognizes a claim which must be settled before man can be freed. This view is on the one hand expressed as an aspect of the doctrine that Christ by His death undoes the sin of Adam, and has accordingly been met with already in the passages above quoted, where it is said that Christ reconciles us to the Father, by atoning in His death for Adam's transgression. The legal aspect of the work of Christ is, however, much more fully developed by Irenæus in the form of a doctrine of redemption from the devil. To this doctrine we now therefore in the next place turn.

Irenæus teaches that, though the devil had at the first unjustly acquired dominion over the human race, yet it befitted God to deal with him by persuasion rather than by force.

Cf. v. 1, 1: "The Word of God, mighty in all things, and not lacking in His justice, acted justly even

against the Apostasy itself, redeeming from it those things which are His own, not by force, as the Apostasy gained possession of us at the beginning, insatiably seizing what was not its own, but by persuasion, even as it was fit that God should by persuasion and without employing force receive what He wished ; so that neither the law of justice should be broken, nor the ancient creation of God perish ”.

Christ therefore “reasonably redeeming us with His blood, gave Himself as a ransom for those who had been led into captivity” (v. 1, 1). In this method of redemption there is a display both of justice and mercy.

“As regards the Apostasy, justly redeeming us from it by His blood ; as regards us, who were redeemed, kindly” (v. 2, 1).

Such then are those main lines of the doctrine of Irenæus, which, however, not infrequently pass over into one another. We may, before we conclude our account of his theology, refer to a great passage in which Irenæus reflects upon the necessity of both the divinity and the humanity of Christ for the work of redemption.

“He united therefore, as we said before, man to God. For unless man had vanquished the adversary of man, the enemy would not have been justly vanquished ; and again, unless God had granted us salvation, we should not have had it securely, and unless man had been united to God, he could not have been partaker of incorruption” (III. 18, 7). Here we come upon the very nerve of the doctrine of Irenæus. Christ must be God to deify man, man to overcome man’s enemy.

The above passage brings closely together the doctrine of redemption from the devil and that of the communication of immortality, just as the phrase previously quoted, “the knowledge of the Son of God, which is immortality,”

brings together the communication of immortality and the bringing of knowledge. The ultimate unity of the different lines of Irenæan doctrine is, however, practical. In so far as Christianity is on the one hand the gift of immortality and on the other hand the forgiveness of sins (reconciliation with God) or redemption from the devil, it is a religion of grace. But the grace is only for those who keep the law. By faith and baptism all the blessings of salvation are secured to the Christian : there remains the task of a life under the new law of Christ, of which these blessings are the final reward. Thus the standpoint of grace in practice alternates with the standpoint of law. In spite of the attempts of Irenæus to conceive the recapitulation as the communication of an ethical life to mankind, it is not subjectively realized as an ethical regeneration in the life of the individual in virtue of which he spontaneously keeps the law. Moreover, the experience of forgiveness is restricted to the washing away of previous sin at baptism.

For the above account of the practical aspect of the teaching of Irenæus, I may refer to Werner, "*Der Paulinismus des Irenæus*," 1889, pp. 202 ff. It may be observed that in his practical attitude, just as in his conception of the work of Christ, Irenæus both sums up the post-apostolic age, and is typical of the Greek Christianity of the future. From the beginning in the primitive Gentile Church, where Christianity was regarded as the knowledge of God and the law and the promise of immortality, the practical understanding of it was essentially the same as that of Irenæus. Baptism was held to assure or communicate the gift of immortality with the forgiveness of pre-baptismal sin : for the rest of his life the Christian was under the law.

Further communication of the gift of immortality

in the Eucharist¹ in no way alters the legal relation to God. Only the Gnostics and Marcion endeavoured to understand Christianity entirely as a religion of grace. But as to this end they undermined the authority of the Old Testament and so discredited themselves, their procedure did but serve to strengthen the general apprehension of Christianity as law.

The above statement of the practical Christianity of Irenæus then serves to supplement his theoretical doctrine of the work of Christ and enables us to understand its true import. At this point, however, some questions of the greatest importance emerge. Irenæus undertook to build his theology upon the threefold basis of the creed, the Scriptures, and tradition. What now is the relation to these doctrinal standards of his teaching on the work of Christ?

It is clear that the Creed is not the source of this doctrine, any further than that it emphasizes the historical facts which Irenæus evaluates. Tradition is a positive source of the doctrine in so far as it develops the ideas of the Apostolic Fathers, especially Ignatius, and of Justin. Loofs has called this particular tradition "the tradition of Asia Minor". But what is the relation of the doctrine of Irenæus to the Scriptures? The Old Testament is for him as for the Apostolic Fathers and the Apologists the foundation of monotheism. The New Testament, however, has supplied Irenæus with his doctrinal proofs and his means of expanding the creed and tradition. We proceed then to examine the relation of the doctrine of Irenæus to the New Testament.

In the first place, his doctrine of the work of Christ as revelation is more Johannine than that of the Apologists. Irenæus gives prominence to the fresh revelation

¹ φάρμακον ἀθανασίας, ἀντίδοτος τοῦ μὴ ἀποθανεῖν. Ign. "Eph." xx. 2; cf. the similar ideas in Irenæus, "Adv. Hær." iv. 18, 5.

of God brought by the Incarnation. Moreover, in him the moralism of the Apologists is to some extent qualified by the Johannine mysticism.

As regards the Recapitulation doctrine this is undoubtedly Pauline in origin. In Eph. i. 10 we have already a pregnant use of the word ἀνακεφαλαιόω, which at least suggests the Irenæan conception of ἀνακεφαλαιώσις. From Paul comes the opposition of the first and second Adam, of the destroying disobedience of the one, and the saving obedience of the other. In Paul's conception of salvation as union with Christ in His death and resurrection we have the idea of salvation as a victory over death and an establishment of eternal life, both already given in principle in Christ and imparted by faith and baptism to the Christian.¹ It is, however, a development which carries us beyond the Pauline doctrine, when Irenæus goes back behind Christ's death and resurrection and views salvation as already given in the Incarnation itself. Harnack speaks of an amalgamation here of the Pauline gnosis of the Cross with a gnosis of the Incarnation.² The new idea so characteristic of Irenæus and after him of the Greek theology is given in the sentence already quoted: "Jesus Christ . . . was made what we are that He might make us completely what He is".³ We have certainly an anticipation of this point of view in the isolated Pauline passage 2 Cor. viii. 9. But the idea that salvation is already given in the Incarnation is fundamentally Johannine,⁴ only that where John interprets the idea through an intellectualistic mysticism,⁵ Irenæus, while not without this interpretation, in the main like Paul in Rom. vi. 1 ff., is realistic. The Incarnation is thought of as a ferment in humanity which leavens it with incorruption and immortality.

¹ Rom. vi. 1 ff.

² D.G. i. 4, p. 561, n. 1.

³ V. Præf.

⁴ Jn. i. 1-18; 1 Jn. i. 1-4.

⁵ *Ibid.* xvii. 3.

Finally, as regards the Irenæan doctrine of the death of Christ as ransom, the Pauline origin of this has already been fixed in our discussion on Marcion.

In view of the above statements, it may seem strange to find that Werner totally denies that the Christianity of Irenæus is a genuine development of Paulinism. According to him Irenæus, though perpetually quoting Paul, has nothing of his spirit. "This Irenæan doctrine of salvation, however frequently it appears to be punctuated with Paulinisms . . . nevertheless is in its entire character pseudo-Pauline."¹ Werner's view turns partly on the way in which the centre of gravity of the theology of Irenæus is displaced from the cross to the Incarnation, partly on the difference in practical attitude between Paul and Irenæus.

"The positive blessing of salvation consists (for Irenæus) not in the believing trust of the heart upon God, but in the hyperphysical transformation of human nature as a preparation for immortality. We become not God's, but God. Salvation is in consequence not full possession in the present, but an earnest of and preparation for the fulfilment in the future. The possession of salvation is not the source of morality, but good works are the pre-condition of receiving the gift of salvation : the morality (of Irenæus) is therefore not a religious but a self-active morality" (p. 212).

Werner's verdict that the doctrine of Irenæus is pseudo-Pauline thus involves two points:—

(1) His doctrine is gnosis of the Incarnation, not of the cross, and his conception of salvation is not the blessedness of trust in God, but deification. The centre of the Irenæan theology is certainly not the doctrine of the revelation of God's love in the cross making its appeal to human trust,² that Pauline doctrine which

¹ Op. cit. p. 211.

² 2 Cor. v. 19.

was central for Luther. But the doctrine of Irenæus that salvation is the communication of immortal life and the destruction of death, both given in Christ's death and appropriated to the believer by faith and baptism, is a Pauline doctrine. Only the retrogression to the Incarnation as itself containing the whole salvation is not Pauline, but Johannine.

It is, however, true that as regards the doctrine of the communication of life to the Christian through Christ, whereas in Paul's doctrine of union with Christ "life" means equally immortality, righteousness, and the spirit of sonship,¹ in Irenæus the stress falls most of all, though by no means exclusively, upon the hyperphysical element of immortality. Loofs speaks of an abbreviation of the tradition of Asia Minor as taking place in Irenæus, i.e. of a tendency to narrow down the Pauline-Johannine tradition received through Ignatius and Justin:² the process of abbreviation is, however, already begun in Ignatius and Justin. The tendency to lay the chief stress on the gift of incorruption rather than on the gifts of righteousness or of faith (trust in God) marks the change experienced by Christianity in passing over from a Jewish to a Greek soil. From the very beginning of the Greek religion death is the object of a supreme fear.³

"Without a doubt the thought of death commonly filled the ancestors of the Greeks also with the deepest dread. . . . Millenniums of enlightenment were not able to free the Greeks from this fear."

Due to the influence of Greek religious thought also is the identification of the communication of immortal-

¹ I.e. it is at once hyperphysical, ethical, and religious; cf. "Man, Sin, and Salvation," pp. 95-7, 123-8.

² D.G. I.⁴, p. 203, n. 2.

³ Cf. Chantepie de la Saussaye, "Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte," ³, II., pp. 258, 259.

ity with "deification".¹ In the history of Greek religion the idea of deification as union with the God and the impartation of immortality goes back to the religion of Dionysus.² Through the medium of Orphism it afterwards influenced Greek philosophy.³

(2) The second point in Werner's indictment of Irenæus amounts to this, that he has not the Pauline conception of justification as an abiding state of communion with God in which the believer rejoices in the forgiveness of sins and faith works by love. Here no doubt Irenæus misses the evangelical nerve of Paulinism, hence Werner's view that he has nothing of Paul's spirit. But it is only fair to add that Paul himself at times tends to regard the Christian as after baptism still under the law and awaiting a final justification after death.⁴ Still on the whole the practical Christianity of Irenæus, like that of the Apologists, is a moralism very different from the Pauline Christianity. Here again the influence of the Greek *milieu* makes itself felt. Compare what has been said before on the Apologists.

The Paulinism of Irenæus is then certainly not quite a pseudo-Paulinism, but still it is a Paulinism modified very considerably by Greek influences. It is only right, however, to recognize that the modification of Paul in the direction of Greek thought is already begun in the New Testament itself in the Johannine theology with its centre in the Incarnation as a manifestation of the Divine life and light, its tendency to interpret faith as knowledge, and its increased stress on the ethical over against the religious aspect of Christianity.⁵

¹ Jn. x. 35 and the late 2 Pet. i. 4 furnish points of contact in Scripture.

² Cf. my Essay, "The Idea of Salvation in the Theology of the Eastern Church," "Mansfield College Essays," 1909, p. 261.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 261-4; cf. Harnack, D.G. i. 4, p. 138 n.

⁴ "Man, Sin, and Salvation," pp. 128-9.

⁵ *Ibid.* pp. 172-9.

So much then for the relation of Irenæus to Paul and to the New Testament. The ultimate question, however, which is raised by the foregoing discussion is that of the interpretation of the New Testament as a standard of doctrine. The New Testament itself neither is nor contains a system of doctrine. It rather includes within itself a number of varying and even in a measure conflicting points of view, which the theologian is called upon in some way to unify. The theology of Paul, the fullest and most developed theology which it contains, alone includes many conflicting elements, to say nothing of further conflict between Paul and other New Testament writers.

One of the chief problems of theology therefore ever since the formation of the New Testament Canon, is the question of its doctrinal interpretation. The systematic theologian has to face the questions, which points of view in the New Testament are to be taken as fundamental, how the different elements within it are to be combined, in what hierarchy of principles they are to be arranged. From first to last since the fixing of the New Testament as a norm of doctrine, the Church has wrestled with this problem and different doctrinal systems have resulted from the different solutions which have been given of it.

We see that in this way in the new age of the Church beginning with Irenæus the old principle of doctrinal development under the guidance of the Spirit reasserts itself. The difference is that the sphere of the Spirit's operation is more closely defined.

§ 2. CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA

It is essentially the theology of Irenæus with its threefold view of the work of Christ, which finally

through Athanasius became dominant in the Eastern Church. Another influence, however, which helped to form the Greek theology was that of the school of Alexandria. We have here two theologians to consider, Clement and Origen.

Upon Clement (*ob. ante* A.D. 216) we may be brief, for his theological influence on posterity was only through his disciple Origen. It is Origen therefore who mainly concerns us.

As we have already seen, the theological position of Clement as regards the norms of doctrine was more archaic than that of Irenæus. The only fresh authority which Clement recognizes beyond those of primitive Christianity is the New Testament: the creed is not for him a doctrinal authority. He has therefore greater theological liberty than Irenæus, in so far as the New Testament is a less definite standard of doctrine than the creed. Moreover, though he repudiates Gnosticism so far as it is dualistic and so far as it refuses the authority of the Old Testament, yet he himself in his own way is a Gnostic, and recognizes an esoteric Christianity. He treats the common Christianity of the Church as a first stage (*Pistis*), to which the stage of *Gnosis* succeeds as a higher and completer Christianity.

(1) The former aspect is connected with the Incarnation. The Logos Incarnate brings the knowledge of God and of His law and of eternal life as the reward of obedience to the law. Such revelation is the ground of the common Christianity, which is a religion of fear. To this lower stage of Christianity belongs the forgiveness of sins. Christ, however, forgives sins as God: as man, He teaches us not to sin (*Pæd.* 1. 3, 7). Clement repeats the Christian tradition of the sacrifice of Christ without any inner appropriation.¹

¹ Cf. Seeberg, D.G. 1.², p. 399.

(2) The higher stage, however, is where the Logos reveals Himself inwardly to the heart not as man but as God. This higher revelation is mystical: it is not law, but grace, conferring the perfect freedom which obeys God spontaneously in love. At this higher stage the Incarnation ceases to have significance. "Love is not of Jesus, but of the Logos, the Ideal. Clement could not bear to think that the rose of Sharon could blossom on common soil."¹

Clement clearly has close affinity with the Apologists. Like them he regards not only the Old Testament, but also the philosophy of Greece as emanating from the Divine Logos. But he adds to their moralism the intellectualistic mysticism of the Gnostics. Where, however, the latter saw opposition and conflict between the religion of law and the religion of grace, Clement sees only a lower and a higher stage. Thus he overcomes the heretical gnosis by a Catholic gnosis.

The theology of Clement stands in sharp contrast with the realism of Irenæus. Bigg says of him (p. 75): "The idea of the Recapitulation of all men in Christ as the Second Adam, so fruitful in the brooding soul of Irenæus, is strange to him". He says indeed of Christ that "having taken on the character of man and having fashioned Himself in flesh He enacted the drama of salvation".² But he says again that "the Word of God became man, that thou mayest learn from man, how man may become God".³ The Incarnate Logos is for us a teacher and an example only.

§ 3. ORIGEN

Origen (*ob.* A.D. 254), Clement's disciple, is the first Christian theologian who (in his work "De

¹ Bigg, "The Christian Platonists of Alexandria," p. 93.

² Strom, 7. 2, 5.

³ Protrept I. 8.

Principiis ") deliberately sets out to form a system or body of Christian doctrine. This he proceeds to do by the development of the elements of Christian truth which compose the Rule of Faith. Origen's Rule of Faith, however, is not an actual creed, but rather an elementary statement (of his own) of the fundamentals of Apostolic Christianity, as believed by the Church. The author of the faith is Christ, the Logos, who speaks not only in the Incarnation, but in the Old Testament and the Apostles. From the elements of the Rule of Faith the body of truth is to be developed either by addition of fresh elements from Scripture, or of deduction from what is given.¹

Origen has devoted in "De Principiis," Book IV, particular attention to the method of Scripture proof. It is necessary in order to refute Jews and heretics to recognize in Scripture not only a literal, but also a moral and a spiritual sense. Sometimes even there is no literal sense. By means of observing the spiritual sense of Scripture it is possible to attain to the wisdom of the perfect.

Origen thus in his theology is prepared to carry out the programme of Clement and understand Christianity as a Pistis advancing to Gnosis.

What then are Origen's results as far as concerns the doctrine of the work of Christ? His doctrine takes two forms. There is first the treatment in the "De Principiis," which we must regard as primary. It is, however, very limited in extent, occurring only in one or two short passages of his treatise. But besides this strictly scientific treatment, there is also a more extended form of doctrine to be drawn from his commentaries on the Scripture.

(1) *The doctrine of the "De Principiis".* This is

¹ "De Principiis," præfatio.

virtually a repetition of Clement. In the first place Christ is for us in His Incarnation an example.

"On this account is Christ proposed for us as an example to all believers, because as He always, even before He knew evil at all, chose the good and loved righteousness, and hated iniquity and therefore God anointed Him with the oil of gladness; so also must each one, after a lapse or error, cleanse himself from stains, in view of His example, and taking Him as the guide of his journey, enter upon the steep way of virtue; that so perchance by this means, as far as possible, we may by imitating Him be made partakers of the Divine nature" (iv. 31).

Still even this is only living under the shadow of Christ. As our shadow repeats the movements of the body, so Christ's human soul repeats the movements of the Divine Word, and may be called His shadow. To imitate the human example of Christ is then to live under His shadow, and well befits this life of ours here in this world, which itself is a shadow. But beyond this life is one where there is no shadow, where we shall no longer live under the shadow of Christ, a state of things which the apostle anticipated through the Spirit when he said, "Yea, though we have known Christ after the flesh, yet now henceforth know we Him so no more".¹

And now in this view of things what place for the cross? By the imitation of the Divine Word or Wisdom we become wise or rational. But Christ meets also the weak by condescending to their weakness, and by being through weakness crucified.² Thus the doctrine of the cross remains as comfort for those who are not yet strong enough to avail themselves of Christ's example.

The general background of this doctrine of the work of Christ in the "*De Principiis*" is the view of the

¹ Cf. II. 6, 7 and 2 Cor. v. 16.

² Cf. iv. 31.

world as a place of discipline for fallen spirits: Origen held the fall to have taken place for each spirit in a state of pre-existence. In the present disciplinary state each spirit is subject to temptation from spirits worse than itself, especially the demons, but is helped by the example and influence of these better than itself. The Logos, who in His Incarnation has united Himself with a sinless human soul, appears as the Supreme Influence for good in a sinful world.

(2) From the doctrine of the "De Principiis" we pass on to the extended doctrine of the Commentaries on Scripture. It was the design of Origen to establish the Christian doctrine not only in systematic form, but also in the form of Scriptural exegesis. This form of treatment naturally brings his doctrine much nearer to the common ecclesiastical Christianity, since the letter of Scripture is not so constantly transmuted into its spiritual essence as in the "De Principiis". The work "Against Celsus" also comes in here, in so far as its presentation of Christianity runs parallel with that in the commentaries, and stands nearer to the popular Christianity than that of the "De Principiis". But the "De Principiis" helps us to see how the more extended doctrine is to be understood. For according to Origen the content of Scripture and the "De Principiis" is the same; as iv. 14 practically indicates. Primary therefore is the doctrine of the work of Christ as revelation, secondary the doctrine of the cross.

(a) The former doctrine does not receive much expansion beyond what we have already found in the "De Principiis". There is first the thought of Christ as Teacher, Lawgiver, and example. The Gospel which He brings is a teaching, distinct from the ceremonial of Judaism. It is spiritual and universal ("Con. Cels." vii. 26).

Origen distinguishes this "spiritual law" ("Con. Cels." v. 33) from the law of nature, as a law of faith ("In Rom." iv. 4). Its essential content is the knowledge of God, faith in Jesus as the Son of God, the following of His commandments in a virtuous life, and the promise of reward and punishment.¹ Besides this Christ is an example of virtue.² But as in the "De Principiis," it is taught that there is a point when the humanity of Jesus is transcended.

"Christ as flesh preaches the Gospel and calls to Himself those who are flesh, that He may first cause them to be transformed according to the Word made flesh, and after this may raise them to see Him as He was before He became flesh; so that they, receiving profit, and advancing beyond the preliminary teaching according to the flesh, may say, 'even if we have known Christ after the flesh, we now know Him so no more'."³

(b) The doctrine of the cross in the Commentaries and the work against Celsus. This takes a variety of forms.

(i) Christ overcomes the demons, who seduce and lead men astray, not only by His doctrine but by His death. According to the view of Origen the demons are in constant warfare with the Christian Church, and the Church is equally at war with the demons. Every triumph of the one constitutes a reverse of the other. Origen teaches, moreover, that in the deaths of the martyrs there is a mighty power which counteracts the dominion of the demons.⁴

A supreme instance of such victory over the forces of evil occurred when the demons crucified Christ. Origen supports his view of the demon-compelling power of our Lord's death by an appeal to the belief common

¹ "Con. Cels." v. 51-3; vii. 17, 48 f.; viii. 1, 51, 75.

² *Ibid.* viii. 17, 56.

³ *Ibid.* vi. 68.

⁴ *Ibid.* viii. 44.

in antiquity that innocent men by giving themselves up for the common weal have removed pestilences or other calamities from peoples or states.

Cf. "Con. Cels." I. 31 : "For it is probable that there is in the nature of things for certain mysterious reasons which are difficult to be understood by the multitude, such a virtue that one just man, dying a voluntary death for the common good, might be the means of removing wicked spirits, which are the cause of plagues, or distresses, or dangers to shipping, or similar calamities".

Cf. again "Con. Cels." VII. 17 : "There is nothing absurd in a man having died, and in his death being not only an example of death endured for the sake of piety, but also making a beginning and advance of the destruction of that evil spirit, the devil, who had obtained dominion over the whole world".

(ii) From this view it is not very far to that other which we find frequently in the commentaries of Origen and which continues a development already begun by Irenæus, viz. that the death of Christ was a ransom-price paid by God to the devil, who had acquired a claim to men through their sin, which claim, however, he lost by accepting as a ransom the death of Christ.

Cf. "In Rom." II. 13 : "If therefore we were bought with a price, as Paul also agrees, without doubt we were bought from some one, whose slaves we were, who also demanded what price he would, to let go from his power those whom he held. Now it was the devil who held us, to whom we had been sold by our sins. He demanded therefore as our price, the blood of Christ." Cf. also "In Exod." VI. 9.

So far the doctrine agrees with Irenæus. But Origen has developed further the conception of which we have hints in 1 Cor. II. 8 (a text continually upon his lips),

and again in Ignatius and Marcion (see above, p. 26), viz. that the devil was deceived in the transaction. Cf. "In Matt." XIII. 8, where 1 Cor. II. 8 is referred to. Above all cf. "In Matt." XVI. 8.

"But to whom did He give His soul as a ransom for many? Certainly not to God: why not then to the devil? For he had possession of us until there should be given to him the ransom for us, the soul of Jesus; though he was deceived by thinking that he could have dominion over it and did not see that he could not bear the torture caused by holding it."

Again on Ps. xxxv. (xxxiv.) 8, Origen says of the words "Let him fall into his own snare" as follows: "I think that he speaks of the cross, into which the devil in ignorance fell. For if he had known, he would not have crucified the Lord of Glory."

In another passage ("In Matt." XIII. 9), the deceit is directly ascribed to God, that the demons "might be laughed at by Him who dwells in the heavens, and might be ridiculed by the Lord, having received the Son from the Father unto the destruction of their own kingdom and rule contrary to their expectation".

It is noteworthy in view of subsequent developments that Origen sometimes substitutes death for the devil. So in the continuation of the previous quotation ("In Matt." XVI. 8), it is said that since the devil could not hold the soul of Christ "death also that thought to have dominion over Him, has dominion no more, He being free among the dead and stronger than the power of death". So again in another passage ("In Matt." XIII. 9) we have the words, "his enemy death being brought to nought".

(iii) Origen has also the idea of a sacrifice to God. Bigg¹ and Harnack² point out that he is the first theo-

¹ "Christian Platonists," p. 210.

² D.G. I.⁴, 682, n. 3.

logian since Paul with a developed doctrine of sacrifice. In this he is epoch-making.¹

Thus Origen writes: "If there had not been sin, it had not been necessary for the Son of God to become a lamb, nor had need been that He, having become incarnate, should be slaughtered, but He would have remained what He was, God the Word; but since sin entered into this world, whilst the necessity of sin requires a propitiation, and a propitiation is not made but by a victim, it was necessary that a victim should be provided for sin".²

Cf. also "In Lev." I. 2; III. 1, and especially "In Joh." XXVIII. 14: "This man, purer than any living being, died on behalf of the people, who bore our sins and infirmities, since He was able to take upon Himself the sin of the whole world and to undo and to dissipate it and make it disappear, because he did no sin".

Origen says that sin necessarily requires a propitiation, but he nowhere deduces the necessity of the propitiation from the righteousness of God. He comes nearest to doing so "In Rom." III. 7, 8, but does not actually reach this idea.³ Nor again does Origen's explanation of the nature of the propitiation lie in the idea of a satisfaction to God, but rather in the mysterious cleansing power of the shed blood of sacrifice. Cf. "In Rom." III. 8 where he quotes Heb. ix. 22. He says, however,⁴ "the death which is inflicted for sin by way of punishment is the cleansing of the very sin for which it is commanded to be inflicted. The sin therefore is remitted by the penalty of death." This reminds one of Paul's doctrine in Rom. vi. 7.

The idea of substitutionary suffering also is quite undeveloped in Origen. He often, however, speaks of

¹ Cf. Harnack, D.G. II. 4, p. 177.

² "In Num." xxiv. 1.

³ Cf. Baur, "Die Christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung," p. 61, n. 1.

⁴ "In Lev." xiv. 4.

Jesus as having suffered for man ; and in one place ("In Lev." I. 3) he says, "He placed the sins of the human race upon His head. For He Himself is the head of the body which is His Church." This passage at least suggests that the explanation of the possibility of the substitution lies in the peculiar relation of Christ to His people.

Such then is Origen's extended and developed doctrine of the cross. There is no doubt that the cross meant much to Origen. On the other hand there is also no doubt that in the end it is a doctrine belonging only to the lower stage of Christianity. This is not merely to be proved by a reference to the essential doctrine of the "De Principiis": the commentaries and the work "Against Celsus," in spite of their emphasis on the cross, leave us no doubt on the point.

Cf. "Con. Cels." III. 62: "God the Word was sent as a physician to sinners, but as a teacher of the Divine mysteries to those already pure and no longer sinning".

Also cf. "In 1 Joh." I. 22: "Blessed are they, as many as needing the Son of God have become such as no longer need Him as a physician healing those who are ill, nor as a shepherd, nor as redemption, but as wisdom and word and righteousness, or anything else to those who through perfection can receive of Him what is best".

The ultimate tendency of the doctrine of Origen both in its systematic and essential, and also in its extended and Scriptural form remains the same as with Clement. The practical difference between the two is that Origen is less confident than Clement of the ability of the individual to attain in this life to the higher or Gnostic stage.¹

It is important to observe the exact relation of the

¹ Cf. Bigg, op. cit. p. 210.

different elements of the Origenistic to those of the Irenæan doctrine.

(1) Common to both is the idea of Christ as the Teacher and Lawgiver. But with Origen this belongs to the first stage of Christianity only, with Irenæus it is never in this life transcended.

(2) Common to both is the view of the first forgiveness of sins in baptism, based upon redemption from the devil or sacrifice to God.¹ This is for both systems the necessary preparation for a life under the law.

(3) The difference is in the doctrine of the communication of immortality or deification. With Irenæus this is, in spite of such Johannine passages as "the knowledge of the Son of God, which is incorruption" (above, p. 39), in the main realistically conceived as communicated to humanity by the Incarnation. Along with forgiveness this gift of immortality then forms the grace sacramentally conveyed to the individual at baptism, while at the same time it remains the ultimate goal of Christian obedience. Origen on the other hand, following Clement, spiritualizes deification into the indwelling of the Logos in the individual Christian, which belongs to the higher or Gnostic stage of Christianity, which is a life beyond the law, but which is brought about through the teaching and example of Jesus. Origen, as Loofs says, could not ignore the doctrine of physical redemption, but he has spiritualized it away.² What the union of the Divine and human in the person of Jesus meant for him is made clear by the following passage :—³

"Both Jesus Himself and His disciples desired that His adherents should not merely believe in His Godhead and miracles, as if He had not also been a

¹ Cf. Bigg, *op. cit.* p. 211, n.

² D.G. I. 4, p. 203.

³ "Con. Cels." III. 28.

partaker of human nature, and had not assumed the human flesh which lusteth against the spirit ; but they saw also that the Power which had descended into human nature, and into the midst of human circumstances, and which had assumed a human soul and body, contributed by being believed in, along with things yet more Divine, to the salvation of believers, who see that from Him there began the union of the Divine with the human nature, in order that the human by communion with the Divine might become Divine, not in Jesus only, but in all those who not only believe, but also enter upon the life which Jesus taught, and which elevates to friendship with God and communion with Him everyone who lives according to the precepts of Jesus."

Here deification is conceived, not as essentially the impartation of a hyperphysical gift of immortality, but rather as the union of the Logos with the humanity of Jesus which repeats itself in the religious and moral life of each of His true disciples. It is noteworthy in this connexion that Origen (following Clement), while retaining in his popular teaching realistic views of the Eucharist like those of Ignatius and Irenæus, in his doctrine for the initiated altogether spiritualizes this sacrament into a symbol of the inner gift of the Logos.¹

Such then is the relation of the theology of Origen to that of Irenæus. Origen's influence on the following age was not through his aim, which was rejected, but through his actual development of doctrine. While in general the Irenæan and not the Origenistic scheme prevailed, yet the Greek theology enriched itself from the abundant stores of Origen, especially from his commentaries. Hence may be understood the words of Harnack : "One must say in general that Origen has helped to

¹ Cf. Rauschen, "Eucharistie und Busssakrament in den ersten sechs Jahrhunderten der Kirche," 1908, pp. 7-10.

trail into the Church an abundance of ancient (heathen) notions with reference to expiation and redemption, always finding some Biblical passages or other with which to connect them".¹ The idea of the mysterious demon-compelling power of sacrifice is certainly a legacy from the ancient Greek (Chthonian) religion. Compare again my Essay, "The Idea of Salvation in the Theology of the Eastern Church".²

It is only right, however, to measure Origen not by his actual results, but by his aim. When we do this, there is no doubt that Origen, like Clement before him, has in his own way reproduced in his doctrine of the Christian Gnostic, the spirit of evangelical freedom from the law, which is altogether lost by Irenæus and is not found again so clearly expressed till we come to Luther.³

¹ D.G. I.⁴, p. 683, n.

² "Mansfield College Essays," p. 262.

³ The Christian Gnosticism of Clement and Origen has a contemporary pagan parallel in the Neoplatonism of Plotinus (A.D. 205-270), which, along with the also contemporary Manichæism of Mani (A.D. *ob.* 276), deserves brief notice here, inasmuch as each of these systems later touches our subject at important points (*v. infra*, pp. 115, 264, Vol. II, p. 196). The Neoplatonic doctrine of salvation exhibits three stages of progressive deliverance from the world: (1) purification of the senses by virtue; (2) participation in the *νοῦς* or Divine Reason; (3) union through ecstasy with the Transcendent Source of Being, of which the *νοῦς* is only the first emanation, intermediate between It and the world. As far as the second stage there is general agreement with the Alexandrian Gnosis: the third stage, however, goes beyond it. Clement and Origen were not mystics to this degree (*cf.* Bigg, *op. cit.* p. 99, n. 1). The resemblance of Manichæism is not to the new Catholic, but to the old heretical Gnosis (*supra*, p. 22 ff.). There are two ultimate principles, Light (good) and Darkness (evil), from whose mixture the world and man originate. The redemption of man is through knowledge and asceticism: hereby the elements of light in him are delivered from their dark prison.

CHAPTER III

THE LATER GREEK THEOLOGY

§ 1. ATHANASIUS

FROM Athanasius (*ob.* 373 A.D.) comes the first complete and systematic treatment of the doctrine of the work of Christ. In the case of Irenæus we had to gather our material from a series of different presentations in the work "Against Heresies". In that of Origen we had to supplement the very brief treatment of the subject in the "De Principiis" by a survey of the doctrine of the commentaries and the "Contra Celsum". Athanasius, however, has devoted a special treatise to the subject of the work of Christ. In his "De Incarnatione," written in his earlier years before the outbreak of the Arian controversy, he shows the necessity of the Incarnation of the Word, by means of a doctrinal statement which stands alone in the Early Church for completeness and clearness. It is based, certainly with modifications and developments, on the doctrine of Irenæus, but Athanasius has also appropriated further Pauline elements left unused by Irenæus. The idea of recapitulation, moreover, ceases to dominate the theological situation in the way that it does with Irenæus. What Athanasius retains from him is rather the conception of the deification of humanity through the Incarnation.

"It is a closely reasoned process of thought (*einstraffer Gedankengang*) which Athanasius develops."¹

¹ Kattenbusch, "Lehrbuch der Vergleichenden Confessionskunde," 1892, p. 297.

Starting from the assumption of the existence of God, and of the activity of the Logos in creation and providence, Athanasius proposes to unfold the doctrine of the Incarnation (1. 1).

The doctrine of the Incarnation presupposes the doctrine of creation. Man's redemption by the Word fitly follows upon his creation by the Word (1. 4). God in His goodness made man by the Word, and has distinguished him above all other created beings in further endowing him with the Logos, thus making him rational and putting him who was naturally corruptible in the way to incorruption (3. 3). But God made the retention of the Logos and the promise of immortality involved in it consequent upon man's obedience to a law, the command given in paradise (3. 4). Man, however, transgressed this law and forfeited both the Logos and the hope of incorruption. Death now reigned over him as a king (4. 4), having in addition to its natural power over men the additional hold given by the Divine commandment with its threat of death to the transgressor (5. 2).

Here then was an unseemly state of things (6. 2). On the one hand God's threat could not remain unexecuted without making Him false (6. 3). Yet on the other it was unseemly that man whom God had made rational and destined for incorruption should perish (6. 4). Neither the deceit of the devil (6. 5), nor the folly of man (6. 6), ought to avail to undo God's purpose.

What then was God to do? To demand repentance. Man's repentance might undo his transgression (7. 2). But it would fail, firstly, to guard what was reasonable with regard to God (*τὸ εὐλογον τὸ πρὸς τὸν θεόν*) (7. 3); and, secondly, it would not call man back from corruption (7. 4). These two things could only be achieved by the Logos, who alone was able to recreate everything, and

was worthy to suffer on behalf of all, and to be the ambassador of all with the Father (7. 5). In His love to men, therefore, the Logos undertook both tasks, and for this purpose assumed a body like our own (8. 1, 2).

This, moreover, in His loving kindness He gave over to death in the stead of all, and offered it to the Father ; (1) that all being held to have died in Him, the law involving the ruin of men might be undone, its power having been spent in the Lord's body, and having no longer holding ground against men His peers ; (2) that by the appropriation of His body and by the grace of the Resurrection He might quicken men to incorruption (8. 4).

The Word did this, perceiving that the corruption of men could no otherwise be undone except by death as a necessary condition. In offering His own body He offered an equivalent (*ἡφάνιζε τὸν θάνατον τῇ προσφορᾷ τοῦ καταλλήλου*) (9. 1) ; and He satisfied the debt by His death (*ἐπλήρου τὸ ὀφειλόμενον ἐν τῷ θανάτῳ*) (9. 2).

Moreover, the quickening of mankind begins with the Incarnation itself, though only in so far as this is the guarantee of the subsequent Death and Resurrection of the Lord.

"The Incorruptible Son of God, being conjoined with all by a like nature, naturally clothed all with incorruption by the promise of the Resurrection. . . . For now that He has come to our realm, and taken up His abode in one body among His peers, henceforth the whole conspiracy of the enemy against mankind is checked and the corruption of death, which before was prevailing against them, is done away. For the race of men had gone to ruin, had not the Lord and Saviour of all come among us to meet the end of death " (9. 2, 4).

Such a work was peculiarly suitable to the goodness of God, who had created man (10. 1). As Scriptural

proofs are advanced 2 Cor. v. 14, Heb. II. 9 f., 1 Cor. xv. 21 f. (10. 2-5).

There was, however, a second reason for the Incarnation. God, knowing that man in his weakness was not sufficient to know Him, made him in the image of the Word, that so, perceiving the Word, he might know the Father (11. 1-3). However, man despised this knowledge and fell into the superstition of idolatry and magic (11. 4-7). While the grace of the Divine image was itself enough to make known the Word and so the Father, God in His mercy to the weakness of man manifested Himself further in the creation, and then through the law and the prophets (12. 1, 2). Nor was the law for the Jews alone, nor yet the prophets ; but these latter, sent to the Jews, and persecuted by them, were a school of the true knowledge of God for the whole world (12. 5). Nevertheless men were still seduced by sense and the demons (12. 6). Therefore God to renew in man the grace of His image sent His Image Himself, the Word, to recreate man afresh after the image (13. 7). Athanasius refers to Luke XIX. 10. It was not sufficient that the Word should be manifested in the creation (14. 7). This manifestation had failed. Therefore the Word became incarnate, that those who would not know Him from His providence in the creation, "may even from the works done by His actual body know the Word of God who is in the body, and through Him the Father" (14. 8). Athanasius quotes 1 Cor. I. 21 (15. 1).

Thus the Word met all man's errors : whether man was induced to worship nature, man, the demons, or the dead, He showed by His miracles His power over all these (15. 3-7). Moreover, seeing that man had fallen to things of sense, He met him here also, attracting their senses to Himself as man, showing by His miracles that

He is God the Word (16. 1). Hence on coming into the world He did not immediately accomplish His sacrifice, but first did His miraculous works (16. 4). Christ's very birth from a virgin was the beginning of His miracles (18. 5). Moreover, even at His death on the Cross He showed His miraculous power in the eclipse of the sun and the earthquake (19. 3). By this transition Athanasius returns to the subject of Christ's death, which "is the sum of our faith" (19. 4). He apologizes for repetition ; but in expounding the counsel of God it is better to incur the charge of repetition than to leave anything out (20. 3). He seeks now to show that the manner of Christ's death was the fittest possible. The most important point is that in accepting an ignominious death at the hands of His enemies, He all the more showed His triumph over death (24. 2, 3). Besides, in dying on the cross (1) He bore the curse for us,¹ since such a death is accursed ;² (2) on it He held out His hands to unite Jews and Gentiles ;³ finally, by dying in the air He cleared the air of evil spirits,⁴ and prepared the way for us to heaven.⁵ That death is destroyed and that the cross is the victory over it, is shown by the faith and constancy of the martyrs, who now no longer fear death (27-29).

Moreover, the Risen Christ shows His power in the conversion of multitudes in all lands (30. 4), and in destroying the power of idols and of witchcraft (31. 2).

In chaps. 33-40 Athanasius now produces Old Testament proofs of the Incarnation against the Jews, and then in chaps. 41-55 rational proofs of it against the Greeks. The latter largely embrace the ground already covered.

Finally, he describes his treatise as a rudimentary sketch and outline in brief compass of the faith concern-

¹ Gal. III. 13.

² Dt. XXI. 23.

³ Eph. II. 14 ; Jn. XII. 32.

⁴ Eph. II. 2.

⁵ Heb. x. 20.

ing Christ and His Divine appearance in the world. It may be expanded from the inspired Scriptures. Athanasius has it himself by a sacred tradition from the past (56. 1, 2).

Scripture, however, tells us also of Christ's second coming to Judgment (56. 3). Both knowledge of the Scriptures and the eternal reward are for those who live a virtuous life and "love God the Father through our Lord Jesus Christ (57. 1, 2).

Such is in abstract the doctrine of the "De Incarnatione". The two following passages from the treatise are noteworthy as concentrating it in a few words :—

"By His becoming man the Saviour was to accomplish both works of love ; first in putting away death and renewing us again ; secondly, being unseen and invisible, in manifesting Himself and making Himself known by His works to be the Word of the Father, and the Ruler and King of the Universe " (16. 5).

"He was made man that we might be made God (*Αὐτός ἐννηθρώπησεν, ἵνα ἡμεῖς θεοποιηθῶμεν*) ; and He manifested Himself by a body, that we might receive the idea of the unseen Father " (54. 3).

The theory of Athanasius demands the most careful scrutiny, in view both of its intrinsic character and its historical results. If Origen is, as Harnack says, epoch-making in being the first after Paul to present a developed doctrine of the sacrifice of Christ, much more is Athanasius epoch-making, on the one hand in having reduced to the utmost clearness the Greek view of the work of Christ as the communication to humanity of incorruption and as the revelation of God, and on the other hand in having been the first after Paul to develop a doctrine of the death of Christ as a satisfaction of the Divine sentence. There is no doubt that as regards the last aspect of his doctrine Athanasius is

Pauline through and through. We have to recognize in his theology a fresh influx of Paulinism into the history of our doctrine.

The following points now demand attention in detail.

(1) As regards the doctrine of the death of Christ as a satisfaction of the Divine sentence, there is practically no difference between Athanasius and Paul, except that the attribute which demands the satisfaction is for Paul the Divine righteousness,¹ for Athanasius the Divine veracity, and again that with Paul the "law" which demands satisfaction is the law of Moses,² with Athanasius the commandment given to Adam.³ The idea of the *necessity* of a satisfaction is, moreover, made explicit, whereas with Paul it is only implied.⁴ For the rest, Athanasius follows Paul most closely, Christ's death is at once a sacrifice to God⁵ and a satisfaction of the Divine sentence:⁶ it is a death for us, and yet we die in Him.⁷ In fact it cannot be said that just here Athanasius has cleared up anything that Paul left undetermined. He hardly does more than reproduce Pauline doctrine without development. It will be remembered that he is sensible that he repeats himself, but fears to lose any revealed truth.

(2) When we pass on to the doctrine of the Incarnation and Resurrection as a destruction of death and a communication to humanity of immortality, here once more Athanasius follows Paul, but Paul as already interpreted by Irenæus. Even more than in Irenæus is the "abbreviation of the tradition of Asia Minor" noticeable.⁸ Attention is more than ever centred upon incor-

¹ Rom. III. 25.

² Gal. III. 13.

³ Cf., however, Rom. v. 15-19.

⁴ Cf., however, the deutero-Pauline passage Heb. II. 9, 10.

⁵ Rom. III. 25.

⁶ Gal. III. 13.

⁷ 2 Cor. v. 14.

⁸ Cf. Loofs, D.G. I.⁴, p. 231.

ruption (*ἀφθαρσία*) as the great gift communicated to humanity by the Incarnation.

"The thoughts of the doctrine of recapitulation, which apprehend Christ as the Beginner of a new humanity, are as good as entirely vanished ; and in spite of Biblical reminiscences in this physical doctrine of redemption the sinful state of humanity almost entirely recedes behind the sentence of death : ' If there were only transgression and no consequence of corruption, repentance were well enough ' " (7. 4).¹

The moral and religious effects of the Resurrection in awakening faith and hope are certainly not altogether overlooked by Athanasius, but are very secondary in his argument.

(3) The view of Christ's work as the revelation of God is very clearly expressed by Athanasius, but in reality contains nothing beyond what we have already found in the Apologists, Irenæus, and Origen.

(4) Athanasius develops his whole argument on the basis of reason (the Logos doctrine) and Scripture. He makes fully explicit the presupposition of Irenæus, viz. that the God of creation and redemption is one. Both creation and redemption are through the Logos. This fundamental character of the Logos doctrine serves to establish a general harmony between reason and authority. The problem as to where revelation transcends reason is not felt, as it is by later theologians.

(5) Finally, the practical view of Athanasius is that of Irenæus. He is at this point no more Pauline than his predecessor. Virtue and knowledge and the love of God and Christ prepare men for the eternal reward (57. 3).

To sum up, the significance of Athanasius lies, firstly, in the bringing in of fresh Pauline points of view ;

¹ Op. cit. p. 232.

secondly, in the closely systematic character of his treatise ; and, thirdly, in the harmonization of authority and reason in his doctrine. He has gathered up and woven together the threads of doctrine which before him were floating loosely apart. In him the theology of the Eastern Church found its first clear expression.

One additional minor point may be noted for the sake of completeness. The doctrine of the price paid to the devil disappears in Athanasius in favour of the doctrine of the satisfaction of the Divine sentence. Yet Athanasius has not divested the death of Christ of all relation to the devil. According to him it took place in the air, not on the earth, our Lord being lifted up upon the cross, that He might clear the air of the malignity of the devil (the prince of the power of the air) and of demons of all kinds (25. 6). Here is the idea, already found in Origen, of the demon-compelling power of sacrifice.

§ 2. THE NICENE CREED

The Nicene Creed (A.D. 325) falls after the “De Incarnatione” of Athanasius, which was probably written in A.D. 318. We have now to estimate the significance of this fundamental creed for the doctrine of the work of Christ.

After the confession of God, the Father Almighty, Maker of all things visible and invisible, the creed proceeds as follows :—

“And (we believe) in One Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, only begotten of the Father, that is of the essence (*ὁυσίας*) of the Father, God of God, Light of Light, very God of very God, begotten, not made, of one substance (*ὁμοούσιον*) with the Father, through whom all things were made, both the things in heaven and the things upon earth ; who for us men and for our salvation came

down and was made flesh, was made man, suffered and rose again on the third day, ascended into heaven, and cometh to judge the quick and the dead.”¹

The importance of the creed for our present study is that it further defines the Person of the Logos who became incarnate for human salvation, in the interest of asserting his true and essential Godhead. In opposition to the inferioristic view of Arius, who for the sake of a philosophical explanation of the world made the Logos a creature, and conceded to Him a Godhead only of the second order, the creed asserts that He is of one substance with the Father, and is true God. That the assertion was made in the direct interests of the Greek doctrine of redemption, is well shown by the apology of Athanasius for the term *ὁμοούσιος* in his “*Epistola de Synodis Arimini et Seleuciæ*,” written in A.D. 359.

“Again, if, as we have said before, the Son does not exist by participation (*ἐκ μετουσίᾳς*), but, whilst all other things, being created, have by participation the grace of God, He, on the other hand, is the Wisdom and Word of the Father, in whom all things participate—it follows that He, being the deifying and illuminating (energy) of the Father, in Whom all things are deified and illuminated, is not of another substance (*ἀλλοτριούσιος*) from the Father, but of the same substance (*ὁμοούσιος*). For by participation of Him we are made participators of the Father, since He is the Father’s own Logos. Wherefore, if He were by participation, and not of Himself, essential Godhead (*οὐσιώδης θεότης*) and the image of the Father, He could not deify, being Himself the subject of deification (*οὐκ ἂν ἐθεοποίησε, θεοποιούμενος καὶ αὐτός*). For it is not possible that one who had Godhead by participation, could communicate to others what

¹ Hahn, “*Bibliothek der Symbole und Glaubensregeln der alten Kirche*,”³, 1897, p. 160 f.

he himself had received, since it is not of himself that he has it, but of the Giver, and as to what he has received, he has hardly received sufficient grace for himself.”¹

§ 3. GREGORY OF NYSSA

The other great systematic treatment of the doctrine of the work of Christ which the Greek Church has produced besides the “*De Incarnatione*” of Athanasius is contained in the “*Great Catechism*” of Gregory of Nyssa (*ob. c. 394 A.D.*). It is a presentation of the subject less rounded and complete than the Athanasian, but shows further reflection on some important points. There is the same desire as in Athanasius to harmonize reason and authority. But Gregory is more conscious than Athanasius that the Incarnation cannot altogether be rationally explained. The sick man must not prescribe his cure. We cannot expect wholly to understand the Divine goodness till the next life. Still it is good to help faith by reason (17).

The Trinity having been established for the Greeks on the basis of common notions, and for the Jews on the basis of Scripture, Gregory proceeds (5) to the great stumbling-block of Greeks and Jews alike, viz. the Incarnation. Through the Logos God has created the world and in particular man, as it was not fit that there should be none to behold the Invisible Light and to enjoy the Divine goodness. Man is therefore made, by sharing to an extent the Divine nature, fit to participate in God. He is endowed with life, reason, wisdom, etc., above all with immortality: all these things are included in the Scriptural idea of the Divine image. Such and no other in view of the Divine goodness must have been the original state of man. His present passibility and mor-

¹ “*De Syn.*” 51.

talities must have another cause. God in His goodness did not deprive man of that noblest grace, the exercise of free will, otherwise the Divine image would have been falsified.

The cause of trouble then was as follows (6) : The Prince of this world envied the constitution of man, and persuaded him by fraud to become his own slayer. He led him to turn from God, his strength, and thus brought him to sin. The necessary result of sin, however, was misery and death. Just as virtue leads to life and impassibility, so vice necessarily leads to all evils.

Since man then was thus fallen, how was he to be restored to the first grace ? Who but God, Who had first made him, could restore him ? (8).

The difficulty, however, is that the way of salvation was the Incarnation with all that it involves. But why so much difficulty ? Are birth, growth, etc., in themselves evil and unworthy of God ? (9). Or again, if it be argued that the finite cannot contain the infinite, is not mind in a way infinite, and yet united to a finite body, and not thereby circumscribed ? (10). We do not know how mind is united with body, nor Divinity with humanity ; but the miracles of Christ show the fact of the union (11). If birth and death are marks of humanity, the virgin birth and the resurrection manifest Divinity (13).

What then was the cause of the Incarnation ? (14). The answer is (15) : our disease needed a physician, fallen man one to lift him up and restore him to life and to participation in the good, our darkness needed illumination, the captive needed a redeemer. But why did not God restore us to our pristine state directly by Divine omnipotence : why the circuit of the Incarnation ? On the other hand, why not ? There is nothing contrary to God in the creature, but only in darkness, death, and vice. But at least (16) the Incarnation implied the passion of

the immutable. No : the Incarnation was a Divine action rather than passion. Christ's birth was an action ; since it took place without lust. So also, therefore, was the life following upon it an action. Finally Christ's death as the separation of His soul and body was not a passion, unless the union of His body and soul was a passion. In His death His soul and body were separated, each being still united to His Divinity, that they might be reunited to each other, the dross of sin having been purged out of the vessel of humanity when it was broken (cf. 8). From the Incarnation this purging of sin by death proceeds to humanity in general, inasmuch as here also soul and body are united in a more general way by the Logos.

But why (17), if Christ had power to destroy death and confer life, the long circuit of the Incarnation ? It is folly (18) to challenge the wisdom of the Incarnation. The works of Christ sufficiently show the fact of it, viz. the abolition of idolatry, the spread of the Church, its rites and its philosophy, also the Christian fearlessness of death.

From what point, however, must we start in a rational explanation of it ? (19). All agree (20) that we must believe God not only to be powerful, but just, good, wise, and all that is excellent : moreover, none of these can be realized without the rest. They must then concur in the Incarnation. Its goodness is apparent in the salvation of fallen man : wisdom must be added, and also justice.

Man was created with free will (21), and fell deceived by the tempter. God, as good, pities him ; as wise, He is not ignorant of the mode of redemption. Wisdom, however, is to know what is just. Justice demands (22) that as man of his free will had given himself to Satan, God must not use force to deliver us, but pay a price to him for us. What would Satan (23), who at first envied the happiness of man, and so fell, accept

instead of him, but one better than he, i.e. Jesus, the virgin-born and the worker of miracles? Satan coveted to get this Divine power into his possession. If, however, he had perceived that it was Divine, he would rather have dreaded than coveted it. Therefore God needed to hide it beneath the veil of the flesh. Thus goodness is displayed in God's will to save, justice in the giving of a *quid pro quo*, wisdom in the devising that Satan might take what he could not retain. But where (24) are the Divine power and incorruption? The power of God is seen most of all in His achieving a thing so contrary to His nature as the humiliation of the Incarnation. On the other hand, however, as Satan could not bear the unshrouded Divinity, God veiled it in the flesh, and so Satan was taken as a greedy fish by the hook concealed in the bait. Thus life was introduced into the midst of death, light into the midst of darkness, and Divine life and light destroyed their opposites. Here then the Divine power directly works results according to its own nature. It is natural that if purity touches sin, life death, guidance those wandering from the way, then the filth of sin should be purged, error remedied, and the dead restored to life. The purpose of the Incarnation (25) was then that human nature, mixed with the Divine nature, might, as being delivered from death and the devil, become Divine. Deliverance from death is the beginning of the reversion to immortal life.

But was not guile used in the Incarnation? (26). Yes ; but this is a mark of wisdom, justice, and goodness—justice, in that the devil is rewarded after his desert ; wisdom, in that by this retribution a better thing is brought about ; goodness, in that the guile ends in human salvation.

It follows (27) that Christ in assuming human nature assumed all its properties ; as the whole of human life

from birth to death was stained by sin, Christ's healing nature came into contact with it all. We can see (29) that the Incarnation was suitably delayed till the disease of sin had reached its head, But why (30) after the remedy has been applied does not sin at once cease? Why does not God extend grace to all? The answer is that God respects human free will. Man without free will (31) were less than man.

But the death on the cross (32) remains a difficulty? Death belongs to human nature: if Christ was born, He must die, otherwise He could not have touched human nature in all its properties. Or rather, Christ was born in order to die. To raise our human nature from death, He must come to close quarters with death in His own body, and begin the resurrection of the race with His own resurrection. For Christ assumed flesh from our nature; which must be conceived as an organism, so that because of continuity the resurrection of one part passes over to the whole.

The application to the individual of the benefits of the Incarnation is, upon the presupposition of faith, through the sacraments of Baptism and the Eucharist. Gregory is the first firmly to interweave the doctrine of the sacraments into the systematic theology of the Incarnation, another epoch-making event in the history of doctrine. In Baptism we imitate the death and resurrection of Christ. Sin is washed away, and we anticipate the grace of the resurrection. Baptism is a small beginning of great goods (36). Again, as the soul is united to Christ through faith, so the body is united to Him through the Eucharist. The antidote of redemption penetrates through our fleshly organism, and makes it immortal (37). Baptism, however, is ineffectual without conversion accompanying it (40). The Christian must strive for the eternal reward set in his view.

Such is in outline the argument of the "Great Catechism". The total view of Gregory is clear. He expresses the dominant tendency of the Greek theology with the utmost precision. The Incarnation is essentially a remedial process in humanity, whose beneficent results are communicated through the sacraments, yet so that the securing of these benefits depends upon a virtuous life lived in anticipation of the eternal reward. Negatively the remedial process destroys sin and death, positively it communicates life and light. When Gregory wishes to show explicitly the necessity of this process, he, however, substitutes for the physical conflict of life and light with sin and death a personal dealing of God with Satan. This twofold way of looking at the Incarnation as at once constituting the basis of a personal dealing with Satan and at the same time acting directly as an impersonal principle is of course not new. It has a Scriptural basis in the Pauline view of the death of Christ as at once a death to sin¹ and a satisfaction of the claims of the angels of the law.² A further Scriptural basis is found in the Fourth Gospel, where at once the Incarnation is conceived as light overcoming the darkness,³ and the death of Christ is regarded as a victory over Satan.⁴ Then again the interchange between the thoughts of the death of Christ as a victory over the devil and as a triumph over death is found in Irenæus and Origen. But in Gregory the transition between the two views is made particularly plain. Such oscillation between principle and person is common to the ancient world as a whole. We see how easy it is for Paul to conceive sin as quasi-personal.⁵ But it is worthy of mention as explaining how natural the double point of

¹ Rom. VI. 6.

² Gal. III. 13; Col. II. 14, 15.

³ Jn. I. 5.

⁴ *Ibid.* XIV. 30.

⁵ Rom. v. 21; VII. 9, 11.

view was to a Greek theologian, that the same oscillation is well marked in the ancient religion of Greece.¹

“In the first place, suffering was regarded as occasioned by a deleterious substance, which was represented as animated and often raised to the rank of a demon. It was the next step, which was taken very early, to conceive these often death-dealing spirits as messengers of the underworld. . . . Gradually the custom grew of regarding suffering no longer as the mode of appearance of the demon, but only as his operation. . . . From this it was only a step to the world-view of the Epos, that suffering too is sent by the Gods. Remains of each of these stages of development are, however, contained in those that follow, so that even the oldest is still clearly to be perceived in historical Greece.”

Here is the closest parallel to the oscillation between the different notions of corruption and death as a deleterious principle infesting humanity, of the personification of death as itself a demon, or once more, as we find in Athanasius though not in Gregory, of death as the result of a Divine sentence. The Greek theologians in fact moved at this point in just the same medium of thought as Paul and John, and hence had here no difficulty in working out their doctrine, whatever difficulty it may present to a later age.

The ancient Greek religion may also be brought in to explain the development of the idea of a deceit practised on the devil, which although it may have a Scriptural basis in 1 Cor. II. 8 is developed with such unscriptural exuberance in Origen and still more in Gregory.

Cf. Gruppe, *op. cit.* II. p. 903, on the deception of demons:—

“The endeavour was to make oneself unrecogniz-

¹ Cf. Gruppe, “*Griechische Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte*,” 1906, II. p. 886.

able and distract the attention of the demon. This was done by there being put in the place of the threatened weak man, either another stranger, over whom the fiends could gain no advantage, or another animate or inanimate being, of which they might possess themselves instead of the man."

To sum up, Gregory of Nyssa brings the Greek doctrine of the work of Christ to a highly systematic and very typical expression. If he is morally inferior to Athanasius in that he reverts from the doctrine of the death of Christ as a satisfaction of the Divine sentence to the view of it as a ransom to the devil, he nevertheless better expresses here the general Greek view. In one point, moreover, Gregory has amended the view of Athanasius: he regards the effect of the Incarnation as a destruction not merely of death, but also of sin. Here he stands nearer to Paul.

§ 4. GREGORY OF NAZIANZUS

Compared with Athanasius and Gregory of Nyssa, this father (*ob.* 390 A.D.) is of secondary importance. His main doctrine runs parallel with that of the two former theologians, but attains to no such systematic expression. A general statement of it occurs in a passage in the second oration "De Pascha".¹

"We were created that we might be benefited. We were benefited after we were created. Paradise was committed to our charge, that we might live in bliss. We received a commandment that having kept it we might obtain a good repute, not that God did not know what would happen, but that He laid down the law of the free will. We were deceived because we were envied (by the devil). We fell, because we transgressed the command-

¹ Oratio XLV. 28.

ment. . . . We had need of a God incarnate and put to death, that we might live. We were put to death with Him, that we might be cleansed. We rose again with Him, because we were put to death with Him. We were glorified with Him, because we rose again with Him."

With this passage may be taken the following summary of Gregory Nazianzen's doctrine of salvation from Ullmann, "Gregor von Nazianz," 1825, p. 451 :—

"This salvation he conceived as the sanctification, beatification, and deification of man, and he connected therewith the idea that God in Christ had therefore united Himself with all parts of human nature, in order that they all might by this union be consecrated and sanctified, and that the Divine nature united with the human nature might penetrate the latter as the leaven does the mass, strengthening and ameliorating it. . . . On this account Christ must pass through all earthly conditions and enter into all human relations, even to the point of the deepest shame and humiliation, in order that all that is human, even what is least, might be honoured and cleansed by this condescension of the Godhead, and under all limitations the image of a Divine life might be glorified and presented as an eternal pattern to humanity."

The above doctrine is summed up in the famous short argument with which Gregory Nazianzen met the view of Apollinaris that in the Incarnation the Logos assumed only an imperfect human nature without *νοῦς*. This argument was that what was not assumed was not cured : τὸ γὰρ ἀπρόσληπτον ἀθεράπευτον.¹

Another passage in which the same doctrine is focussed is Or. XXIX. 19 :—

"Man here below became God since he was united to God and became one person, the stronger nature over-

¹ Ep. 101 (ad Cledonium, i.).

coming, so that I might become God, just as much as He became man."

Cf. further the passage, Or. xxxviii. 13: "I had a share in the image. I did not keep it. He partakes of my flesh, that He may both save the image and make the flesh immortal."

In carrying out his idea of the cleansing and deification of human nature, moreover, Gregory Nazianzen sometimes uses very strong (Pauline) language to describe Christ's identification with sinful humanity. Thus, for example, in Or. xxx. § 5; he says:—

"Just as He was called a curse for the sake of salvation, Who dissolves my curse; and was called sin, Who takes away the sin of the world, and instead of the old Adam is made a new Adam, in the same degree He makes my rebellion His own as Head of the whole body. As long, therefore, as I am rebellious and seditious by the denial of God and by my passions, Christ is called disobedient as far as I am concerned. But when all things shall have been subjected to Him (now they will be subjected both by knowledge and by transformation), then He Himself will have fulfilled His subjection, bringing me, whom He has saved, to God."

A little farther on in the same section we read that when Christ said, "My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me," He spoke in our person. "For we were the forsaken and despised before, but now we were taken up and saved by the sufferings of the Impassible. Similarly He takes to Himself our folly and sin; and says what follows in the Psalm."

So also in the same oration, § 21, Gregory writes:—

"He united to Himself what was condemned, in order to deliver the whole from condemnation, in that for all He became all that we are, sin except, body, soul, and mind, so far as death reaches."

It would be easy to multiply further passages of this tendency. But they have not the same systematic character as the doctrinal statements of Athanasius, but are incidental and occasional, often merely suggested by the attempt to explain various Scripture passages. Therefore we will be content with those already given, which are sufficiently typical.

To the view of the Incarnation as a purifying process in human nature, Gregory Nazianzen, like the other great Greek theologians, naturally adds the further view of it as a revelation of God. Like Irenæus, Gregory regarded the Incarnation as necessary that the finite reason of man might comprehend the infinite God. Hence he frequently uses the expression, God became incarnate, *ὡς ἡμεῖς ὁ ἀχώρητος*.¹

The point at which Gregory Nazianzen shows originality is in his treatment of the doctrine of redemption from the devil. He does not object to the idea that the devil was deceived by the Incarnation.

Cf. Or. xxxix. § 13 : " Since that Master of wickedness thought himself to be invincible, when he had enticed us with the hope of Divinity, he himself is enticed by the screen of the flesh, in order that he may attack God, thinking to be attacking Adam, and so the new Adam may rescue the old Adam and the curse upon the flesh be dissolved, since death is slain through the flesh (i.e. through the death of Christ in the flesh) ".

But although Gregory can thus think of the Incarnation and death of Christ as a victory over Satan and death in which Satan was deceived, yet he cannot allow that in the transaction a ransom was paid to Satan. There is an important passage in which he expresses his view on this subject.

This is Or. xlv. 22, where he says : " As an offering

¹ Ullmann, p. 453.

to whom and for what cause was the blood—I mean that precious and famous blood of God who was high priest and sacrifice at once—shed for our advantage? We were under the power of the evil one, in that we were sold under sin and we exchanged pleasure for misery. If now the ransom was given to no other than the possessor who had power over us, I ask to whom was it offered and for what cause? Was it to the evil one himself? Shame upon the blasphemy (φεῦ τῆς ὑβρεως)! Then doth the robber receive not only a ransom from God, but God Himself as a ransom, and thus an exceeding reward for his tyranny, for the sake of which ransom also it was right for us to be spared. But if to the Father, the question is here in the first place, how was this? For He did not hold us in His power. Again, what ground can one give why the Father should have taken delight in the blood of the only begotten Son, while He did not even accept Isaac, who was offered to him by his father, but changed the sacrifice, substituting a ram for the offering of a rational being. Or is it not manifest that the Father received the ransom, not because He either asked it, or needed it, but on account of the plan of salvation (διὰ τὴν οἰκονομίαν) and because man must be sanctified by the humanity of God; in order that He, overcoming the tyrant by force, might free us, and might bring us back to Himself by the mediation of the Son, who carried this out to the honour of the Father, to Whom He is seen in every way to submit.”

The above passage is important and interesting not only because of the rejection of the idea of a ransom paid to the devil, but also because Gregory equally rejects the notion that a price was paid to God. The need of the death of Christ is seen in the abstract necessity of the renewal of mankind by the Incarnation and of the overcoming at the same time of the devil.

§ 5. CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA

The later Greek theology practically adds nothing to the preceding development. For the sake of completeness, however, a brief account may be given of the ideas of Cyril of Alexandria and John of Damascus.

The view of Cyril (*ob.* A.D. 444) is thus summarized by Schultz, "*Lehre der Gottheit Christi*," 1881, pp. 109 f. :—

"Humanity, apart from Christ, is dominated by the devil by means of sin and death—or without a figure : it is given over to sin and death, to the corruptibility and vanity of the world. Nor will God overcome the prince of the world by His superior power. . . . He goes into the battle as man, and overcomes the devil as the sinless and righteous One, therefore in a moral way. He delivers human nature from the corruptibility and weakness of the world, in that He assumes it and in His own person penetrates it with His Divine life and so in principle elevates it above the world and deifies it.

"This work of the Son of God is the decisive work. Humanity, in its head and representative, has now obtained a right against the devil ; the law in the members is slain, and, therefore, the sinful worldliness of men overcome by a higher principle, as light overcomes darkness."

This is just the same doctrine as we have had before from Athanasius, Gregory of Nyssa, and Gregory of Nazianzus, and requires, therefore, no comment. The only other point further to be noted in connexion with Cyril of Alexandria is the occurrence in his writings of passages speaking of the infinite worth of Christ's passion, an idea which indeed is sporadically found before his time.

Thus Cyril of Jerusalem (*ob.* A.D. 386), "*Catech.*" XIII. 33, says :—

“Not so great was the lawlessness of sinners as the righteousness of Him that died for them : we had not sinned so much as He wrought righteousness, Who laid down His life for us.”

Chrysostom (*ob.* A.D. 407) again writes in *ep. ad Rom.* hom. 10 :—

“What Christ paid was far more than we owed, and so much more, as an infinite sea is greater than a small drop.”

Cyril of Alexandria has, however, developed the idea with greater fulness. He thus expounds *Jn.* i. 29 : The Lamb prefigured in the Old Testament is led to the slaughter for all, that it may take away the sin of the world, that it dying for it, may destroy death and dissolve the curse passed upon us. The Lamb has died, one for all, in order to bring back all to God. “For when we were taken captive in many sins and, therefore, in debt to death and corruption, the Father gave his Son as a ransom for us (*ἀντίλυτρον ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν*), one for all ; for all is in Him, and He outweighs all in value ; One died for all, that we all might through Him attain to life.”¹

So also in his “*De recta fide ad reginas*,” II. 7, Cyril says with reference to *Gal.* III. 13 :—²

“Christ has redeemed us from the curse of the law, having become a curse for us. . . . Inasmuch as the letter of the law declares him accursed who is taken in transgression and sin, He who knew no sin, that is Christ, has been brought under the judgment, having endured an unrighteous sentence and having suffered that which became those under the curse, in order that He who is of equal worth with the whole of humanity (*ὁ τῶν ὅλων ἀντάξιος*) might free all from the accusation of disobedience and therewith redeem the terrestrial

¹ “*Opera*,” ed. Migne, VI. 192.

² *Ibid.* IX. 1344.

world by His own blood. The One would not have equalled all, if He had simply been man; but if He be reckoned as Incarnate God suffering in His own flesh, the whole creation is small compared with Him, and what is required for the ransom of all that is under heaven is the death of this one flesh, for it belonged to the Logos begotten from God the Father."

"Here," says Baur,¹ "there is wanting to the full idea of satisfaction nothing but the express reference to God and the Divine righteousness. But this is just always the obscure point in the older ideas of satisfaction." The fact is that these passages from Cyril of Alexandria, though fuller than those quoted from Cyril of Jerusalem and Chrysostom, are not really of great dogmatic importance. The anticipation in them of the idea of the infinite worth of Christ's passion is of course very interesting, but even in the most definite form in which it occurs, viz. in the last quoted passage, is still only suggestive rather than doctrinally complete. The most important point made is that the infinite value of Christ's death depends on His Divinity. But it is to be remembered that the above passages are after all rather homiletical than strictly dogmatic in character.²

§ 6. THE CREED OF CHALCEDON

Upon our account of the theology of Cyril may fitly follow a note on the Creed of Chalcedon (A.D. 451), with which his name is so closely associated. The Council of Chalcedon set forth as standards of the true faith, first of all the original Nicene Creed with some additions; then the so-called Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed (the Nicene Creed of the English Prayer Book), whose exact

¹ "Die Christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung," p. 103 n.

² Cf. Harnack, D.G. II.⁴, p. 174.

origin is unknown ; finally, a new formula on the Person of Christ.

Neither the additions to the Nicene Creed, nor the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed, need detain us. There is nothing in them which adds materially to what was already given as a basis for the doctrine of the work of Christ in the Roman (Apostles') Creed, and in the original Nicene Creed. The new formula ran as follows :—

“Wherefore, following the Holy Fathers, we all with one accord teach the confession of our Lord Jesus Christ as one and the same Son, the same perfect in Godhead, the same perfect in manhood, very God and very man, the same consisting of a reasonable soul and a body, of one essence with the Father as touching the Godhead and the same of one essence with us as touching the manhood, like us in all things, sin except ; begotten of the Father before the worlds as touching the Godhead, the same in these last days, for us and for our salvation (begotten) of the Virgin Mary, the mother of God, as touching the manhood, one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only-begotten, being made known in two natures, without confusion, without change, without division, without separation ; the distinction of the natures being in no wise done away by the union, but rather the characteristic property of each nature being preserved, and concurring into one Person and one hypostasis, Who is not parted or divided into two Persons, but one and the same Son and Only-begotten, God the Word, Lord, Jesus Christ.”¹

What is important here for the doctrine of the work of Christ is that the exact metaphysical conception of His Person, which was to form its basis, was fixed for

¹ Hahn, “Bibliothek der Symbole und Glaubensregeln der alten Kirche,”³ 1897, p. 166.

the subsequent orthodoxy both of the East and West, both Catholic and Protestant.

In opposition to the Nestorian view, that there were in the Incarnate Christ two persons, a Divine and a human, there was affirmed the absolute unity of His Person. Again, in opposition to the Eutychian view, that in the One Person after the Incarnation there was only one nature, a Divine-human, there was equally affirmed the continued distinction of a Divine and a human nature in one person. Finally, in opposition to the doctrine of Apollinaris, who taught in the interest of the speculative unity of Christ's Person that the Logos in the Incarnation assumed only an imperfect human nature, consisting of soul and body, but without the higher principle of reason (*νοῦς*), the Creed affirmed the perfection of the human as well as of the Divine nature after the Incarnation.

The definitions of the Chalcedonian Council were the result of two influences which crossed each other. One was that of the Greek doctrine of redemption. An interest in it lay behind Cyril's desire for the closest union between the Divine and human natures in the One Person (which desire at times led him very close to Eutychianism). The same interest also lay behind the opposition to Apollinarianism in the Greek Church, which was concentrated in the formula of Gregory of Nazianzen: "What is not assumed is not cured".¹

The other influence was that of the theology of the West, which was exercised through the famous Tome of Leo of Rome, which lay before the Council. From the time of Tertullian onwards the West had always a great interest in the complete humanity of Christ, which was akin to Nestorianism. Western theology, as represented by Leo, therefore, even at the time of the Council of Chal-

¹ Ep. 101 (ad Cledonium, i.).

cedon being less speculative than that of the East and less under the influence of the doctrine of the deification of human nature in Christ, was not afraid to assert strongly the distinctness of the Divine and human natures in the Incarnation, in spite of whatever speculative difficulties might be involved, and in spite of the fact that the doctrine of deification seemed to require as its natural correlate the closest fusion of the Divine and human natures in the Incarnate Logos.

The Creed of Chalcedon then leaves us with the problem how the unity of the Person can coexist along with the completeness and the distinction of the natures. The last word on the subject in the Greek Church was spoken in the formula of Leontius of Byzantium (485-543), who taught "that the human nature in Christ is not ἀνυπόστατος nor yet itself ὑπόστασις, but ἐνυπόστατος, i.e. it has its ὑποστήναι in the Logos".¹

§ 7. JOHN OF DAMASCUS

What is interesting and important about this writer (*ob. ante* A.D. 754) is that in his "Expositio Orthodoxæ Fidei" we have the first complete systematic treatise covering the whole of Christian doctrine since Origen's "De Principiis". John bases his doctrine on Revelation (1. 1), yet as far as possible supports it on rational grounds. The doctrine of God and even that of the Trinity have a rational basis. The doctrine of the Incarnation is seen to be a natural consequence of the doctrine of God in view of the fact of human sin.

As regards the details of the doctrine, John collects his material from previous theologians, especially the two Gregories and Cyril of Alexandria. As Schultz says,² "John of Damascus gathers up in his doctrine of

¹ Loofs, D.G.⁴, p. 305.

² "Die Lehre der Gottheit Christi," p. 130.

salvation the results of the theology since Athanasius". We observe in his treatment, however, the influence of a new and important doctrinal factor, viz. the Gospel history. If we review the progress of the Greek doctrine of the work of Christ up to this point, we see that it really began in earnest with Irenæus, who depends on the Creed, but does not, as a matter of fact, very closely follow it from point to point, being rather concerned to refute the Gnostics than to expound the Creed. Still less does Origen adhere to the order of the extended Rule of Faith which he gives in "De Principiis" (Preface). Athanasius and Gregory of Nyssa, on the other hand, have treated the Incarnation in a systematic order, determined not by history but by the exigencies of logical thought. With John, however, comes the great change that the facts, not merely of the Creed, but of the Gospel history, begin to be treated of in order. The implication is that the whole life of Christ has a saving significance. In fact, John begins to add reflections on the saving value of various historical elements, which before have found no place in the systematic treatment of our doctrine. He considers in turn the Incarnation, the actions and passions of Christ, His death, His descent into Hades, His resurrection, ascension, and sitting at the right hand of the Father ; and everywhere has something to say on the saving significance of these facts.

He begins with the Incarnation itself (3. 1). When man had fallen, deceived by the devil, and death reigned in the world, the Creator and Lord Himself took up the battle for the creature. Since the enemy had deceived man with the hope of divinity, he himself is deceived by the flesh of Christ offered as a bait ; and thus God shows at once His goodness, wisdom, justice, and power. His goodness appears in His not abandoning man, His justice in His taking him from the devil

otherwise than by force, His wisdom in finding a suitable way in this difficult case. His power appears in the miracle of the Incarnation, the newest of all that is new, in fact the one thing new under the sun (Eccles. i. 10). Thus the Word was made flesh of the Holy Ghost and the Virgin Mary, born without concupiscence of Adam's race; and was made obedient to the Father, that by that which He had assumed from us like ourselves, He might supply a cure for our disobedience, and give an example of obedience, without which salvation cannot be had.

The whole Divine nature was in the Person of Christ united to the whole human nature, that it might bring salvation to the whole. John reproduces Gregory Nazianzen: "What has not been assumed cannot be cured" (3. 6). Christ assumed the whole man, and that up to the very part which was liable to death, that He might bestow salvation upon the whole (3. 18). In assuming human nature then Christ assumed its natural and guiltless passions. He assumed all to heal all. He was tempted, and overcame to give us the victory, and to enable us to overcome our enemy (3. 20). He grew in wisdom and grace, or rather He gradually exhibited what was in Him, in order to share our nature (3. 22). He prayed as an example for us (3. 24). In Mt. xxvii. 46, He prays as representing us. In the same way also is to be understood Gal. iii. 13.

In all His passions, however, His Deity suffered through the flesh, not in itself (3. 26). Thus is to be understood the nature of Christ's death. As free from sin, He was not subject to death. But He died, undergoing death for the sake of our salvation, and offering Himself as a sacrifice to God, against whom we had sinned, and to whom the price of our redemption was to be paid, so that thereby we might be freed (3. 27).

John rejects like Gregory Nazianzen the idea of a price paid to the devil. "God forbid that the blood of the Lord should have been offered to the tyrant." But he is all the same unable to get very far away from the idea which he rejects.

"Death approaches, and eagerly swallowing the bait of the body is transfixed by the hook of the Divinity; and so having tasted that innocent and life-giving body, itself is destroyed, vomiting up all those whom it had previously swallowed. For just as darkness is dispelled when light is introduced, so corruption is driven back before the assault of life, and life comes to all, but to the destroyer destruction" (3. 27).

Putting this passage together with the above-mentioned reference in 3. 1 to the deceit practised on the devil through the Incarnation (cf. also 3. 18), we see that John, like Gregory Nazianzen before him, though he protests against the doctrine that a price was paid to the devil, cannot escape out of the circle of ideas therewith connected.

From the death of Christ John passes on to His descent into hell. After His death His deified soul [deified, because it remained, like His body, still in death united to the Word (3. 27)] descended into hell, that as before the Sun of righteousness had risen upon those on earth, now it might shine on those in darkness and in the shadow of death. As Christ had before preached deliverance on earth, so now He did the same in Hades;¹ and having delivered those who were bound, He returned from death to make a way for us to the resurrection (3. 29).

In 3. 28 John has already said that Christ gave resurrection and incorruption to our body through His

¹ 1 Pet. III. 19.

body, becoming for us the firstfruits of resurrection and incorruption.

After His resurrection He ascended into heaven and sits at the right hand of the Father, caring for our salvation both in a Divine and a human manner ; a Divine manner, in so far as He preserves and governs all things by His providence ; a human manner, in so far as He remembers His life on earth, and sees and knows Himself the object of universal adoration (4. 1). Finally in 4. 4, John sums up in a general statement his whole doctrine of the Incarnation as the way of human salvation. As the Son of God created man in His image, i.e. endowed him with reason and free will, so also He gave him His likeness, i.e. endowed him with all virtues, as far as was possible to human nature. This He did by the communication of Himself, by which communication He also gave man the gift of immortality. By disobedience to the Divine command we, however, lost these gifts, and became subject to death. Therefore the Son of God took our nature to restore us to the glory of the image and the likeness. The purpose of the Incarnation was to teach us the way of a virtuous life, affording us an easy way to it through Himself (i.e. through His example). Its purpose was also by the communication of life to deliver us from death, Christ being made for us the firstfruits of resurrection, and renewing the vessel which had been marred. Finally it was to deliver us from the devil and to teach us to overcome him by humility and patience.

As regards the practical aspect of the doctrine of salvation, John teaches that salvation is mediated to us through faith and baptism. Through baptism we obtain the remission of sins, by faith the gift of the Spirit (4. 9). By the Eucharist the life thus communicated is further maintained (4. 13). The posi-

tion attained by baptism must, however, be maintained by good works. To this end, however, we must strive with all our strength, lest, returning to the vomit like a dog,¹ we should again make ourselves the servants of sin (4. 9).

§ 8. THE GREEK SYNTHESIS

With John of Damascus we reach the conclusion of our study of the Greek theology. Before we pass on to the next section, some remarks must be made on the Greek doctrine of salvation as a whole. We have already, in dealing with Irenæus, attempted to indicate its practical unity. It must be admitted, however, that an absolutely perfect theoretical synthesis corresponding to this practical unity is far from being attained by the Greek theologians. The different views which they propound are most intricately entangled with one another, as is particularly clear in the case of John of Damascus, who in his anxiety to include all good doctrine and reject none, ends with a statement which is most involved, far more involved indeed than can be gathered from the above summary of his doctrine.

In particular, however, we have to consider the relation in the Greek theology of two main aspects of doctrine. On the one hand salvation is regarded as the direct result of the Incarnation (*a*) as a Divine revelation, (*b*) as (along with the death and resurrection of Christ) a communication of life to mankind. Through the death and resurrection operates, according to this view, what is implicitly given already in the Incarnation itself.

On the other hand salvation is viewed as following from a certain negative pre-condition, either that of a sacrifice to God or of a price paid to the devil, a pre-

¹ 2 Pet. II. 22.

condition the accomplishment of which removes the obstacles which stand in the way of God's desire to save men.

The problem now is of the relation of these two great points of view. It is generally admitted and has already been recognized that the former point of view, which regards salvation as implicitly given in the very constitution of the Person of Christ, is the central element in the Greek theology. The great proof of this is that only the doctrines of the Trinity and of the Person of Christ constituted properly the dogma of the Greek Church. In agreement with this fact, moreover, we find some startling things said by some Greek theologians as to the secondary importance of all else compared with the doctrine of the Person of Christ.

Irenæus¹ counts the question why the Word of God has become flesh and suffered among those things which, lying outside the *regula fidei*, belong simply to theological inquiry. And so Gregory Nazianzen says:—

“You may philosophize about the world and worlds, about matter, about the soul, about reasonable natures better and worse, about resurrection, judgment, retribution, the sufferings of Christ, for in these matters success is not unprofitable and failure is harmless.”²

From passages like these we might at first be inclined to infer that the doctrine of the work of Christ mattered little or nothing to some at least of the Greek theologians. Obviously, however, the view which regards salvation as sufficiently guaranteed and established by the very constitution of the Person of Christ, implies a certain view also of His work. It involves in fact what in general may be called the Johannine view, the doctrine that Christ is the life and light of men. Thus the silent coefficient of the Greek emphasis

¹ “Adv. Hær.” i. 10, 3.

² Orat. xxvii. § 10, p. 495.

on the dogma of the Person of Christ is the doctrine that in His Person the Logos has revealed God to men and has overcome in humanity sin and corruption and death. The latter point in particular is undoubtedly the central doctrine of the Greek Church on the work of Christ, but the view of the Incarnation as a revelation of God is always most closely connected therewith.

But now as to the doctrine of Christ's work as a sacrifice to God and as a redemption from the devil: Is it right to regard these views, as does for instance Harnack,¹ as merely circumferential? This can hardly be the case, since the idea of a sacrifice to God naturally corresponds to the practical belief of a forgiveness of sins bestowed in baptism, a very vital element in the religion of the Greek Church; though at the same time it must be admitted that the connexion between the two conceptions is not very clearly established by the Greek theologians, and that the forgiveness of sins is not infrequently, as by Gregory of Nyssa, derived from the purification of human nature which is the direct result of Christ's Incarnation, Death, and Resurrection.

Moreover, the doctrine of redemption from the devil can hardly be regarded as unimportant. It is very tempting certainly to follow Schultz and others, who regard this doctrine as no more than a mythological variant upon the more abstract idea of the destruction of death and corruption by the Incarnate Divinity. It is indeed natural enough to a modern theologian thus to regard the doctrine, and there are many passages in the Greek Fathers themselves which might be quoted in support of the view of Schultz—passages in which the idea of redemption from the devil quickly passes over into the notion of a destruction of death and corruption by the Divine life. The truth is, however, that it is as

¹ D.G. II. 174 f.

much a case of death being personally regarded as of the devil being equated to an abstract principle. In general it cannot be doubted that to the Greek Fathers redemption from the devil was a great reality. This is borne out by the immense place which demons filled in the thought of the Hellenistic world, and the dread of their malign influence which was universally felt. Moreover, by the Christian Church the heathen gods were generally identified with the demons (cf. 1 Cor. x. 20). The right view therefore seems to be that of Kaftan, who emphasizes the historical importance of the doctrine of redemption from the devil in addition to that of the dogma of the Incarnation as expressed in the creeds.

"It is not to be regarded as an accident that it originated in the ancient Greek theology. The general historical background of this doctrine is formed by the heathen environment of the Ancient Church, in which it saw the reign of Satan and his demons. It was therefore for the Ancient Church more than a mere doctrine: it was a living view."¹

It is to be observed also that the doctrine of redemption from the devil comes to have a direct practical significance through the exorcism and the renunciation of the devil which accompanied the rite of baptism in the Greek Church.

Cf. Cyril of Jerusalem:² "Here (in baptism) the blood of the unblemished Lamb Jesus Christ is made the charm to scare evil spirits. . . . What then did each of you standing up say? 'I renounce thee, Satan, thou wicked and most cruel tyrant!' meaning, 'I fear thy might no longer; for Christ hath overthrown it, having partaken with me of flesh and blood,

¹ "Dogmatik," ³ and ⁴, 1901, p. 490.

² "Catechetical Lectures," XIX. 3, 4.

that through these He might by death destroy death, that I might not for ever be subject to bondage'."

Here the practical significance of the doctrine of redemption from the devil (and death) appears very clearly. No doctrine, however, which possesses practical significance can be regarded as unimportant.

CHAPTER IV

THE THEOLOGY OF THE LATIN FATHERS

THE development of doctrine during the first eight Christian centuries was in a certain sense a common Catholic development. Nevertheless the Greek and Latin Churches even before their final separation from one another were characterized by their own peculiar differences, at least from the time when, at the end of the second century, the Western Church ceased to be essentially Greek. With Tertullian begins at this time the distinctively Latin type of theology, which in the third century is continued by Cyprian and others. Even the theologians of the fourth century, Hilary, Ambrose, etc., who did so much to introduce Greek ideas into the West, nevertheless show themselves by no means mere imitators of the Greeks. Finally, with Augustine a fresh type, first of religion and then of theology, manifests itself in the West, not indeed altogether without previous preparation, but still of a marked originality ; so that from Augustine onwards both the problems of theology and the outlook upon them differ very considerably from those of the East.

In regard to the doctrine of the work of Christ the most important Western development does not indeed begin till after the period above-named, viz. with the Schoolmen, especially Anselm and Abelard. Yet during the first eight centuries we find, firstly, a type of doctrine on this subject, already deviating more or less

unconsciously from the Greek theology in directions afterwards taken by the Schoolmen, and, secondly, important theological developments taking place especially with regard to the practical view of Christianity—developments the reaction of which upon the doctrine of the work of Christ ultimately produced the Anselmic theory of the subject.

§ 1. TERTULLIAN

In Tertullian (c. A.D. 150-c. 225) we find practically the same points of view with regard to the work of Christ as in Irenæus with the important difference that in Tertullian the mystic-realistic doctrine so central for Irenæus recedes into the background. "He (Tertullian) has," says Harnack, "taken over from Irenæus the mystical conception of redemption—the constitution (of the Person) of Christ is redemption—yet with a rationalistic interpretation."¹

Cf. "Adv. Marc." II. 27, where Tertullian says that the mystery of human salvation is in the Incarnate Son, who mingles in Himself man and God, that He may confer on man as much as He takes from God. But he adds: "God lived among us, that man might be taught to do the things of God. God acted on a level with man that man might be able to act on a level with God." The significance of the Incarnation according to this passage therefore reduces itself to that of Divine teaching and example.

Cf. also "De Resurr." 63, where Christ is called the most faithful mediator between God and man, who will restore (*reddet*) God to man and man to God. Harnack here bids us observe the future tense: in the view of Tertullian the union of man to God is not as with Irenæus a thing already accomplished in the very fact of the

¹ D.G. I.⁴, p. 613, n. 3.

Incarnation, but a thing to be accomplished by the moral influence of the Incarnate Logos upon men.

On the other hand, however, Tertullian lays a greater stress than Irenæus on the death of Christ. "In innumerable passages he has emphatically affirmed that the whole work of Christ is involved in His death on the cross, in fact that the death on the cross was the purpose of the mission of Christ."¹

Cf. especially "Adv. Marc." III. 8, where Tertullian says that if the flesh of Christ is taken to be a lie, His sufferings will not deserve faith. He goes on: "Therefore is the whole work of God overthrown. The death of Christ, the whole import and blessing of the Christian name, is denied."

Tertullian has indeed no definitely formulated doctrine of the death of Christ beyond that of Irenæus; nevertheless his peculiar insistence upon it is noteworthy. Here, as in many other cases, he strikes a note characteristic of the Latin theology throughout.

It is, however, by his treatment of the practical aspect of Christianity that Tertullian becomes indirectly of the greatest importance for the history of our doctrine. Not only does he agree with the Apostolic Fathers, the Greek Apologists, and Irenæus in regarding Christianity as a new law of Christ; but, as was natural to one who before his conversion had been a Roman *juris peritus*, he has made the idea of the new law more strictly legal and also more dominant than it was among the Greeks. With them the new law was essentially a new moral law and a new philosophy of life; but for the West, under the influence of the Roman tradition embodied in Tertullian, the new law was a law in the same sense as the law of the Empire. This applies not only to the Christian ethic, but also to the

¹ Harnack, D.G. I.⁴, 613, n. 3.

Christian faith. "The dogma was always in the West more a law of faith than a philosophy of faith."¹

In this connexion it may be pointed out that the colligation of reason and authority, which we have also found in the Greek theology, begins already to assume in Tertullian the form of the dialectical opposition between them which characterizes Western theology as a whole. In particular Tertullian, while he accepts the rational theology of the Greek Apologists, at the same time bases the doctrine of the death and resurrection of Christ purely on authority.

"To know nothing contrary to the Rule of Faith is to know all things."²

"The Son of God died ; it is certainly believable, because it is absurd : and having been buried, He rose again ; it is certain, because it is impossible."³

We return, however, to the practical attitude of the Christian in his relation toward God. Tertullian has systematized his legal view of the relation of the Christian to God by the use of the important terms merit (*meritum*) and satisfaction (*satisfactio*), both of which, together with their cognates, are common in Roman jurisprudence.⁴ Here first we touch the beginnings of that great Western systematization of the doctrine of grace and merit, the counterpart of which is not to be found in the theology of the East. The following account of Tertullian's doctrine on these points is largely dependent on the exhaustive and definitive articles of Schultz, "Der sittliche Begriff des Verdienstes und seine Anwendung auf das Verständniss des Werkes Christi".⁵ I wish here once and for all to express my

¹ Loofs, D.G.⁴, p. 335.

² "De praescr." 14.

³ "De carne Christi," 5.

⁴ Cf. Dirksen, "Manuale Latinitatis fontium juris civilis Romanorum," 1837.

⁵ "Theologische Studien und Kritiken," 1894, pp. 1-50, 245-314, 554-614.

deep obligation to these articles, which I shall make use of not only in connexion with Tertullian, but with other Latin writers.

Tertullian regards God above all as the Lawgiver, and religion as a discipline ordained of God through Christ. God's will is rational: yet we must obey not because it is good, but because God has commanded it.¹ Thus we win merit (*promereri*).

God is the rewarder of all merit: "If God is the acceptor of good works, He is also the rewarder . . . a good deed has God as its debtor, just as has also an evil deed, since the judge is the rewarder of every matter".²

In general all service of God is meritorious: "Artificium promerendi obsequium est".³ But in the stricter sense only non-obligatory performances are meritorious. God has ordained a sphere of liberty (*licentia*), in order to give an opportunity for such supererogatory works.⁴ To this class belong patience, acts of voluntary penance, above all fasting, virginity, and martyrdom.⁵ In all this region the rule is that of retribution according to law.

"Par factum par habet meritum."⁶

"Majora certamina sequuntur majora præmia."⁷

Such is Tertullian's doctrine of merit. He is indeed not the absolute originator of the view that supererogatory work constitutes merit. We find it already in Hermas, "Sim." 5. 3, 3:—

"If thou doest aught good beyond the commandment of God, thou shalt gain to thyself a more exceeding

¹ "De poen." 4.

² *Ibid.* 2.

³ "De pat." 4.

⁴ "De cultu femin." 2. 10; "De exhort. cast." 8.

⁵ "De pat." 15, 16; "De jejun. adv. ps." 7; "De exhort. cast." 3;

"Ad Scap." 4.

⁶ "De pat." 10.

⁷ "Ad Scap." 4.

glory." Cf. also "Mand." 4. 4, 2 for similar ideas. In one point, moreover, Tertullian is unwilling to go as far in the development of the idea of merit as the general popular Christianity of North Africa. The prevailing view seems to have been that there was possible a transference of the merit not only of Christ, but also of the martyrs. But Tertullian says: "Let it suffice the martyr to have cleansed his own sins . . . Who has paid the death of others by his own, except the Son of God?"¹

These things, however, must not blind us to the extreme importance of Tertullian at this point, in that he first codified the doctrine of merit, and gave it a firm substance, thereby stamping the doctrine of Western Catholicism with a permanently legal character.

The second legal term introduced by Tertullian is *satisfactio*, to the examination of which we now pass on. Where after baptism man by his sin has again become a debtor, he must "per delictorum poenitentiam . . . domino satisfacere".²

"Every sin," says Tertullian, "is discharged either by pardon (*venia*) or penalty (*poena*), pardon as the result of chastisement (*castigatio*), penalty as the result of condemnation."³

Here emerges a somewhat difficult problem. Does Tertullian regard *poenitentia* (*satisfactio*) primarily as a meritorious work availing to pay the debt of sin, or rather as of the nature of punishment and as paying in this way for sin? The view of Schultz is that *satisfactio* is primarily to be regarded as a sub-species of merit. In the first place he appeals to the use of the term in Roman law. *Satisfactio* is here in the stricter sense that transaction by which one man meets otherwise than by *solvere* the legal claim of another,

¹ "De pud." 22.

² "De poen." 5.

³ "De pud." 2.

especially one that has arisen through damage done to him. Its sphere is that of obligations in private law. *Solvere* is the proper performance of the obligation, *satisfacere* the discharge of it by some other method agreeable to the claimant. In this usage *satisfacere* has no inner connexion with the idea of punishment, but has affinity rather with *solvere*. Where in Roman law the word stands in a wider sense, it means simply to meet the claim of one who possesses a right. Thus we find the phrases, *satisfacere sententiae, judicato, stipulationi, conditioni, edicto*, etc. In this sense again, however, the word has no inner connexion with *poena*.

In proof of these assertions Schultz brings forward an exhaustive list of passages from Roman legal authorities, for which he acknowledges indebtedness to his juristic colleague, Professor Merkel.¹

In view of this usage he argues that to a Roman jurist like Tertullian *satisfactio* could not mean one form of punishment substituted for another, but could only mean a meritorious act applied to pay the debt of sin. The alternative is *aut solvere aut satisfacere*; again, it is not *aut poena aut satisfactio*, but *aut poena aut venia*; *poenitentia* for sins after baptism is therefore *satisfactio* in the sense that by it man acquires merit, and so wins *venia* instead of *poena*. If penance includes confession of sin, fasting, and above all martyrdom, these are to be regarded as meritorious acts.

Such then is Schultz's theory of Tertullian's doctrine of merit and satisfaction. Summed up in brief, it amounts to this. Merits are supererogatory works, which win reward from God. Where, however, a debt is occasioned by post-baptismal sin, they avail first to cancel the debt, and then if there is any excess, to win reward. This view has been widely accepted, and is no doubt on

¹ Op. cit. pp. 28-31.

the whole correct ; we actually find the phrase *merita poenitentia*.¹ Nevertheless it is to be kept in mind that the penitential works, which avail as satisfaction, are in general of a penal character (*castigatio*), and Tertullian lays stress on this aspect of the matter. In a most fundamental passage² Tertullian describes penance as a self-humiliation or self-inflicted chastisement, by which we placate an angry God. It is to lie in sackcloth and ashes, to lay the spirit low in sorrow, to exchange the former life of sin for severe treatment : it is fasting, incessant prayer, and self-abasement. "All this penance does, that it may enhance repentance, may honour God by fear of danger ; may by itself pronouncing against the sinner take the place of God's indignation, and by temporal mortification, I will not say frustrate, but discharge eternal punishment. . . . So far as thou hast not spared thyself, so far, believe me, will God spare thee."

In spite, therefore, of the fact that satisfaction in Roman private law is opposed to punishment, and that Tertullian regards penitential satisfaction as a meritorious work paying the debt of sin, he also views it as an act of self-humiliation before God, and even as the endurance of temporal punishment instead of eternal. The unity of the two lines of thought lies in the fact that the satisfaction, so far as it is penal, is self-inflicted punishment : thus it combines in one the characters of active work or merit and passive endurance or chastisement.

The importance of the above theological development in Tertullian lies not only in the systematization of the legal view of Christianity, as already described, but also in that here first we get a definite doctrine with respect to post-baptismal sin. Only when a clear doctrine of the implications of post-baptismal sin had been reached,

¹ "De poen." 2.

² *Ibid.* 9.

could there be the possibility of an application to this sphere of the doctrine of the work of Christ, such as is wanting in the Greek theology.

§ 2. HILARY AND AMBROSE

After Tertullian we get no new theology of the work of Christ, nor any important development of the general view of Christianity, till we come to the Graecizing theologians, Hilary (*ob.* A.D. 368) and Ambrose (*ob.* A.D. 395).

Hilary, while recognizing faith in God and the hope of immortality as belonging to the sphere of a rational religion, bases the doctrine of the Incarnation with all it involves upon the authority of the Gospel. Such things God intended that "faith should not refuse to believe, because it could not understand, but should remember that it could understand if it believed".¹

Hilary, in his actual doctrine of the work of Christ, in the first place more closely reproduces that of the Greeks than does any other of the Western Fathers. We have from him the doctrine of the sanctification of humanity by the Incarnation.

"The Son of God was born of the Virgin and of the Holy Ghost for the sake of the human race . . . that being made man of the Virgin, He might receive into Himself the nature of flesh, and that the body of the human race might through the fellowship of this admixture appear in Him as sanctified."²

We have also the victory of Christ in His death and resurrection over death and the devil.

"He first Himself rising from the dead and discharging the sentence of death by which we before were held, in Himself who still among the dead remained eternal, thus fulfilled the dispensation of our salvation. But in that very thing that He is to us in

¹ "De Trinitate," I. 12.

² *Ibid.* II. 24.

Himself the author of life . . . He also made a show of all the hostile powers."¹

All this is good Greek doctrine. But we find all the same a new and distinctively Western note struck for the first time, when Hilary not merely like Tertullian lays stress on the death of Christ, but actually presents it under the view of a satisfaction to God. Christ's passion was "voluntarily undertaken to satisfy a penal obligation" (*officio satisfactura poenali*).²

Hilary further affirms the necessity of this procedure. "It was necessary therefore that what took place should be done, because the adding of a curse did not permit the neglect of a sacrifice. From which curse Our Lord Jesus Christ redeemed us. . . . He offered Himself therefore to the death of the accursed, that He might undo the curse of the law, offering Himself voluntarily as a victim to God the Father."³

We find a doctrine of the work of Christ parallel with that of Hilary also in Ambrose, in whom the Western type of theology is still more distinctly apparent.

Ambrose definitely rests the doctrine of the Incarnation upon revelation. He does not wonder that human knowledge should err in heavenly things, but wonders that it has not obeyed Scripture.⁴ In such matters reason is of no avail.

"Non in dialecticâ complacuit Deo saluum facere populum suum."⁵

Accordingly everywhere it is the death of Christ which is made central. In no Western theologian before or after is there greater emphasis on the cross.

This appears even where Ambrose continues the realistic mysticism of Irenæus.

¹ Tract. in Ps. LXVII. 23.

² *Ibid.* 13.

³ "De Fide." 4. 1, 1.

⁴ *Ibid.* LIII. 12.

⁵ *Ibid.* 1. 5, 42.

"How except through the flesh did He become one with us? or through what but the death of the body did He loose the chains of death; for the undertaking of death by Christ became the death of death."¹

"His death was the life of all."²

The doctrine of redemption from the devil appears in Ambrose, including the idea of a fraud practised upon him. Interesting is the idea that Christ's fasting in the wilderness was a lure to deceive the devil into believing him weak and an easy prey.

"The snare could not better be broken than by some prey being exhibited to the devil, so that while he hastened to the prey, he might be bound in his own snares. . . . What could be the prey but a body? This fraud had to be practised on the devil, that the Lord Jesus should take a body, and this indeed a corruptible body. . . . And therefore the hunger of the Lord was a pious fraud, that in the case of Him, of whom the devil fearing His greater works was already afraid, he deceived by the appearance of hunger should tempt Him as a man, lest the victory (over him) should be hindered."³

It is noteworthy, however, that Ambrose, besides these ideas inherited from Origen, has others in which the ransom paid to the devil is regarded strictly after the manner of a legal process of debt, to which the devil had a claim, which God was compelled to recognize. Ambrose develops here the imagery of Col. II. 14.

"We were through sin under pledge to an evil creditor, we had contracted a bond of guilt (*chirographum culpæ*), we were owing the penalty of our blood."⁴

"We were before under a hard usurer, who could

¹ "De Fide." 3. 11, 84.

² "De Fide Resurrectionis," II. 16.

³ "In Luc." IV. 12, 16.

⁴ "De virginit." 19, 126.

not be met and satisfied except by the death of the debtor. . . . We had by our sins contracted a heavy debt, so that we were liable, who before were free."¹

This debt Jesus settles by His death.

"The Lord Jesus came, He offered His death for the death of all, He shed His blood for the blood of every one."²

"The ransom of our liberation was the blood of the Lord Jesus, which of necessity had to be paid to him to whom we were sold by our sins."³

Besides these ideas, however, Ambrose presents also with great emphasis the view of the death of Christ as a sacrifice to God.

"What greater mercy was there than that He offered Himself to be sacrificed for our crimes, that He might wash with His blood the world, whose sin could be blotted out in no other way."⁴

It is important in this connexion to notice that Ambrose lays stress on the humanity of Christ as the necessary condition of His priesthood and sacrifice.

"The same then is the priest, the same is the victim : now both priesthood and sacrifice is an office of the human condition."⁵

But Ambrose also supplements the idea of sacrifice with the thought of the satisfaction of the Divine sentence of death pronounced on sinful humanity.

"He underwent death that the sentence might be fulfilled, and that satisfaction might be made to the judgment (*satisfieret iudicatio*) : the sentence was the curse pronounced upon sinful flesh even unto death. Nothing therefore was done in opposition to the sentence of God, since the condition of the Divine sentence was fulfilled."⁶

¹ "Epist. ad Marcellinam," 41, 7.

³ "Epist. ad Constant." 72, 8.

⁵ "De Fide." 3. 11, 87.

² *Ibid.*

⁴ In Ps. XLVII. exp. 17.

⁶ "De fuga seculi," 7, 44.

Finally it is interesting and important to observe the way in which Ambrose states the problem, *Cur Deus homo?*

“What was the cause of the Incarnation, but that the flesh which had sinned might through itself be redeemed?”¹

There can be no doubt that in the doctrine of Hilary and still more of Ambrose we have to observe a distinct advance in the development of our doctrine along the lines peculiar to the West. It is true that we must not forget that the doctrine of both theologians is lacking in dogmatic precision and fulness. Neither Hilary nor Ambrose, for example, makes it clear upon what Divine attribute the necessity of Christ's sacrifice rests, whether the Divine veracity or the Divine righteousness. Nevertheless it is of the greatest importance that in these theologians, if only in a sporadic way, the somewhat loose and vague religious idea of sacrifice is replaced by the more definite juristic idea of satisfaction. In connexion with the idea of sacrifice it is necessary to emphasize the truth of what Heitmüller speaks of as “a fact for the most part overlooked, but of the greatest importance for all investigation of ritual, viz. that ritual acts, ceremonies—rites in general are of a manifold significance”.

“Just this,” he continues, “is the attractive and characteristic point in such transactions and processes, that they awake in those who solemnize them manifold sensations and moods, that they admit of manifold interpretations, which need not always thoroughly agree with one another. The rites remain, the views as to their significance change.”²

¹ “De inc. dom. sacr.” 6.

² “Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart,” s.v.; “Abendmahl,” 1. 3b.

Of no religious rite could these words be truer than of the central rite of sacrifice.¹

It is therefore of very great importance that here first in the history of theology the concept of satisfaction, and not merely the concept but the term itself, definitely appears as a rational interpretation of the idea of sacrifice. It is to be noted, however, that the idea of satisfaction as found in Hilary, has no association with the term as used by Tertullian in the sense of a merit which avails to pay a debt or with the corresponding concept of Roman private law. Its connexion is rather with the general usage in Roman law, which has been already described, i.e. the meeting of the claim of one who possesses a right. The term in the way that it is used by Hilary and Ambrose means that Christ underwent as a substitute the suffering which sinners should have borne. So Ambrose definitely states the matter.

"That since the Divine decrees cannot be dissolved, the person rather than the sentence might be changed."² To look forward to the future, it is in fact towards the Reformation conception of Christ's salvation as a vicarious endurance of punishment rather than to the Anselmic and mediaeval conception of Christ's satisfaction as a merit that pays the debt of sin that the doctrine of Hilary and Ambrose points. We have seen, however, that in Tertullian's writings *poenitentia* (*satisfactio*) has not merely the significance of a merit availing to pay a debt, but also at times that of one form of penal suffering substituted for another. It is, I think, a mistake to imagine that the notion of satisfaction in Western Catholicism, whether as applied to the practical relation

¹ Cf. "Man, Sin, and Salvation," pp. 12 ff., for the manifoldness of the Biblical ideas of sacrifice. Ethnic ideas have a still wider range.

² "In Luc." iv. 7.

of the Christian to God, or as applied to the work of Christ, was ever quite uniform. The ruling conception of satisfaction no doubt everywhere is that of a merit which pays a debt, but the other idea of a substituted punishment is always in the background, and sometimes as in these earliest applications of the term to the work of Christ comes to the front even before the Reformation.

As regards the practical attitude of the Christian to God in general, Ambrose and Hilary continue the ideas of Tertullian. "But with Ambrose begins the introduction of them into an increasingly systematized evangelical view of grace, which is finally irreconcilable with the thought of merit."¹ There is on the one hand a denial of merit in the absolute sense, but on the other hand the firm conviction that through grace merit is made possible, through which we win our salvation according to the rule of a just retribution. In Ambrose, moreover, we find a distinct advance beyond Tertullian in the view that merit is transferable. This idea, which we have seen already to exist in North Africa in Tertullian's time, follows naturally from the legal character of the conception of merit.

"The transition was formed, as appears from Cyprian, by the old conception that the merits, e.g. of the martyrs give them the right to be heard by God in prayer for others."²

Cyprian (ep. 77. 7) writes to the martyrs imprisoned in the mines: "Since now your word is more efficacious in prayer . . . beg more earnestly and ask that the Divine regard may accomplish the confession of us all, that God may deliver us with you entire and in glory from the darkness and snares of the world." In Ambrose the transference of the merits of martyrs (and virgins) is quite axiomatic.³

¹ Schultz, *op. cit.* p. 34.

² *Ibid.* p. 36.

³ *Ibid.* p. 37.

The ideas of Hilary are similar to those of Ambrose, but there is more stress on the grace of God and less on human merit. Faith, the supreme condition of salvation, cannot be merited.¹

§ 3. AUGUSTINE

It is universally recognized that in Augustine (A.D. 354-430) we have one of the great turning-points of doctrinal development. Not only does he sum up in himself what has gone before, but he incorporates with it new and original elements of the greatest importance. His writings constitute a storehouse, whence not only the mediaeval theology, but also to a large extent the theology of Protestantism has drawn its materials.

In the first place we may notice Augustine's re-statement of the problem of faith and reason.² Augustine is not without apologetic thoughts of Christianity as a renewal of the religion of nature.

"What now is called the Christian religion existed formerly among the ancients, nor was it lacking from the beginning of the human race till Christ came in the flesh, from which time the true religion, which was already, began to be called Christian."³

This agrees with the Neoplatonic vein⁴ in the theology of Augustine, according to which the essence of Christianity is simply the Logos doctrine. But more characteristic is the view in which Augustine's scepticism of reason leads him to base Christian truth solely upon revelation and in particular upon the Church. In

¹ Schultz, *op. cit.* pp. 41, 42.

² Cf. Harnack, *D.G.* III.⁴, p. 123, n. 4.

³ "Retract." I. 13, 3.

⁴ Augustine, before his final adhesion to the Catholic Church, was first a Manichæan, holding a duality of principles, good and evil: from this position he made his way to Christianity through scepticism and Neoplatonism successively. The "Neoplatonic vein" in his theology is largest in his earlier works.

a phrase that later became determinative for the mediaeval theology he says:—

“What we understand we owe to reason, what we believe to authority.”¹

Then, as regards the sphere of authority, he says:—

“I would not believe the Gospel, unless I were moved thereto by the authority of the Catholic Church.”²

To the end of his life, however, Augustine continued to hold that belief upon authority is not the highest form of faith. Higher than it is an intuitive understanding of the truth, *intelligere, credere ipsi veritati, inhærere veritati*.³ Faith upon authority is, however, the regular presupposition of understanding. Augustine says in words again determinative of the mediaeval attitude to the subject:—

“If thou canst not understand, believe that thou mayest understand. Faith goes before, understanding follows.”⁵

The next thing which it is important here to observe with respect to Augustine's theology is that by means of his doctrine of original sin he has given a firmer coherence to the understanding of the negative presupposition of the work of Christ. In the Greek theology from Irenæus onwards it was understood that the work of Christ undid Adam's sin, and that mankind was mystically one with Adam. It was also understood that in baptism was given a full forgiveness of all pre-baptismal sin. But Augustine's doctrine of the inheritance of original sin by natural generation from Adam, established it firmly that the chief result of baptism was to wash away original sin, and therefore connected more closely the doctrines of the forgiveness of sins in

¹ “De utilitate credendi,” 11, 25.

³ “De utilitate credendi,” 2, 25.

⁵ “Serm.” 118, 1.

² “Contra ep. Manich.” 5, 6.

⁴ *Ibid.* 16, 34.

baptism and of the work of Christ as an undoing of the sin of Adam.

But it is above all by his practical doctrines of grace, justification, merit, and satisfaction that Augustine prepared for fresh conceptions of the work of Christ. He himself, though we owe to him new and important views of Christ's work, was only able to a small extent to connect his doctrine of this subject with his practical doctrines. In particular his doctrine of grace, the most important element in the whole of this sphere, sits very loose to his doctrine of Christ's work. It is not impossible, therefore, in Augustine's case to treat of his practical doctrines before treating of the doctrine of the work of Christ, which ought properly to form their foundation. We shall, in fact, adopt this order, as it offers the best opportunity of pointing out in Augustine's treatment of the work of Christ, where he has continued along former lines, and where he has attempted to form a basis for his practical doctrines.

As already stated most fundamental of all Augustine's practical doctrines is his doctrine of grace. According to his doctrine of original sin, the fall of Adam had not only involved all humanity (*massa peccati*) in guilt and condemnation, but also infected it with a complete inability to all good. It is the work of grace in justification (Augustine adopts the term from Paul, but gives it his own sense) both to remove by forgiveness the guilt of all sin, especially original sin, and also to renew the will and make it capable of good. The former part, justification as the forgiveness of sins in baptism, is the interpretation of Pauline doctrine common in the Ancient Church before Augustine.

"He who is just, has it as a gift, because he is justified in baptism."¹ It is a not unnatural, though

¹ Ambrose, "Ep." 73. 11.

inexact interpretation of Pauline doctrine. The latter point, the renewal of the will, falls altogether outside the Pauline conception of justification.¹ Augustine evolved it for himself in harmony with the suggestion of the Latin word *justificare*, which he interpreted as *justum facere*: "Quid aliud est enim, justificati, quam justī facti, ab illo scilicet, qui justificat impiū".²

While the remission of sins as an element in justification is of great importance to Augustine, it is on the latter point, the renewal of the will, that the main stress is laid. This was the aspect of grace, whose necessity Augustine discovered for himself by painful experience, and which was hardly present to the minds of the Greek theologians, who were apt to think of the gift of the knowledge of God and of His law as of itself the fundamental grace of the Logos sufficient for all virtue.³ It is, however, only with grace as the remission of sins that Augustine can establish any connexion of the work of Christ through the thought of His sacrifice. Grace as renewing the will is thought of primarily as the direct work of God, or of the Logos independently of the Incarnation. The notion later established by the mediaeval theologians that grace as renewing the will, as well as the grace of pardon, was purchased by the merit of Christ found no expression in Augustine's theology.

There is, however, an important series of passages

¹ For which see "Man, Sin, and Salvation," pp. 114 ff.

² "De sp. et Litt." 25. 45.

³ Cf. Harnack, D.G. II.⁴, pp. 130, 140 ff. It may be observed that Pelagius, who opposed Augustine's doctrines of sin and grace, did so in formal agreement with the previous Greek theology. Yet the doctrine of Pelagius "was an innovation, because it nevertheless, as a matter of fact, in spite of all accommodations in expression, abandoned the pole of the mystical doctrine of redemption, which the Church had steadfastly maintained side by side with the doctrine of freedom" (Harnack, D.G.⁴, III. p. 201).

to which Gottschick has called attention,¹ in which stress is laid on the solidarity between Christ as the Head and the Church as His body or members.

"Jesus Christ for no other reason came in the flesh, and . . . was made obedient even to the death of the Cross, than that by this dispensation of most merciful grace He might quicken all those, to whom, established as if members in His body, He is the Head, that they might gain the Kingdom of Heaven."²

"The Word was made flesh, that He might become the Head of the Church."³

"He justifies only His Body, which is the Church."⁴

"He who believes in Christ . . . Christ enters into him, and is in a way united to him, and he is made a member of His body."⁵

In the above passages the quickening power of grace is definitely associated with the Incarnation; the theological mediation between the historical work of Christ and the operation of grace is, however, not made evident.

With this failure to establish a clear relation between grace and the work of Christ, we may connect a further ambiguity in Augustine's view of grace, viz. that, while he conceives it, on the one hand, in agreement with the thought that grace proceeds directly from God or the Logos, as predestinarian and independent of Church or sacraments; on the other hand, he conceives it equally as sacramental grace, which properly requires that it should entirely flow from the Incarnation. These two thoughts appear side by side in Augustine, and the relation between them is brought to no settlement. They

¹ "Augustins Anschauung von den Erlöserwirkungen Christi," "Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche," 1901, p. 107.

² "De pecc. mer." 26. 39.

³ In Ps. CXLVIII. 8.

⁴ "Ep." 185. 40.

⁵ "Serm." 144. 2, 2.

remain in unstable equilibrium, and the attempt to adjust them will be found to be one of the most fruitful causes of developments in the doctrine of the work of Christ.

The actual nature of grace, in so far as it renews the will, Augustine conceives as the infusion of love or charity, the gift of the Holy Ghost. By this infusion not only is the will renewed and made capable of good, but also faith itself is transformed from a mere historical faith into a faith informed with love, and so made saving faith.

In spite of his firm conviction that salvation is all of grace and that in the last resort human merit had no place, Augustine has nevertheless conserved the previous Catholic doctrine of merit, and reconciled it with his doctrine of grace by the idea that grace in renewing the will makes merit possible. Consequently he says:—

“When God crowns our merits, He crowns only His own gifts.”¹

Looked at from one point of view, salvation is of grace; but on the other side equally salvation is merited.

As regards *poenitentia* (*satisfactio*) Augustine establishes that for light transgressions after baptism, confession of sins in prayer to God is a sufficient satisfaction.² Graver sins, however, require due satisfaction (*satisfactio congrua*).³ In Augustine both conceptions of satisfaction as merit redeeming the debt of sin and as endurance of self-inflicted instead of Divine punishment, stand side by side. Thus on the one hand he writes:—

“Many therefore are the forms of almsgiving, which when we accomplish, we are assisted towards the remission of our sins.”⁴

On the other hand Augustine speaks of *poenitentia*

¹ “Ep.” 194. 5, 19.

³ *Ibid.* 70.

² “Ench.” 71.

⁴ *Ibid.* 72.

as existing where anyone "exercises severity towards himself, that being judged by himself, he may not be judged of the Lord".¹

So also he says :—

"He does nothing, who truly repents, except refuse to allow to remain unpunished the evil done."²

And now at last after these preliminary studies we come to Augustine's actual doctrine of the work of Christ. It is impossible to give a complete account of the enormous variety of views upon this subject, which are to be found scattered throughout his voluminous writings. We shall have to be guided in the matter of selection by the consideration of the place of Augustine in the history of our doctrine, on the one hand as transmitting the ideas of the theology of the past, and on the other hand as frequently presenting new suggestions, new combinations, and new interpretations of former doctrine, often not worked out with any degree of fullness, yet destined to be fruitful in future developments. We shall of course put in the foreground Augustine's own systematic work; but we must also go outside of this to his sermons, epistles, and homiletic works to take account of certain passages which afterwards became the starting-point for further theological developments.

In the first place we shall consider the treatment of our subject in Augustine's complete systematic work, the "Enchiridion," where the doctrine of the work of Christ is set in relation to his fundamental doctrines of original sin and of grace.

The origin of evils, says Augustine, consists in the turning away of the free will from the unchangeable to the changeable good, which took place first in the angel, then in man (23). Both angels and men are alike justly subjects of damnation for their wickedness. But man

¹ "Serm." 351. 4, 7.

² "Ep." 153. 3, 6.

has a penalty of his own, viz. the death of the body (25). Moreover, the sin of the first man brought penalty upon the race. Adam "brought the penalty of death and damnation upon his posterity, which by sinning he had corrupted in himself as it were in its root" (26). Thus the whole *massa damnata* was involved in the eternal condemnation of the rebellious angels. And so it might have justly continued, seeing that man had justly brought the calamity upon himself. So indeed it would have done, were it not that God is not only just but also merciful (27). It pleased God with a view to the order and harmony of the universe to fill up the number of the eternal Jerusalem, depleted by the fall of the angels, by saving some from the mass of sinful humanity (29). This part of humanity, however, could not be saved by the merit of its own works. By the fall the free will had been destroyed, so that man could no longer do what is good. Salvation can therefore only be by grace (30). Faith and regeneration are alike the gifts of the Divine grace (31). The restored free will, therefore, the basis of all merit, is a gift of Divine grace (32).

The human race was thus lying under a just damnation, and all were children of wrath. "Since men through original sin were under this wrath, and that sin the heavier and more hurtful according as they had added greater or rather more sins, a mediator was necessary, that is a reconciler, who might placate this wrath by the offering of a unique sacrifice, of which all the sacrifices of the law and the prophets were shadows."

The grace of God through Jesus Christ is in fact reconciliation through a mediator, and the gift of the Holy Ghost whereby we from enemies are made sons of God (33). The Mediator, being born from a virgin, was without original sin (34). He was at once God and man (35). The Incarnation is itself a supreme manifestation of the

Divine grace. "For what did the human nature in the man Christ merit, that it should be so uniquely assumed into the unity of the person of the only Son of God?" The purpose, then, of this extraordinary manifestation of grace is "that men may understand that they are justified from sin by the same grace, by which it was brought about that the man Christ could have no sin" (36).

Christ, then, exempt from original sin and therefore Himself committing no sin, "yet on account of the likeness of the sinful flesh, in which He had come, is Himself also called sin, from having to be sacrificed to wash away sin" (41). That He was made sin means that He was a sacrifice for sin, which might avail for our reconciliation.

"He therefore was made sin, that we might become righteousness, not our own but God's, nor yet in ourselves, but in Himself; . . . just as He Himself showed by the likeness of the sinful flesh, in which He was crucified, that the sin was not His own, but ours, and that its ground was not in Himself, but in us; so that, because there was no sin in Him, He might in a way die to sin, while dying to the flesh in which there was a likeness of sin, and since He Himself had never lived according to the old sinful nature, He might signify by His resurrection our new life renewing itself from the ancient death, by which we were dead in sin" (41).

It is in fact this death to sin, and resurrection to new life, that is celebrated in the great sacrament of baptism (42). By it all die to sin, infants to original sin only, adults to original and actual sin also (43). So then baptism is a likeness of the death of Christ, and the death of Christ is a likeness of the forgiveness of sins, that, as Christ truly died, we might truly be forgiven, and, as He was truly raised, so we might be truly justified (52).

"Whatever therefore was done in the cross of Christ, in His burial, in His resurrection on the third day, in His ascent into heaven, in His sitting at the right hand of the Father, was so done that the Christian life which is lived here, might be conformed to these things, which were not only mystically said but also done" (53).

This extremely important statement now demands some analysis and comment. As regards the main lines of doctrine as to the work of Christ, it is clear that Augustine resolutely follows Paul. Men were under the wrath of God, and Christ's sacrifice placates this wrath and reconciles us to God. At the same time it is itself a manifestation of the Divine mercy.¹ Augustine moreover distinctly explains the phrase "He was made sin for us"² as meaning, "He was made a sacrifice for us," thus defining Paul's doctrine more clearly than does Paul himself, who does not often actually use the terminology of sacrifice. Pauline also, however, is the addition to the doctrine of Christ's sacrifice of the idea of His death as inclusive of ours and of the appropriation of the principle of this death in baptism.³ Thus Augustine's doctrine in the "Enchiridion" is fundamentally Pauline.

The following points, however, are developments beyond Paul. Augustine has not only brought the work of Christ into connexion with his doctrines of original sin and of grace, but as a result he has also been able on the one hand to evaluate Christ's birth from a virgin as representing His freedom from original sin and consequent fitness for the work of mediation, and on the other hand he has been led to raise the important question, hereafter frequently to be discussed, of the

¹ Cf. for both aspects Rom. III. 24-26, and "Man, Sin, and Salvation," p. 119.

² 2 Cor. v. 21.

³ "Ench." 42, 43, 53. See above.

ultimate relation of the work of Christ to the Divine grace. This question is, Does the work of Christ by reconciling God procure the Divine grace for men, or is it not finally itself subordinate to it, and a pure manifestation of the Divine grace? Augustine, in spite of his clear doctrine that the sacrifice of Christ obtains for sinners reconciliation with God, regards the whole work of Christ from the Incarnation onward as ultimately purely dependent on the Divine grace. The human nature in Christ in no way merited an assumption into the Divine person: thus the Incarnation is a supreme example of Divine grace, teaching that men are justified by the same grace, which effected the sinlessness of Christ. The natural conclusion from this doctrine is that in the last resort justification depends simply upon the absolute unmerited grace of God, and that therefore the necessity of the work of Christ to bring it about can only be relative. This, moreover, as we shall presently see, is in reality the view of Augustine; though nevertheless he lays great stress on the worth of Christ's sacrifice.

If now we take the "Enchiridion" as representing Augustine's considered systematic doctrine of the work of Christ, it is evident that it represents an enormous change from the Greek theology. We breathe a different atmosphere. The presuppositions and the conclusions are alike different. The central points are no longer the physical corruption wrought by the Fall, and the Incarnation as in principle the destruction of death and the deification of humanity; but instead we have original sin, justification by grace, and the reconciliation of God by the sacrifice of Christ. The Western type of thought here asserts itself in a fundamental and most striking form.

We have, however, now to supplement what we have learned from the "Enchiridion" from the other writings

of Augustine, in which process we shall discover the great variety of views already alluded to as contained in his works. There is practically no previous form of doctrine which he does not somewhere continue, while there are not a few notable novelties, which lie outside the doctrine of the "Enchiridion".

Before, however, we come to these further views, we may first supplement the doctrine of Christ's sacrifice in the "Enchiridion" by a few passages from Augustine's other writings, in which his view in this direction is further defined. Specially important is the following:—

"Of thy two evils, one is guilt (*culpa*), the other is punishment (*poena*): the guilt is that thou art unrighteous: the punishment that thou art mortal. . . . (Christ) by assuming the punishment without assuming the guilt, blotted out both the guilt and the punishment."¹

It is to be observed that the sentence here occurring, "Suscipiendo poenam et non suscipiendo culpam, et culpam delevit et poenam," is frequently repeated (with slight variations) in Augustine's writings.²

Of importance also is the stress which Augustine lays on the humanity of the Mediator.

"So far as He is man, so far is He the mediator."³

"Nor yet is He the mediator, on this account that He is the Word . . . but He is mediator in virtue of the fact that He is man."⁴

Here most distinctly in opposition to the characteristic Eastern view of Christ as the God who becomes man in order to deify humanity, we have indicated the view destined to attain complete supremacy in the West, that Christ is the man who offers sacrifice to God, qualified thereto of course by His Divine nature.

¹ "Serm." 171. 3.

³ "Conf." x. 43, 68.

² Cf. Gottschick, op. cit. p. 181.

⁴ "De Civ. Dei," ix. 15, 2.

So much then for Augustine's reflections along the lines of the doctrine of sacrifice. Now in the next place we must consider the alternative statement of the doctrine of justification and reconciliation to God, which Augustine gives in "De Trinitate," XIII., where the work of Christ is regarded mainly as redemption from the devil.¹ This passage in the "De Trinitate" contains also a systematic treatment of the work of Christ, though it differs from that given in the "Enchiridion" in the important point that it is not connected with a complete whole of doctrine.

Here Augustine is once more perplexed by the question of the relation of the grace of God to the need of the placation of the Divine wrath by a sacrifice.

"What is the meaning of the words, Reconciled by the death of His Son? Is it that, when God the Father was angry with us, He looked upon the death of His Son for us and was propitiated (*placatus*) towards us? . . . Unless the Father had been already propitiated towards us, would He, without sparing His Son, have given Him for us?"²

In order to meet this difficulty, Augustine tends practically to substitute in part at least for the wrath of God the claim of the devil as the obstacle which is to be met by the death of Christ, prior to our justification and reconciliation with God. His view is that reconciliation with God and justification are alike the just removal of God's retribution upon sin. God's wrath is not a perturbation of the mind, but simply this just retribution.³ This retribution, however, operates through the claim of the devil upon sinners: so that

¹ Cf. also a brief incidental statement of this doctrine in "Ench." 49.

² 11, 15.

³ 16, 21.

both reconciliation and justification are equivalent to the legal annulment of this claim by means of the death of Christ.

In Augustine's treatment of this subject the notion of a deceit practised upon the devil disappears in favour of the idea of a legal annulment of his claim. Augustine first explains the justice and the general character of this claim.

"By the justice of God in some sense the human race was delivered into the power of the devil, the sin of the first man passing over by origination into all who are born through the conjugal union of both sexes, and the debt of our first parents binding their whole posterity."¹

This delivering up is contained in the course which gives men over to death. God, however, in acting thus "did not release man from the government of His own power, when He permitted him to be in the power of the devil; since even the devil himself is not outside the power of the Omnipotent".² Augustine's tendency in fact is, while making use of the doctrine of redemption from the devil, to allow the devil as little independence of God as is consistent with a real claim on his part.³

The actual process of redemption from the devil Augustine explains in the "De Trinitate" as follows: He was to be overcome not by might but by righteousness, as was seemly for God, in order that He might teach men to value righteousness above might, and not might above righteousness after the manner of the devil.

"What then is that righteousness by which the devil was conquered? What but the righteousness of Jesus Christ? And how was he conquered? Because when he found in Him nothing worthy of death, he yet

¹ 12, 16.

² *Ibid.*

³ Elsewhere Augustine calls the devil "the exactor of punishment". "Enarr. in Ps." CXLII. 8.

slew Him. And certainly it is just that we whom he held as debtors, should be set at liberty, as believing in Him, whom he slew without any debt. This is the meaning of our being said to be justified in the blood of Christ.”¹

The essence of the matter then is that the devil has to cede his claim upon men, as amends for the violence used against the innocent Christ. In connexion with this doctrine we may observe Augustine’s use of a phrase from the Psalms, destined to be famous in the mediaeval theology.² According to the interpretation of the passage adopted by Augustine, it is Christ who speaks, and says, “Then I restored that which I took not away” (“Quæ non rapui, tunc exsolvebam”). The meaning is that Christ pays the debt of sin, which He did not contract.

To the same effect also Augustine refers to John xiv. 30, “The Prince of this world cometh, and hath nothing in me”. The meaning is that Christ was to pay for us debtors what He Himself did not owe, i.e. was to die at the hands of the devil, and so earn our release from sin.

Augustine points out here the necessity that Christ should be both man and God. “Unless He had been man, He could not have been slain; unless He had been God, men would have believed, not that He would not do what He could, but that He could not do what He would.”³

Christ thus conquered the devil by righteousness, not by might, though the latter way was open to Him; afterwards, however, He conquered him by might also in His resurrection.

If now we review this doctrine of redemption from the devil as a whole, we see that it serves in reality as an alternative to the doctrine of sacrifice, one which

¹ 14, 18.² Ps. LXIX. 4.³ 14, 18.

Augustine is led to adopt from the past, in order to meet the difficulty of harmonizing the free grace of God as the source of redemption with the necessity of the death of Christ. In the doctrine of Christ's sacrifice this necessity is grounded in the need of the propitiation of the Divine wrath. Here, however, it is based upon the demand of justice, which for Augustine is expressed in the claim of the devil.

In connexion with this it is to be observed that Augustine not only, as we have already seen, finds in this necessity a reason for Christ's being both God and man, but also a reason for His being of Adam's race.

"Assuredly God could have taken upon Himself to be man, in order that in that manhood He might be the mediator of God and man, from some other source and not from the race of that Adam, who bound the human race by his sin ; just as He did not create him, whom He first created, of the race of some one else. Therefore He was able either so, or in any other mode that He would, to create yet one other, by whom the conqueror of the first might be conquered. But God judged it better to take upon Him from the very race that had been conquered the man through whom to conquer the enemy of the human race."¹

Moreover, as in the parallel doctrine of Christ's work as sacrifice, Augustine here evaluates the virgin birth of Christ as the means by which He had escaped the taint of original sin, which is propagated by ordinary generation, and so was able, as before explained, through His death to conquer the devil.

We may observe that the virgin birth of Christ hereby enters much more essentially into the doctrine of the Incarnation than in the interpretation previously given of it apart from the doctrine of original sin by

¹ 18, 23.

Gregory of Nyssa, viz. that its miraculous character was calculated along with Christ's subsequent miracles to awaken the devil's cupidity for the soul of Christ.

Finally, however, it is most important to note that while Augustine thus finds a rational necessity for the death of Christ, and also for the accompanying circumstances of His Incarnation, he totally denies that this necessity was absolute. His statement, which is of immense consequence for the further history of doctrine, is as follows:—

“We must show, not indeed that no other mode was possible to God, to whose power all things are equally subject, but that there neither was nor need have been any other mode more appropriate for curing our misery.”¹

For this appropriateness Augustine finds many other reasons besides the relative necessity of the death of Christ. These are suggested in “De Trin.” XIII. 10, 13; 17, 22; but are more fully worked out in other places of Augustine's writings, and we shall therefore first study them in this developed form, finally, however, reverting to the statement of the “De Trinitate” because of its classical importance. We may sum them up in general as considerations of the subjective or psychological results of the Incarnation.

In the first place we may note that Augustine, while repeating in places the Greek doctrine of the Incarnation, tends to give this a psychological and subjective turn. We find in his writings such statements as:—

“He who was God became man to make gods (*deos factururus*) those who were men.”²

“For neither should we be made participators of His divinity, unless He became a participator of our mortality.”³

¹ 10, 13. Cf. the teaching of Gregory of Nyssa, that the patient must not prescribe his cure (“Cat. Magna,” 17).

² “Serm.” 192. 7.

³ “In Ps. cxviii.” Serm. 16, 6.

But on the other hand Augustine gives a fresh interpretation of the nature of deification, and one very different from the usual Greek idea.

"We are made gods by loving God (*amando deum, efficitur dii*)."¹ In harmony with this he teaches that the deification of mankind in Christ is not natural but adoptive.

"For God wishes to make thee God, not by nature . . . but by His gift and adoption."²

Approximation to God in fact is not physical but ethical.

"We are moved towards Him, who is everywhere present, not spatially, but by good desire and good conduct."³

The nearest thing to this in the Greek theology is the ethical interpretation of deification by Origen. Whoever imitates Jesus, participates in the Divine nature which He bears.⁴

But even this is not quite the idea of Augustine. A new and warmer note is struck, when he says, "*amando deum, efficitur dii*."

We turn next, however, to consider Augustine's treatment of the Greek doctrine of the Incarnation, not in the shortened or Athanasian form, but in its fuller or Irenæan form. In his theology the Irenæan doctrine of the undoing of Adam's fall by the Incarnation, Passion, Death, and Resurrection of Christ, takes fresh life in combination with the doctrine of Gregory of Nyssa of the Incarnation as a healing process in humanity, the whole being again by Augustine given a subjective or psychological tendency.

The idea of sin as a disease and of Christ as physician and medicine is frequent in Augustine. In this connex-

¹ "Serm." 121. 1.

² *Ibid.* 166. 4.

³ "Doctr. Chr." I. 10.

⁴ "De princ." IV. 31.

ion the passage "*De doctrinâ christiana*," i. 14, is of special importance. Here Augustine says that "the medicine of (Divine) wisdom was by His assumption of humanity adapted to our wounds, curing some of them by their opposites, some of them by their similars."

As examples of the treatment by means of opposites we have the following :—

"Seeing therefore that man fell through pride, He applied humility to cure him. We were ensnared by the wisdom of the serpent : we are set free by the foolishness of God. . . . We used immortality so badly as to incur the penalty of death : Christ used mortality so well as to restore us through life. The disease entered a woman's corrupted soul : the remedy came forth from a woman's uncorrupted body."

As examples of treatment by means of similars Augustine offers on the other hand the following congruities :—

"He was born of a woman to deliver us, who were beguiled through a woman ; He came as a mortal man to save us, who are mortal men, by death to save us who were dead."

These passages are especially important as showing how the Irenæan notion of the work of Christ as an undoing of the work of Adam, in the very nature of the case exactly corresponding with and yet also exactly opposed to the sin which it undoes, passed on to the mediaeval theology. The subjective note, however, is new. When it is said that Christ's humility heals our pride, this is not Irenæan, but distinctively Augustinian. It may be pointed out that this psychological interpretation of the Incarnation readily merges itself into the simple idea of Christ as example and teacher, which indeed is not infrequent in Augustine.

“He has run, crying out by His words, deeds, death, life, descent, ascent, that we may return to Him.”¹

“The Lord Jesus Christ commended to us in His passion the labours and tribulations of this age : in His resurrection He commended eternal life and the blessedness of the future age.”²

Augustine also says that Christ’s sufferings admonish His faithful followers to despise temporal for eternal felicity.³

Thirdly, there is one more explanation of the Incarnation and of the work of Christ, which is in a line with the subjective and psychological aspects of the doctrines just described, and is a fresh and important contribution to the history of our subject. It is the doctrine based on Rom. v. 8 ; VIII. 32 (afterwards to become the starting-point of the theory of Abelard), which receives its fullest and most characteristic expression in “De cat. rudibus,” 4, 7.

“What greater cause was there for the advent of the Lord, than that God should show the love which He has in our case, strongly commending it, because, when we were yet enemies, Christ died for us. This therefore took place, as the end of the precept and the fulfilment of the law is charity, that we should love Him in return, and just as He laid down His life for us, so we also should lay down our lives for the brethren, and if it were difficult for us to love God Himself, at least it should not be difficult for us to love Him in return, when He first loved us and spared not His Only Son, but gave Him up for us all. For there is no greater invitation to love, than to be first in loving.”

Another passage to the same effect is “De cat. rudibus,” 22, 39 :—

¹ “Conf.” IV. 12, 19.

² “Serm,” 217. 3.

³ “De grat. nov. test.” 5, 13.

“Who would not strive to love in return, a most just and merciful God, who first so loved men most unjust and proud, that for their sakes He sent His Only Son, through whom He made all things, who was made man, not by the change of Himself but by the assumption of a man, not merely to live with them, but also to be slain for them and by them?”

Finally, the statement of “De Trin.” XIII. 10, 13; 17, 12, may now be seen to be no more in general than a mere outline sketch of the foregoing views. It has, however, a peculiar importance of its own, inasmuch as it contains one or two things not previously mentioned, and also because of its direct influence on the mediaeval theology. Its arguments are as follows:—

(1) Nothing is more calculated to stimulate our hope of immortality than the manifestation of God’s love in the Incarnation.

(2) This manifestation of Divine love (or grace) is peculiarly seen in Christ’s assumption of our humanity without prior merits on its part, and indeed in spite of our demerits (cf. “Ench.” 36).

(3) The Incarnation shows the value set by God on man, and should prevent the idea that the devils, because they are without flesh, are his superior.

(4) The Incarnation is adapted to heal our pride, to teach man how far he has removed from God, and to show the remedial value of suffering.

(5) Christ’s death is an example of obedience, His resurrection of its reward.

In the above views of the work of Christ we have then the additional reasons why Augustine finds the Incarnation and death of Christ the appropriate means of redemption. It is characteristic of his theology that while, as we have seen, in his systematic work, the “Enchiridion,” he elevates the doctrine of Christ’s

sacrifice into the central and fundamental doctrine of Christ's work, yet he abounds in other suggestive and fruitful points of view, which, however, he has not been able to combine together. Enough has been said to show how Augustine's writings constituted a mine, out of which later theologians could extract an abundant material for many doctrinal developments.

We may conclude our account of Augustine by citing a passage from the "Enchiridion" itself, in which, apart from his systematic treatment of the work of Christ, he has brought together most of his various views on the subject.

"When Adam was made, i.e. as a just man, there was no need of a mediator. When, however, sins had separated the human race far from God, it behoved us though the Mediator, who alone was born and lived and was slain without sin, to be reconciled to God even to the resurrection of the flesh unto eternal life; so that human pride might be reprov'd and healed by the humility of God, and it might be manifested to man how far he had departed from God, when he was recalled by God incarnate, and an example of obedience might be given to rebellious man by the God-man; and the Only Begotten assuming the form of a servant, which had before deserved nothing, the fount of grace might be opened, and also the resurrection of the flesh promised to the redeemed might be shown beforehand in the Redeemer Himself; and by the same nature which he rejoiced to have deceived the devil might be conquered; and yet man should not glory lest pride should again be born; and whatever else may be perceived and expressed by the advanced in knowledge concerning this great sacrament of the Mediator, or may only be perceived even if it cannot be expressed."¹

¹ "Ench." 108.

§ 4. LEO THE GREAT AND GREGORY THE GREAT

Between Augustine and the mediaeval theology stand the figures of Leo the Great (*ob.* A.D. 461) and Gregory the Great (*ob.* A.D. 604), who both deserve some notice.

Leo is the less important. We may note first the form which the doctrine of merit takes in his hands. His teaching is given with numerous references to his works by Schultz,¹ whose results I here summarize. Leo continues on the one hand the view that almsgiving, fasting, and prayer merit eternal life and avail to atone for post-baptismal sin, but on the other the doctrine that in the last resort all is of grace. "The Augustinian doctrine of grace hinders Leo as little as Augustine himself from accepting that by merits eternal life can be earned, and satisfaction be made for sins after baptism. This last, however, properly takes place, when the divinely instituted power of the priest and the ecclesiastically instituted penance are guarantee, as otherwise no one would know when his merits really satisfy for his sins."²

The last point is important as illustrating the development in the West of the ideas which led ultimately in the Middle Ages to the establishment of a sacrament of penance.

Important also is the way in which Leo not only views the merits of the saints as effective for others, but also brings them into comparison with the work of Christ, only, however, to refuse to put the two things on the same level.

He says on the one hand :—

"By so much as we are brought down by our sins, by so much may we be raised by the apostolic merits."³

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 42.

² *Ibid.* ; cf. Leo, "Ep." 108. 3 ; 168. 2 ; 171. 1.

³ "Serm." 82. 7.

But on the other hand he says :—

“The righteous have received, not given crowns; and from the courage of the faithful have been born examples of patience, not the gifts of righteousness. In each case, moreover, their deaths were each for himself (*singulares*); nor did anyone pay the debt of another by his own end, since among the sons of men the Lord Jesus only has appeared, in whom all have been crucified, all are dead and buried, all again have been raised.”¹

Leo explained the effect of the merits of the saints in two ways (1) by the influence of their example,² (2) by their intercession with God.³

As regards the doctrine of the work of Christ Leo affords no new point of view. He is simply a transmitter to posterity of the doctrines already found in Ambrose and Augustine. Moreover, these views are found in Leo principally in his sermons, i.e. rather in a homiletic than in a scientific form.

With Gregory the Great the case is somewhat different. Before, however, we approach his proper doctrine of the work of Christ we must stop to consider his contributions in some outlying regions.

In the first place it is to be observed that he set faith and reason in even stronger opposition to each other than did Augustine. A famous saying of his is often quoted in the Middle Ages.

“Faith has no merit, where human reason affords a test (*experimentum*).”⁴

As regards the doctrines of grace and merit in general Gregory stands in the line of the previous Western theology since Ambrose and Augustine. But in his theology “is to be found a peculiarly external

¹ “Serm.” 64. 3.

² *Ibid.* 85. 1.

³ *Ibid.* 84. 1, 2; 85. 4.

⁴ “In Evang.” II.; Hom. xxvi.

mode of combining the Augustinian doctrine with the doctrine of merit".¹ If on the one hand Gregory holds that salvation is all of grace, on the other hand he teaches almost juristically that God "inquires into the life of men simply by the quantity of merits".²

Like Ambrose and Leo he regards it as axiomatic that the merits of the saints avail for others. Like Leo, however, he views the intercession of the saints with God as the channels through which this availment operates.

"Those who . . . run to the protection of the holy martyrs and press upon their sacred bodies with supplications, pray that they may merit (*promereri*) pardon through their intercession."³

Finally, however, Gregory's actual doctrine of the work of Christ is of some importance. Much of it of course is merely repetition of older ideas. But Loofs⁴ has collected from the writings of Gregory a series of passages, in which, as he says, though neither of the terms satisfaction or merit is used, yet the ideas occur which later found their most pregnant expression in these terms:—

"Some just men can sometimes meet the manifestations of present censure by the merit of an acceptable innocence, but they are not able by their own virtue to expel from the human race the punishment of imminent death. . . . The Redeemer of the human race, being constituted through the flesh the Mediator of God and man, since He alone appeared as righteous among men and yet even without guilt met the punishment of guilt, has both reproved men of sin and stood in the way of

¹ Schultz, op. cit. p. 43.

² "Moral," 25. l. 1, as quoted by Schultz: another reading is "quality".

³ *Ibid.* 16. 51, 64.

⁴ D.G. p. 448.

the Divine stroke . . . has reproved the guilt of man by inspiring righteousness, and by dying, has assuaged the wrath of the Judge . . . has given men an example to imitate, and manifested to God in Himself works by which He might be propitiated towards men.”¹

“Since there was no one, by whose merits the Lord could be propitiated towards us, the Only begotten of the Father, assuming the form of our weakness, alone appeared as righteous, to intercede for sinners.”²

“For in interceding for sinners He showed Himself a righteous man who might merit forgiveness for others (*qui pro aliis indulgentiam mereretur*).”³

“Without intermission the Redeemer slays a holocaust for us, in that He without cessation exhibits His Incarnation to the Father for us. His very Incarnation is the sacrifice of our cleansing, since He shows Himself as man; and intervening blots out man’s offences (*delicta*).”⁴

Moreover, it is of great importance to note that “in connexion with these thoughts the idea, which in Augustine on account of his Neoplatonism did not attain to real recognition, viz. that the grace won by Christ and operative in the saving institution of the Church is the grace of God, is clearly brought to expression”.⁵

Gregory therefore is to be regarded as a distinct stage in the development from Augustine to the Middle Ages. What there emerges into distinct and clear formulation, already finds a more inchoate expression in his writings.

§ 5. WESTERN ADOPTIANISM

In commenting on the Creed of Chalcedon, I have already referred to the interest of the West in the full

¹ “Moral,” 9. 38, 61.

² *Ibid.* 24. 3, 5.

³ *Ibid.* 24. 2, 4.

⁴ *Ibid.* 1, 24. 32.

⁵ Loofs, loc. cit.

humanity of Christ. We have also observed in our study of the Western theologians themselves their corresponding interest in the human aspect of the work of Christ, His cross and passion, which is so emphatically enunciated in the famous doctrine of Augustine, "In quantum homo, in tantum Mediator".

It is now necessary, in order to explain certain developments which we shall meet with in the mediaeval theology, to follow up further some manifestations and consequences of the Western interest in the humanity of our Lord. While the Latins Hilary, Ambrose, and Augustine accepted the Greek view, as fixed in the Nicene Creed, according to which the Logos is to be understood as the subject of the historical life of Jesus Christ, they yet at the same time under the influence of Phil. II. 5-11, present a view akin to that later represented in the Greek Church by the Nestorians, in which more independence is given to the humanity of Christ as the *forma servi* over against the *forma Dei*, and in fact the man Christ Jesus is thought of as the subject of actions, whereby He earns for Himself the reward of immortality and Divine glory.

Thus Hilary says:—¹

"Because all this prayer (Save me, O God, by Thy name,) ² proceeds from the character (*persona*) of the servile form, for which servile form, assumed even unto the death of the Cross, He beseeches the salvation of that name which is God's; and, as one to be saved by the name of God, He goes on to add, 'and judge me in Thy might'. For because of the merit of His humility, since He had emptied Himself, accepting the form of a servant, He was now again seeking in that humility, which He had assumed, the form which He shared with God; when the very man, in whom God had been

¹ Tractatus in Ps. LIII. 5.

² Ps. LIV. 1.

obediently born, should have been saved by the name of God."

Ambrose shows less deviation from the orthodox Greek view, yet he too could write:—

"It was the man, who cried,¹ being about to die by reason of the separation of the Divinity."²

Augustine, again, expounds Jn. xvii. 1 ("Father, glorify thy Son") by a reference to Phil. ii. 8-11, and says:—

"That therefore the Mediator of God and men, the man Jesus Christ, might be glorified by the resurrection, He was first humiliated by the passion. . . . Humility is the merit of glory, glory the reward of humility. But this was done in the form of a servant, but in the form of God there always was and always will be glory."³

Along the same line is the thought of the man Jesus as the supreme example of predestinating grace.

"There is no more illustrious example of predestination than Jesus Himself."⁴

Similar again is the thought which we have already noticed in the "Enchiridion":—

"Men are to understand, that they are justified from their sins by the same grace, by which it was brought about that the man Christ could have no sin."⁵ Augustine once even wrote of the man Christ as *homo dominicus*,⁶ though afterwards he regretted the phrase.⁷

In the subsequent history of thought in the West passages like the above continued to work as a leaven in spite of the general acceptance of the Greek doctrine of the Person of Christ as fixed at Chalcedon. This is

¹ Matt. xxvii. 46.

³ "In Joh. tract." 104. 3.

⁵ "Ench." 36. 11.

⁷ "Retract." 1. 19, 8.

² "Expos. in Luc." 10. 127.

⁴ "De dono persever." 24. 67.

⁶ "De serm. dom." 2. 6, 20.

shown by the adoptianist controversy in Spain and France in the eighth century A.D., in which the Western interest in the humanity of Christ, expressed in an extreme form, came into collision with the Greek view. The "adoptianist" view of the Person of Christ was expressed by Elipandus, Archbishop of Toledo, as follows :—

"The Son of God Himself according to the form of a servant, which He assumed from the Virgin (in which He is less than the Father, and is not the Adopted of God by nature, but by adoption), is the first-born among many brethren according to the Apostle. Wherefore should He not be called the Adopted, who is equally perfect in all that pertains to us, sin except, as in all that pertains to Himself."¹

Elipandus therefore appealed to the Western element in the Chalcedonian Creed in support of his views. Nevertheless his doctrine was rejected at the Councils of Ratisbon (A.D. 792), Frankfort (A.D. 794), Aix (A.D. 799). The opposition to adoptianism was thus voiced by the leading Carolingian theologian, Alcuin :—

"The humanity entered into the unity of the Person of the Son of God and remained the same attribute in two natures under the name of the Son, as it was before in one substance. For in the assumption of the flesh by God, the person of the man perishes, not his nature."²

This is of course the Greek doctrine of the enhypostatic union.

¹ Cf. Loofs, D.G.⁴, p. 456.

² *Ibid.*, loc. cit.



PART II
THE MEDIAEVAL THEOLOGY

CHAPTER I

PRELIMINARY STUDIES

§ 1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF PENANCE IN THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES

As a preparation to the study of the doctrine of the work of Christ in the Middle Ages, it is necessary first of all to give an account of the development of the doctrine of penance, particularly as regards the modification of the idea of satisfaction.

The penitential system of the Ancient Church was fundamentally one of public penance for mortal sins, i.e. for such sins as were held apart from such penance to exclude from final salvation. As we have already observed, for the ordinary minor sins of daily life nothing more than confession of them to God in prayer was regarded as the necessary condition of the Divine forgiveness.¹

Even in the Ancient Church, however, a system of private penance came to be established, at first in monastic circles. This aimed not merely at dealing with manifest sins, such as excluded from the Christian Church, but at eradicating the roots of sin in the heart, and involved therefore a penitential discipline for other than mortal sins.

In the early Middle Ages the public to a great extent disappears in favour of the private penance. In connexion with the latter, moreover, there began to ap-

¹ Aug. "Ench." 71.
(147)

pear first in Ireland, then in England, and finally on the Continent a series of penitential books (*libri penitentialiales*), directing the priest in his office as spiritual adviser and fixing the amount of satisfaction required in individual cases. Not without some opposition was the supersession of the public by the private penance effected, but in the end it became practically universal. "From the end of the eleventh century onwards the *poenitentia (publica et) sollemnis* . . . has become a mere curiosity in the inventory of possible Church procedure against sinners, which in practice was almost entirely put in the background by modern developments."¹

Two things in particular concern us in the newer penitential discipline.

The first is the increasing tendency towards the definite transformation of the penitential discipline into a sacrament. Its parts came to be defined as *contritio cordis, confessio oris, satisfactio operis*,² and the tendency is for the confession (to a priest) to assume a more and more important position. The theory establishes itself that by confession even mortal sins are transformed into venial sins, which require to be expiated not in hell but in purgatory, unless satisfaction be made for them in the present life. This theory is clearly laid down in the eleventh century Pseudo-Augustinian treatise, "*De vera et falsa poenitentia*".

"In that (the sinner) of himself speaks to the priest and overcomes his shame by the fear of an offended God, there comes about the forgiveness of the crime. For that which was criminal in the doing becomes venial through confession; and even if it is not purged away at once (i.e. by satisfaction) nevertheless that becomes venial, which as committed was mortal" (10. 25).

The priest appears in the "*De vera et falsa poeni-*

¹ Loofs, D.G. I.⁴, p. 478.

² Op. cit. p. 484.

tentia" as the "nuntius dei" (10. 25), whose is the "potestas judicis" (15. 30). In this way the discipline of penance becomes essentially a sacrament, since grace operates through the word of the priest in absolution to convert mortal into venial sins, an idea unknown in the Ancient Church.

The other point which concerns us in the newer penitential discipline is the introduction in the penitential books of redemptions or commutations of the satisfactions proper to various offences. The result of this innovation is to increase the tendency to view the satisfaction from a material point of view, which is immanent from the first in the conception of it as a merit cancelling the debt of sin, and immanent also in the notion of the possibility of a transference of merits. The necessary satisfaction comes more and more to be regarded as something that can be detached from the person and treated upon commercial lines.

The commutations and redemptions of penitential satisfaction have thus far their origin in the practice of the Ancient Church that in cases of extraordinary penitence, something of the satisfaction might be remitted.¹ But in the mediaeval practice we come upon a regular tariff of commutations.

In Ireland, as far back as the seventh century, in certain cases fasts were commuted into less exacting penances, such as psalm-singing.² It is, however, a stage beyond this, when we find it allowed to substitute for personal fasting the fasting of others.

"He who knows not the Psalms and cannot fast, must choose a righteous man, who may fulfil this for him, and he must redeem this at his own expense and labour."³

¹ Loofs, op. cit. p. 492.

² *Ibid.* p. 493.

³ "Poenitentiale Cummeani," ninth century, in Wasserschleben, "Die Bussordnungen der abendländischen Kirche," 1851, p. 463.

A still more extreme instance of the redemption of a satisfaction by means of the fasting of others is found in the "Canones editi sub Edgardo" (Edgar of England, A.D. 959-975): de magnatibus II; where it is explained how a rich man can accomplish a seven years' fast in three days.

"In the first place let him take to his help twelve men, and let them fast three days on bread and green herbs and water, and let him look out for himself to complete it, as far as he can, seven times one hundred and twenty men, who may fast for him each for three days: then as many fasts are fasted, as there are days in seven years. . . . This is the relaxation of penance for a powerful man and one rich in friends. But a man without power (*infirmus*) cannot act thus; but must look after the matter with more zeal in his own person."¹

Yet another mode of redeeming the more exacting satisfaction of fasting is by almsgiving.

"If any one perchance cannot fast and have the means of redemption, if he be rich let him give instead of seven weeks, twenty shillings. If he have not wherewithal to give this, let him give ten shillings. If he be very poor, let him give three shillings. . . . But let each one have regard to what he should give, whether it is to be expended for the redemption of prisoners, or upon the holy altar, or for the Christian poor."²

The above instances give a sufficient idea of the nature of the mediaeval redemptions. The important question has been raised whether in part at least they owe their origin to the system of compositions existing in the secular law of the Irish and more especially of the Teutonic peoples.

¹ Quoted by Loofs, op. cit. p. 494, n. 6.

² "Poenitentiale Pseudo-Bedæ," c. A.D. 800, cap. 41, Wasserschleben, op. cit. p. 276 f.

The legal system in question turns upon the idea of the honour-price or wergild set upon the life of every free man. Where a man has been killed his family may accept a composition instead of exercising the right of revenge.

In Irish law every man's life was estimated by an *einechlan* or honour-price according to his status. This was reckoned either in cattle or in female bond-slaves, one of the latter being valued at the worth of three oxen. If a man were slain, his honour-price was paid by the family of the slayer to that of the slain, the fine being leviable first on the criminal himself, and then by a regulated system on his relations in order of proximity.¹

The German ideas were very similar. An injury committed by an individual brings about a state of feud between the kin of the injured and that of the injurer. This feud may be ended by revenge for the injury, or instead the kin of the injured may accept a compensation.

The fundamental case in which the alternative of feud or compensation obtained was that of murder. Here the compensation was the wergild, a compensation fixed according to the rank and position of the murdered man. But compensations for smaller injuries were also fixed: these sometimes were reckoned as fractional parts of the wergild.²

Such are the outlines of the secular system of compositions. There is one way at any rate in which undoubtedly it has influenced the ecclesiastical penance. This appears chiefly in the Irish and Anglo-Saxon penitential books, and consists in the fixing of an

¹ See Wasserschleben, "Die Irische Kanonensammlung," 1885, "Einleitung," pp. XLIX ff.

² See Brunner, "Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte," 1887, I. pp. 156 ff.; II. 760, s.v. Wergeld.

equivalence between the secular satisfaction and an ecclesiastical penance.

So, for instance, "Poenitentiale Theodori," 1. 3, 3 : "He who has often committed theft, is condemned to a penance of seven years, or as long as the priest shall judge in view of the possibility of a composition with those he has injured ; and he who used to commit theft, ought under the influence of repentance always to be reconciled to him whom he used to offend and to make restitution according to the injury he has done to him, and thus he will greatly shorten his penance. If, however, he will not or cannot, he must do penance the fixed time in all completeness."¹

So again, *ibid.* 1. 4, 1 : "If any one shall have slain a man in revenge of a kinsman, let him repent as a manslaughter seven or ten years. But if he is willing to pay the kinsmen the wergild (*pecuniam aestimationis*), his penance will be lighter, i.e. by half the time."²

In these passages penance and composition are reduced to a common measure : so far therefore we may say that there is a tendency to view the ecclesiastical penance as equivalent to a composition. The disputed question, however, is, whether we are to recognize beyond this direct but limited influence a more indirect but much wider one, in which the ideas of the composition system have affected the general spirit and temper of the penitential discipline in helping to materialize and commercialize the idea of satisfaction, and thus bring about the practice of redemptions. This is maintained by Cremer in his essay, "Der germanische Satisfaktionsbegriff in der Versöhnungslehre" (St. Kr. 1893, pp. 316-43), also by Schultz.³ Loofs, however, is more cautious. He says :—

¹ Wasserscheleben, "Die Bussordnungen der abendländischen Kirche," p. 187.

² *Ibid.*, loc. cit.

³ *Op. cit.* pp. 245 ff.

“It is possible that the system of compositions in secular law (e.g. the wergild) has given an incentive for the appearance of these redemptions. But the assumption is not necessary, in view of the part which alms has always played in the matter of the (penitential) satisfactions.”¹

It must be admitted that an influence of the compensation system upon penance does not seem absolutely demanded, as there is really nothing in the later ideas of satisfaction, which has not some starting-point in the thought of the Ancient Church (value of almsgiving, transference of merits, etc.).

On the other hand, in view of our knowledge of an actual direct contact in some cases between the secular and ecclesiastical systems, and of the domination of the idea of wergild over the early mediaeval mind in general, it is hard to think that the development of the ideas of penance is not in some measure due to the influence of the secular system. Nevertheless the point cannot be proved; and so in the end the *non liquet* of Loofs is the safest verdict.

It remains to be added, that the system of redemptions, in spite of its wide extension and development, by no means so dominated the whole field of penance in the Middle Ages as to exclude the quite opposed conception of satisfaction as a voluntary endurance of penal suffering. Especially noteworthy in this connexion is the definition of the “*De vera et falsa poenitentia*,” influential as it is in the determination of much later mediaeval thought:—

“*Poenitere enim est poenam tenere*” (19. 35).

The aim of penance for the sinner in fact is:—

“That he may continually punish, by taking vengeance on himself, the offence he has committed by sinning.”²

¹ D.G. 14, p. 493, n. 3.

² *Ibid.*

§ 2. THE PRINCIPLES OF THE MEDIAEVAL THEOLOGY

In general the Middle Ages constitute a period of great consequence in the history of theology. It is above all other ages the period of systematization, and herein lies its importance. If it be true that each doctrine only appears in its full significance when viewed as a part of the whole, then the work of the mediaeval theologians, in spite of all its limitations, is of the utmost significance. It is true that in Origen's "De Principiis," Gregory of Nyssa's "Great Catechism," Augustine's "Enchiridion" and the "Exposition of the Orthodox Faith" of John of Damascus we have already systematic works from the Ancient Church. But none of these, not even the last, can compare in thoroughness and completeness with the mediaeval "Summæ," the influence of whose systematization is still felt in scientific theology up to the present day.

"All later dogmatic compendia, right up to the nineteenth century, are derived in a direct line from the mediaeval 'Summæ,' and even the most modern dogmatic systems still continue to show in their general shape the original form of the 'Summæ,' just as the species of animals, which stand to one another in a relation of descent, as soon as the skeleton is disclosed, manifest the structure of the original form.¹"

The theology of the Middle Ages is usually, in contrast with that of the patristic period, called scholasticism. It is very commonly assumed that the essence of scholasticism lies in the opposition between authority and reason which is fundamental to it, and in the attempt in connexion therewith to give a rational proof of the authoritatively received doctrine. This characteristic of the

¹ Heim, "Das Gewissheitsproblem in der systematischen Theologie," 1911, p. 8.

scholastic theology is, however, not in itself enough to differentiate it from the patristic theology. The opposition of authority and reason and the attempt to give a rational proof of doctrine in some measure characterizes all theology, and in particular it markedly characterizes the theology of the Western Church from Tertullian onwards.

“Yet there exists a distinction between the mediaeval and the patristic theology. In the period of the Ancient Church its theologians thought within the scheme of the still living philosophic view of the world of the ancients: in the Middle Ages the ecclesiastical tradition and the philosophic culture renewed once again by the help of learned study stand in greater alienation from one another.”¹

As a consequence the union between authority and reason achieved by the Middle Ages tends to be more formalistic than it was in the patristic period. The extreme opposite in that period to the scholastic method is to be found in the classical Greek theology, where the proof of a doctrine by reason amounts essentially to a discernment of the inner rational essence of the doctrine. The Western theology with its dialectic character approaches nearer to scholasticism, though here also a considerable speculative element was introduced by Augustine.

Again, within the scholastic theology itself there are differences. A speculative tendency is by no means altogether wanting in the Middle Ages. In particular Anselm (d. A.D. 1109) is in many ways more akin to the patristic period than to the later scholasticism. There is the purely scholastic element in Anselm. “His theologizing is often only a ‘ratione solvere quaestiones,’ a ‘satisfacere objectionibus’.”² But all the same in him

¹ Loofs, D.G.⁴, p. 498.

² *Ibid.* p. 506.

the speculative element is dominant. "His thought included the whole, in a freer and more attractive manner than the systematic work of the formalistically developed later scholasticism. His 'libri duo,' 'Cur Deus Homo,' are a brilliant attempt to gather together all the dogmas of the Church in a single central thought; his interlocutor Boso admits in conclusion: 'per unius quaestionis, quam proposuimus, solutionem, quidquid in novo veterique testamento continetur, probatum intelligo'." ¹

The thoroughgoing application of the dialectic ² method to all theological questions begins with Abelard's "Sic et Non": ³ its success was assured by Peter Lombard's "Book of Sentences," ⁴ which became the basis of all later mediaeval theology.

Between Abelard and Lombard, however, Hugo of St. Victor (d. A.D. 1141) had endeavoured to find a principle which should gather into one the whole content of Scripture.

"The subject-matter of the entire Scripture is the double work involved in the restoration of man . . . first the work of creation, and second the work of restoration." ⁵

In the theology of the early Franciscan school the same speculative endeavour to reduce the whole of theology to a single principle is apparent. According to Alexander of Hales (d. A.D. 1245) its subject is the doctrine of the *veritas increata*, along with its necessary presuppositions and conclusions. ⁶

Thomas Aquinas (d. A.D. 1274) also endeavours to

¹ Loc. cit. Cf. Anselm, "Cur Deus Homo," II. 23.

² "Dialectic" in the Platonic sense of the search for truth on the basis of a recognition of the oppositions of opinion.

³ Abelard, d. A.D. 1142.

⁴ Peter Lombard, d. A.D. 1160.

⁵ "De Sacram." Prol. cap. II.

⁶ "Summa," Nuremberg, 1482, III. qu. 79, m. 6.

find a conception which shall include the whole of theology. "Sacred theology does not treat of God and the creatures alike, but of God principally and of the creatures so far as they are referred to God, as to their beginning or their end. In this way the unity of the science is preserved."¹

From Alexander onwards, however, the dialectic method introduced by Abelard reigns in the detailed working out of these speculative conceptions. In the great systems of Alexander and Thomas the dialectic element predominates over the speculative as much as the speculative over the dialectic in Anselm. In the critical system of Duns Scotus (d. A.D. 1308) the dialectic element gains still more ground; till finally in the theology of the Nominalists, Occam (d. A.D. 1349), and Biel (d. A.D. 1495), the hope is abandoned of finding any speculative principle in which to gather up the whole of theology, and it takes its place merely as an "aggregative science," whose task is no more than to arrange in some sort of order the different points of Divine revelation.²

It is to be observed, however, that throughout the whole of the scholastic period we meet with a complete confidence in logic and a surprising dexterity in its use. The first form of ancient culture assimilated by the scholastic theologians was the translation by Boethius of Porphyry's introduction to the logical writings of Aristotle. The knowledge of these writings themselves soon followed. The complete Aristotle, however, was unknown in the West till the thirteenth century, when the work of uniting Aristotelianism with the traditional dogma began in the "Summæ" and the "Commentaries

¹ "Summa," I. qu. 1, art. 3, ad. 1.

² Cf. Werner, "Die Scholastik des späteren Mittelalters," II. pp. 43 ff. (Occam); IV. pp. 262 ff. (Biel).

on the Sentences" of the great schoolmen, Alexander, Bonaventura (d. A.D. 1274), Albert (d. A.D. 1280), and Thomas. It is to be observed, however, that throughout the whole of scholasticism certain material¹ principles accepted as rational were drawn from the Neoplatonic principles embedded in the theology of Augustine. Moreover, in the doctrine with which we are especially concerned the ideas of satisfaction and merit, which we have found in the praxis of the Church, are also taken as rational notions. Thus while logical method reigns supreme throughout the Middle Ages, the material principles accepted as rational come from very various sources.

As regards the nature in detail of the authority on which the mediaeval theology is based, it consists of Holy Scripture, the Creeds, and the Fathers.

The creeds established as a doctrinal standard in the Middle Ages (from the Carolingian period onwards) were three in number. The first was the "Apostles'" Creed, the later Gallican form of the earlier Roman Creed, dating from about A.D. 500. The second was the Nicæno-Constantinopolitanum, with the *filioque* addition (A.D. 589). The third was the "Athanasian" Creed, which originated in Gaul in the sixth century.² The three creeds are formally recognized as doctrinal standards by Alexander of Hales.³

"There are three creeds, the first the Apostles', the second that of the Fathers, which is sung in the Mass, the third that of Athanasius, which is sung at Prime."

We have already spoken of the Apostles' Creed in its primitive or Roman form; the only noteworthy changes in the Gallican form are that the clause "who

¹ "Material" in opposition to formal or logical.

² See Loofs, D.G. pp. 87, n. 5, 368, 458.

³ "Summa," Nuremberg, 1482, pars iii. qu. 82, memb. 5, introd.

was born of Holy Ghost and of Mary the Virgin " becomes " who was conceived of the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary," and that there is added the clause " He descended into hell ". The significance of the Nicæno-Constantinopolitanum as a standard of doctrine has also been already estimated. It is now to be added that the Athanasian Creed, as regards its section on the Incarnation, substantially embodies the doctrine of Chalcedon, so that nothing further need here be said of it.

As regards the Fathers, the chief authority is that of Augustine, though many others not only Latin but—in the later scholastics—Greek also, have their place. Anselm at the beginning of the scholastic theology especially relies on the authority of Augustine;¹ and to the end of the Middle Ages Augustine still maintains the same supremacy.

As to the relation between the different authorities of the Scriptures, the Creeds, and the Fathers, there can be no doubt that in general throughout the Middle Ages the fundamental authority was that of Holy Scripture. The Creeds were regarded as summarizing Scripture, the Fathers as explaining and unfolding it.

As early as Abelard there appears a sharp distinction between the authority of Scripture and the authority of the Fathers.

" Distinct from the books of later writers is the excellency of the canonic authority of the Old and New Testament. If anything there appears absurd, we may not say the author of the book did not hold the truth, but either the codex is faulty or the interpreter has erred, or thou dost not understand. But in the works of later writers, which are contained in innumerable books, if by chance any things are

¹ " Monol." Praef. ; " Epist." 68, " Ad Lanfrancum ".

thought to deviate from the truth because they are not understood as they were meant, yet the reader or hearer has free right of judgment to approve what has pleased or disapprove what has offended him."¹

Hugo of St. Victor in his "De Sacramentis" views without question the subject-matter of theology simply as the "materia divinarum Scripturarum" (Prol.). So also for Alexander of Hales² and Bonaventura³ the matter of theology is the content of Holy Scripture.

Aquinas once more like Abelard distinguishes sharply between the authority of Scripture and that of the Fathers.

"Sacred doctrine uses authorities drawn from Holy Scripture as its natural basis, whence to argue with absolute cogency. The authority of other doctors of the Church, however, it uses as a natural basis for argument, but only an argument with probability."⁴

Duns Scotus again teaches that "Holy Scripture sufficiently contains the doctrine necessary for the pilgrim"⁵.⁶ He gives eight rational proofs of the authority of Scripture, viz. from prophecy, the harmony of Scripture, the sanctity of the writers, the carefulness of the canonizers, the rationality of the contents, the irrationality of heresies, the stability of the Church, the glory of miracles.

Finally, the Nominalist Occam taught:—

"A Christian is not compelled as a necessity of salvation to believe either as a duty or in practice what is neither contained in the Bible nor can be inferred as

¹ "Sic et Non," Prol.

² "Summa," I. qu. 1.

³ "Comm. in Sent." I. Prol. qu. 2.

⁴ "Summa," I. qu. 1, art. 8, ad. 2.

⁵ *Viator*, one on the way to eternal bliss, in opposition to *comprehensor*, one who has attained it.

⁶ "Comm. Oxon. in Sent." Prol. qu. 2.

a necessary and clear consequence from the mere content of the Bible.”¹

An interesting point in connexion with the authority of Scripture is that, whereas towards the beginning of the Middle Ages the system of allegorical exegesis was regarded as an important part of the machinery of the theologian,² in the later scholasticism there is a tendency for the allegorical exegesis to disappear behind the literal.

“From it alone can argument be drawn, not from those senses which are according to allegory.”³ See further on this point Kropatscheck, *op. cit.* pp. 448 ff.

So much then as to the authority of Scripture and its relation to that of the Fathers. As to the scholastic view of the relation of the creeds to the Scriptures, typical is what Aquinas says of the relation to them of the Apostles' Creed, which remained the creed *par excellence*.

“In Holy Scripture the truth of the faith is contained diffusedly and in various forms, and in some of these obscurely. To draw out the truth of the faith from Holy Scripture therefore long study and exercise are required, to which not all those who need to know the truth of the faith can attain; for many of them, being occupied with other things, have no leisure for study. It is therefore necessary that out of the statements of Holy Scripture something clear should be succinctly gathered for proposal to all to believe. This then is no addition to Holy Scripture, but is rather taken from Holy Scripture.”⁴

¹ Quoted by Kropatscheck, “Das Schriftprinzip der lutherischen Kirche,” 1904, p. 440, n. 5.

² Hugo of St. Victor, “De Sacram.” Prol. cap. iv.; Alexander of Hales, “Summa,” I. qu. 1, m. 4, art. 4; Bonaventura, “Breviloquium,” Proem.

³ Thomas Aquinas, “Summa,” I. qu. 1, art. 10, ad. 1.

⁴ “Summa,” II. 2, qu. 1, art. 9, ad. 1.

As regards the relation of the two other creeds to the Apostles' Creed we may quote Bonaventura :—

“In the Apostles' Creed all those things which it is opportune to believe are sufficiently contained, as far as concerns the main points of belief. . . . The two other symbols, i.e. the Athanasian and that of the Nicene Council have been added for the fuller explanation of the faith, and the confutation of heresy.”¹

The above statements may be regarded as expressing the general view of the Middle Ages on this subject, when it had become conscious and reflective.

We find, however, in the later scholasticism a tendency to lay stress on the authority of the creeds even independently of that of Scripture.

“For instance, Duns Scotus, who has emphasized the sufficiency of Biblical authority, points at the same time to the symbols of the Ancient Church, which gather up the quintessence of the Scripture for the age following, and also to the compilation of the Canon by the Church, without which no New Testament would be possible. With this then is made lastingly easy the transition to the formula, the Church stands above the Scripture; for there was a Christian Church before there was a Scripture, and in that the Church created the Canon, it thereby ‘approved and authorized’ these books, which it received.”²

Along the same lines are the following passages from Biel, the Nominalist :—

“A truth is to be called Catholic, either because it is revealed of God, or contained in the Divine Scripture, or because it is received by the Church, or because it is approved by the supreme pontiff, or because it fol-

¹ “Comm. in Sent.” III. dist. 25, qu. 1.

² Kropatscheck, *op. cit.* p. 442, n. 1. Reference is made to “Comm. in Sent.” III. dist. 23, qu. 1, 4; 1 dist. 4, qu. 1, 8.

lows from one of the above-mentioned by necessary consequence.”¹

“Many truths which are not found in the canonical Scriptures, and cannot be deduced by necessary consequence from these only, are Catholic.”²

¹ “Collectorium,” III. dist. 25, art. 3, dub. 3.

² *Ibid.* IV. dist. 13, qu. 2, art. 1, not. 2.

CHAPTER II

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE MEDIAEVAL THEOLOGY

§ 1. ANSELM

WE begin our account of the scholastic doctrine of the work of Christ with Anselm's "Cur Deus Homo," which is in many ways determinative of the whole scholastic procedure in this domain, and is moreover epoch-making in the whole history of our doctrine, in that it for the first time in a thoroughgoing and consistent way applies to the elucidation of the subject the conceptions of satisfaction and merit.

From Anselm (*d.* 1109 A.D.), following Augustine, comes the formulation of the fundamental principle of the scholastic method: "Neque enim quaero intelligere ut credam, sed credo ut intelligam".¹

In accordance with this principle is the problem of the "Cur Deus Homo" stated. It is not indeed rational to establish faith in the Incarnation, but yet to give a rational solution of the question:—

"By what reason or necessity God was made man, and by His death, as we believe and confess, restored life to the world" (I. 1).

Anselm begins by rejecting as unsatisfactory various great theories of antiquity.

(1) The recapitulatory theory of Irenæus, in the form in which it has come down to him through Augustine.

(2) The theory of redemption from the devil.

¹ Prosl. cap. I. Cf. *supra*, p. 116.

(3) The theory according to which the purpose of the death of Christ was to show how much God loved us.

Incidentally it may be noted that Anselm has very ingeniously cast the "Cur Deus Homo" into the form of a dialogue, in which he leaves to his interlocutor Boso the task of criticizing the above traditional theories. As, however, he does not meet Boso's criticisms, they are implicitly admitted to be just.

The first ancient theory to be criticized is thus stated. "It was fitting that just as through the disobedience of a man death had entered into the human race, so also through the obedience of a man life should be restored; and just as sin, which was the cause of our condemnation, had its origin from a woman, so the author of our righteousness and salvation should be born of a woman; and just as the devil, who had, thanks to his persuasion, conquered man by the taste of a tree, should likewise through the passion on a tree, which he inflicted, be conquered by man" (I. 3).

Anselm adds that there are many other similar reasons of great beauty showing the fitness of the Incarnation. Boso, however, objects that such thoughts, unless some more solid basis of reason can be shown, are like pictures painted on air (I. 4).

Anselm therefore inquires if it be not a sufficiently solid reason for the Incarnation that the human race would have perished, and God's purpose for it been foiled, unless it had been redeemed by the Creator Himself. Boso, however, objects first of all that this deliverance would more reasonably have been made by some other than God, say an angel or a man. God could have made a man without sin, not taken from Adam's sinful race, just as He made Adam at the first, and he might have delivered men. Anselm, however, objects that in such a case man would have become the slave of the

angel or man who redeemed him, and so would have failed to be restored to his pristine dignity (I. 5). This leads Boso, however, to find a fresh difficulty. Why is man's deliverance called redemption? The traditional view, of course, was that it was because man was a captive of the devil.

But with regard to this doctrine, Boso urges that as the devil is under the power of God, he can acquire no rights against God by tempting man, his fellow-slave. The bond spoken of in Col. II. 14 is not to be interpreted (as it is by Ambrose and Augustine) of an obligation to the devil established by the sin of Adam, but is rather a figure for the Divine sentence which shuts up man to punishment (I. 7).

Finally, as regards the theory that Christ died to show how much God loved us, what necessity was there for Him to choose this way of showing His love, if it was not the only way of human salvation?

"Your assertion that God has shown in that way how much He loved you, is maintained by no reason, if it is not shown that God could by no means otherwise have saved man. For if He could not have done it otherwise, then perchance it would be necessary that He should show His love in this way; but now, seeing that He can otherwise save man, what reason is there why, to show His love, He should do and endure those things that you allege? Nay, does He not show the good angels how much He loves them, though for them He does not endure such things?" (I. 6).

There must then be some absolute necessity for the salvation of man through Christ's Incarnation and Death. It is not enough to refer merely to the will of God, which must of course be reasonable: the question is whether the Incarnation is reasonable, otherwise it is hard to believe that God willed it (I. 8). And there

are so many difficulties in the way. Certainly the difficulty, that the impassible God should have suffered, is none at all ; for He suffered according to the passible human nature. But was it right for God to give the innocent to die ? Anselm replies that Christ died voluntarily. We must distinguish between what Christ did under obedience to God, and what He bore, not under obedience, but because He maintained obedience. The first was that He immutably kept truth and righteousness in life and speech : this, however, brought on Him Jewish persecution, in enduring which He died. As innocent, however, He deserved not to die, but perceiving that His death was the necessary way of human salvation, He willed to die (I. 9). This, however, brings us back to the point already reached : was it necessary for Christ to die, if men were to be saved ?

Anselm demands that there be an absolute necessity for Christ's Incarnation and Death in order to human salvation, thus setting himself in opposition to the authority of Augustine at this point. Nowhere is his theory more revolutionary. Boso represents the traditional view, and again and again presses Anselm by bringing it forward.

Anselm finds the required necessity by means of the consideration that, upon the supposition that man is made for eternal beatitude, he cannot attain to it except by the remission of sins (I. 10).

What, however, is involved in this ?

Sin is nothing else than to fail to give to God what is due to Him (*debitum*). This due is the obedience of the will, which constitutes at once man's righteousness and the honour which he owes to God.

"He who does not return to God this honour due to Him, takes away from God what is His own and dishonours God ; and this is to sin " (I. 11).

But further, he who has sinned must make satisfaction for sin.

"As long as he does not make good what he has stolen,¹ he remains at fault (*in culpa*): nor is it enough simply to restore what was taken away, but he must for the insult inflicted restore more than he took away. For just as he who injures the health of another, does not do enough, if he restores his health, unless he also makes some recompense for the inflicted injury of pain; so he who violates the honour of anyone does not do enough if he restore the honour, unless, in correspondence with the harm done in dishonouring him, he makes some amends acceptable to him whom he has dishonoured. This also must be noted, that when anyone pays back what he has unjustly taken away, he must give what could not be demanded of him, if he had not stolen another's property. So also every one who sins must pay back the honour which he has stolen from God; and this is the satisfaction which every sinner must make to God" (I. 11).

But cannot God forgive sin without the payment of the honour taken from Him? No, for this would be to admit something out of order (*inordinatum*) in His kingdom. Justice demands that sin should be punished. To the objection that this seems to limit God's omnipotence, Anselm replies that unless God is just, He is not God (I. 12).

The only exception to the rule that sin must be punished is where the sinner voluntarily makes satisfaction for his sin.

"It is necessary therefore, either that the honour taken away should be repaid, or that punishment should follow" (I. 13).

¹ Quamdiu non solvit quod rapuit—cf. Ps. LXIX. 4, and Augustine's use of the verse in "De Trin." XIII. 14, 18 (*supra*, p. 129).

Either of these courses reclaims for God the honour which He has lost. Man pays back what he has stolen either willingly or unwillingly, and so God has His due (I. 14). There is either "*spontanea satisfactio vel a non satisfaciente poenae exactio . . . necesse est, ut omne peccatum satisfactio aut poena sequatur*" (I. 15).

Here Anselm digresses in order to show that sufficient men must be saved in order to fill up the places, in the heavenly city of God, of the angels who fell.¹ From this point of view again Anselm enforces the necessity of satisfaction. How, apart from its being made, can man be fit for the society of the good angels?

Now, however, comes a new principle. Satisfaction must be made according to the measure of the sin: anything else would be out of order. What then can we offer?

"Repentance (*poenitentiam*)," replies Boso, "a contrite and humbled heart, fastings, bodily toils of many kinds, mercy in giving and forgiving, and obedience. Do I not honour God, when for fear and love of Him, in contrition of heart I reject temporal joy, in fastings and toils I trample underfoot the pleasures and ease of this life, when I lavish what is mine in giving and forgiving, and subject myself to Him in obedience" (I. 20).

Boso obviously has in mind the *poenitentia* recognized in the discipline of the Church. Anselm, however, replies, in opposition to the doctrine of Hermas, Tertullian, and others, concerning supererogatory works, that all this is owed to God already apart from the satisfaction of sin (I. 20).

Besides, suppose that all this were not owed, it is not enough. "*Nondum considerasti, quanti ponderis sit peccatum,*" says Anselm. He measures the weight of

¹ Cf. Aug. "Ench." 29 (*supra*, p. 122).

sin indirectly. Sin being committed against God is of infinite gravity—for what consideration ought I to bestow even a glance contrary to His will? Clearly then satisfaction according to the measure of sin is impossible to man (I. 21).

Anselm goes on to make a bridge between his new doctrine and the old doctrine that man must conquer the devil. By yielding to the devil man has dishonoured God: he must restore this honour by conquering the devil.

“The victory ought to be such, that, just as while strong and potentially immortal he easily consented to the devil, so as to sin, for which he justly incurred the penalty of mortality, so also, weak and mortal as he has made himself, he should conquer the devil by the difficulty of death, so as in no manner to sin, which he cannot do, as long as, owing to the wound of the first sin, he is conceived and born in sin ” (I. 22).

There is then a double reason why man cannot make satisfaction for sin, (1) because as finite he cannot in any case perform the infinite satisfaction required, (2) because he is impotent through sin. This impotence, however, is no excuse, since he has only brought it upon himself. It seems then that there is no way for man to attain to blessedness unless that way be Christ (I. 24, 25).

Christ, however, is that way. God, having created man for perfection, must complete His work. He is not indeed under physical, but is, however, under moral compulsion to do this (II. 4, 5).

How then can the necessary satisfaction be made, if not by the sinner himself? It must be made by One, who is both man, that He may make satisfaction for man, and God, that His act may have an infinite worth. The answer to the problem is in the God-man of the creeds,

who is perfect God and perfect man, of Adam's race, but as virgin-born, free from sin, and one Person in two natures (II. 6-9).¹

As a sinless man, though He owes to God the obedience of His life, the God-man is under no obligation to die. If He dies, therefore, it is of His own free will (II. 10, 11). Here then is the possibility of satisfaction.

"If man sinned through sweetness, is it not fit that he should make satisfaction through bitterness? And if he was with the extremest possible ease conquered by the devil, so that he dishonoured God by sinning; is it not right that man, making satisfaction for sin, should conquer the devil to the honour of God with the extremest possible difficulty? Is it not meet that he who by sinning so robbed God of himself, that the robbery could not be exceeded, should so give himself to God in satisfaction, that the gift could not be exceeded?"

"Man, however, can suffer to God's honour, of his own accord and not by way of debt, nothing more bitter or more difficult than death; and in no way can man give himself to God more entirely than when he gives himself up to death for His honour" (II. 11).

Christ then is in a position to do all this. Anselm adds that there are also many other reasons, why it is befitting that Christ should be found in the fashion of a man and live a human life without sin, which may more easily be understood from His life and works than demonstrated *a priori* by reason. How wisely was it done, that He who was to lead us back to eternal life, should not only teach us, but also offer Himself as an example of patient endurance! (*ibid.*).

But, to return to the subject of Christ's satisfaction, we have seen that His voluntary death is a gift of the necessary painful character. The question is now as to

¹ Cf. Augustine, "Ench." 37-41; "De Trinitate," XIII. 18-23.

its measure. Is it sufficient to satisfy for all sins, when the least sin is infinite? Anselm measures the value of Christ's death in the same indirect way as he measured the weight of sin. Anselm: "If that Man were before you, and you knew who He was and it were said to you, unless you kill that Man, your whole world and whatever is not God shall perish; would you do this to save every other creature?" Boso: "I would not do it, even if an infinite number of worlds were set before me" (II. 14).

In fact, not only the killing, but the least injury of the God-man were the greatest possible sin. The reason is, that whatever happens to His person incomparably outweighs whatever is done apart from it. This then shows the supreme value of the life of the God-man.

"If therefore to give one's life is to accept death, then just as the gift of this life outweighs all human sins, so also the acceptance of this death" (II. 14).

But how can the gift of Christ's life avail for the sin of those who slew Him? They at least according to the previous argument seem to have committed the unpardonable sin. The answer is in 1 Cor. II. 8: they did it in ignorance (II. 15).

Moreover, the redemption wrought by Christ availed not for His own age only, but for all ages. To show this Anselm uses an important parable. "For suppose there to be a certain king, against whom the whole people of a certain city of his has sinned, except one alone, who, however, is of their race; so that none of them can do anything to escape the punishment of death; but he, however, who alone is innocent, has such favour with the king that he can, and such love to the guilty that he will, reconcile all who believe in his plan by a certain service, which will greatly please the king, and which he is to perform on a day fixed according to the will of the king. And since not all those who are to be reconciled can

assemble on that day : the king grants on account of the greatness of that service, that any who, whether before or after that day shall have confessed that they wish to seek pardon through the work done on that day, and to subscribe to the agreement there established, shall be freed from all past guilt ; and if it happens that after this pardon they sin again, then if they wish duly to make satisfaction and suffer correction, they may again receive pardon through the efficacy of that agreement ; yet so that no one is to enter the king's palace till that be done, by which his sins are to be forgiven " (II. 16).

This parable is peculiarly valuable as showing the practical application of Anselm's doctrine of the work of Christ. It forms a basis for the first forgiveness, and then again, on the supposition of due satisfaction, for further forgiveness in penance. Moreover, Anselm deduces from his parable the conclusion "that no soul could enter the celestial paradise before the death of Christ" (*ibid.*).

In II. 17, 18 Anselm stops in his argument to point out that the Divine predestination of Christ's death does not imply that He died compulsorily, but rather that His will to die was immutable.

Then Boso raises another difficulty. Ought not Christ to die, since He gave an example of patience by dying, and this was well-pleasing to God? Surely He must do what was well-pleasing to God.

Anselm distinguishes, as Tertullian had done long ago, between works demanded and works of supererogation, such as virginity where marriage is lawful. The latter merit a special reward. Christ then performed a work of this kind. He only needed to die because He willed it : He could have done otherwise (II. 18 *b*).

From this point of view, however, it is easy to see how human salvation follows from Christ's death.

Christ's voluntary gift of Himself was meritorious: for so great a gift God must make Him a fitting recompense. As the Son of God, however, He Himself wants nothing.

"To whom then could God more fitly grant the fruit and reward of His death, than to those to save whom . . . He became man, and to whom . . . in dying He gave Himself as an example of dying on behalf of righteousness? In vain will they be imitators of Him, if they are not participators of His merit. Or whom will He more rightly make the heirs of His due which He does not need . . . than His kinsmen and brethren, whom He sees, bound by so many and such great debts, wasting away in the depth of their distress; so that there may be remitted to them what they owe for their sins, and granted them what they lack on account of their sins?" (II. 19).

To sum up: in the Divine method of salvation there is a perfect concord of mercy and justice.

"What indeed can be thought of as more merciful than when God the Father says to the sinner condemned to eternal torment, and who has no means of redeeming himself: 'receive my Only Begotten Son, and give Him for thyself,' while the Son Himself says: 'take me, and redeem thyself'? . . . What again is juster, than that He, to whom a price is given greater than every debt, if it is given with right motive, should forgive every debt?" (II. 20).

Such is in outline Anselm's famous theory of the work of Christ. He sets aside altogether the doctrine of redemption from the devil, though he retains in a subordinate place that of Christ's victory over him. The recapitulatory and moral theories he regards as void, unless some more solid theory can serve as a basis for them. This solid basis Anselm finds in the

doctrine that Christ made satisfaction for sin and merited salvation. This is the essence of His work, the necessity of which may be seen *a priori*. It is not unimportant, however, that Christ gave us an example: by following this we are qualified to share in His merit.

All histories of doctrine recognize the epoch-making character of Anselm's theory of satisfaction and merit. From this time forward the ideas of satisfaction and merit occupy a central place in the mediaeval doctrine: they were passed on moreover though with notable modifications to Protestantism, where they fill an equally important sphere. It is therefore necessary now to discuss Anselm's theory at some length. We must in the first place clearly distinguish his idea of satisfaction from that of Hilary and Ambrose. These Fathers endeavour to clarify the Pauline doctrine of Christ's redeeming us from the curse of the law, by interpreting it through the *satisfactio* of the Roman public law, which means the endurance of the law's sentence. Anselm, however, is quite without any direct purpose of interpreting Paul, and has before him in the fundamental passage (I. 11), where he explains the notion of satisfaction, the analogy not of public but of private law. He regards satisfaction not as the endurance of punishment, but as a positive gift to God or a performance done to God's honour; though at the same time he admits that it is fit that it should be something hard and difficult in opposition to the pleasure of sin. The main idea, however, is that Christ's work is a positive gift or performance, and hence he can call it not merely satisfaction but merit.

It is generally admitted at the present time that the Anselmic conception of satisfaction is derived not from Scripture but from the ecclesiastical penance. The his-

tory of penance, previously given, shows that all the characters of the Anselmic satisfaction above described can be found in the penitential satisfaction. Nor are we left merely to inference in the matter. That Anselm interprets Christ's work in terms of penance is clear for the following reasons :—

(1) When Boso proposes in answer to Anselm's question, how man may make satisfaction for sin, the very terms of the ecclesiastical penance (I. 20), Anselm in no way objects to his conception of the nature of satisfaction, but only seeks to show the inadequacy of the ecclesiastical satisfaction in the case in view.

(2) Anselm himself assimilates the satisfaction of Christ to the penitential satisfaction, in that the satisfaction of Christ brings about the first forgiveness of sins, and any further forgiveness after a lapse must be won by penitential satisfaction (II. 16).

(3) In explaining the meritorious character of Christ's work, he assimilates it to the merit of supererogatory works, such as virginity (II. 18 b).

There is no doubt then that the great epoch-making step marked by Anselm in the history of theology consists in the fact, that he first applied to the work of Christ the legal conceptions proper to the ecclesiastical penance. "Anselm's theory is an evaluation of the work of Christ by means of the conceptual material of the doctrine of penance."¹ Things had indeed for a long while been tending in this direction; but not till Anselm did the crystallization of the idea take place.

The above statement would have to be considerably modified if the theory were correct, which has recently been propounded by Gottschick, that in essence the Anselmic theory stands already complete in Augustine, all that is wanting being the express terms satisfaction

¹ Loofs, D.G. ⁴, p. 511.

and merit, and the doctrine of the necessity of satisfaction. Gottschick's theory is contained in his article "Augustins Anschauung von den Erlöserwirkungen Christi,"¹ and summarized in the first of his "Studien zur Versöhnungslehre des Mittelalters".² According to him, Augustine has already reduced the doctrine of redemption from the devil to a mere doublet of that of Christ's sacrifice, by the thought that that from which Christ redeems us by His death is the Divine punishment, of which the devil is merely the exactor: he has further, in distinction from Hilary and Ambrose with their ideas of Christ's death as the endurance of the sentence of the law, interpreted Christ's sufferings after the analogy of the penitential satisfaction as a self-inflicted punishment, this being the conception of the penitential satisfaction dominant in Augustine's theology. Gottschick refers to Augustine's use of the text so fundamental for Anselm, "quæ non rapui, tunc exsolvebam,"³ and also to Augustine's sentence, "suscipiendo poenam et non suscipiendo culpam, et culpam delevit et poenam".⁴ It is not clear however (a) that Augustine has reduced the doctrine of redemption from the devil to a mere doublet of the idea of sacrifice; or (b) that the Augustinian doctrine, that Christ has reconciled us to God by His sacrifice, has repaid the debt He did not owe, and borne our punishment without our guilt, in order to remove both punishment and guilt, amounts to so coherent and single a view as Gottschick represents. Moreover, while the suggestion of the text "quæ non rapui, tunc exsolvebam" has undoubtedly been followed by Anselm, it is begging

¹ "Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche," 1901, pp. 97-213.

² "Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte," 1901, pp. 378-84.

³ Ps. LXIX. 4; Augustine, "De Trinitate," XIII. 14, 18; Anselm, "Cur Deus Homo," I. 11.

⁴ "Serm." 171. 3, 3 (*supra*, p. 126).

the question to say that he has been governed by the sentence "suscipiendo poenam et non suscipiendo culpam, et culpam delevit et poenam". For the remarkable thing about Anselm's theory is his distinction of satisfaction from punishment, and his avoidance of the idea that Christ's satisfaction is the vicarious endurance of our punishment, whether as self-inflicted or inflicted by God. Anselm does certainly approximate to the penal view of satisfaction, when he emphasizes that it must be bitter and difficult (II. 11): nevertheless he does not reach it. In fact, in drawing upon the conceptual material of penance, he has not drawn upon the whole of it, but in agreement with the current of thought which we have studied in the Early Middle Ages, dwells upon the view of satisfaction as a positive performance or gift, to the exclusion of the conception of it as the self-inflicted endurance of punishment, which is so fundamental to Tertullian and Augustine. In spite of Gottschick then, the conclusion stands good, that Anselm's originality consists in his application of the conceptual material of penance to the work of Christ: it is going much beyond the evidence to say that Augustine had virtually applied it before him. On the other hand we have to observe that Anselm did not apply the whole conceptual material of penance to the subject; what he omitted was precisely that element in penance which has most affinity with the doctrine of Augustine on the work of Christ.

A further question, however, as to the working out of Anselm's theory: it has been asserted that Anselm is here influenced by the ideas of German law. This view is especially developed by Cremer in his two essays, "Die Wurzeln des Anselmischen Satisfaktionsbegriffs,"¹ "Der germanische Satisfaktionsbegriff in der

¹ "Studien und Kritiken," 1880, pp. 7-21.

Versöhnungslehre".¹ We have already seen that the mediaeval modification of the idea of penance, which Anselm shares, viz. the increased stress on its positive or meritorious to the neglect of its penal aspect, has been put down, though without sufficient reason, to German influence ; but other important elements in the Anselmic doctrine have also been assigned to the same source.

One point in which German influence is thus held to be apparent is the substitution of the honour of God for His righteousness as the Divine attribute demanding satisfaction. Refusal to tolerate an injury to personal honour was deeply rooted in the German spirit. As the great pioneer of the study of German institutions pointed out : "Hohn und Schmach duldet kein Freier auf sich".² Yet Tertullian speaks of penance as honouring God from fear of danger ;³ just as Boso asks : "Do I not honour God, when because of His fear and love I reject temporal joy in contrition of heart, trample underfoot in fastings and toils the pleasures and quiet of this life, lavish what is mine in giving and forgiving, and subject myself to Him in obedience?"⁴ As Harnack says : "One must look very closely to discover in this passage a distinction of shade between Anselm's God and the injured and angry God of Tertullian".⁵

Again, there are certainly some striking resemblances between Anselm's doctrine of satisfaction and the German law of wergild, especially in the calculation of the amount of the compensation for injury according to the position of the injured person, and in the idea of the solidarity of the kin in the matter both of payment

¹ "Studien und Kritiken," 1893, pp. 316-45.

² Grimm, "Deutsche Rechtsalterthümer," p. 622.

³ "De poen." 9 (*supra*, p. 107).

⁴ "Cur Deus Homo," i. 20.

⁵ D.G., III.⁴, p. 392 n.

and of the receipt of payment. Compare the description of the German wergild, already given (p. 151). Nevertheless the idea of the solidarity of the race is also a fundamental principle in the theology of Augustine, and in particular of his doctrine of the work of Christ;¹ while we find also in Augustine a remarkable parallel to the Anselmic doctrine that Christ's spiritual kin are the natural heirs of the debt God owes Him. Compare "Tr. in Ev. Joh." 2. 13: "Whom He wished to make His brothers, them He freed, and made His fellow heirs," together with "In Ps." CXXVII. 12: "The Church is His brothers and sisters and mother".

As regards the principle that satisfaction must be according to the position of the injured person, this again is no peculiarity of German law, but belongs just as much to Roman law.² In fact it may be regarded as belonging to the *consensus gentium*. In the Code of Hammurabi, for example, offences were graded according to the rank of the injured person relatively to the offender.³ There is, however, finally, another point where it has recently been contended,⁴ that Anselm has been influenced by German law, viz. in his idea of God as the Moral Ruler of the universe. Anselm, though his general idea of satisfaction, in agreement with that of the ecclesiastical doctrine of penance, belongs to the sphere of private law,⁵ yet in his anxiety to prove the necessity of satisfaction passes over to the analogy of public law in the thought that God cannot admit anything out of order in His domain (I. 12). Now it is a

¹ "De Trin." XIII. 18, 23 (*supra*, p. 130).

² Gaius, "Inst." III. 225; Justinian, "Inst." IV. 4, 9.

³ Hastings, "Dictionary of the Bible," Extra Vol., p. 597.

⁴ Seeberg, D.G.¹, II. p. 53, n. 2; D.G.², III. p. 222; "Die Theologie des Johannes Duns Scotus," 1900, p. 10, n. 1.

⁵ "Cur Deus Homo," I. 11 (*supra*, p. 168).

fact that, while the Roman idea of sovereignty is expressed in the principles of Justinian's Digest, "*Princeps legibus solutus est*" (1. 3, 31), "*Quod principi placuit, legis habet vigorem*" (1. 4, 1), on the other hand the original Teutonic idea seems to have been that the king was not the fountain of justice, but the guardian of the public peace.¹

At the same time even here it is not necessary to look for Anselm's idea very far outside of Augustine. God, according to Augustine, is the *ordinator peccatorum*, "so that those things which would not be sins, except they were against nature, are so judged and ordered, that they are not permitted to disturb or debase the order of nature".²

To sum up then, the case for a distinct German influence upon Anselm's theory must be dismissed with the verdict "not proven".

In conclusion, I may touch on some criticisms of Anselm's theory, and also make some general remarks on the importance of the theological innovation implied by it.

(1) One criticism to which Anselm's theory lies open is that his idea of the absolute necessity of satisfaction conflicts with the principle of private law which he has incorporated, viz. that satisfaction requires the gift to the injured party of "somewhat, according to his pleasure" (I. 11). In private law, in fact, the measure of the necessity of satisfaction is simply the good pleasure of the offended person, and the necessity, therefore, is not absolute. Anselm, as we have seen, in his endeavour to show the absolute necessity of satisfaction passes over to the standpoint of public law (I. 12). There is, there-

¹ Stubbs, "Constitutional History of England," i. p. 199; F. de Schulte, "Histoire du droit et des Institutions de l'Allemagne," French translation from the German, 5th ed., 1882, pp. 39, 95.

² "Contra Faustum," xxii. 78.

fore, a fundamental antinomy in Anselm's theory, which the scholastic theology after him largely devotes itself to bringing out.

(2) A second criticism touches Anselm's alternate use of the standpoints of satisfaction and merit. It is true that it can no longer be said with Ritschl, that in passing from the idea of satisfaction to that of merit, Anselm passes from a legal to an ethical point of view, the one being altogether disparate from the other.¹ The researches of Schultz have shown the true and natural relation between satisfaction and merit. Merit is the genus; satisfaction the species, or the form taken by merit where debt exists. Moreover, neither idea in its theological use is strictly legal or strictly ethical. "The conception of *satisfactio* is no legal idea in the proper sense, and the idea of *meritum* has just as much a legal appearance as that of *satisfactio*."² Nevertheless there is an inconsistency in Anselm's use of the terms satisfaction and merit, which depends on his definition of Christ's satisfaction as corresponding to the exact measure of sin, and upon the view inherited by him from the Ancient Church that the forgiveness of sins and eternal life are two different things.

If Christ's satisfaction only exactly purchases the remission of sins, it is clear that there can be no superfluous merit to win eternal life. The only ways out of the difficulty would be, either with various schoolmen after Anselm to abandon the view that satisfaction is according to the exact measure of sin, or else to equate forgiveness of sins and eternal life, in strict adherence to the maxim of Luther, "Wo Vergebung der Sünden ist, da ist Leben und Seligkeit".³ This last possibility, however, would carry us clean out of the sphere of

¹ Cf. Ritschl, "Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung," 1.², pp. 45, 46.

² Loofs, D.G.⁴, p. 510.

³ *Infra*, p. 369.

Anselm's ideas altogether. As it is, it is evident that his theory contains here another antinomy. Ritschl seems to be right when he says :—

“The strict consequence of the doctrine of satisfaction through Christ would be the thought that, after this condition of the forgiveness of sins was fulfilled, God, for the sake of His own honour, would lead upon the way of salvation those men who take as an example for themselves Christ's surrender to God. . . . Through the conception of merit, however, the significance of Christ for the men who are to be saved is increased, and a more intimate connexion between them and Christ is suggested, than would follow from the doctrine of satisfaction.”¹

Anselm, therefore, gains great practical advantages by supplementing the standpoint of satisfaction with that of merit, but he gains them at the expense of a logical fault.²

So much then in criticism of Anselm's theory : now for its historical importance. In spite of all continuity with the past, the theory is to be treated as emphatically a new development. We must endeavour to measure the greatness of the change involved in it.

(1) In Anselm's theory the doctrine of the Person of Christ is used in a way fundamentally different from its principal use in antiquity, which use indeed was continually in view during the elaboration of the doctrine by the great Councils. There the emphasis was on the God who employed His humanity as the means, whether of the illumination, or of the deification of humanity. Here the emphasis is on the man, whose work is given an infinite value by his participation in the Divine nature. In antiquity we

¹ “Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung,” I.², p. 45.

² Cf. Harnack, D.G.⁴, III. p. 404, n. 2.

find something of a parallel to Anselm's view at this point in the Irenæus doctrine of the victory over the devil of Christ as a man by the help of His Divinity. The Western emphasis on the sacrifice of Christ also prepares the way for the Anselmic view ; and still more again Augustine's stress on the humanity of the mediator ("In quantum homo, in tantum mediator," "Conf." x. 43, 68), is a preparation for it. Nevertheless, if we take a broad view of the contrast between the new and the old, it is a marked and notable one. There the *God-man* ; here the *God-man*.

(2) Dependent upon the above distinction is another. Corresponding to the primacy in the ancient view of the work of Christ of the Divine action in it, is the way in which its result is conceived. This is mystical : in other words Christ's work is thought of as operating in a mode inaccessible to human reason and so proper to Divinity. The death and resurrection of Christ, in fact, act as a ferment in humanity, destroying sin and death and imparting righteousness and immortality. This is the fundamental view of the application of Christ's work, as may be shown by a reference to Gregory of Nyssa,¹ John of Damascus,² and Augustine.³

Anselm's theory, however, replaces this mystical view with another which is rational and intelligible. Christ gives a gift to God, in return for which God gives eternal salvation. For the purposes of his theory Anselm has to reinterpret the death of Christ as the gift of his life. It is not the death in itself, but the gift made in it, that brings about salvation, and that not directly, but through the reaction of God. This is a totally different view of the work of Christ from the

¹ "Great Catechism," 35.

² "Exposition of the Orthodox Faith," iv. 9.

³ "Enchiridion," 42.

older view, so fundamentally different indeed that it means a theological revolution.

§ 2. ABELARD

Another great starting-point of the mediaeval doctrine of the work of Christ is found in Abelard (d. A.D. 1142), who possesses a double significance for us, (1) through his general contribution to system and method in theology, (2) through his direct treatment of the doctrine of the work of Christ.

As regards the first point, Abelard has begun a systematic treatment of theology of a different kind from that of Anselm. In his "*Introductio ad Theologiam*" and his "*Theologia Christiana*" he has laid the foundations for a scientific treatment of theology in detail, beginning with a doctrine of principles and method, and proceeding to a detailed discussion of the different doctrines upon the basis of carefully selected authorities. His work here remains a torso, in that it only reaches as far as the fundamental doctrine of the Trinity. "His purpose is with the weapons of dialectic to strike infidels and false dialecticians. . . . Abelard's standpoint is that of apologetic in the widest sense."¹

Though Abelard in the above systematic treatises has not carried his work to completion, he has, however, sketched in "*Introd. ad Theol.*" I. 1 the outlines of a new arrangement of the whole theological material, which he consciously sets in opposition to the arrangement of Augustine in the "*Enchiridion*," and which is of great significance. Augustine had reduced² the essence of religion to the three heads "faith, hope, love". But Abelard says:—

"There are three things, as I think, in which the

¹ Bach, "*Dogmengeschichte des Mittelalters*," 1873, II. pp. 45, 46.

² "*Ench.*" 3.

sum of human salvation consists, viz. faith, love, and the sacrament. Hope, on the other hand, I consider to be included in faith, as the species in the genus." Abelard therefore is the harbinger of the great development in mediaeval theology of the doctrine of the sacraments. Since, however, in the Catholic view of Christianity the blessings of the Christian salvation are assured to us through the sacraments, this development has a profound retrospective importance for our understanding of the meaning of the mediaeval doctrine of the work of Christ.

Finally, in "Sic et Non" Abelard has made an even more important contribution to theological system and method, in that he has here arranged the whole material of theology in an ordered system of questions, raised by the apparent discrepancies between the various Biblical and patristic authorities on the various points. Here above all Abelard has laid firmly the foundation of the typical scholastic method, and has also gathered most of the material afterwards used as a basis of theological operations.

The second point mentioned at the outset was that of Abelard's direct treatment of the work of Christ. This is not found in any of the above systematic works, but in his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, where, however, it is discussed in the form of a special theological question rising out of the exegesis.¹

The question is as to the nature of our redemption through Christ, or as to our being justified in His blood. It is exactly the question therefore which Augustine discusses in "De Trin." XIII. 10, 13 ff., which fundamental passage Abelard clearly has in view in the place before us, as a detailed comparison of the two statements shows.

¹ Lib. II. col. 833 f. in Migne's edition of the works of Abelard.

Abelard, however, begins by rejecting as flatly as Anselm the doctrine of redemption from the devil. His objections to this doctrine are as follows :—

(1) Christ redeemed only the elect, but these never were in the devil's power.

(2) If the devil seduced man, his fellow-servant, that gives him no right over man, but makes him rather deserving of punishment. This is the same as Anselm's argument.

(3) The devil could not give man the immortality which he had promised, and so again could have no rights over him.

Abelard sums up :—

“By these reasons it seems convincingly proved that the devil had acquired by the act of seduction no right against man whom he seduced, unless perhaps, as we said, in so far as our reasons related to the permission of the Lord, who had given man over to him as jailer or torturer for punishment.”¹

Man therefore had sinned only against God, whose obedience He had abandoned. If therefore God wished to forgive sin even apart from Christ's passion (as was done many times before the passion and in particular by Christ in His earthly life),² then there was nothing to prevent God saying to the torturer, “I will that you punish man no more”. Moreover, the same grace that chose a man without any preceding merits for union with Christ in the Incarnation, could also, without injury being done thereby to the devil, if God had willed it, have freely forgiven men's sins and delivered them from punishment. “Could not He, who showed man so great grace as to unite him with Himself in one person, expend on him the lesser grace, of forgiving his sins ?”³

¹ Col. 834.

² Cf. Lk. vii. 47 ; Matt. ix. 2.

³ Col. 835.

Why then the Incarnation, the sufferings, and the death of Christ? Again, why, when Christ died at the hands of men by a sinful act far greater than Adam's in eating the apple, did not this rather increase God's wrath against men than bring about, as St. Paul says, the justification or reconciliation of men? And again, if the solution of these questions be that Christ's blood was given not to the devil, but to God (a ransom is paid for captives not to their torturer, but to their real possessor), does not this create a further difficulty?

"How cruel and unjust it appears, that anyone should demand the blood of the innocent as any kind of ransom, or be in any way delighted with the death of the innocent, let alone that God should find the death of His Son so acceptable, that through it He should be reconciled to the world!"¹

Abelard's solution of the above difficulties is a fuller development of the ideas of Augustine in "De Catechizandis Rudibus," 4, 7.

"It seems to us, however, that we are justified by the blood of Christ and reconciled to God, in this, that by this singular grace shown us, that His Son took our nature and persevered in instructing us both in word and deed even unto death, He more largely bound us to Himself by love, so that kindled as we are by so great a benefit of the Divine grace, true charity should henceforth fear nothing at all. . . . And so our redemption is that supreme love manifested in our case by the passion of Christ, who not merely delivers us from the bondage of sin, but also acquires for us the liberty of the sons of God, so that we may fulfil all things from love rather than from fear of Him, who, as He Himself bears witness, showed us grace so great that no greater is possible."²

¹ Col. 835 f.

² *Ibid.* 836.

Such is Abelard's solution of the great question he has set himself. Two benefits proceed from the passion of Christ: (1) the forgiveness of sins, (2) the liberty of the sons of God, which last he interprets to mean the kindling in us of a love towards God, that willingly obeys Him. Abelard does not in the above discussion explain how the two benefits are related the one to the other, nor make it clear how the first benefit, the remission of sins, proceeds from the death of Christ; his argument only shows how that death issues in the second benefit, the awakening of love towards God. The preceding continuous commentary, however, clears up the points in doubt. Abelard there views the remission of sins as the direct result of the kindling of love, and so as the indirect result of the death of Christ. In opposition to Augustine, who made justification include both the remission of sins and the infusion of love, though laying chief stress on the latter, Abelard appears to identify justification simply with the latter, and then says that God has given Christ "in order that through this righteousness, i.e. charity, we may obtain the remission of sins". He refers to the words of the Lord,¹ "Her sins are forgiven, because she loved much".²

As Abelard's formal discussion is naturally to be read in the light of the preceding commentary, it is important to supplement it by means of these additional thoughts just described; and then it becomes evident that he has reduced the whole process of redemption to one single clear principle, viz. the manifestation of God's love to us in Christ, which awakens an answering love in us. Out of this principle Abelard endeavours to explain all other points of view.

It brings him, however, into difficulties with regard to the matter of baptism. The older objective views of

¹ Lk. vii. 47.

² Cf. col. 833.

the work of Christ formed a natural basis for the remission of sins in baptism, with which rite also the Augustinian doctrine of the infusion of love easily enough connects itself, since this love is regarded as the first fruits of the baptismal gift of the Spirit. But the psychological doctrine of the kindling of the love of God through the death of Christ leads to the problem, how, if the love thus awakened justifies, baptism can yet be necessary to salvation. Abelard replies that, unless baptism or martyrdom follows the kindling of love, it must be concluded that perseverance has been lacking. Remission of sins in fact does not take place till baptism, even though love be kindled before baptism. Moreover, in the case of children Abelard has to admit that remission of sins precedes justification, as infants, though clean in God's sight, are not capable either of charity or righteousness, nor can have any merits.¹ Remission of sins therefore in this case at least appears to be independent of the kindling of love. In fact, as Loofs observes, Abelard's new view could not be consistently carried through without more changes than he was prepared to make.²

Thus one is not surprised to find side by side with the above fundamental statement on the work of Christ, other passages to which Gottschick has called attention, where Abelard in the traditional way speaks of Christ as a sacrifice for sin, also others again, in which He is said to have borne our sins.³

There is, moreover, an important passage, in which Abelard, comparing the results of Adam's sin with those of Christ's obedience, makes use of the principle of merit. If the references to Christ's sacrifice are but short, and

¹ Cf. col. 837-8.

² Cf. D.G.⁴, p. 515.

³ Cf. "Studien zur Versöhnungslehre des Mittelalters," "Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte," 1901, p. 425.

the idea they contain undeveloped, the same cannot be said of the treatment of Christ's merit in this passage. The argument is as follows :—

“When God made His Son man, He indeed set Him under the law, which He had given in common to all men. And so He as man must according to the Divine precept love His neighbour as Himself, and exercise in our case the grace of His charity, both in teaching us and also in praying for us. . . . But His supreme righteousness required that His prayer should in nothing meet repulse, since the Divinity in union with Him allowed Him to wish or do nothing but what should be. . . . And so, being made man, He is constrained by the law of the love of His neighbour, that He might redeem those who were under the law and could not be saved by the law, and might supply from His own what was wanting in our merits, and just as He was singular in holiness, so also He might be singular in His utility in the matter of others' salvation. Otherwise what great thing did His holiness merit, if it availed only for His own, and not for others' salvation?”¹ As Gottschick has pointed out,² it is not right here, with Ritschl,³ to understand the above passage as referring only to the question, how the imperfect merits of the justified may be supplemented. It has a wider reference, and treats of the whole problem of salvation, from the point of view of Christ's merit. The passage is to be regarded therefore as containing a view of Christ's work, not so much supplementary, as alternative to the theory first discussed.

The doctrine of Abelard, in spite of its somewhat fragmentary and sketchy character, in which it contrasts strongly with the fully elaborated theory of Anselm, is

¹ Col. 865.

² “Studien zur Versöhnungslehre des Mittelalters,” *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, 1901, p. 423.

³ “Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung,” *i.*, p. 50.

nevertheless of the greatest importance and deserves careful study. Its importance indeed has, in view of the striking discussion reproduced at the beginning of this section, been generally conceded. Gottschick, however,¹ by laying stress on the passages in Abelard describing Christ's death as a sacrifice, and again on the passage just quoted touching His merit, endeavours to bring Abelard more into line with the patristic and the scholastic theology in general. But Loofs seems right in asserting in reply² the significance of Abelard's discussion, as at least an attempt to reduce the whole doctrine of the work of Christ to a single thought, and that thought one that does not coincide with any main tendency of previous doctrine. The opinion of centuries, whether favourable or unfavourable, has always been impressed by the singular force of this passage. And, if Abelard does in other places present views along different lines, and so himself controvert his own tendency to a simplification of doctrine, this need not prevent our recognizing that this tendency exists.

It is, moreover, not only the central thought of Abelard's discussion, viz. that of the moral effect of Christ's death, which is important. Besides the effective criticism which the discussion contains of the doctrine of redemption from the devil, a criticism in which Abelard stands side by side with Anselm, it introduces what, so far as I know, is a new element into the doctrine of the work of Christ, in that it formally subordinates it to the Augustinian doctrine of predestination. Only the elect are the objects of Christ's redeeming work ; its scope is limited beforehand by the Divine decree. We have here a thought destined to play a conspicuous part in the further development of our doctrine.

¹Op. cit. p. 428.

²D.G.⁴, p. 515.

§ 3. BERNARD OF CLAIRVAUX

The Middle Age was not content only with an intellectual apprehension of the treasures of the Christian religion as delivered to it by the past: it sought perhaps even more earnestly for an emotional appropriation of them. The movement towards such appropriation, after earlier beginnings, appears in full force in the twelfth century. One manifestation is Abelard's moral theory of the work of Christ, which we have just been studying, where clearly the whole doctrine is arranged so as to secure a definite inner experience of conversion to God. But undoubtedly the most striking and important manifestation of the tendency is in the practical and ascetic writings of Bernard of Clairvaux (d. A.D. 1153), above all in his famous sermons on Canticles.

As Ritschl has pointed out in his essay "*Lesefrüchte aus dem Heiligen Bernhard*,"¹ Bernard has put forward in these sermons a very remarkable view of the redemptive work of Christ, turning on a new and original evaluation of His Person. Bernard sees in the patience and love of Christ in His human life and passion, not merely the revelation of the love of God, but the actual saving manifestation of His own Divinity. His doctrine is the true Western counterpart of the doctrine of Irenæus and Athanasius, according to which the Incarnation is the saving entrance of God into humanity. Only there the Incarnation and its result are conceived in more physical and objective terms—what God brings into humanity is life and incorruption: here on the other hand they are conceived more subjectively and psychologically—the entrance of God into humanity is seen in the patience and love, which inspire similar patience and love in us. Again, as in the case of the

¹ "Gesammelte Aufsätze, Neue Folge," pp. 204 ff.

Anselmic theory, we may observe the tendency to exchange a mystical and rationally inexplicable doctrine of the saving operation of God in humanity for one that is naturally intelligible. It may be added that the secondary doctrine of Irenæus and Athanasius (which is the primary doctrine of Clement and Origen), where the Incarnation is thought of as the shining of the Divine light in humanity, of course stands much nearer to the new view of Bernard, but is nevertheless more mystical, and less completely intelligible than it.

The principal passages, in which the doctrine we have been summarizing is found, are the following :—

(1) “Serm.” 11. 3 (redemption is the filling of man from God through His emptying of Himself).

“Let not what is chief and greatest in the work of our redemption at all recede from the memory of the redeemed. Two things . . . most of all in this work I shall seek to instil into your serious thoughts, . . . its manner and its result. The manner is the self-emptying of God ; the result is our being filled from Him.”

(2) “Serm.” 6. 3 (Jesus shows His Divine nature and power in His miracles and teaching, still more in the patience of His sufferings and in His love to sinners).

“While He does in the flesh and through the flesh the works, not of the flesh but of God, commanding nature and conquering fortune, making foolish the wisdom of men and overcoming the tyranny of the demons, He plainly shows Himself to be Him through whom these same things were made, before, when they were made. In the flesh, I say, and through the flesh, He mightily and manifestly worked miracles, spoke sound words, suffered indignities, and so showed clearly that it is Himself who mightily but invisibly founded the world, wisely rules it and kindly protects it. Then,

while He preaches to the unthankful, shows signs to the unbelieving, prays for His crucifiers, does He not clearly show it is Himself, who with the Father makes His sun to rise upon the good and bad, and rains upon the just and the unjust?"

(3) "Serm." 20. 2 (the love shown in the work of redemption is a greater manifestation of Divine power even than the creation of the world).

"Above all things, I say, kind Jesus, the cup of our redemption, which thou didst drink, makes thee lovable to me. . . . Greatly did the Saviour toil in it, nor in the whole creation of the world did its Author assume so much weariness. The Creator indeed spoke and things were made, He commanded and they were created. But the Saviour in His words endured gainsayers, in His deeds spies, in His torments mockers, and in His death revilers. Behold how He loved."

Bernard was, however, not only an ascetic writer, originating new ideas, but also a theologian, warmly attached to tradition. As such he wrote a treatise against Abelard ("Tractatus contra quædam capitula errorum Abælardi"), in which he reaffirms in opposition to that writer the doctrine of redemption from the devil, concerning which he says all the doctors since the Apostles agree. Abelard is to know that the devil had not only a power, but a just power over men. Man was justly held captive by him, though the justice was not in man, nor in the devil, but in God (v. 14).

"Man therefore was justly given over to the devil, but in mercy delivered from him; yet in such mercy, that there was not lacking a kind of justice in the very deliverance; though it was also as a result of the mercy of the deliverer that (as befitted the remedies of deliverance) He made use of justice against the usurper rather than power. For what now could man, the

servant of sin and the captive of the devil, do of himself to recover the righteousness which he had once lost? There was assigned to him therefore, who had none of his own, the righteousness of another, and this was as follows: The prince of this world came and found nothing in the Saviour, and since none the less he most unjustly laid hands on the innocent, he most justly lost those whom he held; since He, who owed nothing to death, having received the injury of death, rightly freed him, who was liable to it, both from the debt of death and from the dominion of the devil. For with what justice could man a second time be asked for it? If it was man who owed the debt, it was man who paid it. For if one (saith the Apostle) died for all, then all died; so that to wit the satisfaction made by one may be imputed to all, just as the one bore the sin of all: nor is it one who transgressed, and another who satisfied: for the head and the body is one Christ. The head therefore satisfied for the members, Christ for his bowels" (VI. 15).

The above passage repeats the doctrine of Augustine in "*De Trin.*" XIII. 10, 13 ff., yet with a notable condensation and clarification, and also with some important additions.

(1) Bernard goes beyond Augustine in making use of the idea of satisfaction; though he applies it, not like Anselm with reference to the claim of God, but in harmony with patristic thought with reference to that of the devil.

(2) In order to show the operation for our benefit of Christ's satisfaction, he connects it further with the idea of imputation, and also with the notion, already found with a general reference to redemption in Augustine, of the solidarity of the head and the members in the one body.

(3) Where Augustine speaks of justification and the remission of sins, Bernard, guided by Paul, uses the alternative form of expression, "*Assignata est homini justitia aliena*," or as he puts the point in vi. 16, "*justum me dixerim, sed illius justitia*".

These are seminal thoughts destined later to issue in great theological developments.

It is from the point of view of a firm belief in an objective redemption that Bernard is so much opposed to the doctrine of Abelard. The latter he says reduces the whole matter of the Lord's Incarnation, Passion and Death to this: "That He gave to men by living and teaching an example of life; whilst by suffering and dying He set before us the extreme limit of charity. Did He therefore teach righteousness, and not give it; did He manifest charity, but not infuse it; and did He on these terms return to His own concerns?" (vii. 17).

The opposition between the objective view of redemption and the subjective could not be more clearly stated. Bernard's incisive mind goes straight to the fundamental difference between Abelard's doctrine and what he holds to be the essential doctrine of the past. It is true that the doctors of the past had never taught an objective without at the same time a subjective redemption, and that they had by no means distinguished the way in which these two views conditioned each other. It is true also that Bernard himself as appears from his sermons on Canticles valued greatly the subjective view; while on the other hand Abelard had, as we have seen, by no means exclusively set forth this view, but had in many places left tradition standing. Nevertheless, Bernard feels the force and sweep of Abelard's argument in his fundamental discussion, and how inevitably it tends to reduce all theories of Christ's work to one only, that of the moral influence of His life

and death. Such a view of redemption taken alone Bernard regards as in reality denying redemption altogether.

“How is it that he says, that the purpose and reason of the Incarnation was that Christ might illuminate the world with the light of His wisdom, and kindle it to love of Himself? Where then is the redemption?” (ix. 23).

Bernard argues that Abelard's theory implies the denial of the doctrine of original sin. “If the life which Christ gives is nothing other than His instruction, neither undoubtedly will the death which Adam gave to men likewise be other than his instruction; so that the one educated men by his example to sin, and the other by His example to live well and love Him” (*ibid.*). He points out, what indeed Abelard had admitted, the inconsistency of the moral theory with the Church's practice of infant baptism: this implies a real and objective redemption, not a subjective process. “How shall it (the advent of Christ) inflame to the love of God, who do not yet know how to love their own mother?” (ix. 24).

Abelard had not only found difficulties in the idea of our redemption from the devil, but in that other which Augustine in “De Trin.” XIII. 11, 15, couples with it, the thought of our reconciliation to God. In answer to the problem, how it was that the death of Christ did not increase rather than blot out man's account of sin, Bernard says that it was of such avail as to blot out the sin of the crucifixion with all the rest. And again in answer to the question, how God could possibly take delight in the death of His Son, Bernard gives the noble answer: “It was not Christ's death that pleased God, but His will in voluntarily dying, and by that death abolishing death, working salvation, restoring innocence, triumphing over the principalities and powers.

...” (VIII. 20). The Father, says Bernard, did not require the death of His Son, nevertheless He accepted the offering of it; not thirsting for blood, but for salvation, because there was salvation in the blood. It is to be observed that Bernard here does what the patristic theologians had been unable to do: he establishes a clear relation between the ideas of Christ’s death as the means of redemption from the devil, and as a sacrifice to God. The death of Christ is accepted by God as an oblation, because it is the way of redemption from death and the devil.

We must note that Bernard for all his stress on an objective redemption nevertheless follows the Augustinian tradition in admitting that the Incarnation was not absolutely necessary for God. Nevertheless from the human point of view it was necessary: this must be enough for us (VIII. 19).

In IX. 25 Bernard sums up his total view of the work of Christ. “Three principal things I perceive in this work of our salvation: the pattern of humility, in which God emptied Himself: the measure of love, which He stretched even unto death, and that the death of the cross: the mystery of redemption, in which He underwent the death, which He bore. The two former of these without the last are like a picture on the void.”

In the above passage Bernard is moved by the criticism of Abelard to correlate the objective and subjective aspects of redemption in a definite way, which indeed Anselm had already suggested,¹ but which the Fathers had not found necessary. The objective view is the firm basis of the subjective: without the objective the subjective itself must come to nothing.

We must not allow ourselves to be diverted from the essential importance of Bernard’s objection to a purely

¹ “Cur Deus Homo,” I. 4.

subjective view of the work of Christ by the fact that for him the objective view of redemption was bound up with the notion of a ransom paid to the devil. The fundamental thing to be observed is not the particular form of objectivity favoured by Bernard, but that he has brought into such clear relief the contrast between pure subjectivity and a subjectivity which rests on an objective basis. Here first in the history of theology, in this controversy between Abelard and Bernard, appears with full consciousness of its importance the opposition of two views of the work of Christ, which still at the present day stand in vital conflict with one another.

§ 4. RUPERT OF DEUTZ

Rupert of Deutz (d. 1135 A.D.), the contemporary of Bernard of Clairvaux, deserves mention not because of a peculiar theory of the work of Christ, but because he was the first to raise an important question, which has a profound bearing upon the doctrine of this subject. This was the question: "Whether Christ would have become incarnate if Adam had not sinned?"

The thought of an Incarnation independent of the Fall naturally harmonizes with those main tendencies of Greek theology, which see in Christ the Life and Light of men; and according to Westcott there are patristic phrases which seem to imply that the idea was to a certain extent realized and discussed by the Eastern Fathers.¹ But the question was not actually raised till the eleventh or twelfth century; from the thirteenth century onwards, however, it became a recognized question of the schools. Its appearance is again like so much that has already been spoken of, a mark of the new intellectual vigour of the age, which in endeavour-

¹ See his essay, "The Gospel of the Creation," "Commentary on the Epistles of St. John," p. 288.

ing to appropriate the inheritance of the past entered often upon bold and fresh lines of speculation, and often also discovered problems where none had been perceived before.

Rupert of Deutz, whose name is connected with the emergence of the question, handles it only in a tentative way, from which it is clear that he had neither received nor was able himself to give a firm and consistent opinion on the subject. His references to it are not cast into systematic form, but take the shape of interpretations of various texts of Scripture.¹

In an exposition of Heb. II. 10² Rupert reads *consummari* for *consummare*, and obtains the sense that it was fitting for the Son of God, for whom were all things, and through whom were all things, to be perfected through sufferings. He then goes on to say: "The first thing to inquire here is whether the Son of God spoken of in this place would have become man or not even if sin, for which we all die, had not intervened" (p. 290). It is certain that in this case He would not have become a mortal man: "The question is whether God would have become man as the Head and King of all as He now is, and whether this was in some sense necessary for the human race" (*ibid.*).

Rupert further argues from the doctrine of Augustine³ that the elect saints would certainly have been born if man had not fallen, to the inference that in this case it is absurd to suppose that their Head and King would not have been born also. Sin did not make of none effect the original Divine purpose of Incarnation, but brought the added grace that Christ not only did not

¹ For the passages quoted below I am indebted to Westcott's just-mentioned essay: the pagination given with the quotations refers to this.

² Comm. in Matt. XIII.

³ "De civ. Dei," XIV. 23.

shrink from our nature, which He had purposed to assume, but for our sakes even descended to death.

In another place¹ Rupert disputes the doctrine, which we have found stated by Anselm, that man was created to fill the gap caused in the angelic ranks by the fall of some, and says: "It is more right to say not that man was made for the sake of the angels, but that the angels, as every thing else, were made for a particular man" (p. 291). What does Christ say in Prov. VIII. 31 but virtually this: "Before God made anything from the beginning, and when He was making this or that, this was His purpose, that I the Word of God, the Word God (*verbum Deus*) should become flesh, and dwell among men with great love and great humility, which are true delights"? (*ibid.*). The Incarnation therefore is essentially independent of the Fall of man; but again Rupert argues that the Fall did actually redound to the glory of Christ, who may be imagined as saying to the sinner: "I should not have been such as I am and so great, except for thy sake for the sins of the human race ('*causa tui propter peccata generis humani*'). . . . We see, the Apostle says, the Lord Jesus Christ for suffering crowned with glory and honour"² (p. 292).

It is clear that the question raised by Rupert has a most important bearing on the doctrine of the work of Christ. If the Incarnation would have taken place even apart from the Fall, then an essential element of His work must be without reference to sin.

¹ "De glorif. Trin." III. 20 ff.

² Comm. in Matt. XIII. (cf. Heb. II. 9).

CHAPTER III

THE SYSTEMATIZATION OF DOCTRINE

§ 1. HUGO OF ST. VICTOR

HUGO OF ST. VICTOR (d. A.D. 1141) is of great significance, not so much for his actual doctrine of the work of Christ, as because from him we obtain the first complete mediaeval system, and have clearly defined for the first time the full context in which the Middle Ages understood Christ's redeeming work.

On the one hand it is of the utmost importance that Hugo has followed out the suggestion of Abelard and has given to the sacraments the place in theology which corresponds to their practical importance in mediaeval Christianity. His whole system in fact, as is suggested by its name "*De Sacramentis Christianæ Fidei*," is so arranged that every doctrine converges upon that of the sacraments as the practical means of salvation.

On the other hand Hugo has brought the work of Christ once more into relation with the economy of revelation, proceeding by successive stages from natural law through the written or Mosaic law to the new or Christian law. He has thus set it in the wider context in which it is found in Irenæus and Origen, and has recovered in consequence something of the breadth of treatment so apparent in the earlier Greek theology. It is, however, to be observed that there is a difference. In the Greek theologians the preliminary stages of revelation are directly attributed to the Logos, and so are

more closely connected with the historical work of Christ. By Hugo they are rather derived immediately from God Himself, and thus, while supplying a context necessary for the understanding of the mediaeval conception of the work of Christ, do not even indirectly come under that title.

We have already noted elsewhere (p. 156) that Hugo in his system aims to give an account of the doctrine of Holy Scripture, and groups it under the two heads of creation and redemption. The principal matter of Scripture is the work of redemption; yet the doctrine of creation (and of the fall) is the necessary preface.¹

By putting together various passages from the "De Sacramentis" we can obtain an idea of Hugo's view as to the nature and the different grounds of theological statement. Faith is perfected, when it proceeds through rational proof to an intuitive understanding (*per veritatem apprehendere*).² While the doctrine of creation depends upon the debt of nature, the doctrine of redemption depends upon the debt of grace. "The former we ought to believe, because we are formed by nature: the latter we ought to believe, because we are redeemed by grace" (1. 10, 5). "To nature belong reason and the creation (*creatura*); to grace inspiration and doctrine" (1. 3, 31). Hence the doctrine of redemption rests on authority. "Wherefore after these things we must have regard to those things which authority proves, since human reason, unless illuminated by the Word of God, cannot see the way of truth" (*ibid.*).

Upon the basis of the rational doctrine of creation Hugo then builds the supernatural structure of the doctrine of redemption. The doctrine of the Trinity, its presupposition, is regarded as substantially rational,

¹ 1 Prol. 3.

² Cf. 1. 10, 4.

in view of the image of the Trinity in the mind, and so is included in the doctrine of creation (1. 3, 30). "The work of redemption is the Incarnation of the Word with all its sacraments."¹ These sacraments Hugo distinguishes as belonging to the three stages of revelation familiar to us since Irenæus, viz. natural law, the written law, and the new law. It is a peculiar feature of his system that the subject of the work of Christ is introduced twice. It appears the first time before the discussion of the sacraments of natural law and of the written law, chiefly in the form of an abstract discussion of its necessity. The second time it appears before the discussion of the sacraments of the new law, under the head of the doctrine of the Incarnation as actually realized. To obtain a complete view of Hugo's doctrine of the work of Christ it is necessary to put these two isolated sections together.

In the former of them Hugo begins by effecting a curious combination between the new Anselmic doctrine of satisfaction and the old doctrine of redemption from the devil. He views the work of Christ as the settlement of a kind of triangular lawsuit, in which God, man, and the devil are all concerned (1. 8, 4).

"These three therefore, man, God, and the devil, come together in the cause. The devil is convicted of having done injury to God, in that he both deceitfully abducted and violently held His bond servant man. Man similarly is convicted of having done injury to God, in that he both despised His commandment, and putting himself under an evil stranger brought on Him the loss of his service. Moreover, the devil is convicted of having done injury to man, in that he first deceived him by promising good things, and afterwards harmed him by bringing upon him evil things. . . . Man then

¹ 1 Prol. 2.

is justly subject to the devil as regards his own fault, but unjustly 'as regards the devil's deceit. If therefore man had a patron, such that by his power the devil could be brought to judgment, man could justly oppose his dominion. . . . No such patron, however, can be found but God alone ; but God would not undertake man's cause, because He was still angry with man for his own fault."

In this complicated situation what is to be done? Man must first satisfy God, and thus obtain help against the devil. Here therefore enters the Anselmic theory of satisfaction, which Hugo repeats in a condensed form, making, however, some important modifications in it. He distinguishes between two parts in the satisfaction made : (*a*) the placating of God's wrath by the making good the loss of man's service which took place in Christ's life of obedience, wherein He rendered to God what was due to Him from man ; (*b*) the satisfaction made for man's contempt of God by Christ's voluntarily undergoing the punishment of sin which He did not deserve. This last does away with man's guilt (*reatus*), or liability to punishment.

It will be remembered that Anselm himself suggested such a distinction. "He who violates the honour of another does not do enough if he restore the honour, unless, in correspondence with the harm done in dishonouring him, he make some amends acceptable to him whom he has dishonoured."¹ In Anselm's hands, however, the distinction came to nothing ; whereas Hugo has developed it in a way somewhat anticipatory of the later Protestant doctrine of Christ's satisfaction as consisting both in His active and passive obedience, the resemblance, moreover, extending also to the conception of the satisfactory nature of Christ's

¹ "Cur Deus Homo," I. 11 (*supra*, p. 168).

death, which is not as with Anselm simply an offering inclining God to remit punishment, but also a substitutionary endurance of our punishment.

Hugo completes his doctrine by returning to the position of the devil after God has been satisfied. The evil one has now no ground of accusation against man, since he never had any right to rule over man, and now moreover man is worthy of deliverance.

Hugo sums up the whole therefore as follows (I. 8, 6 and 7): "Thus God was made man, that He might deliver man whom He had made, that the Creator and the Redeemer of man might be the same. . . . Wisdom came to conquer wickedness, that the enemy who had conquered by cunning, might be conquered by sagacity. He took from our nature a sacrifice for our nature, that the whole burnt offering to be offered for us might be taken from what was ours, so that redemption might belong to us just in this very thing, that the sacrifice was taken from what was ours. Of which redemption we are indeed made partakers, if we are united by faith to the Redeemer who is become our partner through the flesh."

Hugo proceeds, however, to point out that God would have done no wrong to men had He left them in their sins to eternal punishment. Salvation in fact depends simply upon the Divine election. There are two kinds of justice. One is the justice of power, according to which God may without injustice treat man as He will, having regard only to the sovereign claims of His own power. The other justice is the justice of equity, which is according to merit; and by it God rewards or punishes him who is the recipient of this justice, even though it be against his will. Justification then takes place by the justice of power, not in accordance with merit. Man is therefore made just by the justice which he receives from God (I. 8, 8).

Salvation, therefore, both in election and justification proceeds from the justice of power. So, however, does the Incarnation itself.

“Wherefore we truly confess, that God could have accomplished the redemption of the human race in another way also, if He had wished. But we confess that the way chosen was the better suited to our weakness, and so God became man, and for man’s sake assuming human mortality renewed man by giving him the hope of His own immortality. . . . So that He may be the way in example, the truth in promise, and life in reward” (1. 8, 10).

In the end therefore the necessity of the Incarnation turns out not to be absolute. Election, justification, and the Incarnation, the whole process of salvation in fact in all its parts depends simply upon the sovereign arbitrament of God. It is of great significance that Hugo consciously draws a parallel between the doctrine of election and the doctrine of the atonement: it is another stage on the way to the subordination of the latter to the former which we shall presently find in the theology of Duns Scotus.

We pass on to the second section of the “De Sacramentis” bearing on our subject. Hugo devotes the whole of II. pt. 1 to the Incarnation, and here are to be found as also in II. 2. 1 some important passages on the work of Christ.

2. 1, 5 exhibits once more a tendency to explain the whole process of salvation from the one principle of sovereign grace. The Word assumed human nature but without guilt (*culpa*); that being free from sin, He might become a sacrifice for sin. This was the beginning of the grace, which ends in our salvation.

“That it might be united free from sin to the Word, human nature was cleansed from sin by the same grace

by which the Christian is freed from sin, that he may be conjoined to the same nature in Christ His head."

2. 1, 7 further explains the view of Christ's work as a vicarious endurance of our punishment. In the assumption of human nature at the Incarnation, though guilt was not assumed, the penalty of sin was assumed, not of necessity but by Christ's free will, in order that, because human nature in the Saviour suffered without guilt, the rest of human nature, which was liable to penalty on account of guilt, might be delivered.

More important, however, is a discussion in 2. 1, 6 on the merit of Christ, in which Hugo breaks fresh ground and sets the pattern for the subsequent scholasticism.

The soul of Christ was from the first perfect in wisdom and grace. As regards His merit, however, some assert that the man Christ merited the glory of immortality only through His passion and death, in proof of which doctrine they quote Phil. II. 8, 9. In truth, however, His merit was for us, not for Himself. He merited nothing by His passion, which He did not already merit by His innate goodness from His conception. "So far as He was man in rank, so far was He good in will. This is merit. If His will was always perfect, so also was His merit always perfect." Christ then only merited by His passion in a different way what He already merited from His conception. His merit was first in Himself, then in His work. If the passion had not been needed, He would still by His perfect obedience to God have merited without it the glory of immortality. By the passion, however, He has become an example to us who must die, not only calling us to glory, but also showing the way.

Of great significance also is 2. 2, 1, which treats of the grace which is given through Christ, and diffused

by the Spirit from the head to the members. Here we find for the first time after the hints and suggestions of Augustine and Bernard a systematic treatment of this important aspect of the work of Christ.

Man was first put under the law of nature, and left to himself. The only result was that through ignorance he erred. The written law came to remedy this ignorance, but could not give strength to man to perform its commandment. "After these things, therefore, grace was fitly given to illuminate the blind and to heal the weak." Grace illuminates in order to give the knowledge of the truth, it inflames in order to produce the love of virtue. Hugo says elsewhere (2. 1, 1): "The time of grace took its beginning from the Incarnation of the Son of God". Here in 2. 2, 1 he is concerned to show how grace operates.

"Just as the spirit of a man through the mediation of the head descends to quicken the members, so the Holy Spirit comes through Christ to Christians. For Christ is the Head, the Christian the member. The Head is one, the members many, and there is constituted one body from the Head and the members, and one Spirit in one body. . . . By faith we are made members, by love we are quickened. By faith we receive union; by charity we receive quickening. Sacramentally, however, we are united by baptism, we are quickened by the body and blood of Christ. By baptism we are made members of the body, by the body of Christ (in the Eucharist), however, we are made participators in the quickening."

The doctrine of the work of Christ therefore issues ultimately in that of the Sacraments. As Gregory of Nyssa was the first in the Greek Church, so Hugo of St. Victor is the first in the Latin Church to work out this issue in systematic form: Hugo, however, has done

it much more fully than Gregory. According to him three things are necessary to salvation both before and after the advent of Christ, viz. faith, the sacraments of faith, and good works (1. 9, 8).

Faith has been manifested before the law (i.e. the law of Moses), under the law, and under grace. Before the law God the Creator was believed in, and redemption was hoped for from Him. Under the law the Person of the Messiah was known, but not definitely as the God-man. Under grace Christ and the mode of redemption are fully known. Under the earlier stages, however, some knew the full truth, and the rest were saved by being joined with them in simple faith and in working righteousness (1. 10, 6).

Each stage, moreover, has its own precepts. The stage of natural law had the two unchangeable precepts of love to God and love to man, which the written law expanded into the three and the seven of the Decalogue (1. 12, 5). To these ten commandments were also added in the written law certain mutable precepts, intended either for discipline and for the increase of devotion or else for the symbolization of coming truth. The New Testament has further developed the meaning of the Decalogue, has abolished some mutable precepts, and retained others (1. 12, 9).

So far as Christianity is law it is a religion of merit and reward. It is also, however, in all the stages of revelation a religion of sacramental grace. The written law, says Hugo, contains three things, precepts, sacraments, and promises.

"In the precepts there is merit, in the promises reward, in the sacraments assistance" (1. 12, 4). *Mutatis mutandis*, this general principle applies also to the other stages of revelation.

We thus come to the doctrine of the sacraments:

“A sacrament is a bodily or material element outwardly presented in sensible form, by likeness representing, by institution signifying, and by sanctification containing a certain invisible and spiritual grace” (1. 9, 2).

Every stage of revelation has its sacraments. Natural law had tithes and sacrifices, the written law circumcision and other rites. Only the sacraments of the New Testament, however, fully correspond to the above definition. They alone are both signs of grace and by benediction channels of grace. The previous sacraments were signs of redemption only, and conveyed grace only indirectly through the mediation of the realities for which they stood. Again, the sacraments of natural law were not instituted but voluntary (*ex voto*): those of the written law, however, like those of the New Testament were instituted (*ex precepto*). The relative inefficacy of the pre-Christian sacraments is shown in that the saints of the Old Testament who had them could not enter heaven till the ascended Christ had opened the gate (1. 11, 5).

The sacraments of the New Testament are therefore alone properly called the sacraments of grace. Hugo connects them with the doctrine of the Incarnation at the point where we finally left it, viz. that Christ is the Head, through whom grace flows to the members. The connecting link is the doctrine of the Church.

“The Holy Church is the body of Christ, quickened by one Spirit and united by one faith, and sanctified. . . . What therefore is the Church, but the multitude of the faithful, the whole society of Christians?” (2. 2, 2).

The Body of Christ, however, has two sides, the Clergy and the Laity (2. 2, 3). It is the former that administer the sacraments, and bear rule in the Church. The administration of the Church, therefore, consists in orders, sacraments, and precepts (2. 2, 5). The Church

is in fact a legal and sacramental institution, whose existence depends on the orders of its clergy.

One thing only is missing from the precision of Hugo's doctrine of the sacraments. He does not definitely fix their number. There are three kinds of sacraments :—

(1) There are certain in which salvation principally consists and is received : these are Baptism and the Eucharist.

(2) There are others not necessary for salvation, but valuable for the exercise of virtue and the increase of grace, such as the Sprinkling of water and the Receiving of ashes.

(3) There are others instituted for the preparation of persons employed in the sacraments, such as Ordination (1. 9, 7).

Besides Baptism, the Eucharist, and Ordination, however, Confirmation, Extreme Unction, and Matrimony are named as sacraments. Penance is included in the scheme of Hugo's treatise ; but does not appear to be included formally by name among the sacraments.

Hugo's doctrine of Penance is as follows. He urges the duty of confession (2. 14, 1). Grace first kindles those dead in sin to inner compunction, and leads them to make confession ; which done, they receive from the priest the remission of the debt of damnation. The sinner, however, must still perform the appointed satisfaction or incur the pains of purgatory (2. 14, 3). Here it is to be observed that, while Hugo deduces the remission of eternal punishment from the priestly absolution, the preliminary grace which creates inner contrition is traced directly to the free gift of God. The grace received in Penance is therefore not conceived as entirely sacramental, but a most important part of it lies outside the sacrament.

Apart, however, from difficulties in detail like the above, the general view of Hugo is clear. The Church is on the one hand the body of the faithful, on the other hand it is a legal and sacramental institution. In both aspects it rests upon the foundation of the Incarnation as the culmination of the process of the Divine revelation. Finally, the Church as institution continues the work of Christ for the benefit of the Church as the company of believers, which is, through the Spirit, the recipient of the salvation brought by Him.

Hugo has thus given classical expression to the mediaeval view of Christianity.

"Grace (in the form of the sacraments) and merit (law and performance) are the two centres of the curve of the mediaeval conception of Christianity. This curve, however, is entirely embedded in faith in the Church; for since to it—as no one doubted—were entrusted the sacraments and the power of the keys resulting therefrom, it was not only the authority for the whole construction, but in the strictest sense the continuation of Christ Himself, and the body of Christ, which is enhypostatically united to Him."¹

§ 2. PETER LOMBARD

The other great systematic work of the twelfth century besides the "De Sacramentis" is Peter Lombard's "Book of Sentences".² A great importance attaches to this work because of the place which it took during the next three centuries, when it was regarded as the fundamental statement of the doctrine of the Western Church and was made the basis of innumerable commentaries. The book consists in the first place of a compilation of select extracts (*sententiae*) from Scripture and the Fathers on

¹ Harnack, D.G.⁴, III. p. 519.

² Lombard, d. A.D. 1160.

the various subjects of Christian doctrine, arranged, as in Abelard's "*Sic et Non*," which here has given the model, so as to form a system. The cement, however, which is necessary to form these diverse elements into an actual system, and which was wanting in Abelard's work, is furnished in the "*Book of Sentences*" in the shape of intercalated comments intended to unite and reconcile the various authorities. Abelard himself and Hugo of St. Victor have supplied a good deal of this additional matter. It is clear that the method of the book does not allow great scope for originality, nor indeed was originality the thing aimed at; the intention of the whole is rather to furnish a guide through the labyrinth of existing tradition by means of a careful selection and systematization. Nevertheless such scope for originality as the scheme allows Lombard makes full use of. It is obvious that very different accounts might be given of tradition according to the different plans of systematization adopted, the different passages selected for discussion, and the varying methods of reconciliation made use of in case of divergence between one authority and another.

Lombard's system contains four books. The first has for its subject the doctrine of God, the second that of the Creation and the Fall: in this book is discussed the general relation between grace and free will. The third deals with the Incarnation, and with faith, hope, and love, the fourth with the sacraments and with eschatology.

We shall begin directly with the doctrine of the work of Christ as developed in Lib. III. The redemptive purpose of the Incarnation is defined in general as the bringing in of grace. Of the doctrine of the Incarnation as the medicine of fallen humanity there are some brief reminiscences in III. 2, A: "Since in man the whole of

human nature had been corrupted by vice, He assumed the whole, that is soul and flesh, that He might heal and sanctify the whole". The authority of John of Damascus is quoted: "The whole Christ assumed the whole of me, that He might gratify the whole of me with salvation. For what cannot be assumed, cannot be cured."¹

There is, however, no development of this line of doctrine. The doctrine of the Incarnation as traditionally accepted from the Ancient Church is, in fact, developed simply as a speculative doctrine of the Person of Christ, apart from the practical motives which had governed the Greek Fathers in enunciating it. So also the discussion of Christ's predestination (Dist. VII.) has no direct soteriological connexion. There is, however, soteriological importance in the discussion of the grace of Christ in His humanity, which is contained in Dist. XIII. A.

"It must also be known that Christ according to His humanity received from His very conception the fulness of grace; for to Him the Spirit was given not according to measure, and in Him the fulness of the Godhead dwells bodily. It so dwells in Him, as saith Augustine to Dardanus (Ep. 187, 13, 40), that He is full of grace in every respect. Not so does the Godhead dwell in the saints. As in our body there is sense in the different members, but not to the same extent as in the head (for in it is sight and hearing and smell and taste and touch; but in the other parts touch only), so in Christ dwells all the fulness of the Godhead, since He is the Head in which are all the senses. In the saints, on the other hand, there is, as it were, touch only; for to them the Spirit is given by measure, since they have received of His fulness. They have received, however, of His fulness, not according to essence, but according to like-

¹ Cp. "Expos. orth. fid." III. 6.

ness ; for they never have received the same grace essentially, but have received a similar grace. The Child therefore was full of wisdom and grace from His very conception."

Dist. xv., xvi. have also some bearing on our theme. In Dist. xv. Lombard teaches that Christ assumed human infirmities, the penalties of sin, without human guilt. In Dist. xvi., again, he teaches that Christ's death was purely voluntary.

The main discussion of the work of Christ, however, is reached in Dist. xviii.-xx. Dist. xviii. deals with the merit of Christ. Some say that Christ won merit, not for Himself, but for His members only. But it is proved by the authority of Paul,¹ also by that of Augustine² and Ambrose (or more properly Ambrosiaster),³ that Christ merited by the humility and obedience of His passion the glorification of His body and also the impassibility of His soul. Lombard, however, says that all these things which Christ merited for Himself, He merited from the instant of His conception. Christ had more merits in His passion than in His conception ; but He had no greater virtue in the many merits than formerly in few.

Further, by His passion Christ merited the name that is above every name. This is the name of God, which He had by nature as God, but merited as man. This name, however, could have been merited without the passion because of His previous virtue. Christ, even if He had become a mortal man, might still have attained the above-mentioned glory. His mortality might have been consumed, and He might have been clothed with the glory of immortality.

Lombard does not say whether these discussions

¹ Phil. II. 8, 9.

² "In Joh. Ev." 104, 3.

³ "Comment. in ep. ad Philipp." (on chap. II. 9-11).

have any reference to the doctrine of Rupert of Deutz as to the possibility of an Incarnation apart from the Fall, but it is obvious that they have a bearing on it. This is particularly clear when we proceed to the next question proposed and the answer returned to it.

“Why then did He will to suffer and die, if His virtues sufficed to merit the above things? For thee, not for Himself. How for me? That His passion and death might be for thee both pattern (*forma*) and cause, the pattern of virtue and humility, the cause of glory and liberty. . . . For He merited for us by the endurance of His death and passion, what He had not merited by the foregoing stages, viz. the entrance to paradise, and redemption from sin, from punishment, and from the devil, and by His death we have obtained these things, viz. redemption and the adoption of the sons of glory. For He Himself in dying became the sacrifice for our deliverance.”

Of these results of the passion and death of Christ Lombard takes first its positive or prospective effect, the opening of paradise. He says that God had decreed because of Adam's sin to close paradise to his posterity, unless his sin of pride should be expiated by a corresponding righteous act of humility. This was accomplished by the perfect sacrifice of Christ, “who was brought much lower in humility, in tasting the bitterness of death, than the aforesaid Adam had been exalted in pride in enjoying a harmful delight through the eating of the forbidden fruit”. Thus Christ's death fulfilled the Divine decree, and annulled the writing that prevented our entrance into paradise. We are not to understand indeed that He could not have saved us in any other way than by His death; but, if we were to be saved by a sacrifice, no other sacrifice would have availed. “For all other men were debtors, and scarcely

was his own virtue and humility sufficient for each. None of them therefore could offer a sacrifice sufficient for our reconciliation."

In Dist. xix. Lombard comes to the negative or retrospective effects of Christ's passion and death, viz. our redemption from the devil, from sin, and from punishment.

"We are delivered from the devil and from sin by the death of Christ; because, as saith the Apostle, we are justified in His blood; and in that we are justified, i.e. are delivered from sins, we are delivered from the devil, who held us by the chains of our sins."

Here Lombard first follows the lines of Abelard. We are delivered from our sins, because in the death of Christ there is commended to us the love of God, who gave His Son to die for us sinners, and we are by this pledge of Divine love kindled to love of God, who has done so much for us. Thus we are justified, i.e. freed from sins and made just by the awakening of love in our hearts, love which ensues upon the faith that looks at Christ and His passion, as the Israelites looked at the brazen serpent in the wilderness. By this look we are healed of our sins, and thus are freed from the devil, so that after this life he can find nothing in us to punish.

But now Lombard adds to this line of thought the doctrine of an objective redemption. Christ by His sacrifice has blotted out the guilt (*culpa*), through which the devil held us for punishment. Thus the latter has lost his power over us; and, though he is allowed still to tempt us, he cannot prevail. Christ has bound the strong man, i.e. has restrained him from the seduction of the faithful, "and thus in the blood of Christ, who answered for the robbery which He did not commit (*qui solvit, quæ non rapuit*), we are redeemed from sin and thereby from the devil". Here Lombard brings in the doctrine of

Augustine that the blood of Christ, who was without guilt, having been shed, all the bond of our guilt by which the devil held us was annulled. The devil in fact was outwitted by Christ. "What did the Redeemer to our captor? He extended to him His cross as a mouse-trap; He set there as a bait His blood." Here almost for the last time in the history of theology appears the doctrine of the deceit practised on the devil. Lombard returns, however, to the thought that the devil was conquered, in which he finds the explanation both of the Incarnation and of the death of Christ.

"God therefore was made mortal man, that by dying He might conquer the devil. For unless it had been man who conquered the devil, man, who subjected himself to him of his own accord, would have appeared to be taken from him, not justly, but violently. But if it was man that conquered him, he lost man by manifest right, and in order that man may conquer, it is necessary that God should be in him, to make him immune from sins."

It will be remembered that Anselm also had retained this last form of the patristic doctrine of redemption.¹

So much then for redemption from sin and the devil, Lombard next touches on redemption from punishment. Christ has redeemed us from eternal punishment by paying our debt. As regards temporal punishment, we have to wait for our full redemption till the future. But even now we are redeemed from guilt (*culpa*), though not from punishment, nor yet indeed altogether from guilt. We are not redeemed from it in the sense that it does not exist, but in the sense that it no longer rules over us.

Redemption from temporal punishment takes place

¹ "Cur Deus Homo," I. 22 (*supra*, p. 170).

as follows : Christ is said to have borne our sins on the cross, i.e. the punishment of our sins, in that through His punishment all temporal punishment owed for sin is entirely remitted in baptism, and is no more exacted from the baptized. Temporal punishment for sins after baptism is reduced in the sacrament of penance by the co-operation of the sacrifice of Christ.

Christ, then, is our Redeemer and Mediator, who reconciles men to God. But we are not to think that God did not love us before this reconciliation. In so far, however, as we were sinners, we were at enmity with God, and His enmity is removed by the Mediator. The whole Trinity is involved in the reconciliation, so far as the exercise of power in the blotting out of sins is concerned : the Son alone is involved in the fulfilment of the obedience, by which according to His human nature those things were accomplished, by believing and imitating which we are justified. Christ then is mediator as man ; and all believers are healed of their wickedness, who believing in His humility come to love it, and loving it imitate it.

In Dist. xx. Lombard discusses more fully the question already touched on in Dist. xviii., whether God could have redeemed us in any other way than through the death of Christ. Here he repeats what Augustine says in "*De. Trin.*" xiii. 10, 13, that the Omnipotent could have saved us in other ways, but this was the fittest for healing our misery. What could so encourage us, and deliver us from all despair of immortality, as to know that God loved us so much that His Son became incarnate and died for our sake ? Moreover, God wished to conquer the devil by justice, not by power, which was done in that the devil lost his right to mankind by slaying Christ, upon whom he had no claim. This idea is developed at length with further

quotation from Augustine's "De Trin."¹ Hugo of St. Victor² is also quoted.

Christ's sacrifice, however, was not offered to the devil, but to the Trinity. On the altar of the cross, Himself the priest, He offered the sacrifice of our reconciliation, "for all, as to the sufficiency of the price ; but for the elect alone, as to the efficacy, in that He effected salvation for the elect alone ".

So far as the Jews and Judas gave Christ up to death, their work was evil, since their intention was evil ; but so far as the Father surrendered Him, and as Christ surrendered Himself, the work was good, for the intention was good.

Lombard has gathered together in his doctrine of the work of Christ practically the whole tradition of the Latin Fathers, without, however, achieving a complete unification of the same. He has indeed, while passing by Anselm's standpoint of satisfaction, made use of that of merit ; but he has not used the conception, so as to unify the whole of his material. What he has given us may, however, be reduced under three main heads : (1) the doctrine in various forms of an objective redemption from the devil, sin, and punishment, with, as its positive (or prospective) result, the opening of the gate of heaven ; (2) the revelation of God's love in the death of Christ ; (3) the example of His humility. These principal heads, however, by no means exhaust the whole material, which contains many additional incidental points. A particularly important distinction introduced by Lombard is that of the sufficiency and the efficacy of Christ's work : by means of this he deals with the problem introduced by Abelard, as to whether the redemption of the elect alone was the object intended in it. Another point worthy of notice is the connection Lombard

¹ XIII. 12-14, 16-18.

² "De Sacramentis," 1. 8, 4.

establishes between the work of Christ and its particular application in baptism and penance.

This leads us directly to the next point of our study. In order properly to understand Lombard's formal doctrine of the work of Christ, we must further consider the way in which he has supplemented it (A) with the doctrine of faith, hope, and love, (B) with the doctrine of the sacraments.

(4) The doctrine of Faith, Hope, and Love begins with Dist. XXIII. of the third book: 3. 23, A takes up the thread from 3. 13, A.

"Since it was above asserted that Christ was full of grace, it is not irrelevant to inquire whether He had faith and hope, as well as charity. For if He lacked these things, He does not appear to have had the fullness of graces."

Lombard's view then is, though suggested rather than explicitly developed, that grace manifests itself in the subject in the forms of faith, hope, and love; and that therefore, since grace flows from Christ as the Head to the members of His body, these virtues must appear first in Christ and then in His people.

Consequently we next have a discussion of the nature and mutual relation of faith, hope, and love. Faith is first of all a belief in the Christian verities (3. 23, B). This faith, however, is in itself a *qualitas informis* and not the faith that justifies. Justifying faith is faith which works by love (3. 23, D).

"For charity is the cause and mother of all virtues: if this is wanting, all the rest are possessed in vain; if it is present, all the rest are possessed (3. 23, I).

Lombard points out that the faith of the Old Testament saints was the same as that of Christians, except that they believed in Christ to come, and we in Christ as come (3. 25, A).

So much then for faith and love in their mutual relations. We come next to hope, which is thus defined :—

“Now hope is a virtue, by which spiritual and eternal blessings are hoped for, that is, are expected with confidence (*fiducia*). For hope is the certain expectation of future beatitude, arising from the grace of God and merits preceding both the hope itself, which by nature charity precedes, and the thing hoped for, that is, eternal beatitude. For to hope anything without merit, cannot be called hope, but presumption” (3. 26, A).

In order to bring out the full meaning of all this we must supplement it by a reference to the doctrine of grace and merit in Lib. II. Dist. xxvii. Here Lombard distinguishes between virtue, which is a quality informing the soul, and the act of virtue, which requires the free will. Grace, then, informs the soul with charity, the root of all other virtues, and thereby enables it to put forth meritorious acts. The first of these is the *act* of justifying faith, which accordingly is said to merit justification and eternal life, but only as that act is of grace, and is informed by love.

What then is the love or charity on which all turns? The content of love is defined in the two precepts commanding love to God and to our neighbour, which are the essence of the whole law (3. 27, B). The ceremonial precepts of the Jewish law were only temporary (3. 36, C); but in the Decalogue the two precepts enjoining love of God and of our neighbour are expanded into three and seven commandments respectively (3. 37, A).

Finally, however, the law issues in the Gospel, which is still a law, though a law with a difference. The Apostle calls the Decalogue the letter that killeth :—

“Not because it is a bad law, but because by forbidding sin, it increases concupiscence and adds transgres-

sion, unless grace delivers, which grace does not so abound in the law as in the Gospel. . . . The letter of the Gospel, however, differs from the letter of the law, because the promises are different. In the one case earthly, in the other heavenly, things are promised. The sacraments are different ; for the one only signified, the other conferred grace. The precepts are different, as regards those which are ceremonial. For, as regards the moral precepts, they are the same, but are more fully contained in the Gospel" (3. 40, B).

(B) This leads us then to the doctrine of the Sacraments with which Lib. iv. opens. Against the wounds of original and actual sin God has instituted these remedies (4. 1, A). A sacrament is thus defined :—

"That is a sacrament properly so called, which is the sign of the grace of God, and the form of an invisible grace, in such a way that it bears its likeness and is itself its cause" (4. 1, B).

Only the sacraments of the Gospel, however, fully correspond to this definition. Those of the law were only signs of grace (*ibid.*).

After a brief discussion of the sacraments of the law, especially circumcision, Lombard proceeds to the sacraments of the new law, which he is the first definitely to enumerate as seven. "These are Baptism, Confirmation, the Blessing of Bread, i.e. the Eucharist, Penance, Extreme Unction, Ordination, and Matrimony. Some of these supply a remedy against sin and confer assisting grace, as Baptism ; some are only a remedy, like Matrimony ; others support us with grace and virtue, as the Eucharist and Ordination" (4. 2, A).

A most important point is brought out as follows :—

"Why were not these sacraments instituted at once after the Fall of man, since in them is righteousness and salvation ? We say that the sacraments of grace

were not to be given before the coming of Christ who brought grace : for they have obtained virtue from His death and passion " (*ibid.*).

It will be remembered that Lombard in his doctrine of the work of Christ established a connexion between it on the one hand and baptism and penance on the other (3. 19, D). Here, however, it is taught that all the sacraments without exception have virtue from the passion and death of Christ. This co-ordinates the sacraments, and makes them in spite of their great variety parts of one ordered system of grace.

Through baptism we are cleansed (4. 8, A), and to that end receive the Spirit (4. 7, A). The *res sacramenti*, i.e. the grace conveyed in the sacrament, is justification (4. 3, M). Confirmation bestows the spirit for strengthening (4. 7, A). The Eucharist perfects us in good ; since in it Christ Himself, the fountain of all grace, is received (4. 8, A). Penance as interior is a virtue, as exterior is a sacrament : each is the cause of salvation and justification (4. 14, A). The perfection of penance includes three parts, *compunctio cordis, confessio oris, satisfactio operis* (4. 16, A). Extreme Unction is instituted for the remission of sins and the relief of bodily weakness (4. 23, B). Orders convey spiritual power and office (4. 24, K). Matrimony exists for the remedy of concupiscence in the performance of conjugal duty (4. 26, B).

CHAPTER IV

THE EARLY FRANCISCAN THEOLOGY

§ 1. ALEXANDER OF HALES

ALEXANDER OF HALES (d. A.D. 1245), the founder of the early Franciscan school of theology, and called *theologorum monarcha* and *doctor irrefragibilis*, employed the scholastic method introduced by Abelard in his immense "Summa universæ theologiæ" with "a virtuosity, which in richness of content, clearness of development, and definiteness of results, is far superior to the treatment of the earlier Summists, and even later has scarcely been surpassed".¹ It has been usual in histories of theology to pass over Alexander and proceed straight to Thomas Aquinas, as the culminating point of the thirteenth century scholasticism. Harnack, for example, in his great "History of Dogma" follows this method, saying of Thomas: "In him his predecessors and contemporaries have disappeared".² But the wisdom of this short cut is questionable. In the most recent literature bearing on mediæval theology, the originality and importance of Alexander and the difference of the Franciscan theology from that of the Dominican Thomas is coming more and more to be recognized. I may refer especially to the notable work of Karl Heim, "Das Gewissheitsproblem in der systematischen Theologie," 1911, and to the very important second enlarged edition

¹ Windelband, "Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie,"³, p. 259.

² D.G.⁴, III. p. 497.

of Seeberg's "Dogmengeschichte". Seeberg says with reference to the doctrine of the work of Christ in particular: "In the doctrine of the atonement Alexander has set the standard for scholasticism at its zenith".¹

Alexander has in fact for the first time combined the new speculative theology of Anselm with the traditional material as collected in Lombard's "Book of Sentences". The speculative method of Anselm was evidently congenial to Alexander. Nevertheless he adopts it only with considerable reservations. In his doctrine of principles² he views the epistemological basis of theology as an immediate experimental intuition of the Supreme Truth *per modum gustus*. In this intuition God is apprehended not only as the true but as the good. With regard to the derivation of other truths from the Supreme Truth, Alexander wavers between the idea that they are already implicitly given in the revelation of the Supreme Truth as consequences that can be speculatively drawn out of it, and the notion that they are given in a supra-rational manner by further revelations from the Supreme Truth.³ Hence is explained the position which he takes up with regard to the speculative arguments of the "Cur Deus Homo". He cannot regard Anselm's reasons as so absolutely convincing that all must admit them; yet they have a necessity for faith.

"There are reasons for the things to be believed, which are strong and apparent, such as those showing in what way God is and is one and omnipotent, which the philosophers prove by many reasons, and there are reasons for the things to be believed, which are not apparent but weak according to human reason, such as

¹ D.G.², III. p. 392.

² "Summa," pars I, qu. 1, ed. Nuremberg, 1481.

³ Cf. Heim, op. cit. pp. 144 ff.

those showing in what way Christ was incarnate and suffered, which Anselm introduces in his book 'Cur Deus Homo,' as do others: nevertheless, reasons of this kind, when informed through faith infused by God, through the very light of faith acquire strength, so that reasons which appeared to be only based upon congruity and upon God's goodness, by the light of faith appear necessary."¹ In accordance with this general position Anselm's theory of satisfaction is admitted, and everywhere by Alexander is treated as practically inexpugnable. But at the same time room is made for the fundamental Augustinian position that God could, if He had pleased, have redeemed men otherwise than by the Incarnation. In answering the question, whether human nature could be restored without satisfaction,² Alexander distinguishes between God's absolute power and His power with order. "In considering the Divine power absolutely, we think of a certain infinite might; and according to that mode there is no limiting the Divine power. And it is granted, that according to this mode it can restore human nature without satisfaction for sin. But in considering the same with order, then we regard it within an order of justice and mercy, and in this mode it is granted that God can do nothing except in accordance with mercy and justice."

Justice again can be thought of in two ways, either so far as it is equivalent to the Divine essence, or as it is conditioned by respect to the creature, when it connotes the rewarding of each according to his merits. If then we ask, whether God can according to justice remit sin without satisfaction, and refer the term justice to what it principally signifies, i.e. the Divine essence,

¹ Pars III. qu. 78, memb. 5, art. 2, Resp. ad 5.

² Pars III. qu. 1, memb. 4.

then what God can do according to His justice is the same as what He can do according to His power, and in this way therefore He can remit sin without satisfaction.

"But if it be referred to what is connoted, Anselm says that then possibility according to justice is possibility according to congruity of merit; and in this way the same Anselm says: God cannot remit unpunished sin without satisfaction, nor can the sinner attain to a beatitude such as he was to have had before sin" (*ibid.*).

With these limitations then Alexander accepts Anselm's theory. In pars III. qu. 1, *de lapsu humanæ naturæ et ejus reparatione*, and qu. 2, *de convenientia incarnationis Christi*, he has practically written out the whole of the "Cur Deus Homo," following Anselm from point to point. He looks, however, beyond Anselm's theory, when in conclusion (qu. 2, memb. 13) he proposes the question raised by Rupert of Deutz as to the fitness of the Incarnation apart from the Fall. Alexander's view, *sine praejudicio*, is that the Incarnation was even apart from the Fall intended by God, in order that man might be blessed in all his powers, and might apprehend God not only internally by the intellect but externally by the sense. This could not take place unless God should assume a bodily nature, which again could be no other than a human nature. For, as Alexander has already shown (qu. 2, memb. 7), only the microcosm of human nature can contain the various Divine attributes which are manifested in the many things of the world, and at the same time reduce them to unity.

In the following questions Alexander largely follows the guidance of Lombard's "Sentences"; but he still continues to make use of the "Cur Deus Homo," working up the Anselmic theory into a new unity with the

additional patristic, and especially Augustinian, material drawn from the "Sentences". He has in fact drawn firmly the lines of a comprehensive theory of the work of Christ of a much wider scope than the Anselmic theory of satisfaction. Here for the first time in the history of the Latin Church do we obtain a unified view of Christ's work that is anything like as comprehensive as that of the great Greek Fathers. Hugo and Lombard have certainly prepared the way for this wider view; but it was Alexander who achieved it. His merit in this regard has by no means been sufficiently recognized.

The dominating principle of Alexander's whole doctrine of the work of Christ is the Augustinian doctrine of the constitution of Christ as the God-man with a view to the salvation of men by the Divine grace. The theory begins with qu. 3, which deals with the predestination of the Incarnation. Alexander here introduces fresh Augustinian material of the greatest importance for the total view. The meagre reference to the predestination of Christ in Lombard's "Sentences," III. 10, C, F, does not, as has been pointed out, bring the subject into connexion with the work of Christ, nor touch on the relation of His predestination to ours. Alexander, however, gives the subject of Christ's predestination a commanding position, treating it before even the Incarnation itself, and so makes it, in accordance with his speculative leanings, the key of the whole doctrine. He is here a forerunner of Duns Scotus and the later Franciscan school, and also of the Calvinistic theology.

His doctrine is then as follows: The Son of God is predestinated, so far as He is man (qu. 3, memb. 1). His predestination and that of the elect are one in the Divine foreknowledge. But, as this predestination

also connotes the grace and glory to be bestowed on the predestinated, from the temporal point of view there is an order of predestination, "according to which we say that grace and glory in Christ is the *cause and pattern* of our grace and glory" (memb. 5). In the words "cause and pattern" we have already the forecast of Alexander's further development of the work of Christ. He follows here lines suggested by Lombard (III. 18, E).

The working out of the scheme is contained in questions 11 and 12, which treat of the grace of Christ. This subject furnishes the preamble to the doctrine of His merit.

There is in Christ first of all (qu. 11, memb. 1), a grace of union. It is not possible for the human creature, by means of God's gift consisting in his natural condition, to be elevated and disposed to the Divine union: therefore grace is necessary to this end. This grace is called the grace of union (*ibid.*). It is twofold: it is a created grace which disposes to union, and an uncreated grace which completes it. The last is the Holy Spirit Himself (qu. 12, memb. 1, art. 1).

But further (qu. 11, memb. 2, 3), there is also grace in Christ, so far as He is Head of the Church and so far as He is a single man. As to the latter Christ lacked no grace possible to man (memb. 3). As to the former Alexander teaches as follows (memb. 2):—

So far as Christ is God, He is the giver of grace immediately as the efficient cause; but as man He is the medium of grace in many ways:—

(1) By the mode of faith, in so far as the God-man is the object of faith.

(2) By the mode of merit, "because by His passion He merited from God, that grace should be given to all those who believe upon Him and love Him".

(3) By the mode of desire or prayer, in so far as He prays for all who believe and desire grace.

(4) By the mode of disposition, as regards His human nature. Before the Incarnation human nature as a whole had become hateful to God because of original sin, but, as assumed by the Son of God into the unity of His Person, it was disposed to grace, as regards the predestinated, by a disposition of congruity or of dignity.

Christ's grace as Head of the Church, so far as it is created, differs in idea, though not in substance, from the created grace of union: so far as it is uncreated and is the Holy Spirit, grace is in both respects one (qu. 12, memb. 1, art. 2).

In qu. 12, memb. 2, art. 3, § 4, Alexander further treats of the flow of grace from Christ the Head into the body of the Church. This takes place in three ways: (1) by the mode of merit, (2) by the mode of example, (3) by the mode of the Head.

(1) "By the mode of merit there is grace in us from Christ Himself as a man; since it is He who merited for us the grace by which our sins might be remitted, and the grace by which we might know and love Him."

(2) "In the second mode He pours grace into us by the mode of example; for, just as we see that the example is related to the copy, and in a certain way the copy is derived from the example; so in Christ Jesus as man there is put before us an example of grace, to which we must fit and conform ourselves."

(3) "The third mode of the influence from Him is by the mode of the Head. Now there is a certain love and natural appetite of the head to the members. For the head itself loves the members with a certain natural love. Wherefore the animal spirits, which are in the head, out of this love run down from the head into the members. . . . According to this it is to be said, that

the uncreated Spirit by which we have communion with the whole Trinity, i.e. the Holy Spirit, abounds in our Head, i.e. Christ ; and the desire of Christ and of His blessed soul is that we should partake of His Spirit. But the Spirit Himself fulfils the desire which Christ has towards us, because of the love which He has towards us."

Putting together now the above two passages (XI. memb. 2 ; XII. memb. 2, art. 3, § 4), we obtain a very clear conception of the way in which Alexander understands the work of Christ in general. It is as man that He is Mediator : as God, His work for human salvation in no way differs from that of the whole Trinity. As man, however, His work is twofold. On the one hand He obtains grace for us from God by His merit, intercession, and representation of human nature before God : in this way He is the cause of grace. On the other hand He is the object of faith and the example which we are to copy.

In qu. 16 Alexander goes on further to define the merit of Christ. In memb. 1 he distinguishes five modes of merit :—

(1) The term "merit" is sometimes improperly applied to the case where God rewards the good work of the wicked, as if they had won merit.

(2) The term *meritum de congruo* is used of the case where the saints are said, still being in sin, to merit the first grace (i.e. baptismal grace).

(3) The term "merit" in the strict sense is used in the case where we make something that was not owed to be owed to us, as where by grace and the free will we merit eternal life.

(4) There is also a merit that makes what is owed to be more owed, as by further works done in grace.

(5) The term "merit" is also used of the case where

what is owed by reason of a habit is made to be owed by reason of an act, "according to which mode Christ won merit for Himself; for though from the instant of His conception all good was owed to Him by reason of the habitual plenitude of grace, which He possessed, yet, through the succession of time, He made by the act of grace in His excellent works, what was owed Him by reason of habit, to be owed by reason of act".

Alexander, however, next inquires, what was the exact difference between meriting by habit and meriting by act. As to the power of the merit, there was no difference; since Christ's charity could know no increase. But there is a difference as to the effect, at least as regards us (memb. 3, art. 2). In particular as regards the passion, Christ merited more by it as regards effect than He had merited before it (memb. 3, art. 3).

This difference is made plain, when Alexander comes to state the effects of Christ's merit, and how His merit is completed by His passion (memb. 4). First of all, Christ merited for Himself His exaltation. The Divine nature could not of course itself be exalted; yet Christ's Divinity could be manifested before the eyes of men, which happened in the resurrection (memb. 4, art. 1, § 1). He also merited the glorification of His body, or more properly indeed that of His soul, upon which the glorification of His body follows as a consequence (§ 2). Finally He merited the name above every name, i.e. the name Jesus or Saviour (§ 3), and even the name of God, i.e. the manifestation of the name (§ 4).

For us (memb. 4, art. 2) Christ merited the removal of guilt (§ 1), the remission of eternal punishment (§ 2), and of temporal punishment (§ 3). In §§ 1, 2 Alexander introduces as an explanation the Anselmic doctrine of satisfaction [which, it may incidentally be remarked, is

another proof that Schultz is right in regarding satisfaction as a species of the genus merit]. Christ's death is a satisfaction for our sin, inasmuch as it is His gift of His life, which is of infinite value in view of His Person and of His infinite charity. In § 3 we meet another aspect of the idea of satisfaction, different from the Anselmic, though equally derived from the practice of penance. Christ's passion is regarded as a voluntary endurance of penal suffering, the greatest possible in the world. This too, however, falls under the general notion of merit, precisely because it is voluntary.

Here then at last in Alexander's doctrine we have outlined the full mediaeval conception of Christ's merit and satisfaction. It is thought of along the lines of the penitential satisfaction in which the repentant sinner punishes himself and offers to God the gift of his self-humiliation and austerity. Not only the notion of the satisfaction as a gift to God, as in Anselm, but also the idea of it as a voluntary endurance of punishment—the whole concrete conception of it as practised in the Church—is utilized by Alexander, who thus importantly modifies the Anselmic doctrine. The fuller development of the idea of satisfaction is reserved for the next question (17), which deals with the Lord's passion. But before proceeding to this Alexander adds a most significant note (§ 4), showing how, from the standpoint he has reached, may be interpreted the old patristic doctrine of the destruction of our death by the death of Christ.

“The question that next rises is, how He destroyed our death by dying; for so say the authorities. . . . Reply: It is to be said that He destroyed death by way of cause. Christ's death is the cause, i.e. the meritorious cause of the destruction of future death in the glorious resurrection. For He destroyed eternal

death in those that are His, since He brought it about that they should not fall into it ; but He also destroyed the dominion of temporal death in many. For death used so to rule before that men through fear of death turned back ; afterwards, however, it was brought about that death was not feared, but they gladly ran to death, as was evident in the case of martyrs."

Nothing could better show the distance to which the mediaeval theology has moved from the patristic than to compare this short section with the "De Incarnatione" of Athanasius. The subjective effect of the example of the death of Christ in removing the fear of death remains the same in both. But the mystical idea that the death of Christ is itself our death, so convincing to the Fathers, is to Alexander essentially unintelligible ("so say the authorities") until he has interpreted it by the clear rational notion that Christ by His death merited for men the destruction of death in the resurrection.

From this excursus we return to take up the further development of the doctrine of satisfaction in qu. 17, on the Lord's passion. Here for the second time Alexander works in the material of the "Cur Deus Homo". Memb. 3 is on the necessity of the Lord's passion. There was no externally imposed necessity for Christ's passion. He was under no compulsion to suffer and die, as we sinners are. There was only the internal necessity imposed by the end, viz. that of human redemption (art. 1). If men were to be redeemed by the payment of a price, or in other words, if satisfaction was to be made for sin, then Christ needed to die (art. 2). The ultimate necessity for His death was in the immutability of the Divine will, which had fixed on this way of redemption (art. 3).

The reason of this Divine will is given in memb. 4,

which treats of the fitness of the passion of Christ. It befitted alike the Divine justice and the Divine mercy. As to the Divine justice, Alexander says :—

“It belongs to the Divine justice never to let sin go without punishment. No sin is reduced to order except in punishment. . . . Either therefore sin is reduced to order in accordance with strict justice, so that it is punished eternally, or else by justice with mercy, so that it is punished temporally, and it is in this way that Christ suffered in accordance with justice because human guilt (*reatus*) could not be paid for by a mere man, as Anselm proves. For man could not pay, but ought to pay. God could, but ought not. Therefore the God-man had to pay, being man who ought and God who could” (memb. 4, art. 1, § 1).

As regards the Divine mercy, Alexander lays down the principle, that “the goodness and mercy of God must choose that way, which is best for salvation. But that way is best for salvation, which most has imitators” (§ 2).

The way of the cross is then shown to be the best in this sense. “It is to be said after Augustine, ‘De Vera Religione,’ that all sin arises from the cause that we desire what Christ despised, and because we flee from what Christ endured or desired. Now Christ desired poverty, meanness, and subjection. Men, however, choose riches, pleasures, and honours. If therefore Christ had chosen the way of prosperity, this would not have befitted the Divine mercy, because then there would have been no departure from sin. Christ, however, Himself chose that way, in which there was a departure from sin.

“Or it may be said that the redemption of man was required to be wrought by satisfaction for sin. But satisfaction for sin ought to be penal and afflictive.

Wherefore the redemption of man ought to be by a walk in the way not of prosperity, but rather of penal adversity" (*ibid.*).

Once more then we see that Alexander has modified Anselm's notion of satisfaction. Christ's satisfaction is for him no longer merely a supreme gift to God outweighing the dishonour done to Him by human sin. It must be a gift of endured suffering: "Satisfaction for sin ought to be penal and afflictive". It must be a voluntary vicarious penance and self-humiliation before God. Alexander was undoubtedly led thus to modify the Anselmic theory by his recurrence to the patristic doctrinal material, above all to the Augustinian sentence "Suscipiendo poenam et non suscipiendo culpam et culpam delevit et poenam". This can be shown by a reference to qu. 5, memb. 3, § 2, where Alexander, in discussing how Christ assumed punishment in order to deliver us from both guilt and punishment, teaches that there must be an equivalence of Christ's punishment as satisfaction for sin.

"In the punishment of satisfaction (*poena satisfactoria*) two things are necessary, the will and the punishment, and it is not necessary that the punishment, by which one makes satisfaction, should be greater than the punishment for which He makes satisfaction; but that the will joined to the punishment should be greater." Thus the separation of the body from the soul in the death of Christ in virtue of the will accompanying it is satisfaction for the separation of the soul from God. This is a very different way of viewing satisfaction and the equivalence of satisfaction from that of Anselm. Led by the Augustinian sentence above quoted Alexander makes the *satisfactio* of Christ a penitential *satisfactio* in the full patristic sense, at once a positive gift and a passive endurance, not merely a

positive gift only as in Anselm. The equivalence of suffering then comes into view and means have to be found to estimate it. Alexander returns to this point in qu. 17, memb. 2, art. 2, § 1, which deals with the generality of Christ's passion. "It is to be said, that it is not required in satisfaction to suffer according to every kind of passion, but there is required an equivalence of punishment, that the punishment may be equivalent. Moreover, it is necessary that there be a condignity in the satisfaction." In what this equivalence of punishment consisted we have already seen; it was in Christ's voluntary endurance. Other factors, however, must come in to make the satisfaction condign; what these are we shall see presently.

To come back to the point whence we digressed, we had followed Alexander in his doctrine of the fitness of the Lord's passion as far as that it befitted both the Divine justice and the Divine mercy (qu. 17, memb. 4, art. 1, § 1, 2). Finally in art. 2 Alexander deals with its fitness as regards us. That Christ suffered at the hands of men, had a fitness in so far as it was especially calculated to manifest His love. "Wherefore He did not only deliver us from our original sin, but was also alluring us to love, when He endured contradiction of sinners against Himself.¹ Moreover, He prayed for them."²

Memb. 5 of the same article deals with the measure of the passion.

First, as regards its measure in itself (art. 1), since Christ's body was perfect and perfectly fitted to His soul, His pain was very great. Moreover, His passion was against His natural, though not against His rational, will. Its agreement with the latter indeed constitutes the merit of His passion.

¹ Heb. xii. 3.

² Luke xxiii. 34.

As regards the measure of the passion with regard to satisfaction (art. 2), Alexander in part follows Anselm, but in part introduces fresh and important motives. His arguments are worth giving in detail in view of their relation to preceding and following developments. On the one hand it may be argued as follows :—

(1) The life of grace is nobler than the life of nature. But by sin the life of grace is destroyed. Christ's death was only a death of nature. How then could it be a satisfaction for sin?

(2) The sin of Adam was universal, because it passed upon all. Christ's death was particular. The latter therefore cannot satisfy for the former.

(3) The sin of those who crucified Christ was as great as the value of His life, i.e. it was infinite : therefore a satisfaction for it at least is impossible.

On the other hand, however, it may be argued

(1) "He who suffers is not only man, but also God. If therefore any act whatever of His be weighed : it will compensate for any sin whatever."

(2) "Again the measure of merit is according to will and love. If therefore the person making satisfaction is the Person of God, and the love that greatest love, which exceeds all things, then He will be able to satisfy for any guilt whatever."

The former of these two last cited reasons is of course from Anselm ; the second, however, transcends Anselm by making use of Lombard's doctrine of merit (cf. Sent. II. Dist. 27, E), and carries us on to a more inward measure of Christ's satisfaction. Alexander decides in favour of these latter reasons. "It is to be said that we must consider not how much the Lord suffered, but from how large a basis He suffered. Wherefore, if we consider the circumstances of His

Person, because He is the Son of God, and the circumstances of His passion and so on, then the passion of Christ is sufficient for satisfaction of every kind and for all things."

Alexander therefore replies to the former series of arguments, as follows :—

(1) The natural death of Christ as man was not a sufficient satisfaction, but since He was also God, it was sufficient.

(2) Christ's satisfaction is as universal as Adam's sin. "Wherefore Rom. v. (19) says, As through the disobedience of the one man, the many were made sinners, so through the obedience of the one, the many were made righteous, i.e. as regards sufficiency, though not as regards efficiency; just as the sun is the sufficient cause of the illumination of all men, yet is not the efficient cause of the illumination in all, for he is not so in the blind."

(3) The sin of those who crucified Christ was not infinite, inasmuch as it was one of ignorance: they did not intend to take the life of God, but the life of man. Thus the satisfaction of Christ remains universally sufficient.

Qu. 18 proceeds to the effects of the Lord's passion. These are (1) justification from sins, (2) reconciliation to God, (3) the loosing of the power of the devil, and (4) the opening of the gate of paradise.

Memb. 1 deals with justification.

"The passion of Christ is related to the remission of sins in various ways. For the passion of Christ exists in two ways, in its own essential nature, and in the soul. So far as the passion of Christ exists in its own essential nature, it is related to the destruction of sin in two ways, by the mode of merit and the mode of satisfaction. Now in sin there are two things, the stain and the guilt: the

stain, which is deformity or dissimilarity to God: the guilt, which is liability to punishment. The passion of Christ is therefore the meritorious cause of the removal of the stain, because He merited for us grace and all that destroys sin. . . . It is also the cause that makes satisfaction for the liability to punishment. . . . But when the passion of Christ is considered according to the existence which it has in the soul, it also avails for the remission of sin according to four modes, by love, faith, sympathy, and imitation. For by these four modes it is joined to the soul, and has an existence in it. The passion of Christ therefore by love and faith avails for the removal of the stain. But the passion of Christ by sympathy and imitation avails for the destruction of the liability and guilt demanding punishment."

This happens as follows: it works by love to the end of the removal of the stain, in that it excites to love which covers a multitude of sins. As regards faith it works as efficient cause; for the passion of Christ, operating by faith which is informed by love, avails for the removal of the stain, in adults by their own faith, or in infants by the sacrament of faith, i.e. baptism, through the faith of the Church. As regards sympathy with and imitation of Christ's passion, these work for the removal of the liability to punishment, the former as the meritorious cause of the remission of punishment, the latter in the external act as the cause that makes satisfaction for punishment due.¹

Alexander points out, however, the limits within which this doctrine is to be understood.

"It is to be said, that God Himself alone is the cause blotting out guilt, as the principal doer and

¹ The reference here is to the sacrament of penance. Alexander means that the inner contrition of the penitent, and his external work of satisfaction, are, each in its own way, to be understood as a continuation of Christ's meritorious passion.

agent. But the passion of Christ belongs to the class of the material cause or of the efficient cause, so far as it is a thing meritorious : because it is not the principal, but a co-operating cause."

In memb. 2 reconciliation with God is discussed, under the general Augustinian point of view that Christ is Mediator as man. Here Alexander deals with the order of the different aspects of the work of Christ. Scripture has many names for Christ as Mediator, which illustrate the variety of His acts for us as man. There is first the act of union, whereby His humanity is united with the Son of God. Then follows the second act, whereby the human nature of Christ shares in the properties of the Divine nature. This is the act that makes Christ Mediator, and causes to abide in Him fulness of grace. It belongs, however, to fulness to communicate itself : there follows therefore a third act, whereby Christ as Head communicates grace to His members. This is done in particular as follows : Christ illuminates the mind, and awakes the affections ; He regenerates us in baptism, and feeds us with doctrine ; He redeems us from sin, original and actual ; then He removes the flaming sword, or the veil of the mind, which separates us from God ; finally He glorifies us.

The treatment of the remaining two effects of Christ's passion may be briefly summarized as follows : The power of the devil is generally lessened, in that true faith has largely banished idolatry. In the faithful he has no power, except what is granted him (memb. 3).

As regards the opening of paradise, the handwriting which excluded us from paradise was Adam's guilt. This had to be blotted out before we could enter paradise, i.e. before we could have the vision of God. This was done by the passion of Christ (memb. 4).

This is the conclusion of the doctrine of Christ's

passion. It is very noteworthy how in Alexander's theology the centre of gravity of the whole doctrine of the work of Christ has come to reside in the passion, its merit, and the satisfaction made by it. In the patristic theology it is not the passion, but the death and resurrection of Christ as the destruction of death and beginning of new life for humanity, which most engage attention. In Anselm's theory of satisfaction it is still not the passion, but the death of Christ which is central : the great gift which Christ offers to God as satisfaction for sin is the gift of His life. Peter Lombard indeed begins to lay more stress on the passion ; and, so far as he discusses the death of Christ separately from it, he does not do so in connexion with the work of Christ, but rather with reference to the questions, whether there was in it a division of the soul, or of the flesh from the Word (Sent. III. Dist. XXI.), and whether Christ in His death was still man (Dist. XXII.). Alexander follows Lombard in his similar treatment of the death of Christ (pars III. qu. 19), adding, however, a section (memb. 4 and 5) on the descent into hell, in which he depends on John of Damascus ("Exp. fid. orth." III. 29, 112). But he has still more than Lombard concentrated attention on the passion itself by interpreting it, as Lombard does not, through the idea of satisfaction, at the same time modifying this idea, as has been shown, so as directly to evaluate the pain and suffering in the work of Christ. Not the death of Christ in itself, but His death as the culmination of His passion, therefore becomes for Alexander the central thing in the work of Christ. This is a great change in the presentation of the doctrine, and worthy of all observation.

How then does Alexander view the other point, so fundamental to the patristic doctrine, viz. the resurrection of Christ ? This is a critical question, in the

light of Scripture and the Fathers, not only for him, but for the whole mediaeval theology that contemplates the work of Christ by means of the ideas of satisfaction and merit. Anselm, Hugo, and Lombard had simply left the question alone: it is, however, characteristic of the thoroughness of Alexander that he devotes qu. 20 to the resurrection of Christ, and discusses in memb. 2 the causality and effect of the resurrection. Just as he had previously (qu. 16, memb. 4, art. 2, § 4) reinterpreted the patristic doctrine of the saving effect of the death of Christ, so he does the same here for His resurrection, but at much greater length.

According to art. 1, § 2, "The resurrection belongs to the class of meritorious cause, but not strictly; to the class of efficient cause, strictly; to the class of material cause, so far as it is believed; to the class of final cause, so far as it is loved, and to the class of formal or exemplary cause, so far as it is contemplated".

This statement is expanded as follows: The resurrection is a meritorious cause, not strictly, but by way of intercession. Merit is not consistent with complete beatitude, but belongs to servitude: besides, in Christ's passion His merit was already consummated. (In other words, after His resurrection Christ no longer merits, but pleads His merit.) The resurrection is an efficient cause of the general resurrection, or rather Christ Himself in rising is the efficient cause by the mode of agency.¹ The first cause of the general resurrection is God; the mediate cause is the humanity of the Word, or rather the Word Incarnate. The first cause is, however, the very humanity of Christ appearing in glory at the judgment. As to whether the resurrection is a material cause, since it does not justify except as believed, which is not the case with the wicked,

¹ Jn. v. 25.

it is to be said that it is the cause of resurrection for both, with glorious transformation¹ in the good, so far as it is believed and loved, but without transformation in the wicked. In the former way it is a material cause in the good. In the second way it is an efficient cause in all.

Art. 2 examines the causality of the resurrection in justification. Alexander makes the same distinction as in the case of the passion, and treats of (1) its causality in itself, (2) its causality in the soul. In itself the resurrection is the cause of justification by the mode of disposition; because the whole of human nature is ordered to the human nature of Christ, wherefore, since Deity is united with humanity in Christ, the whole of humanity is exalted, so that it may be in complete possession of Deity. Human nature is therefore disposed more and more by the Incarnation and the Passion, and still more by the Resurrection, to higher grace. The resurrection is also in itself the cause of justification by the mode of example. Christ's resurrection is an example of our present justification from guilt to grace, and also of our future justification from misery to perfection. In the soul again the resurrection justifies, as it is believed and loved. In these ways then it appears that not only the passion but the resurrection also is the cause of justification. But Christ's resurrection is also a sign of our resurrection, and therefore justification is in Scripture² more attributed to the resurrection than to the passion, since the resurrection is not merely, like the passion, the cause, but also the sign and the consummation of justification.

Art. 3 discusses the resurrection of Christ as the cause of the general resurrection of the body. The causality of the resurrection is wider than that of the

¹ 1 Cor. xv. 15.

² Rom. iv. 25.

passion. Christ's sufferings were in order to the justification of the saved, but He was rewarded for them by His resurrection, with judicial power over both good and bad.

Art. 4 deals with the question: Was Christ's resurrection the immediate, or the remote cause of our resurrection? By His passion Christ merited for us justification, resurrection, and glory, both as regards body and soul. There followed at once the deliverance of the souls in Limbo by the descent of Christ's soul into Hades, but the deliverance of bodies waits for His bodily appearance at the last judgment to renew the world. While, therefore, the deliverance of souls followed immediately upon the passion, the resurrection of bodies is separated in time from Christ's resurrection.

Art. 5 inquires whether Christ's resurrection was a necessary or a contingent cause of ours. It was the necessary cause of ours in accordance with the Divine fore-ordination, only, however, after the fall the necessary cause because of the Divine justice (i.e. because this required Christ's passion and death).

Finally art. 6 deals with the difference between the causality of the passion and that of the resurrection. The passion of Christ is the meritorious cause of our resurrection and felicity; but His descent into hell and His resurrection are the efficient cause.

This section on the causality of the resurrection is of the utmost importance in the history of theology. What is left here of the old patristic view which is so clear in Gregory of Nyssa's "Great Catechism" (32) according to which the resurrection works directly like a ferment in humanity? Only a trace, in so far as it is idealized into the view that human nature was increasingly disposed to grace by the Incarnation, Passion, and Resurrection. In the main Alexander has entirely reinter-

preted the causality of the resurrection. As regards our resurrection, it is not Christ's resurrection, but rather the Risen Christ at the Judgment that is personally the efficient cause of it, He having obtained the judicial power by His merit. Causality is here not physical but personal. As regards justification, the resurrection no more as with Gregory restores a nature whose dross has been purged by death, but it is strictly the passion that is the cause of justification, and the resurrection is the cause only indirectly by way of its subjective effects. Rom. iv. 25 can therefore only mean that Christ's resurrection is symbolically, not actually our justification.

Alexander rounds off his doctrine with a question on the ascension (qu. 23). According to memb. 7, art. 2, § 2, its effects for the Church on earth are as follows : It is the cause of the hope of beatitude, also of spiritual love to Christ according to His Deity ; the Spirit could only be given when Christ was ascended, His flesh being an impediment to pure spiritual love of God.

Thus then ends Alexander's express doctrine of the work of Christ, which, however, as in the case of Hugo and in that of Lombard, needs to be completed by some reference to his doctrines of law and grace, and of the sacraments.

(1) Alexander's doctrine of the law. He distinguishes the eternal law, the law of nature, the law of Moses, and the law of the Gospel.

According to pars III. qu. 26, the eternal law is the order of the universe, and is one with the will of God directed towards the good. It derives its authority, wisdom, and goodness from the three Persons of the Trinity. Its subjects are all rational and irrational creatures alike, the rational in accordance with the freedom of the will, while the irrational obey of necessity. The eternal law is immutable in principle, but variable

in execution. The basis of this doctrine is especially Augustine's "*De Vera Religione*".

Qu. 27 treats of natural law, which is the law within the heart of rational creatures. It is in essence one with the uncreated eternal law ; but, in so far as it is written in the heart, it is different and is a thing created.

Qu. 28 is on the law of Moses, in which the law of nature was expanded into the decalogue, while ceremonial and judicial precepts were added. Memb. 1, art. 1, deals with the utility of this law. In the first place, it was given to assist the law of nature. That contained the seeds of righteousness ; the law of Moses was added with an authority calculated to bring them to fruition. In the second place, however, it came in to coerce the law of sin in the members. Thirdly, on its ceremonial side it is a figure of the Gospel.

Qu. 60 discusses the law and precepts of the Gospel in general. Here memb. 4 treats of its relation to the law of nature. "As nature is in order to grace, so the law of nature is in order to the law of the Gospel." It is not abolished but perfected by the Gospel. "The law of nature is not a part of the law of the Gospel ; yet it is the foundation of it, just as nature is the subject of grace, and therefore it is that whatever the law of nature commands, the law of the Gospel commands, yet by a higher reason."

Memb. 5 has for its subject the relation of the law of Moses to that of the Gospel. They are one in their general, but different in their individual, conception. As to their agreement, both have behind them the one God, who is a God both of goodness and severity ; they have also one end, which is righteousness, and one truth. On the other hand, they differ in that the one was given through a mere man, the other through Christ.

The one seeks the common aim by turning man away from evil by fear, the other by working good through love. Finally, truth is in a figure in the law, but plainly revealed in the Gospel.

In memb. 6 Alexander works out still further in detail the difference between the law of Moses and the Gospel. Amongst others, we note that the rewards of the law were temporal, while those of the Gospel are eternal. The law was only given to Israel, whereas the Gospel is for the world. But the great difference, over and above these already stated in memb. 5, is that the Gospel justifies, as the law cannot do, and this because it brings in its sacraments grace, whereas the sacraments of the law were without grace.

Memb. 7 explains how the law is contained in the Gospel. As regards the ceremonial elements, law is compared to Gospel, as sign to thing signified ; as regards the moral elements, as plant to fruit. The law of nature was the seed, the law of Moses the plant, the Gospel the fruit.

Memb. 8 treats of the additions made by the Gospel to the law. As regards the meaning of the law, the law adds to the law no new precepts, but adds an elucidation of the precepts. As regards the letter of the law, the Gospel adds to the ceremonial precepts, in so far as fulfilment adds to promise ; to the moral precepts it adds the prohibition of the cause and occasion to that of the effect : to the judicial precepts addition is made by the perfection of the imperfect.¹

(2) Alexander's doctrine of grace. In qu. 69, memb. 2, art. 1, Alexander raises the important question, Whether grace is anything real in the subject of grace, or exists only in the acceptation of the Giver of grace?²

¹ Cf. Matt. v. 33, 39.

² I.e. does grace exist in us, or in God's attitude to us ?

The reply is, that grace is something in the subject of grace, since he is pleasing to God. But that is pleasing to God, which is deiform, or is made like God. What is hateful to God is want of deiformity, i.e. sin. Thus in the subject of grace there is likeness to God, which merits eternal life, which is complete likeness to God.

The next question (art. 2) is whether grace is uncreated or a thing created. Lombard had identified grace with love or charity, and both with the Holy Spirit. "It certainly appears that charity is the Holy Spirit, which informs and sanctifies the qualities of the soul, so that by them the soul is informed and sanctified; without which a quality of the soul is not called a virtue, because it is of no avail to heal the soul" (lib. II. Dist. 27, F). Alexander is more cautious; he teaches that grace is both uncreated and created. Uncreated grace is the Holy Spirit (*forma transformans*); created grace is the effect of the Spirit in the soul (*forma transformatam*).

As regards the natural life of the soul grace is an accident, but as regards its higher life or *bene esse* it is substantial (art. 3). Virtue, again, is related to grace, as the ray to the light (art. 4).

Art. 5 touches for the first time on an important distinction, due to Alexander himself, between general grace (*gratia gratis data*) and saving grace (*gratia gratum faciens*). General grace includes any and every gift given without merit, such as the image of God given with creation, or added knowledge. Saving grace is a particular determination of general grace, and means either the first saving gift of grace, as undifferentiated, or the first virtue in which it is manifested, as faith.

In qu. 73, memb. 1, Alexander teaches that *gratia gratis data*, which is not *gratia gratum faciens*, imparts the knowledge of God; it disposes to salvation. Its

results are *fides informis*, *spes et timor servilis*, faith without love, and servile hope and fear (memb. 3).

On the other hand (qu. 70), the effects of *gratia gratum faciens* are, in so far as it is light, to cleanse, to illuminate, and to perfect (memb. 1); in so far as it is life, to quicken the soul, to make it like God and pleasing to Him (memb. 2); in so far as it is motion, to justify, to awake, to draw out acts of merit (memb. 3). It destroys mortal sin, but leaves the *fomes peccati* or kindling-matter of sin (i.e. concupiscence), and thus the possibility and even necessity of venial sin (memb. 5). The moment of the expulsion of sin is the same as that of the infusion of grace (memb. 7); as grace comes in, sin departs.

Some further points in connexion with saving grace are discussed in qu. 69, memb. 3, art. 5. The difference between grace before and after the fall is accidental. The same principle which was the ground of health before the fall, is the remedy after it.

It is further taught (§ 1), that there is no essential difference between grace before and after the Incarnation; nevertheless there is a different efficacy of grace. Before, grace existed along with the guilt of original sin, which was a hindrance to the vision of God; this hindrance could not be removed except by the passion of the God-man. Further (§ 2), the difference between grace in the child and in the adult is that in the child it informs only, in the adult it both informs and operates. Memb. 5 of the same question deals with the cause of grace. The efficient cause of grace is God. Is there a meritorious cause on our part? Grace according to its definition excludes merit (art. 1). Merit, however, is to be distinguished as *meritum congrui* and *meritum condigni*. God is so generous that He allows merit where none strictly exists (art. 2, § 1). What then is the position

of him who does what he can (*quod in se est*)? Can he merit grace? No: nevertheless God by reason of the Divine immutability must give him grace (art. 3).

The distinction between *meritum congrui* (i.e. the disposition for grace which God in His goodness cannot overlook) and *meritum condigni* (strict merit) is a new creation of Alexander's. It is important to observe that together with his other distinction between general and saving grace, it enables him to modify the Augustinian position that man can in consequence of original sin do no good thing apart from grace. He cannot indeed merit strictly without the *gratia gratum faciens*, but a *meritum de congruo* is possible in virtue only of *gratia gratis data*, i.e. in one who is not strictly speaking in a state of grace.

(3) Alexander's doctrine of the sacraments. Were sacraments necessary in the state of innocence? (pars iv. qu. 1, memb. 2, art. 1).

"Sacraments have been ordained for the apprehension (*intellectus*) of grace, and for the remedy which is given through grace. As far, therefore, as they have been ordained for remedy, they are not necessary in the state of innocence. So far again as concerns the fact that they have been ordained for apprehension, inasmuch as they were (afterwards) added for the apprehension of remedial grace, they were not (then) necessary in this way. But if in them there was an apprehension of a certain grace perfecting unfallen nature, in this way they may be said to be necessary."

According to art. 2, "The sacraments were at once necessary after the fall, and were of vital necessity; wherefore says the gloss on the words, Who is the figure of Him that was to come:¹ 'From the side of Christ flowed forth the sacraments, viz. the water of washing

¹ Rom. v. 14.

and the blood of redemption, through which the Church is saved'. Wherefore it is said in Eph. II. (3): 'We were by nature children of wrath,' i.e. as the gloss explains, debtors of eternal punishment. The sacraments exist to take away this debt, and especially the sacrament of baptism and the others which have been (instituted) for the remedy of original sin. Besides, since with Abel and Cain there began the division of the spiritual Jerusalem from the city of Babylon, it was necessary that there should be some sacred signs by which the citizens of Jerusalem should be distinguished from the citizens of Babylon."

According to memb. 3, art. 1 the institution of sacraments is either direct, by Divine precept, or indirect, by Divine counsel (i.e. inspiration): in the latter way were instituted the sacraments of natural law. Only the sacraments of the written law and of grace have the obligation of the precept (art. 2).

Memb. 5, art. 2 discusses whence the sacraments have the virtue of sanctifying. This is above all from faith (§ 1), which perfects the intellect and is the foundation of all good. But from what article of faith in particular? Alexander replies (§ 2): from the passion and resurrection of Christ. The sacraments remove defect and add virtue: *per appropriationem*¹ it may be said that, while faith in the passion removes defect, i.e. merits remission of sin, faith in the resurrection merits renewal of life through grace moving the will toward good. This mode of speech is, however, only *per appropriationem*. In general the sacraments have virtue from faith in Christ *simpliciter*.

The above applies to all sacraments: all ultimately have their effect of grace from the passion of Christ.

¹ I.e. by *appropriating* a particular cause to a particular effect.

But the pre-Christian sacraments sanctified simply by faith in the passion, of which they were symbols. On the other hand the sacraments of the new law, through sanctification or benediction, themselves contain grace (memb. 7).

Qu. 8 expands the above general doctrine of the sacraments, with special reference to the sacraments of the law of the Gospel.

Memb. 3, art 5, § 7 again raises the question, from what is the virtue of the sacrament, and gives a much fuller reply.

“There are many things, from which the sacraments are said to have virtue. One is the institution itself of the Saviour, who instituted them to sanctify. Another is the form of words of Christ and the Church, according to which words are instituted to sanctify, and are uttered by the ministers of the Church. The third is the due action itself of the ministers. The fourth is the passion of Christ with the resurrection. The fifth is the faith itself of the Church concerning the Creator and the Saviour.

“Now, the institution is as it were the first cause ; the minister is the second cause, receiving its virtue from the first. The words are by way of instrument ; the due action, as it were, is the disposition¹ on the part of the ministers. The passion with the resurrection is as that which gives efficacy to the grace that justifies from punishment as regards its essence, and is a disposition on the part of the Saviour to save fully. Faith again is as it were a disposition on the part of the recipient or of the Church itself.”

Alexander does not hesitate therefore to say that all the Christian sacraments are the cause of grace by reason of the *opus operatum* (memb. 4, art. 1). It is

¹ I.e. the due action *disposes* the minister to be a channel of grace.

God indeed who alone infuses grace, yet man may dispose to the reception of grace : thus God alone sanctifies, yet the priest, the minister of God, also sanctifies (memb. 3, art. 5, § 2).

The grace given in the sacraments is the *gratia gratum faciens*, it serves both for the healing of the wounds of injured nature and for assistance in good works (memb. 4, art. 2, § 1 ; cf. memb. 2, art. 2, § 1).

Finally, Alexander has endeavoured, not very successfully indeed, to explain why there are seven sacraments and no more, and to arrange them in an ordered system of grace (memb. 7, art. 2 ; cf. memb. 4, art. 1). In memb. 2 art. 1 he distinguishes Baptism and the Eucharist from the rest. All the sacraments of the new law surpass in worth those of the Mosaic law, in so far as they were instituted by Christ and His Apostles ; but these two, Baptism which is of the greatest necessity, and the Eucharist, which is of similar necessity—to repair daily infirmities—these are of peculiar dignity, in that they were instituted by Christ Himself.

It may be added that the subject of justification is treated under the head of the sacrament of penance : we have to turn for it to pars iv. qu. 70, “Of the effect of contrition, which is the justification of the ungodly”. Memb. 1 defines justification as the rectitude of the free will.

According to memb. 2, in order to the justification of the adult contrition is required ; inasmuch as all commit, if not actual mortal, yet venial sins. If there were no actual or even venial sins, contrition would not be required, justification having already taken place in baptism by grace and the faith of the Church. Justification is not preceded by, but simultaneous with, contrition (which is repentance induced by the love of God, and thus dependent on the same grace which justifies) :

hence justification is unmerited as regards *meritum condigni*. Attrition (i.e. repentance induced by fear of punishment preceding the advent of grace) may, however, merit justification by way of *meritum congrui*.

Memb. 3 declares that contrition by reason of the grace involved in it purges from guilt. Memb. 4, art. 1 states its further results, as follows :—

“The effect of grace taken in itself is to destroy guilt: according as there is joined to it habitual or actual grief of the will together with continued detestation of sin, it blots out eternal punishment: according as there is joined to it pain of sense it destroys the punishment of purgatory under a condition, viz. if that grief suitably corresponds, according as it is accompanied with works of mercy and satisfaction.”

In art. 2, § 3, Alexander says, as regards the remission of temporal punishment, that contrition remits the whole punishment, if it is sufficient; otherwise it remits only a part.

§ 2. THE FORMATION OF THE MEDIAEVAL SYNTHESIS

Now at last that we have completed our account both of Alexander's doctrine of the work of Christ, and of his complementary doctrines of the law, of grace and of the sacraments, we may stop and review the main features of his scheme, so as to bring out its significance and measure his achievement. It is an immense theological material which he unrolls before us, and there is perhaps a danger that the very wealth of ideas may prevent us from seeing the scheme as a unity. What requires to be done is therefore to consider it in its broad outline.

Alexander's view is based ultimately upon the Divine predestination. There is a relative but not an absolute necessity of the Incarnation and the passion: all neces-

sity in this matter ultimately depends upon the Divine sovereignty. Subject to the Divine decree, however, there was a necessity both of the Incarnation and of the Passion. The Incarnation was necessary even apart from the Fall, in so far as man, a creature of sense as well as intellect, needed a revelation to the senses as well as to the intellect. It agrees with this that the sacraments were necessary even in the state of innocence, in so far as they serve for the apprehension of grace.

The main cause of the Incarnation, however, was sin, which necessitated the passion of Christ. Christ indeed by His charity merited grace even from His conception, but by His acts of love merited it in a different way. The grace merited in both these ways, however, is positive, viz. the infusion of *caritas*, which makes good works possible. So far as grace is the remedy of sin, Christ merited it by His passion alone: by His passion also He merited the opening of paradise to sinners. The passion has also, however, a psychological influence, and the same is true of the resurrection: they serve as example, reveal the love of God, and awaken faith. Finally, the resurrection invests Christ with judicial power.

The complement of the work of Christ as the procuring of grace is the Divine revelation in the law, culminating in the law of the New Testament. The law is accompanied throughout by sacraments, through which grace is given, though only to faith: these sacraments possess virtue from the Lord's passion and resurrection: only the sacraments of the new law, however, contain grace.

Such is the general outline of Alexander's doctrine. In it at last we possess the complete Western parallel to the Greek doctrine of the work of Christ, or, as we

may say, the mediaeval synthesis in contrast with the Greek synthesis. Some differences between the Greek theology and Alexander's theology have been noted in our previous study: now, however, we are concerned rather with the similarities occurring along with the differences, similarities which, it may be observed, must necessarily exist between all complete schemes of Christian theology, in so far as they aim at explaining the same ultimate results from the same ultimate causes.

For the Greeks the work of Christ is in the first place the bringing of the knowledge of God and of the law by the Incarnate Logos. Alexander has reminiscences of this view in its wider aspect in his doctrine of the fitness of the Incarnation even apart from sin; but what mainly corresponds to it is his doctrine of the law, which, however, is traced not to the Logos, but to God.

The next point of the Greek view is that by His Incarnation, Death, and Resurrection, Christ has purged away sin, and deified humanity. Finally, He has also in His death paid a ransom to the devil, and has offered a sacrifice of reconciliation to God. All the blessings thus obtained are communicated to mankind in the sacraments: they are, however, properly religious blessings and there remains for the recipients the ethical task of good works, apart from which their possession cannot be assured.

For this complex of ideas Alexander substitutes the Western view that Christ by His merit and satisfaction has obtained grace, including both the remission of sins and the infusion of love which enables the recipient to do good works and merit salvation. Christ has further won for men the opening of paradise. It is not then as in the Greek view salvation itself which in anticipation is conferred on men in the sacraments, as a pos-

session to be assured indeed by good works : what the sacraments confer is rather grace, which makes good works possible and enables salvation to be merited.

There remains in Alexander's scheme the psychological influence of the passion and resurrection in awakening faith and love and stimulating to virtue. This view of the work of Christ is indeed anticipated in the Greek theology so far as Christ is viewed as in His death an example of virtue and as by His resurrection awakening faith (Athanasius); but it is in the West that it receives through Augustine and Abelard its greatest development. It is in general a natural addition to the sacramental view of Christianity, which, however, has no very logical place in its system. There is indeed more place for it in the Greek theology, in so far as there the benefits conferred on man through the sacraments are religious rather than ethical, and man is left to the exercise of his free will to win virtue; a psychological influence of the Incarnation is, however, not altogether incapable of combination with the idea of free will. In the Western scheme where the sacraments confer grace, i.e. the miraculous and supernatural infusion of charity, a natural psychological effect of the Incarnation appears either as itself unnecessary or else to make sacramental grace unnecessary. The same thing, viz. love as the principle of action is viewed as being produced both by a supernatural and a natural cause; and therefore, inevitably, on the principle of the parsimony of reason, the one view must ultimately be reduced to the other. There remains here in fact a problem for subsequent theology, to determine which view is to predominate.

Alexander's theology deserves a prolonged and careful study not only on account of its historical importance, but also because of its real value. The

theology of the early Franciscan school may also be studied in his disciple Bonaventura (d. A.D. 1274), of whose doctrine of the work of Christ, Baur has given an account.¹ But it is preferable to study it at first hand in Alexander, if for no other reason than that in Bonaventura we lose the advantage of Alexander's new systematic dispositions. Bonaventura wrote no great theological "Summa," but only the "Breviloquium," a compendium of doctrine, and also a commentary on the "Sentences". Though the former is a fine work, it necessarily lacks the breadth and fulness of treatment of Alexander's "Summa," while the latter necessarily conforms to the system of the "Sentences," and so fails to reproduce the full gain of Alexander's undoubtedly great improvement over Lombard in the matter of combination.

¹ "Die Christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung," pp. 214 ff.

CHAPTER V

THE DOMINICAN THEOLOGY

§ 1. THOMAS AQUINAS

WITH Thomas Aquinas (d. A.D. 1274), "doctor angelicus," we reach the climax of the scholastic movement, and the system which at the present day is recognized as the official theology of the Roman Catholic Church. Thomas is distinguished above all by method and clearness. Moreover, upon the basis of a more thorough study of Aristotle, begun by his master Albert the Great and continued by himself, he has much more completely than either Alexander or Bonaventura succeeded in establishing a working relation between the Peripatetic philosophy on the one hand and the Christian faith on the other. Albert and Thomas were Dominicans, and the Thomist theology was accepted as the theology of the Dominican order in opposition to the Franciscan theology of Alexander and Bonaventura.

In the first place, Thomas defined very differently from Alexander the relation between reason and revelation. While Alexander hesitated between the view that the doctrines of natural theology were the antecedents and the doctrines of revelation the consequences of the intuition of God as the first truth, and the view that the doctrines of revelation were fresh truths not to be deduced by human reason from the first truth, Thomas decided very definitely for the latter alternative, and moreover distinguished very exactly between the

spheres of natural and revealed theology. On the one hand reason can prove the existence of God: on the other it cannot demonstrate the ecclesiastical doctrines of the Trinity, creation in time, original sin, the Incarnation, the sacraments, purgatory, the resurrection of the flesh, the final judgment, eternal beatitude and damnation.¹

Thomas declares the doctrines of revelation to be above reason, but not contrary to reason. Reason can never prove their truth, which rests solely on their Divine authority: if it could, it would overthrow the merit of faith. It can, however, starting from the basis of authority, manifest the implications of revealed doctrine. It can also invariably destroy the reasons assigned by adversaries against the Christian faith; for since the latter rests upon infallible truth, all reasons against it must be fallible.²

Thomas has also given a reason why supernatural revelation is absolutely necessary for the salvation of man. It is "because man is related (*ordinatur*) to God, as to a certain end, which exceeds the comprehension of reason. . . . But the end ought to be foreknown to men, who are required to order their purposes and their actions towards the end. Wherefore it was necessary for man's salvation, that certain things which exceed human reason should be known to him by Divine revelation."³

Two fundamental principles of the theology of Aquinas here appear together. As Ritschl has pointed out,⁴ he has combined in his doctrine of God the Neoplatonic conception of His absolute transcendence of

¹ Cf. Ueberweg-Heinze, "Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie," II., 9th ed., p. 302.

² Cf. "Summa Theologica," I. qu. 1, art. 8.

³ *Ibid.* qu. 1, art. 1.

⁴ Cf. "Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung," I², p. 61; E.T. p. 47.

the world with the Aristotelian notion of final cause. In the combination, moreover, the former, which expresses God's essential Being, dominates the latter, which denotes His relation to the world. The result is therefore, that "God's relation to the world and to all that in it is ordered by God, bears the mark of contingency".¹ By this means, however, a firm philosophical basis is given to the final subordination of all other attributes expressing God's relation to the world to that of His absolute power ; so that the Augustinian doctrine to this effect is substantiated against the Anselmic view that God's action is subject to a moral necessity. To this point we shall return, when we come to the doctrine of Thomas on the work of Christ.

Before this doctrine, however, in his system appear the doctrines of law and grace. This arrangement, in which Thomas deviates from his predecessor Alexander, is a result of the determination of his system by the thought that God is the chief end of man. It is in direct pursuance of this thought, that he now considers law and grace as the general principles, by which man is ordered to his supreme end.

The doctrine of these subjects is developed as follows: The ultimate end of man is beatitude, which consists in the vision of the Divine Being. For man to obtain beatitude, however, good works are necessary. Since the vision of God is beyond all created nature, God alone has it naturally, and without any progress towards it. Angels may acquire it by one motion of meritorious operation. "Men, however, obtain it by many motions of operations, which are called merits, wherefore according to the Philosopher (i.e. Aristotle), beatitude is the reward of virtuous operations."²

¹ Cf. "Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung," I², p. 62 ; E.T. p. 47.

² "Summa Theologica," II. 1, qu. 5, art. 7.

The external principle moving us towards the good is God, who instructs us by the law, and assists us by grace (II. 1, qu. 90, introd.). In qu. 91 Thomas distinguishes first the eternal law, which is the rule of the Divine providence, eternally immanent in the Divine reason (art. 1). Then there is the law of nature, or the light of reason implanted in us by God (art. 2), which is carried out into its particular applications by the human law of the state (art. 3). Finally, there is the Divine law, which is necessary, beyond the law of nature, in order to direct us to eternal beatitude, since this exceeds the nature of man as such (art. 4). This again has the two forms of the old and new law, i.e. the law of the Old Testament and the law of the New Testament (art. 5): "The new law is the Gospel itself" (qu. 106, art. 1).

The law of nature was a law implanted in the heart; the old law was a written law. The new law contains both characteristics. It is at once written, and implanted in the heart. The latter is its chief characteristic: "that which is most important in the law of the New Testament, and in which its whole virtue consists, is the grace of the Holy Spirit, which (grace) is given through faith in Christ; and therefore above all the new law is the very grace of the Holy Spirit, which is given to believers in Christ" (loc. cit.). From the law of nature it differs in that this grace is a supernatural gift beyond the light of reason.

With regard to the written part of the new law, this consists of such things as pertain to the grace of the Holy Spirit, either as disposing to, or regulative of this grace (loc. cit.). Since grace is mediated to us through the Incarnation, "therefore it is fitting that the grace flowing to us from the Incarnate Word should be conducted to us by some external sensible channels, and

also that from the inner grace, by which the flesh is subdued to the spirit, certain sensible works should proceed" (qu. 108, art. 1).

With regard then to the relation of the old and the new law, beyond the great difference that the new law is accompanied with grace, the following differences emerge. The ceremonial elements of the old law Christ fulfilled, substituting for the shadow the substance. The precepts He fulfilled in general by His work and His doctrine; by His work, in that He kept the law; by His doctrine, (1) in that He explained the true sense of the law, (2) in that He showed how the precepts might be better kept, (3) in that He added to the precepts certain counsels of perfection (qu. 107, art. 2). These last, the ascetic elements in the new law, open a more immediate way to the supernatural beatitude, which is the end of the law; inasmuch as they make complete separation from the world (qu. 108, art. 4).

So much then for the Divine instruction in the law; we now come to the Divine assistance, which is by grace.

According to qu. 110, art. 1, grace means three things: (1) God's love, according to which He holds anyone in favour (*gratum*); (2) any gift of His grace; (3) the thanks, which we return to Him, saying grace. Grace in the second and third senses result from grace in the first sense.

God's grace differs from that of man, in that His will of good to the creature creates some good in the creature: whereas man's grace presupposes wholly or in part some reason for it in the recipient.

God's grace in the first sense is twofold: it is (1) the general love, which He has to all creatures; (2) the special love, by which He draws the rational creature beyond its condition of nature to participation in the Divine good. Hence, that man possesses the grace of

God signifies something supernatural in man, coming from God.

Sometimes, however, the grace of God means His eternal love, i.e. the grace of predestination.

According to art. 2, grace in the second of the three senses originally defined, i.e. grace as an effect in man of God's gracious will, is twofold. It is (1) a particular motion in the soul, (2) a habit by which man tends to the supernatural eternal good. In this latter sense it is a quality of the soul.

Grace, as habit, manifests itself in supernatural virtues, as reason in natural virtues (art. 3). Its seat is in the essence of the soul, while the virtues inhabit its diverse powers (art. 4).

In qu. 111, art. 1 grace is distinguished as *gratia gratum faciens* and *gratia gratis data*. The first is the grace by which man is brought to God. The second is the grace by which He is enabled to bring others to God. In art. 2 grace is further distinguished as *operans* and *co-operans*: so far as it renews the will it is the former, so far as it assists it, thus renewed, it is the latter.

According to qu. 112, art. 1 the sole cause of grace is God. The gift of grace exceeds the whole faculty of created nature, and is nothing but a participation of the Divine nature. God alone, however, can deify, which He does by communicating fellowship with the Divine nature through a certain participation of likeness.

The humanity of Christ is the instrument of His Divinity and does not cause grace by its own virtue but by that of the conjoined Divinity, whence it is that the human actions of Christ are saving actions.

As regards the reception of grace, art. 2 teaches that there is a preparation for habitual grace, which consists in the motion of the will to good by general grace or

the help of God. Such a preparation is required, as a form can only exist in a matter disposed for it. Art. 3 discusses the question : Is grace necessarily given to him who prepares himself, or does what in him lies ? Thomas replies, that, if the preparation be considered in relation to the free will, there is no necessity, as the gift of grace is out of all proportion to human virtue ; but, if it is considered in relation to the Divine assistance involved, then there is a necessity, though not of compulsion but of infallibility, inasmuch as God intends that the preparation shall be followed by the gift of grace.

According to qu. 113, introd., the effects of grace are two : (1) justification, which is the result of operative grace ; (2) merit, which is the result of co-operative grace. Qu. 113 deals with justification. It will be remembered that Alexander had defined justification as the rectitude of the free will : Thomas, however, feels himself compelled by ancient theological tradition to raise the question : Whether the justification of the ungodly is the remission of sins ? Art. 1 replies that justification is the remission of sins, in so far as it is a change from a state of unrighteousness to a state of righteousness by the remission of sins. Art. 2 then inquires : Whether for the remission of guilt, which is the justification of the ungodly, there is required the infusion of grace ? Thomas makes answer that the remission of sins means that God is reconciled to us, which reconciliation consists in the love wherewith God loves us. This love of God is unchangeable and eternal ; but its results are variable, in that we sometimes fall away from it, and sometimes regain it. The effect of the Divine love, by which sin is removed, is grace : and therefore there cannot be remission of guilt without infusion of grace.

It is objected that the remission of sin consists in

the Divine imputation,¹ while the infusion of grace implies something in us; therefore the infusion of grace is not required for the remission of sins. Thomas answers: That God does not impute sin proceeds from the Divine love, and this implies a certain effect in him to whom sin is not imputed.

In the two following articles Thomas proceeds to show in what sense justification is by faith.² The grace infused moves the free will to accept it (art. 3). Its first motion is faith; but concurrent with this is the motion of love, so that faith is informed with charity (art. 4).

Qu. 114 is on merit. According to art. 1, merit implies the rewarding of work in accordance with justice. The possibility of merit lies in the fact that God's justice towards men is not a justice as between equals, but a *jus paternum* or *dominativum*. Hence, while there can be no strict merit as between man and God, merit can exist by presupposition of the Divine ordination, which has attached certain rewards to certain works.

The next thing is the relation of merit to grace. According to art. 2, man even in the state of innocence could not without grace merit eternal life. This is so (1) because all merit depends upon the Divine ordination; (2) because eternal life is out of all proportion to human nature, and therefore human nature can merit it only by the aid of the supernatural gift of grace. Still less then can man in the state of sin merit eternal life; for here there is the added impediment of sin which alienates man from God, and excludes him from eternal life. The sinner then can never merit eternal life, except he first be reconciled to God by the forgiveness of sins, which takes place by grace.

¹ Ps. xxxii. 1.

² Rom. v. 1.

In grace, however, man can merit eternal life (art. 3). His merit is *meritum condigni*, if the meritorious work be regarded as proceeding from the Holy Spirit; but it is only *meritum congrui*, if it is viewed as proceeding from the free will.

Art. 5 inquires whether it is possible to merit the first grace. The answer is: No; for (1) grace is in itself opposed to merit;¹ (2) grace exceeds the proportion of nature; (3) man in sin is prevented from meriting by sin. According to art. 6, only Christ can merit the first grace for others with *meritum condigni*; "since each one of us is moved of God through the gift of grace, to the end that he himself may attain eternal life, and therefore his condign merit does not extend beyond this motion; but the soul of Christ was moved by God through grace, not only that He Himself might attain eternal glory, but also that He might bring others to the same, in so far as He is the Head of the Church, and the author of human salvation".²

It is possible, however, for the saints to merit the first grace for others *ex congruo*.

Finally, art. 7 teaches that no one can merit repentance after a fall. Being out of grace, he has no *meritum condigni*; while his sin itself impedes the operation of any *meritum congrui* on the part of others.

The incidental remarks of Thomas upon the humanity of Christ as the instrument of His Divinity in causing grace, and upon the operation of His merit as the Head of the Church point forward for their fuller explanation to the doctrine of Christ and His work in pars III., to which we now proceed. There are first some general considerations as to the fitness of the Incarnation (qu. 1). In art. 1 Thomas says: "It belongs to the nature of the Highest Good to communicate Himself in the highest

¹ Rom. iv. 4.

² Heb. ii. 10.

manner to the creature, which, however, is especially done by this, that 'He so joined to Himself a created nature, that one Person is made of the three, the Word, the soul, and the flesh,' as Augustine says in his thirteenth book on the Trinity (cf. 17, 22); wherefore it is manifest that it was fitting that God should become incarnate".

This general reason for the Incarnation would seem to demand its occurrence, even apart from sin. Thomas, however, (art. 3) prefers the opposite view as being more in agreement with Scripture, which constantly speaks of the Incarnation as a remedy for Adam's sin, "though the power of God is not limited in respect of this; for even if sin were non-existent, God could have become incarnate".

In art. 2 the reasons for the necessity of the Incarnation are set out at length. While God could have redeemed us in other ways, it is the fittest way of redemption.

Thomas sets out first, after Augustine, its positive effects in restoring human nature. These are:—

- (1) The establishment of faith by Divine authority.
- (2) The elevation of hope, in that God showed His great love by becoming participant of our nature.
- (3) The kindling of love by the manifestation of the Divine love.
- (4) The giving to man of a Divine example.
- (5) The bestowal of the full participation of the Godhead, which is the beatitude of man and the end of human life.

Then there are five other reasons, which refer to the removal of evil:—

- (1) Man is taught not to think more of the devil than of himself, because the devil is pure spirit.
- (2) Again, that human nature has been dignified by

the Incarnation, should prevent us from defiling it with sin.

(3) The assumption in Christ of human nature without preceding merits, manifests the Divine grace, and checks presumption.

(4) Our pride is healed by Christ's humility.

(5) The Incarnation also delivers men from the bondage of sin by the provision of a satisfaction for sin.

All these reasons come from Augustine and Leo, except that as regards the last there is no mention of satisfaction in the passages from these Fathers quoted in support of it. This last reason anticipates the discussion of the effects of Christ's passion (qu. 48), where in art. 2 His satisfaction is more fully dealt with.

It will be observed that already in these thoughts on the Incarnation Thomas makes the article of the Divine omnipotence the ultimate test of doctrine, both as to the necessity of the Incarnation apart from sin, and as to its necessity altogether. Its necessity can in any case only be relative.

As to the manner of the Incarnation, the union of the two natures in Christ took place by grace.

"Grace is spoken of in two ways: in one way it means the will of God itself giving anything freely; in another way it is the free gift of God itself. Now human nature needs the gracious will of God, that it may be raised into union with God, since this is beyond the power of its own nature. Human nature, however, is raised to union with God in two ways: in the one way by the operation by which, to wit, the saints know and love God: in the other by personal being, which last mode belongs to Christ alone, in whom human nature was assumed for this end, that it may be in the person of the Son of God. Now it is manifest that for the perfection of working, a faculty (*potentia*) must

be perfected by a habit: but that a nature has its existence in its substrate does not take place through the mediation of any habit. Thus therefore it is to be said that if grace signifies the will of God itself freely doing anything, or holding anyone to be pleasing or acceptable, then the union in the Incarnation took place through grace, as indeed also does the union of the saints to God through knowledge and love: if, however, grace stands for the free gift of God itself, then the very existence of the union of human nature with the Divine person may be spoken of as a certain grace, in so far as this took place with no preceding merits; not, however, that there is any habitual grace, by the mediation of which such union takes place" (qu. 2, art. 10).

As an individual man, however, Christ possesses habitual grace for three reasons:—

(1) Because of the union of His soul with the Word of God, by the closeness of which union it peculiarly participates in the Divine grace.

(2) Because of the nobility of that soul, whose operations could not but attain most closely to God by knowledge and love. Human nature, however, can only so attain by grace.

(3) Because of Christ's relation to the human race. Christ, as man, is Mediator, and must therefore possess grace overflowing to others (qu. 7, art. 1).

Christ consequently possessed all virtues (art. 2) and had all the gifts of the Spirit in the most excellent degree (art. 5). He had also all *gratiæ gratis datæ* needed to make Him the first and chief Teacher of the faith (art. 7). As man Christ also possessed the gift of prophecy, and foretold the future (art. 8). Christ had in fact the fulness of grace, both as regards its amount and its effects (art. 9).

As communicating grace to others, Christ is the Head of the Church. "To give grace, or the Holy Spirit, befits Christ, as He is God, by way of authority; but instrumentally it befits Him, as He is man; in so far, to wit, as His humanity was the instrument of His Divinity; and so His actions from the virtue of His Divinity were salvation-bringing for us, in so far as they cause grace in us, both by merit, and by a certain efficacy" (qu. 8, art. 1).

Christ is in the first place the Head of the Church as regards the soul, but secondly as regards the body. He is the latter "in one way, inasmuch as the members of the body are presented as the weapons of righteousness in the case of the soul of one living through Christ, as the Apostle says;¹ in another way, in so far as the life of glory flows from the soul to the body, according to Rom. VIII. (11)" (art. 2).

"According to its essence the personal grace, by which the soul of Christ was justified, is the same with His grace, according to which He is the Head of the Church, justifying others; they differ, however, in idea" (art. 5).

Finally, Christ alone is in the highest sense the Head of the Church. "The inner inflow of grace is from none other than Christ alone, whose humanity has the power of justifying from the fact that it is joined to His Divinity; but the inflow into the members of the Church, as regards its exterior government, may befit others; and in this way certain others may be called heads of the Church" (art. 6).

Thomas reckons the grace of Christ to the perfections assumed together with His assumption of human nature (qu. 7, introd.): He also, however, assumed in the Incarnation certain defects (qu. 14, introd.).

¹ Rom. vi. 13.

“It was fitting that the body assumed by the Son of God should be subject to human infirmities and defects. And this chiefly for three reasons: in the first place, because to this end the Son of God, having assumed flesh, came into the world, viz. to satisfy for the sins of the human race; now one satisfies for the sins of another, when he takes upon himself the penalty (*poena*) due for the sin of the other; but bodily defects such as death, hunger, thirst, and so on are the penalty of sin, brought into the world by Adam, according to Rom. v. (12); wherefore it was fitting in regard of the end of the Incarnation, that Christ should in our place assume penal characters of this kind, according to Is. LIII. (4).” The second reason for the assumption of these corporal defects was to show the reality of the Incarnation; the third that Christ might be to us an example of patience (qu. 14, art. 1).

It is to be observed that in the above statement Thomas follows Alexander in defining satisfaction as penal in character. It is in fact the vicarious endurance of another's punishment; “*unus autem pro peccato alterius satisfacit, dum poenam pro peccato alterius debitam in se suscipit*” (loc. cit.).

The active aspect of satisfaction is, however, also recognized as follows: “Satisfaction for the sin of another has indeed, as its matter, the penalties which one undergoes for the sin of another; but for principle it has the habit of the soul, according to which the soul inclines to the will to satisfy for another, and from which satisfaction has its efficacy; for it would not be an efficacious satisfaction, unless it proceeded from charity” (loc. cit.)

Christ assumed not only bodily defects, but also defects of soul: in particular His soul was passible. “Therefore He was at once a *comprehensor*, in so far

as He had the blessedness proper to the soul, and also a *viator*,¹ in so far as He tended towards beatitude in respect of what was lacking to Him in beatitude " (qu. 15, art. 10).

Christ, as man, was subject to the Father ; as appears in that He prayed to the Father, also in that He served Him in His Priesthood (qu. 20, introd.). Thomas discusses the Priesthood of Christ in qu. 22. Christ is a priest, in so far as a priest is mediator between God and the people, offers to God the prayers of the people, and in some way makes satisfaction for sin ; all of which in the highest degree apply to Christ (art. 1). Thomas observes : " Other men have severally certain graces, but Christ as the Head of all, has the perfection of all graces ; and therefore, as far as pertains to others, one is legislator, another is priest, and another is king, but all these concur in Christ as the source of all graces " (loc. cit.).

Christ was both priest and victim (art. 2). The result of His work is the expiation of sins. The *macula culpæ* is destroyed by grace : the *reatus poenæ* by satisfaction. Both are effected by the priesthood of Christ, by which He procured for us grace and made satisfaction for sin (art. 3).

Christ was not a priest for Himself. He prayed for Himself, and by His passion merited for Himself ; but His passion was a sacrifice, i.e. a satisfaction, only for us (art. 4). " In any priest's offering of a sacrifice two things can be considered, viz. the sacrifice offered, and the devotion of the offerer : the proper effect of priesthood, however, is that which follows from the sacrifice itself. But Christ obtained through His passion the glory of His resurrection, not as it were by the virtue of His sacrifice, which is offered by the mode of satis-

¹ See note 5, p. 160.

faction, but by His very devotion, by which in charity He humbly underwent the passion" (loc. cit.).

Under the same general head of Christ's subjection to the Father is discussed in qu. 24 His predestination, which is thus reduced from the position of supremacy which it occupies in the scheme of Alexander to a subordinate point of interest. Thomas, however, repeats in arts. 3 and 4 the doctrine of Alexander, that in the eternal act Christ's predestination and ours are one; nevertheless, viewing predestination according to its end, the predestination of Christ is the example and cause of our predestination; the example, in that we are predestinated to be sons of God by adoption as He was predestinated to be Son of God by nature, in each case without prior merits; the cause, in that our salvation was preordained to take place through Jesus Christ.

The next section is on those things which belong to Christ in relation to us (cf. qu. 25, introd.). Here in qu. 26 is discussed His mediatorship. He is the one perfect Mediator, in that by His death He has reconciled man to God (art. 1). Further, He is Mediator as man (art. 2). "According as He is man, He differs both from God in nature, and from man in dignity both in grace and glory; in so far also as He is man, it befits Him to unite men to God, bringing the commandments and gifts of God to men, and making satisfaction and intercession for men to God; and therefore He is most truly called Mediator, according as He is man" (loc. cit.).

The final section on the Incarnation treats of what the incarnate Son of God underwent or suffered in the nature united to Him. Here Thomas considers (1) what pertains to Christ's advent into the world, (2) what pertains to the progress of His life in it, (3) His departure from the world, (4) what pertains to His exaltation after the present life (qu. 27, introd.). Altogether, he treats

of the details of the Gospel history much more fully than Alexander, expanding and enlarging upon the pattern set him by his predecessor.

Under the first of the four heads just mentioned falls the conception of Christ. Christ merited from the very instant of His conception ; but what He merited thereby, He merited by the subsequent actions of His life, not, however, that He merited it more, but simply for fresh reasons (qu. 34, art. 3).

Under the head of Christ's life in the world, Thomas discusses His conversation, His temptation, His doctrine, and His miracles (qu. 40, introd.).

"By His humanity Christ wished to manifest His Divinity : and therefore having converse with men (as belongs to man) He manifested to all His Divinity by preaching, by working miracles, and by living innocently and justly among men " (qu. 40, art. 1).

He chose poverty, amongst other reasons, that His Divinity might the more by contrast reveal its power (art. 3). He lived under the law, (1) to approve the old law, (2) to keep it and end it in Himself, (3) to obviate Jewish calumny, and (4) to redeem men from its bondage according to Gal. iv. 4, 5 (art. 4).

Christ was tempted that He might overcome the devil and assist us in our temptations, also for our warning and example and to assure us of His sympathy (qu. 41, art. 1).

Among the things pertaining to the end of Christ's life the first to be treated of is His Passion, which receives very full consideration.

Qu. 46, art. 1, discusses its necessity. "It was not necessary as a matter of compulsion for Christ to suffer, neither as regards God, who ordained that Christ should suffer, nor yet as regards Christ, who suffered voluntarily : it was, however, necessary with a view to its

end." This necessity was threefold : (1) as regards us, who are redeemed by it, (2) as regards Christ, who by the humility of His passion merited the glory of His exaltation, (3) as regards God, whose foreordination of it announced in Scripture must be fulfilled.

Thomas, however, in agreement with his doctrine of the contingency of all that belongs to God's relation to the world, denies that the passion was absolutely necessary for human redemption, and subscribes to the doctrine of Augustine in the "*De Trinitate*," XIII. cap. 10, 13 (art. 2).

"Anything can be called possible or impossible in two ways : in one way simply and absolutely, in another way hypothetically. Speaking therefore simply and absolutely, it was possible for God to redeem man in another way than by the passion of Christ ; because no word is impossible with God.¹ But from a certain supposition that had been made, it was impossible : for, since it is impossible that God's foreknowledge should be deceived, and His will or ordinance should be broken, granting the foreknowledge and foreordination of God concerning the passion of Christ, it was not at the same time possible for Christ not to suffer, or for man to be delivered in any other way than by His passion" (loc. cit.).

Still more characteristic of his view is the answer which Thomas gives to the objection that God's justice demanded Christ's passion as the necessary satisfaction for human sin, and that God cannot deny His own justice without denying Himself. Thomas says :—

"This justice depends upon the will of God, demanding from the human race satisfaction for sin : for, if He had wished to deliver man from sin without any satisfaction, He would have done nothing contrary to

¹ Lk. I. 37, Vulg.

justice : for the judge, who has to punish an offence committed against some other, as for instance some other man or the whole state, or the prince above him, cannot without violating justice remit the offence without punishment ; but God has no one above Him, but He Himself is the supreme and common good of the universe. And therefore, if He remit sin, which comes under the category of an offence, because it is committed against Himself, He does no one wrong : just as any man whatever, of his mercy, forgives without satisfaction, and does no wrong " (loc. cit.).

This is a very important passage, inasmuch as it contains a criticism of the Anselmic theory of satisfaction, not merely on the religious ground of an instinctive objection to limit the Divine omnipotence (Augustine, Boso, Alexander), but also upon legal grounds. As Anselm had appealed to legal analogies, Thomas meets him with his own weapons. Anselm had at first defined satisfaction in accordance with the rule of private law, but then, in order to demonstrate its necessity, had spoken of God as the Moral Ruler of the universe, who cannot remit sin unpunished. Thomas fixes on the latter point, and supports his view of the contingency of the Divine relation to the world by the analogy of the position of the sovereign, who is not a judge that must execute the law of the state, but is himself the fountain of justice, and is as free to forgive any offence whatever, as a private person is to forgive a wrong against himself. We have seen that the Anselmic idea of the Divine sovereignty has affinity to the German conception of kingship. The Thomist doctrine on the other hand is clearly akin to the Roman notion of the Emperor : *princeps legibus solutus est* (" Digest," I. 3, 31). The argument of Thomas reduces the two analogies, brought forward by Anselm, to one. The

Divine Sovereignty is to be interpreted according to the rule of private law. This is an immensely important position: as long as it remains uncontroverted, the Anselmic doctrine is vitiated at an essential point. It is just round about this point, however, that controversy rages in later attempts to apply legal analogies to the work of Christ.

In qu. 46, art. 3, Thomas, having rejected the absolute necessity of redemption by Christ's passion, goes on to inquire into the fitness of this mode of redemption. "Any mode is the more fitting for the attainment of an end, in proportion as through it more things combine, which are expedient to the end." Here, however, many things besides deliverance from sin combine to make the passion the fittest mode of salvation.

(1) It reveals the love of God to man, and incites him to love God, which is the perfection of human salvation.¹

(2) In the passion Christ gave us an example of obedience, humility, constancy, righteousness, and the rest of the virtues necessary for human salvation.²

(3) Christ not only by His passion delivered man from sin, but also merited for him justifying grace and the glory of beatitude.

(4) In that man is bought by the blood of Christ, he has a motive for keeping himself from sin.³

(5) Man's dignity is increased, in that as man had been conquered by the devil and merited death, so it was man who conquered the devil, and by dying conquered death.⁴

I pass over the various symbolical congruities which Aquinas, following the Fathers, finds in the fact that

¹ Rom. v. 8.

² 1 Pet. ii. 21.

³ 1 Cor. vi. 20.

⁴ 1 Cor. xv. 57.

Christ died upon the cross (art. 4), merely observing that among them lingers the old Irenæan idea that, as Adam fell by a tree, so it was meet that Christ should die on a tree.

The next point is more important (art. 5). Christ suffered every possible kind of suffering though not actually every possible suffering. Though the least suffering of His would have sufficed to redeem humanity, yet as He came to redeem men from every kind of sin, there was a fitness in His suffering every kind of suffering.

Moreover (art. 6), His grief was the greatest possible in this present life. It was both pain of sense and pain of mind and was excessive, the pain of sense because of the extreme painfulness of crucifixion, the pain of mind, because He was satisfying for all the sins of men, because of the sin against Him both of the Jews and His own disciples, and because His suffering was to the point of death. Moreover, His body was perfect and therefore perfectly sensitive, His mental pain had no mitigation, and finally "the greatness of the grief of Christ may be seen in this, that His passion and grief were assumed voluntarily by Christ to the end of freeing men from sin, and therefore He assumed an amount of grief, as great as was proportionate to the greatness of the fruit which thence followed".

The importance of the above thoughts shows that Thomas, like Alexander, applies the concrete idea of penance to explain the passion of Christ. Whereas, however, Alexander lays stress on the penal character of Christ's satisfaction, Thomas emphasizes His inner pain of mind, which corresponds to the contrition of the ordinary penitent.

"The pain of Christ, however, exceeded all the pain of any and every penitent: both because it proceeded from greater wisdom and love, whence the grief of

contrition is increased ; and also because His grief was for all sins at once.”¹

Christ’s grief was not diminished by His innocence. The innocent indeed has to grieve not for guilt, but at punishment only ; yet His grief at punishment is increased because this is not His due.

Thomas, however, refuses to compare Christ’s sufferings with the pains of purgatory or hell. These exceed all evil of the present life, just as the glory of the saints exceeds all present good.

Moreover, Christ’s suffering was only in the lower powers of His soul, which were concerned with temporal things : with His higher reason He continued to enjoy the vision of God (art. 7).

In qu. 47 Thomas treats of the efficient cause of the passion. Art. 2 teaches that Christ died out of obedience for the following reasons :—

(1) It befitted human justification that Adam’s disobedience should be met by Christ’s obedience.²

(2) It befitted the reconciliation of God to men,³ in that Christ was a most acceptable sacrifice to God ;⁴ but obedience is better than sacrifice,⁵ and thus Christ’s passion and death fitly proceeded from obedience.

(3) It was fit that Christ should obtain victory by obeying God, as a soldier his leader.⁶

God, then, gave up Christ to suffer (art. 3) according to His eternal counsel,⁷ inspiring Him with love so that He willed to die for us,⁸ and abandoning Him to His persecutors.⁹ The Father gave up His Son, and Christ Himself gave up Himself in love. At the same time Judas gave Him up from envy, Pilate from fear. All these acts were externally the same, but the motives

¹ Is. LIII. 4.

² Rom. v. 19.

³ *Ibid.* 10.

⁴ Eph. v.

⁵ 1 Sam. xv. 22.

⁶ Prov. XXI. 28, Vulg.

⁷ Is. LIII. 6, 10.

⁸ *Ibid.* 7, Vulg.

⁹ Mt. XXVII. 46.

were different. Christ's passion began at the hands of the Jews and was completed at the hands of the Gentiles (art. 4), that its fruits might reach first the Jews, then the Gentiles. The Jewish rulers did not recognize the Divinity of Christ,¹ but this was because of their unwillingness to believe :² the Jewish people were seduced by their rulers, and were therefore relatively excusable :³ still more excusable were the Gentiles who knew not the law. The sin of the Jewish rulers therefore, though not that of their agents, was the greatest possible (arts. 4, 5).

With qu. 48 we reach the very heart of the doctrine of Thomas on the passion. The question deals with its mode as regards its effect.

It operates in the first place by the mode of merit (art. 1). "To Christ was given grace, not only as to a single person, but in so far as He is Head of the Church, in order that from Him it might overflow to the members ; and therefore the works of Christ have the same relation both to Himself and to His members, as the works of another man established in grace have to himself. Now it is manifest, that whoever being established in grace suffers for righteousness' sake, by this very thing merits for himself salvation ;⁴ wherefore Christ by His passion merited salvation, not only for Himself, but also for all His members."

The passion in itself, as having its principle from without, was not meritorious ; but as voluntarily endured, and thus having its principle from within, it was meritorious.

Christ merited salvation for us from the very beginning of His conception ; but there were on our side certain obstacles which hindered the effect of His merits before the passion : to remove these, as will be

¹ 1 Cor. II. 8.

² Jn. xv. 22, 24.

³ Lk. xxiii. 34 ; Acts III. 17.

⁴ Mt. v. 10.

presently shown (qu. 46, art. 3), the passion was necessary. The passion had an effect which Christ's previous merits did not have, not because His love was increased in the passion, but because it was a work suitable to such an effect.

Arts. 2, 3, 4 then show how it was that the passion had a peculiar merit of its own, and what were the obstacles it removed, which prevented the operation of Christ's former merits.

The passion operated by the mode of satisfaction (art. 2). So Ps. LXIX. 4 teaches; and the proof that Christ in His passion actually made satisfaction for sin is as follows:—

“He properly satisfies for an offence, who presents to the offended person, what he loves as much as or more than he hates the offence. But Christ in suffering out of love and obedience, presented to God something more than was required as a recompense for the whole offence of the human race; first indeed, because of the greatness of the love out of which He suffered; secondly, because of the dignity of His life, which He gave as a satisfaction, which was the life of God and man; thirdly, because of the generality of His passion, and the greatness of the grief assumed, as has been said before (qu. 46, art. 6): and therefore the passion of Christ was not only a sufficient, but even a superabundant satisfaction for the sins of the human race.”¹

Though Thomas lays stress on the grief of Christ in His passion, it is, however, by the agreement of the passion with penitential satisfaction, rather than with penitential contrition, that he explains its operation for others.

“The head and members are, as it were, one mystical person, and therefore the satisfaction of

¹ 1 Jn. II. 2.

Christ belongs to all believers as His members. So far as two men even are one in charity, one can satisfy for the other : but the position is not the same as regards confession or contrition : because satisfaction consists in an external act, for which instruments can be adopted, amongst which friends also are counted."

Thomas easily disposes of the old problem as to the extreme sin of Christ's crucifiers. Christ's love was greater even than their wickedness ; and His passion was therefore a sufficient and superabundant satisfaction even for their sin.

In answer to the objection that satisfaction implies, as an act of justice, an equality with the universal offence expiated, whereas Christ suffered, not as God, but merely in His flesh,¹ Thomas says that because His flesh was assumed by His Divine Person, it had an infinite value.

It will be observed that Thomas in the above section follows Anselm, as regards the definition of satisfaction, and as regards the infinite value given to Christ's satisfaction by His Godhead. Thomas, however, follows Alexander, in attaching the idea of satisfaction to Christ's passion rather than to His death, also in estimating the value of the passion for God from Christ's inner love and grief, as well as from His Divinity. We see, however, that He regards a vicarious contrition as impossible : it is after all only the *satisfactio operis* that can be vicarious. Finally, when Thomas makes the satisfaction not only sufficient but superabundant, we might be disposed at first to think this an advance beyond Anselm in the same direction : in reality, however, the thought carries us away from Anselm, the essence of whose theory is the necessity of the exact equivalence

¹ 1 Pet. iv. 1.

of satisfaction and sin. Thomas in fact here loosens the close connexion of the Anselmic theory, in agreement with his general principle of the contingency of all that belongs to God's relation to the world.

Art. 3 goes on to teach that Christ's passion operated as a sacrifice.¹ "Sacrifice in its proper meaning is anything done towards the honour properly owed to God, in order to placate Him." Christ then in His passion offered Himself for us ; and His voluntary endurance of suffering was eminently acceptable to God, as proceeding from His charity. In reality therefore Thomas reduces, though he does not say so, the Scriptural idea of sacrifice to an aspect of the ecclesiastical notion of satisfaction, which has been explained in art. 2.

Art. 4, again, teaches that Christ's passion operated by the mode of redemption. This too is reduced to the category of satisfaction. Christ, by satisfying for us, redeemed us both from sin and its penalties, and so from the devil, who held us in the bondage of sin, and had in charge the execution of its penalties : the price, however, was paid not to the devil, but to God.

Our redemption belongs immediately to Christ as man alone ; though the first cause of it was the whole Trinity (art. 5).

Finally, according to art. 6 the passion operated by the mode of efficacy.

"The principal efficient cause of human salvation is God ; but since, as was said before (qu. 43, art. 2), the humanity of Christ is the instrument of His Divinity ; therefore as a consequence all the actions and passions of Christ operate instrumentally in the power of His Divinity to the end of human salvation ; and accordingly the passion of Christ is the efficient cause of human salvation."

¹ Eph. v. 2.

From its association with His Divinity, Christ's passion, though corporeal, has yet a spiritual power, and therefore obtains efficacy, not by corporeal, but by spiritual contact, i.e. through faith and the sacrament of faith.¹ In conclusion, Thomas shows how all the different modes of operation are related.

"The passion of Christ, as referred to His Divinity, acts by the mode of efficacy : in reference to the will of Christ's soul, again, it acts by the mode of merit : again, if it is considered as belonging to the flesh of Christ itself, it acts by the mode of satisfaction, in so far as by it we are delivered from the obligation to punishment : again, by the mode of redemption, in so far as we are delivered from the bondage of transgression : once more, by the mode of sacrifice, so far as by it we are reconciled to God."

Qu. 49 carries us on to the effects of the passion. According to art. 1 we are liberated by it from sin—

(1) By the mode of provocation to love,² for love brings the forgiveness of sin.³

(2) By the mode of redemption, Christ's merit in His passion being reckoned to the Church, as being one person with its Head.

(3) By the mode of efficacy, inasmuch as Christ's humanity, by which He suffered, was the instrument of His Divinity in expiating sin.

Next (art. 2) we are liberated from the power of the devil—

(1) In so far as man had merited by the fall to be given over into the power of the devil, he is delivered by Christ's passion, as the cause of the remission of sins.

(2) Again it was God, offended by sin, who had given us over into the power of the devil, but by Christ we

¹ Rom. III. 25.

² Rom. v. 8.

³ Lk. VII. 47.

were reconciled to God, and so delivered from the devil's power.

(3) The devil wickedly hindered men from obtaining salvation. But the passion of Christ delivered us from his power, in that he exceeded the measure of power granted him by God, in plotting the death of the innocent Christ ; so that, as Augustine says,¹ it is just that he should set free in return the debtors whom he held.

It is to be observed that in this place, somewhat inconsistently with what he says in qu. 48, art. 4, Thomas retains, at least in its modified Augustinian form, the doctrine of redemption from the devil.

Again (art. 3) we are delivered from the punishment of sin. We are liberated from the obligation to punishment—

(1) Directly by the mode of satisfaction, since, as a sufficient satisfaction has been exhibited, this obligation is removed.

(2) Indirectly, in so far as the passion of Christ is the cause of the remission of sin, in which is founded the obligation to punishment.

Once more (art. 4), by the passion we are reconciled to God—

(1) In so far as it removes sin, which makes us hateful to God.

(2) In so far as it is a most acceptable sacrifice, placating God, so that He forgives the offence of man.

Again (art. 5) it opened the gate of heaven. Sin, both as original and as actual, prevents our entrance to heaven. Christ's passion delivered us by the payment of a price, not only from original sin, both as regards guilt and as regards obligation to punishment, but also from actual sin, if we have communion with His passion by faith and the sacraments of faith. Before

¹ "De Trin." XIII. 14, 18.

the removal of the obstacle of the guilt of original sin, no entrance into heaven was possible.

Finally (art. 6), Christ by His passion merited His own exaltation. If anyone by a righteous will withdraws from himself what he deserves to have, then he merits that more be added to him as the reward of his righteous will. Christ, in His passion and in the circumstances accompanying His passion, humbled Himself below His proper dignity: He merited by His passion, therefore, His exaltation in His resurrection, ascension, sitting at the right hand of the Father, and judicial authority.

This concludes the extended discussion of the passion, which is almost entirely concerned with its saving value. The death of Christ, however, which comes next (qu. 50), Thomas treats, like Lombard and Alexander, almost entirely as a historical event. In art. 6, however, he discusses its saving value, and comes to terms with the patristic doctrine, just as Alexander had felt bound to do. What a problem the old doctrine presented to the mediaeval mind, centred as it was on the thought of Christ's satisfaction and merit, comes out very clearly in an argument which Thomas finally rejects. "The passion of Christ wrought our salvation by the mode of merit; but the death of Christ could thus work nothing; for in death the soul, which is the principle of merit, is separated from the body; therefore the death of Christ wrought nothing for our salvation."

Thomas replies, that the death of Christ, as distinguished from His passion, is the cause of our salvation, not by the mode of merit, but only by the mode of efficiency. By Christ's death His flesh was separated from His soul, but not from His Divinity, by reason of which the flesh of Christ, even as separated from the soul, is of saving virtue for us.

"Now the effect of any cause is properly regarded after the likeness of the cause; wherefore, since death is a certain privation of one's own life, the effect of the death of Christ is looked for in the removal of those things which are opposed to our salvation, which indeed are the death of the soul and the death of the body; and therefore by the death of Christ there is said to be destroyed in us both the death of the soul, which is our sin,¹ and the death of the body, which consists in the separation of the soul."²

This is the same doctrine as that of Gregory of Nyssa.³ Thomas does not, like Alexander, altogether cut himself loose from the patristic doctrine; nevertheless he relegates it to a somewhat out-of-the-way corner of his system.

Passing on from the death of Christ, Thomas says that, in his descent into hell, Christ liberated by virtue of His passion the Holy Fathers,⁴ who were excluded from paradise till the obligation to punishment had been dissolved (qu. 52, art. 6).

Then Thomas comes to the Resurrection of Christ. According to qu. 53, art. 1, it was necessary—

(1) To evince the Divine justice in rewarding His humiliation.

(2) To confirm our faith in the Divinity of Christ.

(3) To elevate our hope, that we too shall be raised like our Head.

(4) To give a pattern for the life of believers.⁵

(5) To fulfil our salvation, that as Christ died to deliver us from evil things, so He might be raised to advance us to good things.⁶

Qu. 56 has for its subject the causality of the re-

¹ Rom. iv. 25.

² 1 Cor. xv. 54.

³ Cat. Magna. 32.

⁴ The saints of the Old Testament.

⁵ Rom. vi. 4.

⁶ *Ibid.* iv. 25.

surrection. In art. 1 Thomas discusses "whether the resurrection of Christ is the cause of the resurrection of bodies". Here the difficulty of carrying through the Greek view as developed by Gregory of Nyssa comes out very clearly. The resurrection is the cause of our resurrection in the sense that it is first in the *genus* of true resurrection, and that in all resurrection the operative principle is the Word of God, who first quickened His own body, and through it quickens ours, in so far as we are first conformed to Christ's sufferings, and so attain to the likeness of His resurrection. The primary cause of resurrection is therefore God Himself, who could bring about our resurrection apart from that of Christ, just as He could save us apart from His passion; nevertheless in the actual way appointed by God, the resurrection of Christ operates as a secondary cause of our resurrection, not indeed as the meritorious cause, but as the exemplary and the efficient cause.

In reply to the objection that no cause can act, except on that with which it is in contact, and that our bodies are separated in space and time from that of Christ, Thomas says:—

"The humanity of Christ, according to which He rose again, is in a certain sense the instrument of His Divinity, and operates in the power of it; and therefore, just as the other things which Christ did or suffered in His humanity, are salutary to us by the virtue of His Divinity, so also the resurrection of Christ is the efficient cause of our resurrection by the Divine virtue, whose property it is to quicken the dead; which virtue by its presence reaches all places and times; and such virtual contact suffices as the ground of this efficiency."

There remains, however, the difficulty that unbelievers and sinners also share in the resurrection, and here there is not even spiritual contact. In answer to this objection,

Thomas says that God operates here in virtue of His justice, whence Christ as man has judicial authority, and thus the efficiency of Christ's resurrection extends not only to the good, but also to the bad, who are the subjects of His judgment. Here then the resurrection of Christ is an efficient but not also an exemplary cause; since there has been no prior conformation to His death.

Thomas has wrestled much more thoroughly than Alexander with the difficulty as to the causality of the resurrection. His fully developed Aristotelianism, with its sense of the real difference of individuals, makes the traditional doctrine very difficult. He has only by somewhat roundabout ways succeeded in justifying the latter. This remark applies, not only to the above statements of art. 1, dealing with the resurrection of bodies, but also to those of art. 2, which is concerned with the resurrection of souls. Thomas says:—

“The resurrection of Christ acts in virtue of His Divinity, which indeed extends itself, not only to the resurrection of bodies, but also to the resurrection of souls; for it is from God that the soul lives by grace, and that the body lives by the soul; and therefore the resurrection of Christ has instrumentally an effective power, not only in regard of the resurrection of bodies, but also in regard of the resurrection of souls; similarly also it possesses the character of exemplarity in regard of the resurrection of souls, because we ought also according to the soul to be conformed to Christ rising again.”

We complete our long study of the doctrine of Thomas on the work of Christ, by a reference to qu. 57, art. 6, which discusses “whether the ascension of Christ is the cause of our salvation”. The answer is that it is so—

(1) With regard to us ; in so far as it gives us ground for faith, hope, love, and adoration.

(2) With regard to Christ Himself : (i) in so far as He has prepared a way for us to heaven, the Head preceding the members of His body ; (ii) in so far as He has entered as our High Priest into heaven to intercede for us ; (iii) in so far as He has been exalted to Divine dignity to give gifts to men.

So much then for the doctrine of Christ's work : we come last of all to the doctrine of the sacraments. According to pars III. qu. 60, art. 2, a sacrament "is a sign of a sacred thing, in so far as it sanctifies men". Art. 3 teaches that a sacrament is of manifold significance. It signifies our salvation, which implies (1) its cause, the passion of Christ ; (2) its form, grace, and the virtues ; (3) its end, life eternal.

According to qu. 61, art. 1, sacraments are necessary for salvation—

(1) Because man is naturally led from the sensible to the spiritual.

(2) Because man by sin has subjected himself to bodily things, and the remedy must therefore be applied where the disease exists.

(3) Because man's natural exercise is bodily, therefore in the sacraments wholesome exercise is given him.

Art. 2 maintains that sacraments were not necessary before the fall, when the soul was subject to God and the body to the soul. For the soul in this state to be perfected through the body, whether in knowledge or in grace, would be contrary to order.

Sacraments were, however, necessary after the fall, man's reason having become darkened by sin (art. 3) ; and were necessary with increase of definition, as sin increased. Saving faith always remaining the same,

the sacraments of the written law were more narrowly defined than those of the state before the law. After the coming of Christ, new sacraments became necessary to distinguish between faith in Christ as coming and in Christ as come (art. 3).

According to qu. 62, art. 1, the sacraments of the new law, not only signify, but also cause grace. God is the primary cause of grace, but the sacraments are an instrumental cause. Each adds (art. 2), beyond the general grace which is the basis of the virtues and gifts, some special determination of grace necessary to the Christian life : so, for example, baptism brings about regeneration, and makes a man a member of Christ.

The sacraments of the new law have their virtue from the passion of Christ (art. 5).

“As was said above (art. 1) a sacrament operates to cause grace by the mode of an instrument ; but an instrument is of two kinds ; one is separate, as a stick ; the other is conjoint, as the hand ; now the separate instrument is moved by means of the conjoint instrument, as a stick by the hand. Now the principal efficient cause of grace is God Himself, compared with whom the humanity of Christ is as a conjoint instrument, while the sacrament is as a separate instrument ; and therefore it is necessary that saving virtue should flow from the Divinity of Christ, through His humanity, into the sacraments. Sacramental grace, however, appears to be ordained for two things particularly, viz. to take away the defects caused by past sins, in so far as they pass away in act and remain in guilt, and again, to perfect the soul in those things which belong to the worship of God, according to the religion of the Christian life. Now it is manifest, from what has been said before, that Christ freed us from our sins, not only effectively, but by way of merit and satisfaction. Similarly by

His passion He originated the rite of the Christian religion, offering Himself as an offering and sacrifice to God.¹ Whence it is manifest that the sacraments of the Church have virtue especially from the passion of Christ, whose virtue is in a certain way united to us by the reception of the sacraments : in sign of which there flowed from the side of Christ, hanging on the cross, water and blood, of which the one belongs to Baptism, the other to the Eucharist, which are the chief sacraments."

Art. 6 proceeds to show why the sacraments of the ancient law, unlike those of the new law, did not confer grace. The virtue of the passion of Christ is united to us by faith and the sacraments. The former mode of union is ideal, the latter external. Now the cause in idea, or final cause, may in time follow the result, not so the external, or efficient, cause. Thus the sacraments could not cause grace before the passion of Christ, but only signified the faith by which we are justified.

In qu. 64, art. 2, Thomas comes to the institution of the Christian sacraments. In general the sacraments may be said to be instituted by God alone, since it is from Him that their virtue proceeds. As regards matters of detail, the things in the sacraments absolutely necessary were instituted by Christ, who is God and man, the rest come through ecclesiastical tradition from the Apostles.

Qu. 65, art. 1, gives reasons why there are just seven sacraments. Five have reference to individual, two to social life ; together the sacraments contribute in all ways to perfect man in the Christian religion, and to remedy the defect of sin. Baptism is spiritual regeneration. Confirmation perfects baptismal grace.

¹ Eph. v. 2.

The Eucharist is spiritual nutriment. Penance restores spiritual health. Extreme unction removes the remains of sin. Ordination gives spiritual power over the multitude. Matrimony secures the multitude.

Art. 4 adds that the sacraments absolutely necessary are baptism and, supposing mortal sin, penance; also ordination, as the foundation of the Church. The rest are relatively necessary, as by way of spiritual assistance.

§ 2. THE PERFECTING OF THE MEDIAEVAL SYNTHESIS

Initiated by Abelard, Hugo, and Lombard, the mediaeval synthesis of the doctrine of the work of Christ is formed by Alexander and perfected by Thomas. The main doctrinal outline remains in Thomas the same as in Alexander; but he tends to approximate the doctrine as much as possible to the Greek doctrine. He does not indeed like Alexander recognize the fitness of the Incarnation apart from sin; but he brings out strongly the activity of the Divine Christ in conferring grace through His humanity as a conjoint instrument and the sacraments as a separate instrument, and he describes the effect of sacramental grace as the deification of man. This is in close agreement with the Greek doctrine of the Incarnation; only that the mediaeval view must needs add that the deification which Christ bestows as God, He purchases as man by His merit. The Greeks found no such complementary idea necessary.

The main advances made by Thomas upon Alexander are as follows:—

(1) He is more thorough in his use of the Scriptural material. As Alexander is here more thorough than the Greeks, so Thomas than Alexander; he is indeed most exhaustive in this respect. Theology in his hands

becomes no mere free construction illustrated from Scripture, but a genuine analysis and synthesis of the Scripture material.

(2) In particular, Thomas has made full use, in his doctrine of the work of Christ, of the details of the Gospel history. Here a line of development, begun by John of Damascus and continuing through Lombard and Alexander, reaches full fruition: the advance made by Thomas on his predecessor is at this point very great.

(3) Thomas is distinguished by the thoroughness of his criticism of the traditional patristic doctrines. Here, however, the advance on Alexander is less marked; still Thomas sums up the progress of criticism from Anselm and Abelard through Lombard and Alexander.

It is desirable to add a word or two on the success of the mediaeval synthesis as completed by Thomas. The amount of detail may easily at first blind us to the greatness of the total scheme. The true analogy of the scholastic system, however, is, as has often been pointed out, the mediaeval cathedral, where immense detail is combined with such strong and noble outlines. It is important to observe that, besides the worth of the general scheme, the wealth of detail in Scripture material and analytic criticism have great value as preparing the way for further developments. Harnack has indeed described the doctrine of Thomas on the work of Christ, in view of the oscillation between different standpoints which it presents without attaining to complete unity, as being *multa, non multum*; ¹ and there is justice in the implied criticism, in so far as the unity of the mediaeval synthesis is still, to a considerable extent, only a unity of aggregation on the basis of

¹ D.G. III.⁴, p. 540.

authority. Nevertheless the basis of all further simplification and consequent development of doctrine must be admitted to lie in the careful collection and analysis of material made by the mediaeval schoolmen, particularly Alexander and Thomas. Nowhere can the real problems of theology be better studied, by anyone who has sufficient patience, than in the mediaeval scholasticism.

CHAPTER VI

THE LATER FRANCISCAN THEOLOGY

§ 1. DUNS SCOTUS

JOHANNES DUNS SCOTUS (d. A.D. 1308) ("Doctor subtilis") is the founder of the later Franciscan school of theology, in distinction from the earlier Franciscan theology of Alexander and Bonaventura and from the Dominican theology of Thomas.

In the theology of Duns the critical element predominates. In the previous scholasticism criticism was mainly directed upon the traditional patristic doctrines, with a view to the substitution of new doctrines in their place. An immanent criticism of these new doctrines, however, begins with Alexander and is greatly increased in Thomas : in Duns Scotus the tide of criticism increases to such a point as practically to make all doctrine appear void of any rational proof other than the reference to the arbitrary sovereign will of God, which has decreed that certain things must be. The principle, already so important in Thomas, of the contingency of the relation of God to the World, becomes the fundamental principle of theology, and all doctrine in consequence is mere matter of authority.

Subject, however, to the Divine decree, the actual place of revealed knowledge in the world-order remains very much the same as in Thomas. On the presupposition that God has ordained that human salvation must take place by way of merit, the Divine revelation

is necessary ; inasmuch as man could not know by reason that eternal beatitude was to be the reward of merit, there being no proportion between the two ; and also inasmuch as he could not know by reason what acts were meritorious and acceptable to God as sufficient for salvation.¹ From the above basis, however, Duns draws a conclusion opposed to that of Thomas,² viz. that theology is wholly a practical, not a theoretical science, inasmuch as it is a science simply directive of practice.³

It is in accordance with the critical character of the theology of Duns Scotus that he wrote no "Summa" ; but that we have from him only two commentaries on the "Sentences," the great "Opus Oxoniense," already referred to, and the shorter "Opus Parisiense". The latter is also called "Reportata," as consisting of notes taken by students from his Paris lectures : the "Opus Oxoniense" received its form from the hand of Duns himself, and is therefore to be regarded as the primary statement of his doctrine.

That this doctrine appears in the form of a commentary on the "Sentences" has an important significance for our estimate of the teaching of Duns on the work of Christ, to which we are now about to proceed. While the work of Duns himself is so largely critical, it is to be remembered that the doctrine of the "Sentences" remains as its basis, and that therefore, where the "Sentences" are not corrected, they are to be regarded as standing. In this way we come to a somewhat more positive view of the ultimate result of the Scotist criticism than would otherwise be possible. We shall later, when we touch on the doctrine of Duns on the

¹ "Comm. in Sent." ("Opus Oxoniense"), ed. by Cavellus. Antwerp, 1620. Prol. qu. 1, 8.

² "Summa," qu. 1, art. 4.

³ "Op. Oxon." Prol. qu. 4.

sacraments, have reason to see that this more positive view is the correct one.

With these cautions, therefore, we proceed to the doctrine of Duns on Christ's work. In "*Opus Oxoniense*," lib. III. Dist. 18, qu. unica, he discusses "whether Christ merited in the first instant of His conception". First of all he lays down a definition of merit, which is fundamental to the whole subsequent procedure.

"I say that merit is something accepted, or to be accepted in another, for which reward is to be bestowed by the acceptor on him in whom it is, as if it were owed to him in return for that merit, or else on some other for whom he merited" (4).

Next the nature of merit is thus more fully explained. "Then with regard to what is before us, speaking of merit, so far as it consists in the good willing of the will, I say that Christ merited for us by such a willing; and I say that the root of all merit consists, speaking strictly of merit, in the love of righteousness of will, not, however, in the love of advantage, nor of the love of righteousness, as it governs the love of advantage. This is clear, because the first object with reference to which anyone in the first place merits is God Himself, according as by the love of righteousness He wishes good to God, as being and well-being, viz. being just and wise, etc.; but the will by the love of advantage has regard to one's own good, and sometimes inordinately, unless it is ruled and governed by the love of justice. Therefore, merit does not consist first of all in the love of righteousness, as it moderates and governs the love of advantage with reference to one's own good: but just as the first demerit of the angels was an inordinate motion and desire of beatitude with regard to God; so merit is a governed motion with reference to God

wishing good to Him, and wishing next, with the due circumstances, union with Him in oneself and in others. And therefore everything loved with the love of advantage, if this is not governed and moderated by the love of justice is a demerit, because it is an immoderate desire for one's own good, or else it is a thing indifferent, if there can be a thing indifferent, of which nothing shall be said now (for perchance there can be in so far as it anticipates the love of righteousness): consequently in the love of advantage, unless it is referred to this ultimate end by the love of righteousness, no merit exists" (5).

The way is now prepared for showing how Christ merited.

"Christ in a certain sense was a pilgrim (*viator*),¹ and was capable of suffering as regards His sensitive nature, and the lower portion of His will:² consequently He had many objects present to His senses and the lower portion of His will, with regard to which He could possess a volition contrary to the love of advantage, which is always for the convenience of him, whose it is: consequently by fasting, watching, prayer, and many other such things He could merit, either by performing such things outwardly or wishing such things inwardly for the sake of God" (*ibid.*).

The objection that Christ was already *in termino* (i.e. in the full enjoyment of beatitude), even as regards the lower portion of His will, Duns sets aside by means of the distinction that this was so as regards impeccability, but not as regards impassibility. But there is a more serious objection.

"Just as in us merit has regard to the intellective

¹ See note 5, p. 160.

² According to IV. Dist. 49, qu. 10, 2, there is a twofold desire in the will, viz. a natural, and a free (or rational).

part, so is it also in Christ ; but in us there is no merit in the inferior portion, unless it has been completely in the superior portion, as is also the case with sin ; consequently neither could Christ merit according to the inferior portion only, unless He merited according to the superior portion " (7).

To this Duns replies : " I say for the sake of argument, that Christ merited according to the superior portion and according to every act of His " (8).

This, however, seems difficult to maintain in view of the accepted doctrine that the blessed do not merit, but enjoy their reward. If Christ could merit even by His beatific vision of God, why should not they ? The answer is that merit depends absolutely upon the Divine acceptance. God could, if He chose, treat the beatific act of Michael or of any other of the blessed in heaven as meritorious ; actually, however, He does not do so, for the reason that the blessed in heaven are altogether removed from the earthly life, which is the proper sphere of merit. " With Christ, however, the case was different ; in a certain respect He was *in statu viatoris*, and therefore every created act of His was accepted, and meritorious, for those for whom it was offered to God " (9).

This distinction helps Duns further to clear and explain his conception of merit. " Just as merit neither has regard to nor consists in the very act called forth alone, but in a way in the conditions of the person or the subject calling it forth ; so the Divine acceptation not only regards the act, but the accidental conditions of the subject calling it forth " (10).

For instance, two persons may beg pardon of a king for a third, and ask equally well : yet one may not be heard, while the other is for some accidental reason, such as that he is the king's friend. So with Christ the fact that He is so far *extra terminum* is a reason why

His beatific act can be accepted as meritorious, in distinction from that of the blessed in heaven.

There is still, however, a further doubt as to whether it is strictly Christ's beatific act, in the enjoyment of the Word in Himself, that is His meritorious act, or rather the same act as it extends to other things seen in the Word, as, for instance, when He loved His mother as seen in the Word, or the other elect thus seen, for God's sake and in God, and even His enemies for God's sake. Altogether then there are three ways in which Christ may be conceived to have merited. Duns says : " Let the most pleasing way be chosen " (*ibid.*).

It is clear that in place of the firm connexion of the parts of the doctrine of merit found in Thomas, Duns offers us something much looser. The result remains, Christ merited ; but the manner of His meriting is by no means so simple as it is in Thomas. In the end Christ appears to merit by an act which it is difficult to view as meritorious ; nevertheless accidental circumstances lead God thus to regard it ; and the Divine acceptance after all is the only final standard of merit.

Duns next agrees with the former doctors, that Christ merited from the first instance of His conception ; since He already had perfect grace, and the object of His action, viz. the whole Trinity, was present to His mind, nor was there any hindrance to His act of volition. There follows the question, as to what He merited. He did not merit for Himself the enjoyment of God ; since this was His first act, which could not merit itself. Duns adds, that it would not have been more but less glorious for Christ to have had this union of the soul with God by the way of merit. Did then, as the Master of Sentences declares, Christ merit for

Himself the impassibility of soul and body? To this question Duns replies as follows:—

“It may be said, in pious agreement with the Master, and by way of a pious gloss upon him, that although He did not merit directly the impassibility of both, yet He merited the removal of the obstacle on account of which these glories were immediately not in Him, viz. the termination of the miracle, which prevented the overflowing of glory to the lower portion of His soul and to His body” (15).

The remainder of what Christ merited is treated of in Dist. 19, qu. unica: “Whether Christ merited for us all, grace and glory, and the remission of guilt and punishment”.

Here, first of all, Duns gives five (principal) reasons for the negative answer:—

(1) The merit of Christ may be held to outweigh the reward of human salvation, and thus there is a disparity which makes a connexion between the two impossible.

(2) On the other hand the merit of Christ was a finite good, since it belonged to Him according to His human nature, whereas the sin of others in so far as it was an offence against God was infinite; so that here there appears to be a disparity the opposite way round, which, however, equally with the former makes the supposed connexion invalid.

(3) The third argument is simply a modification of the second, in so far as the infinity of punishment is substituted for the infinity of sin, and the same conclusion is drawn.

(4) The possibility cannot be denied that the posterity of Adam, inheriting original sin, might extend to infinity, and thus an infinite guilt be produced, which again cannot be compensated by a finite merit.

(5) If Christ's merit were sufficient to confer grace upon all, then all would have obtained grace and glory, which is not the case.¹

Yet over against all these things the tradition of the Church voiced by Pope Leo declares that Christ, "just as He found no one free from guilt, so came to redeem all".²

Duns opens the discussion which follows with a reference to the view of Thomas, who recognizes in Christ a merit, infinite as regards its sufficiency for the salvation of all, but limited as regards its efficiency for the salvation of those united to Christ by knowledge and love.³ He also refers to the theory of Anselm, on which the Thomist doctrine as regards sufficiency is founded, viz. that Christ's merit obtains an infinity by reason of the Divine Person Whose it is.⁴ The criticism of Duns on the point of sufficiency is as follows :—

"Against this mode of statement I argue, that those statements, in which it is said that the life of Christ was so excellent that it had a certain infinity, appear to be hyperbolical and are to be so explained, seeing that now we speak of the good volition of Christ, by which He merited, and in view of which God accepted His Person for all as regards sufficiency, as they say : because either the good volition of Christ, by which He merited, was just as much accepted as the Person of the Word ; or if not, consequently it had not an infinite acceptability, so that it could suffice for an infinite number. If the good volition of Christ was just as much accepted as the Person of the Word, then since the Person of the Word is simply infinite, that good volition was accepted as infinite ; but, since God accepts

¹ Mt. xxii. 14.

² "Serm." xxi. 1.

³ Cf. "Summa," III. qu. 48, artt. 2, 6.

⁴ Cf. "Cur Deus Homo," II. 14.

nothing except so far as it has acceptability, consequently that will by reason of its subject had a ground of infinite acceptability; and thus there would be no difference in acceptability between the proper volition of the Word in Himself, and the will of that (i.e. the human) nature in the Word; since as regards what is acceptable there is no greater acceptability: consequently the Word, setting aside the assumed nature, could merit by willing good which is false. And beyond this, it follows that the Trinity could love the volition of the assumed nature as much as the Word Incarnate, which is nonsense, since this is to assume that a creature has as much loveableness as the uncreated, which is false.

"Besides a volition of this kind is no more acceptable to God than it is good: if therefore it was accepted as infinite or for an infinite number, then that will with relation to its subject in the Word was formally infinite:¹ consequently thus the soul of Christ could perfectly enjoy God, or could will with the same regard as the Word with His own will: which is nothing but to assume that the soul was the Word.

"Besides, in itself the principle of that will, taken with every respect to the Word, or to anything else, is finite: consequently both the will was formally finite and limited, and as a consequence was accepted as finite, nor had the Word any causality over that will, which the whole Trinity had not. And if it be granted that the Word has a special influence over that act, yet it does not follow that it is formally infinite and accepted as infinite: because an act thus infinite cannot depend essentially upon any finite causes in completeness, along with an infinite co-operating cause;

¹ I.e. infinite, not merely from some accidental point of view, but in virtue of its form, or intrinsic quality.

so that what is created should have an essential causality over that act and not merely an accidental one, such as the assumed nature might have over the volition of the Word, and the whiteness of a builder over his building. But the assumed nature had an essential, and not merely an accidental, causality over Christ's will, because according to that nature He merited. Consequently let it be granted that the Word acted specially there, otherwise than the Trinity, yet it does not follow that that act has any ground of infinite acceptance, so that it may avail according to sufficiency for the redemption of an infinite number, but just as the merit was finite in itself, so according to commutative justice it received a finite reward: therefore He did not merit according to sufficiency for an infinite number in the Divine acceptance, just as neither was His merit accepted as infinite, being itself finite" (4).

It has seemed best on account of its extreme importance to give this remarkable criticism in the words of Duns himself, difficult, involved, and thorny as the statement is. It marks the growing gap between the Greek doctrine of the Person of Christ and the new mediaeval doctrine of His human merit.

Seeberg¹ says of the doctrine of Duns on the Person of Christ:—

"One may be tempted for a moment so to reproduce the Christology of Duns Scotus, as to conceive of Jesus as a man, who with free will gives Himself to God and is brought by God into a relation of unique communion and absolute dependence, and who possesses in God the truth, which He in detail successively apprehends, and who through His communion with God possesses the power by means of which He immovably,

¹ "Die Theologie des Johannes Duns Scotus," p. 274.

like the blessed in heaven, wills and does the good. This picture would not be absolutely false, yet it would not reproduce the 'doctrine' of Duns, in fact not at all accurately—to put it in modern language—express his feelings. We must not forget that Duns held it possible, that Jesus from the first moment of His conception onwards exercised the moral activity of merit, and that he—in theory at least—in spite of everything, maintained that Christ's human nature was impersonal."

It is, in fact, in the coexistence side by side of two irreconcilable elements in the doctrine of Duns that its irrationality consists—an irrationality which is met by the appeal to authority. On the one hand, Jesus is a Divine Person, clothed with an impersonal human nature; on the other hand, He is a real human will containing a principle of action independent of the Word. It is out of the discrepancy herein involved that the criticism of Duns, above reproduced, develops itself. If—he says in effect—in order to establish the infinity of the merit of Christ, you take Him strictly as a Divine Person, clothed in an impersonal human nature, then there is in Him no merit at all, nor is there any real difference between His action simply as the Word, and as the Word clothed with humanity. If, on the other hand, you take Him as a human will, as is necessary with a view to the reality of merit, then it is difficult to see how this will of His depends on the Word in any way different from its dependence upon the whole Trinity. Or even, if such special dependence be admitted, since the principle of action is finite, finite it must remain. The two points of view stand sharply apart. Duns ultimately, as we shall see, commits himself to the latter.

We come next to the criticism of the distinction

made by Thomas¹ between the sufficiency and the efficiency of Christ's merit, based on the principle that an agent acts in what is disposed to its action and united to the agent. In reply to this position Duns asks, if it means that Christ has not merited for us the first grace, by which we were united to Him. If, however, this be granted, the basis of the distinction is undermined.

Having thus disposed of Anselm and Thomas, Duns proceeds to his own positive statement. Three points are to be considered. First, how Christ merited with regard to efficacy; secondly, how He merited with regard to sufficiency, the words being taken in a fresh sense; thirdly, what He merited.

Duns deals with the first point by outlining the order of the Divine predestination.

"As regards the first point, I say that the Incarnation of Christ was not by way of occasion,² but as the end was seen immediately by God from eternity, so Christ in His human nature, as being nearer to that end, was predestinated before the rest, speaking of the things which are subject to predestination. This, therefore, was the order in the Divine prevision. First God apprehended Himself under the notion of the highest good. In the second act³ He apprehended all other creatures. In the third He predestinated some to glory and grace, and with regard to the rest exercised a negative act by not predestinating them. In the fourth He foresaw that they would fall in Adam. In the fifth He foreordained or foresaw concerning the remedy, how they might be redeemed by the passion of the Son. Thus then Christ in the flesh, just as also all the elect,

¹ Cf. "Summa," III. qu. 48, artt. 2, 6.

² Sc. the occasion of human sin.

³ *Signo* (sc. *beneplaciti*), i.e. manifestation of His good pleasure.

was first foreseen and predestinated to grace and glory, before the passion of Christ was foreseen as a remedy against the fall, just as the doctor first wishes the health of a man, before he ordains the medicine to his healing" (6).

This important argument, in which Duns accepts the position of Rupert of Deutz, that the Incarnation is independent of the fall, leads obviously to the conclusion that, the passion of Christ being subordinate in the Divine purpose to the salvation of the elect, He must have offered it, and the Trinity must have accepted it, for them alone.

We proceed to the second point, viz. the sufficiency of Christ's merit. Here we have first a summary repetition of the argument already given at length as to the finite nature of the merit of Christ. On the other hand, however, "just as everything other than God is therefore good, because it is willed by God, and not conversely: so that merit was just as great a good as it was accepted for" (7). Formally, therefore, Christ's merit was not infinite or acceptable for an infinite number; nevertheless, in view of the circumstance that its subject was the Person of the Word, there was a congruity about its being acceptable for an infinite number. Actually, however, it suffices just for so many and for so much as God willed to accept it for.

As to the third point, Duns teaches as follows: Christ merited for all the first grace, so that our will does not co-operate, except when adults are baptized; and it is the chief point in His merit, that He merits that those, who are not united to Him, should be so. Next, as to penitential grace after a fall into actual sin, although the merit of Christ is here the principal part of the merit required and the total cause of its

condignity, yet there is demanded from the recipient of grace, a *meritum de congruo*, such as contrition and compunction for sin. Finally, Christ entirely merited, without the co-operation of any other, the opening of paradise and the removal of the obstacle in the way of our entrance, whether that obstacle was original sin or anything else. Yet, although the obstacle was removed by the passion of Christ, no one (excepting infants, who consequently have the least degree of glory) actually enters heaven without co-operating and using the first grace, which Christ merited for him.

Such then is the positive statement. We return from it to see how Duns disposes of the original (principal) arguments.

(1) As to the argument that the merit of Christ exceeds its reward:—If it be granted that He merited according to the inferior portion of the soul, then the reward of the saints is greater than any such merit of Christ. If, however, it be maintained (as it has been), that Christ merited according to the superior portion of the soul, then, where a person merits for others, the reward need not necessarily exceed the merit.

(2) As to the difficulty of a finite merit being set over against the infinity of sin:—

(a) Though Christ's merit was formally¹ finite, yet since it joined the elect, by grace and glory, to the infinite God, it could destroy the guilt of sin, or sin itself, which turns man away from the good.

(b) If this is denied, because sin is infinite, the answer is that it is not formally infinite. To maintain this amounts to maintaining a highest evil and a Manichæan God.² If, however, the infinity of sin consists in that it is an offence against God, then this is

¹ See note 1, p. 309.

² Cf. note 3, p. 62.

not a formal or intrinsic infinity. But an act of love to God can possess the same kind of infinity from an extrinsic regard. In fact Duns holds it probable that a saint's ardour of love to God may be great enough to counterbalance his inordinate affection in turning away from Him. Especially is this true of the love of the soul of Christ.

(3) As to the infinite punishment due to mortal sin :—If the will formally remains in that sin, it is true that it must suffer a punishment extensively infinite. This rule, however, depends simply upon the Divine ordination, and God could punish sin differently, and with a finite punishment, if He willed it.

(4) As to the infinite number of Adam's possible posterity, this difficulty has already been met by anticipation in the main discussion. Duns here therefore merely says that Christ's merit, though finite, could avail for an infinite number, if God so willed ; as a matter of fact, however, it avails only for the elect.

(5) As regards the objection, that if Christ's merit had sufficed for all, then all would have been saved, this is easily settled by what has been already said. Christ's passion was offered and accepted, as regards efficacy, for the elect only.

We come now to the last part of the doctrine of Duns on the work of Christ, which is contained in Dist. 20, qu. unica : " Whether it was necessary that the human race should be restored by the passion of Christ ".

Duns deals with this question by subjecting Anselm's " *Cur Deus Homo* " to a most thorough criticism. He reduces Anselm's doctrine to four points :—

(1) That it was necessary man should be redeemed.

(2) That he could not be redeemed without satisfaction.

(3) That satisfaction must be made by the God-man.

(4) That the best way was by the passion of Christ.

Under these four heads Duns summarizes the argument of the "Cur Deus Homo"; and then the criticism begins with the words, "In what Anselm says there appear to be some things doubtful" (7). When, however, Duns has finished, it appears that there is nothing certain.

He takes first the fourth point, and sets against it the familiar authority of Augustine in "De Trin." XIII. 10, 13. He also argues as follows:—There was no necessity that Christ should die to redeem man, except the necessity of consequence. As it is necessary that I move, if I run; so it was necessary that, if God had ordained man's redemption by the passion of Christ, Christ must die. But here the antecedent as well as the consequent is contingent. Anselm's first point of doctrine in fact is not sound. The only necessity of man's redemption is to be found in the Divine predestination.

Then as regards the second point, viz. the necessity of satisfaction, Duns refers to iv. Dist. 15, qu. 1 (7), where he says that as regards the absolute power of God, He could allow even a sinner by mere attrition¹ to merit grace *de congruo*, God transforming His attrition into contrition, and thus enabling him to satisfy for sin. Further, even if Christ had not become incarnate, works of supererogation would have been possible, if God had in this case also bound us only to the decalogue: by such works again satisfaction for sin might have been made. Nevertheless, according to God's power as subject to order,² satisfaction for sin is necessary, and God

¹ See p. 258.

² See p. 229 for Alexander's explanation of the distinction between God's "absolute power" and his "power with order".

has made all further satisfaction depend upon the satisfaction made by Christ in His passion.

With regard to the third point, the central point of Anselm's whole doctrine, Duns says that with all respect to him, his doctrine here also is untrue. It is untrue that no one satisfies for sin, unless he offers to God what is of greater value than the whole creation.

"It was not necessary that the satisfaction for the sin of the first man should formally¹ exceed the whole creation in magnitude and perfection : for it would have sufficed if there had been offered to God a good greater than was the evil of that man's sin. Wherefore, if Adam, by grace given him and charity, had exercised one or many acts of loving God for His own sake, by a greater effort of the free will than was his effort in sinning, such love would have sufficed for the remission of his sin, and satisfaction would have been made : and thus the proposition is false that he must offer to God something greater than all that for which he ought not to have sinned. But just as he ought not to have sinned for the love of the creature as an object capable of love, so in making satisfaction he ought to offer to God, by touching Him in idea through his act, something greater than is the creature, viz. a love reaching out to God for His own sake ; and that love, in its idea, as it is terminated in God, exceeds the love of the creature, just as God exceeds the creature. Wherefore just as he sinned by a love without limit of the less noble object, so he ought to satisfy by a love without limit of the more noble object, and this would have sufficed, at least as regards possibility " (8).

Such an act of love to God, regarded in its idea, i.e. considered with reference to its contemplated end in God, might then have served to make satisfaction for

¹ See again note 1, p. 309.

sin. "Nevertheless that act, by which I am converted to God by love, is not, in its formal aspect, greater than the whole creation, nor even was the created love of Christ, with which He loved God, such" (*ibid.*).

As to Anselm's fourth point, viz. that no one but a man ought to make satisfaction, this again does not appear to be absolutely necessary. One who is not a debtor can make satisfaction for another, just as he can pray for another.

"Wherefore, just as Christ, being an innocent man and not a debtor, made satisfaction, so, if it had pleased God, a good angel could have made satisfaction, offering to God on our behalf, something according to His pleasure, which He might have accepted for all sins : since every created oblation is worth what God accepts it for and no more, as has been said before" (9).

Moreover, a mere man, if he had been miraculously conceived in the same manner as was Christ, and if he had received similar grace, might have made the necessary satisfaction. Nor is Anselm's argument cogent, that in such a case we should have been indebted to him instead of to God. On the contrary, our indebtedness would have been simply to God, he who had made satisfaction being no more than God's instrument, just as our obligation is to God, when the Virgin and the saints have merited on our behalf.

Finally, as regards mere possibility, any man might have made satisfaction for himself, since God might have given him, without any merits at all, the first grace which would enable him to win salvation, just as even now He gives him it, without any merits of his own.

The answer to the original question, "Whether it was necessary that the human race should be restored by the passion of Christ," is therefore as follows:—

Whatever Christ did in reference to our redemption was only necessary by presupposition of the Divine fore-ordination that would have it so.

"Hence we must believe that that Man suffered for righteousness' sake. For He saw the wickednesses of the Jews, which they committed, and how they were affected with inordinate and distorted affection towards their law, nor would they allow men to be cured on the Sabbath, and yet they would draw out a sheep or an ox out of a well on the Sabbath, and do many other similar things. Christ therefore wishing to recall them all from that error by works and words, preferred to die rather than to remain silent, because the truth had then to be spoken to the Jews, and therefore He died for righteousness' sake. As a matter of fact, however, of His grace He ordained¹ His passion, and offered it to the Father for us, and therefore we are much beholden to Him. For since man could have been otherwise redeemed, and yet of His free will He thus redeemed us, we are much beholden to Him, and more than if we had been thus redeemed of a necessity, and could in no other wise have been redeemed. And therefore, as I believe, He did this especially to attract us to a greater love of Himself, and because He wished man to be more fully bound to God: just as if anyone had first created man, and then instructed him in discipline and in holiness, he would be more under obligation to him, than if he had only created him and another had instructed him, and this is congruity not necessity" (10).

If, however, we wish to "save" Anselm, we must say that all his reasons proceed upon the presupposition of the Divine fore-ordination, which ordained that man should thus be redeemed: and thus the argument seems to run, that God by His fore-ordination willed

¹ Or "set in order" (as a sacrifice): Lat. *ordinavit*.

to accept, for the redemption of man, nothing but the death of His Son ; yet there was no absolute necessity in the case. Whence says Ps. cxxx. (7) : " With Him is plenteous redemption ".

What is supremely interesting in this positive statement is that Duns (anticipated indeed at this point by Anselm, " *Cur Deus Homo*," i. 9) first gives a frankly historical view of the cause of the death of Christ. He died to maintain righteousness. Next, however, he accompanies this historical and ethical view of his work with the consideration, that Christ Himself put upon His death the value of a sacrifice to God, Who also accepted it as such. The result is a striking anticipation of the type of theology later developed in the nineteenth century by Ritschl. Moreover, there is another point which is highly noteworthy, viz. that while Duns, as has already been pointed out, most thoroughly carries out the Western anthropological view of the work of Christ, he yet supplies the necessary corrective to the view (here again anticipating Ritschl) by emphasizing the immanence of God in His work. Christ is, in His work, human though it be, simply the instrument of God ; and therefore our ultimate obligation is not to a man, but to God. In this portion of the doctrine of Duns we have then the outline of a view, whose balance and completeness are in every way remarkable, and which in an extraordinary degree anticipates some of the best modern thought. We see that Duns was far more than a mere critic, and had it in him to develop new dogmatic syntheses. That he did not do so to a greater degree than he has done, is due to his inability after all to break away from tradition.

We have now reached the conclusion of the doctrine of Duns as to the work of Christ. As regards the doctrine of the law, his results in general coincide with

those of the previous schoolmen. Men were first under the law of nature : then God added, by way of expansion and elucidation of it, further positive law, first the Mosaic law, and then that of the Gospel. Duns, however, limits the law of nature more than his predecessors do. Not the whole decalogue, but only, strictly speaking, the first two commandments belong to the law of nature. Moreover, he regards the positive law of the Gospel contained in Scripture as being supplemented by apostolic tradition, and also by the present legislation of the Church : all are alike Divine law. We have before noticed that Duns in his doctrine of Scripture and tradition prepares the way for the later doctrine of the Roman Church.¹

The principal points of the doctrine of Duns on sacramental grace are contained in "Opus Oxoniense," iv. Dist. 2, qu. 1 : "Whether the sacraments of the new law have efficacy from the passion of Christ".

The new law, as the perfection of law, has necessarily the most perfect assistances to grace, i.e. the most perfect sacraments.

Moreover, a second proof, that the new law has the most perfect sacraments, is as follows :—

"The most perfect meritorious cause of grace, which the Trinity determined to give to the human race, was Christ, accomplishing His course in this life along with us : now the meritorious cause justly inclines God to grant good to him, for whom such cause merits : moreover, that cause demands more, as manifested, than as promised : therefore in view of the passion of Christ, as manifested and confirmatory of the new law, it was fit that the greatest assistance to grace should be con-

¹ See for the doctrine of Duns on the law in general, Seeberg, "Die Theologie des Johannes Duns Scotus," pp. 484 ff.

ferred on men, for the time that that law was to be observed " (2).

The perfection of the sacraments of the new law, thus assured, is seen to be both intensive and extensive. The former perfection appears in the completeness with which they signify the truth, the latter in the completeness with which they confer grace. Duns reproduces here the doctrine of Lombard and Thomas, showing how the seven sacraments confer the grace necessary at every stage of the life of the individual Christian, and also the grace necessary for the Church as a community.

Next he agrees with Thomas against Alexander, that all the sacraments were instituted by Christ or God. He, moreover, gives a Scripture proof for this, as follows :—Baptism, Mt. xxviii. 19 ; Eucharist, Jn. vi. 22 f. ; Mt. xxvi. 17 f. ; Confirmation, Jn. xx. 22 f. ; Penance, Jn. xx. 23, Mt. xvi. 19 ; Extreme Unction, Mk. vi. 13 ; Matrimony, Mt. xix. 4 f. ; Orders, 1 Cor. xi. 24, Jn. xx. 23. None but God could institute a sacrament, which is a practical sign of God's proper action.

It is then fixed that the sacraments of the new law are the most perfect possible, and that they were instituted by Christ Himself. Hence, says Duns, follows the solution of the question, if we first understand its meaning ; " for, for a sacrament to have efficacy, is for it to have the effect signified regularly accompanying it : therefore it has efficacy from Him from whom it is, that the effect accompanies it " (6).

This concomitance may take place for two reasons, on account of the principal cause which brings it about, or on account of the meritorious cause which merits it.

" And according to this I say that the sacraments of the new law have efficacy from God alone as principal

cause, but have efficacy from Christ suffering, or from the passion of Christ, as meritorious cause" (*ibid.*).

The first point is clear from the fact that God alone instituted the sacraments, because, if He instituted them, their efficacy can be from no lower cause. For the acts signified by the sacraments are proper to God alone, and can have no second cause. Only God alone therefore can determine Himself to the effects signified by the sacraments.

The second point is clear from III. Dist. 19, and may be shortly proved as follows:—

"When man had become an enemy to God through guilt, God determined not to forgive that guilt, nor to give any assistance towards such remission, or towards the obtaining of beatitude, except by means of something offered to Him, which He would accept with more pleasure than that offence was displeasing or disagreeable to Him. Nothing, however, can be found more agreeable to the Trinity than the whole guilt and offence of the human race was displeasing or disagreeable, except there should take place some obedience of a person more beloved, than that whole community which offended through the universal offence had been dear, or ought to be dear, if it had not offended. Such a person so beloved the whole human race could not produce from itself, since it was as a whole God's enemy in one mass of perdition. The Trinity, therefore, determined to give to the human race a person so beloved, and to incline him to the offering of an obedience for that whole race: such a person there is none but Christ, to Whom God gave, not according to measure, the spirit of charity and of grace,¹ and such an obedience is that in which there appears the greatest charity, that is to offer oneself even to death for right-

¹ Jn. III. 34.

eousness' sake : therefore the Trinity granted to man as pilgrim¹ no assistance belonging to salvation, except in virtue of this offering of Christ made on the cross, both by a Person most beloved, and out of the greatest charity. And in this way that passion was the meritorious cause, in regard of meritorious good granted to man as pilgrim " (7).

Duns adds two corollaries. First, it is clear how, in the granting of such remedies necessary to the human race, mercy and truth agree.

"It is a work of the greatest mercy, to grant such remedies to a man who is an enemy : but also it is a mark of the greatest justice, on account of an obedience so pleasing of a Person so beloved, to grant such a remedy to those for whom that Person offered that obedience. It was the greatest mercy in the Person offering, thus to offer Himself for the enemies of the Trinity, Which He supremely loved : but it was also a mark of the greatest justice, both with reference to God and to fallen man : for He would not appear in the greatest degree to love God and His neighbour, unless He were willing to offer that obedience for the sake of so great a common good, viz. the beatitude of man, to which God had fore-ordained him, and had decreed that he should not attain, except through that obedience " (8).

The second corollary is that although the passion of Christ was the meritorious cause of the efficacy of the ancient sacraments, and of the grace granted to the ancient fathers, yet it has a greater efficacy in regard of our sacraments and the grace granted through them, in so far as the obedience of Christ has greater acceptance as manifested, than merely as foreseen.

The above discussion of the efficacy of the sacraments is important in enabling us more adequately to

¹ Note 5, p. 160.

understand Duns' total doctrine of the work of Christ. In the first place, we see that when he is dealing practically with the effect of Christ's passion, he can be much more positive than we might imagine from the extent and incisiveness of his criticism.

It becomes clear that Duns is very much in earnest when in III. Dist. 19 he speaks of "saving" Anselm—only with the omission of his doctrine of the absolute necessity of the work of Christ. Of course this doctrine was the real nerve of Anselm's theory; but in wishing to destroy it, Duns was one with Alexander and Thomas.

The discussion is also important because of the different attitude towards the grace in the sacraments which we find in Duns, as compared with Thomas. For him, as for Alexander, the grace is not strictly in the sacraments, but they are the sign of it : as he puts it, they are the Divinely appointed sign of its regular concomitance. The sacrament therefore appears less and less to have efficacy in the very nature of things, and to possess it only in virtue of an arbitrary Divine institution.

We may complete our account of the teaching of Duns by a reference to his important criticism of the doctrine of justification. For a succinct account of this I may first most conveniently refer to "*Opus Parisiense*," III. Dist. 18, qu. 2 : "Whether God can remit guilt, that is mortal guilt, without the infusion of grace".

The judgment of Duns is as follows :—

"I say that God can do this by His absolute power, but not by His power with order.¹ The first point is proved, in that it includes no contradiction, that sin should be remitted, and grace not given, because when two certain things have a mean between them, it is not necessary that the transition from one extreme to the

¹ See note 2, p. 316.

other should take place without (a passing through) the mean—nay rather a stay may be made at the mean, as in the case of colours; but between the state of guilt and that of grace a mean is included, viz. that a man should be in a state of mere nature, just as Adam was created without any sin, and without justifying grace (*gratia gratum faciente*); therefore he who is in a state of mortal sin may without any (implied) contradiction be brought back to the same state (as Adam's), because this can be done, and is not inconsistent with the matter in itself, and is not therefore impossible to God.

“The second point is proved, because such procedure does not befit the wisdom, goodness, and justice of God in accordance with the order which He has instituted: because He has decreed, that no one should attain beatitude unless he is clothed with grace like a wedding garment, therefore He clothes every man, to whom He remits mortal guilt, with such a garment. Nevertheless, if He had done otherwise, or wished to do otherwise, it would have been just, simply because it pleased Him; yet according to the order mentioned God cannot remit guilt without the infusion of grace. This is also necessary to man in accordance with the state of fallen nature, because, as it is, man cannot progress in good, nor long keep himself from sin, without the assistance of grace, because such nature is weak on account of sin, although perchance in the state of innocence he might be able to stand, and to keep himself without grace” (G).

In “*Opus Oxoniense*,” iv. Dist. 16, qu. 2, Duns discusses “whether the remission and expulsion of guilt and the infusion of grace are one change simply”.

This question Duns answers in the negative, for four reasons :—

(1) The first can be multiplied while the second remains single. In fact the first is multiple, in so far as God separately forgives each sin committed.

(2) The first can take place without the second, and *vice versa*. God did in fact, without remission of sin, infuse grace into man in the state of innocence and into the good angels. That He can remit sin without infusing grace, is shown as in the argument already given from "Opus Parisiense".

(3) There is no formal repugnance between guilt and grace. For the will of the creature has power to bring guilt into existence, or to avoid so doing; but it has no power over the existence of grace. Hence there can be no necessary relation between guilt and grace.

(4) One change only is reckoned, when it takes place from the corresponding privation to the corresponding quality. But from (1) it is clear that guilt, which may be manifold, cannot be the privation corresponding to the quality of grace.

We are carried still farther into the heart of the view of Duns, when he tells us next that neither are the remission of guilt and the infusion of grace two real changes. The infusion of grace is indeed a real change, since it takes place, from the privation of a real quality, to the existence of it. But the remission of guilt is, not a real, but an ideal change (*mutatio rationis*), by which the sinner passes from the state of being under obligation to punishment, for this is what guilt really is, to the state of being without such obligation (18).

It is clear that this doctrine of Duns is of great importance in regard to the doctrine of justification. The two parts of justification, as traditionally distinguished, from Augustine onwards, viz. the remis-

sion of sins and the infusion of grace,—which Thomas had identified as aspects of one and the same real change,—now appear as logically independent of one another, and merely coexisting by the Divine decree. Moreover, most important of all, the remission of sins, in opposition to the real change of the infusion of grace, is declared to be an ideal change, as indeed guilt itself is ideal and not real. Guilt is in fact a relation in the Divine mind between a certain person and punishment ; so that the remission of guilt is the removal in the Divine mind of this relation.

CHAPTER VII

THE END OF THE MEDIAEVAL THEOLOGY

§ 1. THE NOMINALISTS, OCCAM AND BIEL

THE history of the scholastic theology after Duns Scotus is, in the main, one of dissolution. The greatest schoolman of this period, the Franciscan, William of Occam (d. A.D. 1349), went farther than Duns himself in criticism of the rational proofs of the faith of the Church, resting the support of it more and more upon authority alone. Theology was defined to be, not a proper science, which proceeds from a first principle to necessary conclusions, but simply an aggregative science, i.e. a science improperly so-called, which collects and arranges in order the different independent points of Divine revelation.¹

There were two factors which contributed to this atomistic point of view:—

(1) A nominalistic philosophy was now adopted by Occam instead of the realism which had characterized the previous schoolmen, including Duns. Realism assumed that in the concept the mind touched the essence of the thing represented by it: for nominalism this was not so, but the concept was simply the subjective combination of impressions made by the thing on the human mind. Thus all knowledge was merely an operation with concepts (*termini*), whose accuracy could only be

¹ Cf. Werner, "Die Scholastik des späteren Mittelalters," II. 1883, pp. 46, 47.

verified by the intuition of the senses. Where, as in the case of revelation, the senses failed to give help, there no such verification was possible. Moreover, knowledge as contained in concepts (*termini*) was inevitably also symbolic, especially where no intuitions were forthcoming. Thus all theological knowledge was only an arrangement of symbols, which never touched the heart of reality. It could therefore hardly be expected that the logic which applied to ordinary natural science should apply to this revealed knowledge. Here was one basis of the increased irrationalism of nominalism.¹

(2) Occam adopted from Duns the idea of God as a contingent or arbitrary will, and gave it an even wider scope. He excelled himself in showing, that God could just as well have chosen a thousand other possibilities, instead of the course actually taken by Him. Faith, for example, teaches that God assumed one nature only, viz. the human ; but He might just as easily have assumed the nature of an ass, a stone, or of wood. All the actual arrangements of the order of salvation were purely arbitrary.²

The relation between Thomas, Duns, and Occam is thus forcibly described in the "Manual of Catholic Theology," of J. Wilhelm and Thos. B. Scannell (London, 1890), Vol. I, Introd., p. xxviii: "St. Thomas is strictly organic ; Scotus is less so. St. Thomas, with all his fineness of distinction, does not tear asunder the different tissues, but keeps them in their natural, living connexion ; Scotus, by the dissecting process of his distinctions, loosens the organic connexions of the tissues, without, however, destroying the bond of

¹ Cf. Heim, "Das Gewissheitsproblem," pp. 202-19 ; Hermelink, "Die theologische Fakultät in Tübingen," pp. 96-106.

² Werner, *op. cit.* p. 356 ; Heim, *op. cit.* p. 212.

union, and thereby the life of the loosened parts, as the Nominalists did. In other words, to St. Thomas the universe is a perfect animal organism, wherein all the parts are held together in a most intimate union and relation by the soul; whereas to Scotus it is only a vegetable organism, as he himself expresses it,¹ whose different members spring from a common root, but branch out in different directions; to the Nominalist, however, it is merely a mass of atoms arbitrarily heaped together. These general differences of mode of conception manifest themselves in almost all the particular differences of doctrine."

This striking description is true if we look at the actual theology of Thomas, Duns, and Occam: it is, however, to be remembered that the seeds of the subsequent process of dissolution were sown by Thomas himself, in so far as he made the relation of God to the world essentially contingent.

Occam himself in his great commentary on the "Sentences" deals only with a part of the distinctions of the Third Book. We therefore take our account of the Occamist doctrine of the work of Christ from the Commentary of Occam's disciple Gabriel Biel (d. 1475). The commentary is based chiefly upon Occam himself, where that is possible, and is otherwise known as "*Collectorium ex Occamo in iv libros sententiarum*". Biel, like Occam, in his positive theology generally, though not exclusively, follows Duns: the Occamist criticism also is largely a repetition of that of Duns, but is also developed independently, as there is opportunity, from the standpoint of the Nominalist epistemology.

We may notice first of all how Biel deals with the question, whether Christ would have become incarnate,

¹The passage referred to is quoted by Seeberg, "*Die Theologie des Johannes Duns Scotus*," p. 77.

even if man had not sinned (III. Dist. 2, qu. un., dub. 3). Biel first refers with approval to the opinion of Thomas, not in the "Summa Theologica," but in his commentary on the "Sentences" (III. Dist. 1, qu. 1), that He alone can know the truth on this question, Who was born and was offered, because He willed it. "Wherefore," says Biel, "this question is sufficiently doubtful." Reference is then made to the affirmative answer given by on the one hand Alexander and Scotus, and on the other hand to the negative reply returned by Thomas ("S. Theol." III. qu. 1, art. 3); and in conclusion the matter is clinched with a reference to Bonaventura, as follows: "St. Bonaventura says in book III. Dist. 1 that the first opinion (that the Incarnation would have taken place apart from the Fall) rather follows the decision of reason. The second (that it depended on the Fall) rather agrees with Holy Scripture and the authorities of the saints and the reverence of faith. For wherever mention is made of the descent of God (into this world) in either Testament, there is assigned as its reason the deliverance of the human race."

Biel therefore leaves the point open. It is important, however, to observe that he refutes, on the authority of Occam, the doctrine of Duns which assigns the order of the Divine decrees as a reason for the view that the Incarnation would have taken place apart from the Fall.

"There is no such order in Divine things. But God from all eternity predestinated those whom He chose. He foreknew also those whom He rejected: and at the same time He foresaw merits and demerits, punishments and future rewards: that fiction, therefore, proves nothing."

Though, however, this reason of Duns and others on the same side are not conclusive, neither are those

on the other side. "That problem, therefore, remains indeterminate, equally probable in either direction, till God shall be pleased to reveal the one doctrine, or the other."

As regards the grace of Christ (Dist. 13, qu. unica), Biel holds (art. 1), with Occam, against Duns, that there is no absolute limit to any form or quality, but that its degree can always be infinitely increased. Accordingly he teaches (art. 2, concl. 1) that the soul of Christ had not the highest grace possible according to the absolute power of God; nevertheless (concl. 3), it had the highest possible that could be conferred on a creature according to God's power with order.¹

As regards the grace of union, the habitual grace of Christ, and His grace as Head, Biel holds (dub. 2), that it is a probable opinion that the union itself is really distinct from Christ's habitual grace, while of Christ's grace as Head he says this is the same as His habitual grace, in so far as the latter, in accordance with its fulness, filled the soul of Christ, and is the meritorious cause of our grace, by which He infuses into us the knowledge of God, and the motive principle of love.

We may next notice that Biel lays great stress on the sufferings of Christ (Dist. 15, qu. unica, art. 2, pars 2, concl. 2), viewing them as the means whereby He saved men from the penalties of their sin. He teaches, that Christ experienced grief or pain in every part of His soul, and that this pain was the greatest possible endurable in this life. Biel goes into great detail on this point, and reckons in all the sufferings which Christ endured in His life from infancy onward, till the climax of suffering was reached in Gethsemane and on the cross. Biel constantly describes the sufferings of Christ as penal

See note 2, p. 316.

(*poena Christi*), and assimilates His whole passion in the contrition of the penitent. He says, as follows :—

“Although the outward suffering of Christ was the greatest bodily suffering and extreme pain of sense, yet His inward suffering in the rational part of the soul was greater and was of highest excellence. For it was concerning what He supremely hated, viz. the injury and contempt of His Father through the sins of all men as well past, present, and future. None of the repentant ever had so great contrition and grief for his own sins, as in that hour of satisfaction the Lord had for the sins of each and all. For His contrition assumed for us sufficiently blotted out all sins, and paid the whole penalty owed for them.”

Biel further agrees with Thomas (“Summa,” pars III. qu. 46, art. 6) that since the Lord voluntarily assumed grief for the sake of delivering mankind from sin, therefore the grief assumed was proportionate to the fruit that followed it, viz. the remission of the sins of all men. Although a smaller degree of suffering would have sufficed by reason of the infinity of the Person of the Sufferer, yet Christ wished to save the human race not by power, but by justice.

“Therefore He not only considered how great virtue His suffering would have because of the Divinity united to His humanity ; but He considered how much would suffice according to His human nature for such a satisfaction.”

As regards the merit of Christ, Biel teaches (III. Dist. 18, art. 2, concl. 5) that Christ not only merited in His passion, but, from the very instant of the Incarnation, in His conception.

“Christ in the instant of His conception had all things requisite for merit, viz. a power perfected by the light of glory, as they say, and charity, and the presence

of the Object of merit. Nor was there any hindrance : therefore in that instant He had a clear vision and blessed enjoyment of Divinity. But by His enjoyment He merited, as has just been proved ;¹ therefore the conclusion is true. For He was in that instant of His conception a man perfected with every grace, and virtue, and meritorious operation."

But further (concl. 6) it was the same thing which Christ merited in His passion, and before it in His conception. "The proof is : since in the moment of His conception He merited the redemption of the human race and the glory of His own body, by the obedience in which, obeying the Father, He by an act of will offered Himself, to the honour of the Father, to a death to be endured for the redemption of the human race : therefore He merited by this act, and He merited the very same thing by His passion : therefore the conclusion is true." This doctrine, however, leaves open the doubt as to whether, if Christ merited all at once from His conception, He could merit at all by His passion. Can anyone merit the same thing twice over ? Biel resolves this difficulty (dub. 3) by an appeal to the doctrine of Thomas. The same thing may be merited in different ways.

In Dist. 19, qu. unica, Biel accordingly deals with the merit of Christ in His passion. Here he reproduces mainly the doctrine of Duns, but with some noteworthy modifications and developments.

(Concl. 1.) "Christ sufficiently merited grace and the opening of the kingdom for Adam and his whole posterity. This is proved because the merit of the passion of Christ was sufficient in the Divine acceptance for the remission of all sins, at least of those who believed in

¹ Cf. not. 2, and concl. 2. Charity, the root of merit, has its seat in the superior portion of the soul, while every act of this portion of the soul, as inspired by charity, terminates in God, and is beatific.

Christ, and obeyed the law. And while the truth of this stands as a matter of fact and is in itself contingent, and therefore cannot be sufficiently demonstrated (though plausible arguments may be adduced, whereof the blessed Anselm gathers many in his book 'Cur Deus Homo'), yet the authority of Scripture is an efficacious proof." Biel refers to Lk. xix. 10, 1 Tim. i. 15, Jn. iii. 16, Mt. xx. 28, Rev. i. 5, and adds: "And there are innumerable such passages in Scripture, in which it is testified that He merited eternal rewards for those who are united to Him by faith and the sacraments" (Mk. xvi. 16).

(Concl. 2.) "For those who preceded Him, Christ, by His passion as a sufficient merit, obtained, in so far as it was foreseen, the remission of sins and grace, but in so far as it was exhibited, the opening of the kingdom of heaven and glory." This doctrine Biel proves by the authority of Mt. xxi. 9 on the one hand, and of Ps. lxviii. 18 on the other.

(Concl. 3.) "Although the merit of Christ was in itself simply finite, nevertheless it was accepted as sufficient for an infinite posterity of Adam (if there should be such). The first point is clear from not. 3; since the merit of Christ was an act or a passion of His human nature, and with all the rest of its actions and attributes was a creature, and was in consequence finite. The second point is clear; since Christ's merit was accepted as a sufficient satisfaction and reconciliation for all who obey Him, though they be infinite in number."

(Concl. 4.) "By His passion and death, which He offered to the Father for the restoration of men, He efficaciously merited final grace and glory for the predestinated alone." This is proved by the arguments, that on the one hand only those obtain final grace and glory who obtain them through Christ's passion, and that on the other hand those who obtain these things

are the predestinated alone.¹ On this point Biel repudiates, as previously,² the doctrine of Duns on the order of the Divine decrees. He says:—

“Such priorities are not to be admitted in things Divine, just as neither is there to be admitted a plurality of decreed acts in accordance with the imagination of the Subtle Doctor. For there is but one act in Divine things, indivisible both in fact and in conception (*re et ratione*), which is the Divine Essence itself, by which act in one single cognition that Essence itself foresaw the Incarnation of Christ, the future beatitude of all the elect, and the Fall and Restoration through Christ’s passion. Nor is one thing prior, and another posterior, and therefore there is no such order in things Divine.”

(Concl. 5.) “Although the passion of Christ principally merited salvation for all the sons of Adam, yet there co-operated from time to time the work of those who were to be saved, by way of *meritum de congruo* or *de condigno*.”

“Though the passion of Christ be the principal merit, on account of which is conferred grace, the opening of the kingdom, and glory, yet it is never the only and whole meritorious cause. This is clear: since there always concurs with the merit of Christ some work as *meritum de congruo* or *de condigno* on the part of the recipient of grace or glory, if he were an adult having the use of reason, or of some other on his behalf, if he lacks the use of reason.”

Biel, however, adds that this is this case *de lege communi*: he makes this reservation to allow for those who have been sanctified in the womb, in which case the passion of Christ was the sole and total cause of the sanctification.

¹ Mt. xxv. 34, Rom. viii. 30.

² See p. 332.

This last conclusion is particularly noteworthy, inasmuch as it brings at last to clear statement what of course is the implicit doctrine of all the schoolmen, viz. that the merit of Christ requires to be supplemented by further merit in order to salvation. No one of the great schoolmen had, however, ventured to say roundly like Biel, that the merit of Christ is never the only and whole meritorious cause of salvation.

In connexion with the above doctrine of Dist. 19, qu. un., it is particularly interesting to notice how simply Biel identifies Christ's merit and His satisfaction. "Christ's merit was accepted as a sufficient satisfaction and reconciliation for all who obey Him" (concl. 3). Biel's conception of this satisfaction is further elucidated by the answer which he gives (dub. 2) to the traditional question, how we are delivered from guilt, from punishment, from the power of the devil, and from the bond of the writing of the Divine sentence.

"Although the solution of these points is clear from the foregoing, yet for the sake of a short and summary answer, it is to be noted, that through the sin of the first man, by which God was offended with the whole human race, man fell into a state of guilt or obligation to eternal death; and by means of this fell under the power of the devil, as the executioner inflicting the punishment. Now this obligation, in so far as it binds man to pay the penalty of death, is called the writing of the sentence; because just as a writing is an evidence and assurance of a certain debt, so the bond, by which man is under penalty of death by reason of the Divine decree (since it is certain) is metaphorically called the writing of the sentence.¹ But now by the remission of the debt, which is the sentencing of man to punishment because of sin inherited or committed,

¹ Col. II. 14.

man is freed from guilt, from punishment, from the power of the devil, and from the bond of the writing of the sentence, because by the remission of the debt he is no longer sentenced to punishment, but is received through grace into friendship with God, and thereby has neither guilt nor liability to punishment, and as a consequence is neither under the power of the devil nor under the bond of the writing. Now this remission is made by the passion of Christ, because the Divine wisdom ordained, not to predestinate fallen man to salvation, and therefore, neither to remit his guilt nor his punishment, unless an obedience as acceptable as his guilt was displeasing and unacceptable should be offered by some innocent person: Christ therefore according to His human nature, of His supreme charity voluntarily choosing to die, offered such an obedience to the glory of God; for the human will of Christ proceeding from love so great pleased God more than the sins of all men, not only past, present, and future, but even possible, displeased Him. Therefore on account of a work of Christ so acceptable, which He offered to the Trinity for the reconciliation of man, the Trinity forgave their sins and the guilt of sin to all incorporated in Christ, and ordained anew to glory those formerly ordained to punishment, and thereby delivered them from all the things before mentioned."

With Dist. 20, qu. unica, we come at last to the central problem, "whether the restoration of the human race took place of necessity through the passion of Christ as man".

Here (not. 1) Biel, like Duns, criticizes the reasons of Anselm's "*Cur Deus Homo*," and says that though they are pious and plausible, "yet unless they proceed upon the presupposition of the Divine decree, they prove nothing". They do not, therefore, prove the

necessity, taken strictly, either of redemption or of the mode of redemption. As to the first point, there was no more necessity for redemption than there was for creation. "God could have annihilated, and could still annihilate every rational creature, whether in glory, or in the way of salvation, or under damnation: for just as He contingently created them, so He contingently preserves them." Thus Anselm's argument, that God must lead man on to beatitude, fails. Again, as to the mode of redemption: "sin could have been forgiven without satisfaction by mere non-imputation.¹ For by sin, neither is anything existing in God destroyed, nor is the Divine honour in itself diminished, and so there is nothing that can be restored to God, just as there is nothing that can be taken away from Him. Wherefore the sinner need not remain in guilt, until he make satisfaction, but only till God forgive him the satisfaction which ought to be made; nor, if God were freely to forgive sin without satisfaction, would there be anything out of order in the universe: for the only thing that could be out of order in the universe would be, if anything were to take place or to exist against the will of the Divine good pleasure. For the will of God alone is the rule of all order and justice in the universe."

In the above arguments as to the necessity of redemption and of the mode of it, even more daring conclusions than those of Duns are drawn from the absolute contingency of all temporal things upon the Divine will. But the second argument contains a further most interesting point. We have already seen (p.337) how strongly Biel holds the absolute metaphysical unity of the Divine Being; so that he denies any such plurality or order of the Divine decrees as Duns had

¹ Ps. xxxii. 1.

maintained. Here he turns this same metaphysical doctrine against Anselm's doctrine that sin robs God of His honour and that satisfaction restores it. Anselm, indeed, who shared the same metaphysical doctrine of God, had felt the difficulty Biel points out; but had anticipated it by the distinction:—

“It is clear that God, as far as He is in Himself, can be honoured or dishonoured by no one; but any one, as far as he is in himself, appears to do this, when he subjects his will to God's or withdraws it from His.”¹

Next, Biel comes to the necessity of Christ's satisfaction, it being supposed that satisfaction is the appointed way of redemption. Here he simply repeats the critical reflections of Duns on the natural finitude of Christ's merit, and on the dependence of its enhanced value upon the Divine acceptation.

His final result, then, is that neither the redemption of the human race, nor the mode of it chosen by God was necessary (concl. 1); but that, nevertheless, the mode of redemption through the passion of the Only-Begotten was the fittest of all modes by which the human race could be redeemed (concl. 2). For the proof of its fitness Biel refers to Lombard, Alexander, Bonaventura, and Thomas.

Gottschick² remarks upon the doctrine of Biel on the work of Christ, that there is no need to prove in his case, what rather demanded proof in the case of Duns, that all his critical reflections only play round about the indubitable validity of the tradition derived from Lombard. An interesting proof of this appears in the fact that Biel adds to the “summary answer,” covering the whole ground of the doctrine, previously quoted from Dist. 19, qu. unica, dub. 2, the remark:

¹ “Cur Deus Homo,” i. 15.

² “Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte,” 1903, p. 221.

"these things can be gathered from Anselm (lib. II. 'Cur Deus Homo')". As it was with Alexander, Thomas, and Duns, so it is with Biel. It is not the elements of Anselm's view that are criticized, but only the nexus between them.

Biel's doctrine of the law must next engage our attention. He distinguishes between the law of nature and the Divine law as follows (Dist. 37, qu. unica, not. 1):—

"The Divine law is obtained by revelation. The law of nature is obtained from the natural light of the intellect."

"The Divine law concerning one's neighbour of itself governs man to the end of eternal happiness. The natural law governs him to the human felicity of this life. In the remaining points the natural law and the Divine law agree."

Biel, however, agrees with Duns (concl. 1) that not all the precepts of the decalogue belong to the law of nature in the strict sense, but only the precepts against the worship of strange gods and against irreverence (concl. 2). It is only the precepts strictly belonging to the law of nature that are absolutely indispensable (concl. 4).

In Dist. 40, qu. unica, Biel states the usual scholastic doctrine as to the superiority of the new law of the Gospel to the law of the Old Testament, alike in precepts, in sacraments, and in promises.

We proceed to the doctrine of the sacraments. In iv. Dist. 1, qu. 1, Biel discusses "whether the sacraments of the new law are the effective causes of grace".

Concl. 1 lays it down that "the sacraments of the new law cause the sacramental effect, which by Divine institution they signify and certify".

Biel undertakes to prove this by authority and

reason, having first defined the "sacramental effect" as being justifying grace (*gratia gratum faciens*) in every case but that of the Eucharist, where it is the Real Presence of Christ on the altar. The authorities quoted are Augustine, Bernard, Hugo, and Thomas. The rational proof rests on the point, "that when God instituted the sacraments He determined Himself to produce at the presence of the sacrament, the gracious effect which He would not produce in its absence". Concl. 2 asserts that "the sacraments of the new law are not the cause of grace, by reason of their proper nature as assigned them at the first creation of things". The proof is that the matters of the sacraments had no gracious results before the advent of Christ. Finally (concl. 7) Biel sums up his doctrine as follows:—

"The sacraments are *causae sine qua non* of the sacramental effect. This is clear because they are the causes of the sacramental effect, by the first conclusion, and not the natural causes, or causes by their proper nature, by the second conclusion; therefore they are the *causae sine qua non*. The consequence holds from the sufficiency of the division. Moreover, by the voluntary Divine institution the sacramental effect is not caused without them—it is, however, caused when they are present—therefore they are *causae sine qua non*. The consequence holds from the definition of the term, *causa sine qua non*."

Biel has thus reduced the correspondence between the sacrament and the sacramental effect to the mere *fiat* of the Divine will. It is a good example of the atomizing method of the Nominalist scholasticism, and its tendency to treat all things merely as problems in logic. Nominalism gives up all attempt to understand the thing, but is most careful as to the logical definition of the term corresponding to it.

Biel gives the usual scholastic reasons for the number of the seven sacraments, which he thinks it probable were all instituted by Christ (Dist. 2, qu. 1, not. 1, 2). He follows Duns in the doctrine of how they derive their effect from the passion of Christ (dub. 1).

We come finally to Biel's doctrine of justification, which is given in Dist. 4, qu. 1, with reference to baptism, and Dist. 14, qu. 1, with reference to penance.

Biel teaches (Dist. 4, qu. 1, not. 3) that "grace and sin are not absolutely and in the nature of the thing contrary one to another, and in consequence do not in the nature of the thing expel one another".

This is so, because whether a particular act is sin depends simply upon God's will, and a change in this will would make the act no longer sin, and therefore perfectly consonant with the infusion of grace.

Neither are the terms guilt and grace in themselves logically contradictory, but only when taken connotatively, i.e. in the sense that guilt presupposes the Divine rejection, and the gift of grace the Divine acceptance to eternal life. If, however, grace is taken without further connotation simply for the infused quality, and guilt for the sinful act without the thought of the offended God, then there is no repugnance between them.

The corollary is "that God of His absolute power can remit sin and punishment without the infusion of grace. He can also accept to life eternal and confer the same without grace. . . . But as a matter of fact God, according to His power, as subject to order, can do neither."¹

Further light is cast upon the subject in Dist. 14, qu. 1, where Biel inquires (not. 2), what it is that is

¹ See note 2, p. 316.

destroyed when sin is forgiven. Guilt, or the stain of sin, is nothing but the ordination of the sinner to punishment, or more strictly it is the sinner viewed as ordained to punishment, while the offence of the sinner is, strictly speaking, God viewed as angry and ordaining him to punishment. "The first two are spoken of as being in the sinner by identity, or by predication, not by real inhesion; the third is similarly spoken of as being in God: and they are, therefore, said not to remain, by reason of the forgiveness of sin; for, when sin is forgiven, they no longer stand for the sinner, or for God, and yet nothing is really destroyed or abolished either in the justified sinner, or yet in God."

Finally (not. 4) "in accordance with God's power as subject to order guilt is not remitted; unless at the same time justifying grace (*gratia gratum faciens*) is infused". "And hence it is, that between a sinner, under the obligation of punishment, and a righteous man expecting glory, there is no mean, no more than there is between one in grace and out of grace. And notwithstanding the remission of punishment and the gift of grace are distinct changes, because remission is as it were a change in the nature of loss; because it is the cessation of the obligation and the removal of the punishment. On the other hand the gift of grace is a change in the nature of gain, because the creation of grace is also its infusion."

The result of all this is in the sharpest way to distinguish the two elements united in his conception of justification by Augustine, which Thomas had endeavoured to identify, even more sharply from one another than had been done by Duns. According to Biel the remission of sins and the infusion of grace have no vital connexion, and hang together simply by the Divine *fiat*.

We notice in the above argument the continual stress on the distinction between terms and the things for which they stand, which is fundamental to the epistemologically grounded logic of Occam. This is the instrument by which the Nominalist scholasticism achieves its atomizing effect upon the traditional theology.

“Logic,” says Occam himself, “is the most apt instrument of all the arts, without which no science can be had in perfection.”¹

As to the positive effect which Occam hoped to effect upon theology by his logical criticism it is interesting to read in the same work (III. 1) :—

“Hence it arises that many, not knowing logic, have publicly taught out of the sayings of the saints and the writings of Aristotle new opinions beyond those vocally expressed in Holy Scripture ; and, filling books not a few, have left behind these opinions in their writings.” Here is a programme indicated, which it was given neither to Occam nor Biel to carry out, viz. the simplification of theology by the return from the Fathers and Aristotle to the words of Holy Scripture. Three very different men attempted each in his own way to carry out this programme. They were Erasmus, Luther, and Zwingli.

§ 2. ERASMUS

The Renaissance was in the first place the literary revival of the culture of the ancient Græco-Roman world, in the second place the appropriation of its ideas and ideals. Under both aspects it appears as a movement of opposition to the culture of the Middle Ages and above all to the mediaeval scholasticism. The great representative of the spirit of the Renaissance

¹ “*Summa totius logicæ Ven.*” 1522, I, Preface.

upon the field of theology is Erasmus (d. A.D. 1536). As a humanist, he was repelled by the complication and technicality of the mediaeval schoolmen in contrast with the clarity and ease of the classical authors. As a theologian, he wished to simplify theology by a return to the original literary sources of the Christian religion, viz. the writings of the New Testament. What he saw in them in opposition to the elaborate argumentation of the schoolmen was a simple Christian morality, possessing at once its standard and its attractiveness in the example of Jesus Christ. He did not deny the rights of the scholastic theology in its own domain; but he regarded it as the peculiar function of the monastic theologians, and so unnecessary for simple practical Christians. It is a Christianity for laymen which he propounds, in opposition to a Christianity for clerics. Erasmus calls the essential Christian doctrine, which he derives from the New Testament, the "philosophia Christi". This he holds to be in agreement with the best of ancient philosophy, such as the doctrines of Plato, Cicero, and Seneca. He has, however, no love for Aristotle, the idol of the schoolmen. Outside the New Testament, the truest Christianity is to be found in the ancient Fathers of the Church, such as Origen, Basil, Chrysostom, and Jerome. The Fathers are better interpreters of the New Testament than the schoolmen: the best of all is Origen; Erasmus specially commends him as a safe guide in allegorical exegesis. He demands, however, of the exegete a wide knowledge of many other things besides theology proper. He must know Hebrew, Greek, and Latin, also dialectic, rhetoric, arithmetic, music, physics, history: the knowledge of dialectic alone is insufficient. The above general ideas of Erasmus are developed in his "Paraclesis ad lectorem pium," and his "Ratio

seu compendium veræ theologiæ," prefixed to his New Testament (2nd ed. Basel, 1519). See also "Die religiösen Reformbestrebungen des deutschen Humanismus," by H. Hermelink, 1907, pp. 22-38. The best general statement of the doctrine of Erasmus is in the "Epistola de philosophia evangelica," prefixed to the later editions of the New Testament (see Hermelink, *op. cit.* p. 50, where a large part of it is quoted).

Erasmus begins by pointing out with a reference to Rom. xi. 33, that the "philosophia Christi" has nothing to do with the Divine essence. On the other hand no mystery more belongs to us than the Divine plan for the redemption of man. The problem is to explain what was the special value of Christ's Incarnation and teaching. There is so little in the New Testament which is not anticipated either by the Old Testament or the philosophers.

"I will state my opinion, yet so that each may retain his own, if any has anything nearer the truth. Since the Old Testament was a shadow of and as it were a preparatory training for the gospel philosophy, and since the gospel doctrine is at the same time the establishment and perfection of nature, as it was first created in purity, it should not seem strange if it was given to certain Gentile philosophers by the power of nature to perceive some things which agree with the doctrine of Christ, when according to the witness of Paul those same men were able from the visible framework of the world to gather those things which are comprehended, not by the eyes, but by the mind, even God's eternal power and divinity. What distinguishing mark, therefore, belongs to that Renewer of all things? There are indeed many such marks. In the first place, that whatever commandments or examples of absolute virtue had been partially given by one and another, He

alone both taught and illustrated everything. Nor did He only teach, but He also fixed, inculcated, and by various parables so impressed His doctrine on the minds of all that it could not escape. Moreover, He so illustrated it by behaviour and deeds that His whole life is nothing else than an absolute example of absolute love, modesty, tolerance, clemency, and gentleness. This harmony, this concord of all the virtues, is to be found in none of the saints, save in Christ Jesus alone. Here truly was that Word reduced and brought down to a compend, which at last the Lord manifested upon the earth, in which to recapitulate all things, both in heaven and on earth, that whatever before was sought in so many books and so many saintly lives, might now in compend be derived from Christ alone both far more clearly and more absolutely."

We see that the simplification of Christian theology proposed by Erasmus amounts essentially to the restoration of the Logos doctrine of the Apologists, only that he has learned from the piety of the Middle Ages to lay more stress on the example of the historical Jesus. In the above passage Erasmus reproduces the doctrine of Justin that in Jesus the whole Logos has become incarnate. The phraseology of the last sentence clearly follows Irenæus, whom Erasmus edited in 1526. But the doctrine of recapitulation has not with him the same realistic meaning as with Irenæus. He does not think of the sanctification of humanity in Christ, but of the complete revelation of the Word in Him.

The Logos doctrine of the Apologists was itself the first attempt to simplify Christianity. The Church had, however, found it insufficient and had united with it, first in the classical Greek theology of Irenæus and Athanasius the idea of the deification of humanity by


the Incarnation, then in the Western theology instead of this, the idea of man's redemption by the grace purchased by the satisfaction and merit of Christ. The schoolmen had analysed in minute detail these great conceptions, till the original unities were in danger of being lost in the analysis; and it is no wonder that a desire for simplification should have been expressed even by the analysts themselves. The simplification proposed by Erasmus is, however, inferior to the mediaeval doctrine in that it loses sight of the redemptive aspect of Christianity, which scholasticism amid all its mass of details held firm, and the importance of which Erasmus himself was at times constrained to acknowledge.¹ Was a Christian theology possible, which might avoid the complications of scholasticism, and yet retain at its heart the redemptive element as the central thing in Christianity? We must seek the answer to this question in the theology of Luther and Zwingli.²

¹ Hermelink, *op. cit.* p. 52, n. 13.

² The German mysticism of the fourteenth century, of which the greatest exponent was the Dominican Eckhart (d. A.D. 1327), whose ideas were popularized by Tauler and the "Theologia Germanica," prepared the way for the theology of the Reformation, in so far as there is manifested in it a tendency to the reduction, in the practical interest, of the complexity of scholasticism to a doctrine of salvation as its essence. This doctrine of salvation was, however, completely different from that of the Reformation, inasmuch as it was essentially independent of history. Salvation is through union with Divine Being: the historical Christ is ultimately only an example of the saving process (cf. Loofs, *D.G.*⁴, p. 621 ff.). Eckhart connected his doctrine with the Neoplatonic element in Thomas (*supra*, p. 264). On Luther's relation to the "Theologia Germanica" see Ritschl, "Justification and Reconciliation," I. E.T. p. 105.

PART III

THE OLDER PROTESTANT THEOLOGY



CHAPTER I

THE REFORMERS

§ 1. LUTHER

LUTHER (A.D. 1483-1546), as he is one of the most important figures in the history of theology, is also one of the most difficult to interpret. His importance lies in the enormous significance of his thought, as the principal though not the sole source of Protestantism. The difficulty of interpreting him is due partly to the comparatively unsystematic character of his thought and to his exuberant variety of statement, partly and still more to the fundamental irrationalism which characterizes his doctrine even in its clearest statements, and which becomes almost its hall-mark and distinguishing stamp. This peculiar characteristic of Luther's thought has been finely described by O. Ritschl.¹

"It is the religious intuition, in virtue of which he was in a position, to view and feel the sharpest contradictions as in their final basis yet a unity, to identify extremes one with another, and synoptically to comprehend at least their co-existence in one and the same subject. It is the capacity to achieve the boldest reinterpretations of apparently simple facts and connexions, and yet to present them with the most convinced certainty as self-evident equations. It is the high art of the most daring harmonization, which succeeds

¹ "Dogmengeschichte des Protestantismus," Bd. II. 1, p. 85.
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in making the *contradictio in adjecto* the dominating starting-point of lines of thought, whose logical consequence then is a match for every objection however keenly critical. It is courage and strength for the religious 'nevertheless' in the most perverse form of its expression and application."

O. Ritschl goes on to inquire what was the origin of this irrationalistic type of view, which is the "breath of life of Luther's religious thought, and in a certain degree the *principium individuationis* of his entire theology". He finds it not in any previous Christian theology, but in the Bible itself: it comes from the Psalmist with his convinced "nevertheless,"¹ and from the Second Isaiah, Jesus Himself, and Paul with their paradox of the Cross.²

"But that Luther was in a position to hear in the Biblical tradition just these notes as the over-tones, and to penetrate with them and with the melody that guides them his own proclamation of Christianity, must be recognized as the result of the staggering religious conflicts, which preceded the winning of his conviction of the grace of God. Just as he had found in the latter the deliverance from that conflict, so evermore for him there went indivisibly together the *mortificatio* of a humiliation, which had led his soul through hellish pains to full submission to God's will even though one of damnation, and the *vivificatio*, which in this very experience of an extremest despair had taught him still just only to hope and trust in God's grace" (*ibid.* p. 86).

Besides, however, this positive origin of Luther's irrationalism in Scripture itself, as interpreted to him by his own remarkable experience, we must also re-

¹ Ps. LXXIII. 23.

² Is. LIII. ; Lk. XVI. 15 ; Mk. VIII. 35 ; 1 Cor. I. 23 ; 2 Cor. XII. 9.

cognize at least a negative preparation for it in the Occamist theology, which was the form of scholasticism in which Luther had been nurtured as student and doctor of Christian theology. As Hermelink well says :¹ "From the contradictions of the Occamist theology, and especially of the *Collectorium* of Biel, is to be understood the development of the Reformer". In fact Luther's central and most characteristic idea—the doctrine of justification by faith alone—which again and again he has emphasized as the fundamental doctrine of the Gospel and as containing in itself all other Christian articles, has undoubtedly not only a positive origin in the Pauline gospel as interpreted by Luther's experience, but also a preparation in the critical reflections which we have already studied in Duns and in Biel, on the abstract possibility of God's justifying the sinner by a non-imputation of sin without at the same time infusing charity.

What, then, is this new fundamental doctrine of Luther's? It is by no means easy to give an account of it, for Luther never reduced it to a single point of view. O. Ritschl, in his work above mentioned, says as follows (p. 147) :—

"Luther's reformatory doctrine of justification contains the following ideas, which more or less stand in tension with one another. In the first place it is God, who, out of mercy for Christ's sake, justifies—i.e. holds and declares to be righteous—sinners, if they believe. Secondly, God justifies, in that He gives to the sinner justifying faith. Thirdly, faith justifies, so far as it establishes that relation of the sinner to God, which God by means of His imputation holds for righteousness and allows to avail as such. Fourthly, faith justifies, in that it is the righteousness

¹ "Die theologische Fakultät in Tübingen," 1906, p. 127.

of Christ, entirely alien to sinners, but infused into their hearts, and in so far is the ideal fulfilment of the law. Fifthly, there ever increasingly proceeds from the purity of heart, which thus comes to be in faith, the proper righteousness and fulfilment of the law of believers, which indeed is never perfect in this life, but in spite of the constant element of sin which it contains, is yet pleasing to God, since the latter is not imputed to them."

O. Ritschl says that all these thoughts are found in Luther's writings to the end of his life, but that, as time went on, the imputative view, of righteousness before God, gains ground on the rest, inasmuch as it stands in the sharpest contrast to the idea that man can be just before God in virtue of any act or quality of his own.

Such then is the new ferment, working in Luther's theology, and destined to produce a great revolution in the whole traditional system of doctrine. In order properly to understand Luther's principle of justification, and especially its conflict with the preceding Catholic doctrine, the following further points must be noted:—

(1) Luther reinterpreted the word grace. Grace meant originally for the Greek Church little more than the gift through the Logos of the knowledge of God and of the promise of immortality.¹ Augustine gave it a deeper meaning in so far as he took it to mean on the one hand the forgiveness of sins, on the other, and this was the chief idea, the infusion of charity which makes merit possible. For Luther grace is not a quality of the soul, the *gratia creata* of the schoolmen,² which is charity, but God's free unmerited favour to the sinner shown above all in the forgiveness of sins, which, however, is accompanied by the gift of the Holy Spirit.

¹ Athanasius, "De Incarnatione," III. 3-4.

² *Supra*, p. 252.

(2) Luther also gave a new meaning to faith. From the beginning of the systematic theology of the Church faith had been conceived as in itself belief or acceptance of Christian doctrine, especially as embodied in the articles of the creed. According to Clement and Origen this faith was but a beginning, and in order to become a free principle of virtue needed to be transformed into knowledge. According to Augustine and the schoolmen, on the other hand, belief, in order to become saving faith, needed to be informed by love, the principle of merit. Faith is not in Western Catholicism confidence (*fiducia*). According to Lombard (III. 26, A) such *fiducia* belongs to hope based on merit. Hope apart from merit is presumption. For Luther, on the other hand, faith, though presupposing belief of the articles of the creed,¹ is essentially *fiducia*, confidence or trust in the mercy of God revealed in Jesus Christ.

So much then for Luther's central principle of justification by faith. We have next to try to estimate its reaction upon the complex of doctrine, which we have watched growing up in the Mediaeval Church as the equivalent of the Greek doctrine of the work of Christ. In order that we may do this, I shall make use of three systematic presentations which Luther has given us of practically the whole of Christian doctrine, viz. the Schmalkald Articles (1537), and the Larger and Smaller Catechisms (1529).² The Schmalkald Articles have the advantage of presenting Luther's new conception of Christian doctrine in its antithesis to Romanism. The Catechisms, on the other hand, are not polemical or apologetic, but are positive statements of doctrine :

¹ Larger Catechism, II. 3, 66-69.

² All three works are contained in "Concordia, Libri Symbolici Ecclesiæ Evangelicæ". Berlin, 1857.

these take us into the very heart of Luther's religion. By making use of these three sources, supplemented here and there from other writings of Luther, we may hope to obtain a good general view of his whole Christianity in the form in which he himself conceived it. It is, however, to be observed that Luther was not by nature a systematic theologian but an original religious genius ; and that, even more than is the case with Augustine, his incidental statements constantly exceed the framework of any system even of his own making. This point we shall take further note of with particular reference to the doctrine of the work of Christ.

As regards the proof of his doctrine, Luther, as is well known, appealed to the Scripture alone. The Schmalkald Articles (pars II. art. 2, 15) incidentally contain a peculiarly sharply formulated statement on this point.

"The articles of faith are not to be built up from the words or the deeds of the Fathers. . . . We, on the other hand, have another rule, namely that the Word of God should establish the articles of faith, and none besides, not even an angel."

Luther, however, found nothing contrary to Scripture in the ancient creeds. A. Ritschl¹ has laid great stress on Luther's adherence to the Catholic creeds ; and it is of course true and important that Luther did adhere to the traditional creeds of the Mediaeval Church. In his preface to his treatise, "The Three Symbols or Confessions of the Christian Faith" (viz. the Apostles' and Athanasian Creeds and the *Te Deum*), Luther says :—

"I have *ex abundanti* caused to be published together in German the three symbols or Confessions, which have hitherto been held throughout the whole

¹ "Justification and Reconciliation," I. E.T. p. 126 f.

Church : by this I testify once for all that I adhere to the true Christian Church, which, up to now, has maintained those symbols, but not to that false pretentious Church, which is the worst enemy of the true Church, and has surreptitiously introduced much idolatry alongside of these beautiful Confessions" (*ibid.* p. 130, n. 1).

Luther has, moreover, taken the Apostles' Creed, along with the Ten Commandments and the Lord's Prayer, in his Larger and Smaller Catechisms, as the basis of instruction on Christian faith and morals. He explains this choice by saying : " God Himself has given the Ten Commandments, Christ has ordained and taught the Lord's Prayer, the Holy Spirit has composed and conceived the articles of faith in the shortest and most correct manner ".¹ Luther, however, regarded the Apostles' Creed and the other Confessions merely as a summary of the truth of Scripture, not as an independent authority.²

As regards the interpretation of Scripture, Luther emphasized first of all the necessity of following the literal sense. In controversy with Emser he even said : " The Holy Ghost is the all-simplest writer and speaker that is in heaven or on earth ; therefore His words can have no more than one simplest sense, which we call the Scriptural or literal meaning ".³ But there was a further important principle which Luther made use of, viz. the distinction between the obscure and the clear passages of Scripture, already found, after Augustine, " De Civitate Dei," xi. 19 ; in Duns Scotus, " Reportata," iii. Dist. 24, qu. 1 ; Biel, iii. Dist. 24, qu. un., concl. 6. Luther explains himself on this point in " De Servo Arbitrio," §§ 3, 4. The *things* con-

¹ O. Ritschl, " Dogmengeschichte des Protestantismus," i. p. 274.

² *Ibid.* pp. 274, 275.

³ See Beard, " The Reformation," v. 1907, p. 119.

tained in Scripture, the Incarnation, the Trinity, Christ's Passion and Eternal Reign are all perfectly plain and clear, though individual *passages* may be obscure. Christ is the essential content of Scripture. How these things are Scripture does not say, nor is it necessary to know.

The above clearness is, however, external only ; it requires to be supplemented by internal clearness : " If you speak of the internal clearness, no man sees an iota in the Scriptures, but he that hath the Spirit of God. All have a darkened heart, so that if they know how to speak of and set forth all things in the Scripture, yet they cannot feel them nor know them ; nor do they believe that they are creatures of God, or anything else." ¹ Luther accordingly refused to admit reason as the interpreter of Scripture. ² It is to be observed that he does not, like Thomas or Duns, argue simply from the natural finitude of reason, but rather from its corruption through sin. As we shall presently see, Luther took the Augustinian doctrine of original sin more rigorously and carried out its consequences more ruthlessly than the schoolmen. Luther did not indeed deny a natural knowledge of God ; but this natural knowledge is so poor that it is in fact completest darkness.

The following theses from Luther's Heidelberg disputation ³ (theses propounded by himself to be maintained by one of his pupils under his presidency) show his attitude from his central standpoint of justification by faith towards the system of natural theology, including the doctrine of natural law, as developed by the schoolmen :—

¹ "De Servo Arbitrio," Eng. trans. by H. Cole, 1823, p. 17.

² *Ibid.* §§ 52, 82.

³ "Disputatio Heidelbergæ habita" (1518), contained in Stange, "Die ältesten ethischen Disputationen Luthers," 1904.

"19. He is not worthily called a theologian, who beholds the invisible things of God, through these things that are made. 20. But he is worthily so called who understands the visible and back parts of God,¹ as seen through His Passions and Cross. 22. That wisdom, which beholds the invisible things of God, as understood from His works, altogether puffs up, blinds, and hardens. 23. And the law works the wrath of God and slays, curses, charges with guilt, judges, condemns, whatever is not in Christ. 24. That wisdom is not evil, nor is the law to be avoided, but a man without the theology of the Cross makes the worst use of the best things. 25. He is not just, who works much, but he who without works believes much on Christ."

In a similar "Disputation against the scholastic theology" (A.D. 1517)² Luther deals particularly with the great representative of reason in the Middle Ages, the philosophy of Aristotle. "41. Almost the whole exceedingly bad ethic of Aristotle is hostile to grace. 43. It is an error to say: Without Aristotle a theologian is not made. 44. Rather, a theologian is not made, unless it is done without Aristotle. 50. In brief, the whole of Aristotle is to theology, as darkness to light."

It was particularly the support given by Aristotle to the doctrine of free will and the consequent mitigation of the Augustinian doctrine of original sin to which Luther objected so vehemently; this will more clearly appear when we come to Luther's doctrine of sin.

After these preliminary statements as to Luther's view of reason and revelation, we proceed to study his general theological outlook, following the lines previously indicated.

¹ Cf. Exod. xxxiii. 23.

² Also in Stange, *op. cit.*

In the Schmalkald Articles Luther begins (pars i.) by acknowledging as the highest articles concerning the Divine majesty the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, as stated in the Apostles' and the Athanasian Creed. He says: "Concerning these articles there is no controversy between us and our adversaries, since we on both sides confess them; wherefore it is not necessary that we should now treat at length upon them".

Pars II. deals with the articles which concern the office and work of Jesus Christ and our redemption.

"Here the first and principal article is: that Jesus Christ, our Lord and God, died for our sins, and rose again for our righteousness.¹ And that He alone is the Lamb of God, who taketh away the sins of the world,² and that God hath laid upon Him the iniquities of us all.³ All have sinned, and are justified freely without works or their own merits, by His grace, through the redemption, which is in Christ Jesus, in His blood.⁴

"Since it is necessary to believe this, and it can be acquired and apprehended by no work, law, or merit, it is certain and clear that this faith alone justifies us, as Paul saith.⁵ No religious man may recede from this article or grant or allow anything against it, even though heaven and earth and all things be destroyed together. For there is no other name given to man, whereby we may be saved, saith Peter.⁶ And by His wounds we are healed.⁷ And in this article are set and consist all things, which in our life we teach, testify, and treat of against the Pope, the devil, and the whole world. Wherefore we must be certain of this doctrine, and have no doubt at all of it, even though the Pope, the devil, and all things contrary obtain the right and the victory against us."

¹ Rom. iv. 24.

² Jn. i. 30.

³ Is. LIII. 4.

⁴ Rom. III. 24.

⁵ *Ibid.* III. 18, 26.

⁶ Acts iv. 12.

⁷ Is. LIII. 5.

It is important to notice in this section that Luther states the doctrine of the work of Christ as viewed through the principle of justification by faith. To him the two were not two but one. It is just here that the synthetic character of his doctrine, and its difference from the essentially analytic doctrine of the schoolmen appears most momentarily. Luther did not regard the scholastic doctrine of the work of Christ as in itself amiss, any more than the doctrine of the Incarnation; what he objected to was the practical use made of these doctrines. Gottschick well says: "In relation to Christ's Person and mediatorial work Luther concedes to his opponents that they confess the correct doctrine, and merely contends with them that they should believe it, i.e. take it in practical earnest".¹ What he found especially amiss in Catholicism was that it did not in his view take the work of Christ in sufficient earnest as the sole ground of salvation, but endeavoured to supplement it with a further ground of salvation in human merit. Accordingly pars II. of the Schmalkald Articles contains a polemic against various things in the system of the Roman Church, which to Luther appeared as abuses, in so far as they contradicted the primary article, "which teaches that Christ alone, and not men's works, saves souls" (Art. 2, 12).

How fundamentally Luther agreed with the mediaeval doctrine of the work of Christ, apart from the question of its practical meaning, is shown by his great statement of his own doctrine on the subject in the Larger Catechism (II. 2, 27 f.).

"I believe that Jesus Christ, the true Son of God, has become my Lord. What does this mean: To become my Lord? It signifies that He has delivered me by His

¹ "Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, 1914, Erstes Ergänzungsheft," p. 79.

blood, from sins, the devil, death, and all destruction. . . .

“For when now we had been created by God, and had received from the Father inestimable gifts of every kind, there came the devil, envying our happiness, and drawing us by his devices brought us into open and rebellious disobedience to God, death, and all dangers, so that we lay under His wrath, condemned to perpetual damnation, as we had merited by our guilt. Here there was no longer left any hope of regaining grace, or way of winning salvation, or aid to placate the Father, or way to forgive the sin, till that immortal Son of the immortal Father, pitying in the depth of His kindness our wretched misery and exile, descended from heaven to bring us help, and liberated us from all captivity of sin and death, and the devil, into the freedom of His adoption. Thus then the power of all these tyrants and exactors was dispersed and overthrown, and into their place came Jesus Christ, the author of life and righteousness, salvation, justification, and all goods ; who delivered us poor wretched sinners from the jaws of hell, saved us and guaranteed us liberty ; won the favour and grace of the angry Father by placating His wrath, and took us as His own possession under His care, to rule and govern us through His justice, wisdom, power, life, and beatitude.”

In virtue of all this Christ is “our Lord”. The rest of the articles in the creed concerning Him explain the details and conditions of the above-described redemption. Christ was incarnate and born of the Holy Ghost and the Virgin Mary to be the “Lord of sin”. He suffered, died, and was buried to “satisfy for me and pay my debt (*culpa*), which I had to pay, not with gold or silver, but with His own precious blood”. None of those things did He do for His own sake, but to

become my Lord. Then He rose, ascended, and sits at the right hand of the Father to compel the submission of all the hosts of the devil, till He comes again to redeem us from the evil one.

Luther concludes: "The whole Gospel which we preach tends to the right understanding of this article, as that in which the sum of our whole salvation and eternal happiness is placed, which because of familiarity and because of its far-and-wide-spreading richness we can never thoroughly enough learn".

In this extended statement, one of the completest that we have from Luther on the subject,¹ two things are noteworthy. The first is the close formal resemblance to Biel's "summary answer" to the question: "How we are delivered from guilt, punishment, from the power of the devil, and the obligation of the writing of the sentence" (III. 19, qu. un., dub. 2). The second is the new atmosphere in which the doctrine is viewed, which is especially felt in the religious appreciation of the title, "Our Lord," and the convergence of the whole doctrine upon this point: "all these things, He did for no other reason, than that He might become my Lord". This religious apprehension of the title is practically the same thing as the doctrine of justification by faith: what we have therefore once more is the interpretation of the old doctrine from the new standpoint.

Pars III. of the Schmalkald Articles further unfolds the peculiarity of Luther's doctrine as opposed to Catholicism. In the first place (Art. I.), he insists by way of basis for his new doctrine on a more thoroughgoing adherence to the Augustinian doctrine of original sin. In their anxiety to establish the doctrine of merit, and under the influence of the Aristotelian ethic, the schoolmen had increasingly modified the severity of Augus-

¹ Cf. Th. Harnack, "Luthers Theologie," II. 1886, p. 248.

tinianism, so as to admit in man after the fall some liberty to good. Luther says that original sin is not to be measured by reason but solely by the Scripture. He repudiates, amongst other scholastic doctrines, the famous principle of *meritum congrui*: "That, if a man do what in him lies, God certainly grants him His grace". This and all such monstrosities have arisen from ignorance of sin and Christ our Saviour, and are mere heathen doctrines not to be borne.

There follows in Art. 2, "De Lege," Art. 3, "De Pœnitentiâ," Art. 4, "De Evangelio," Luther's distinction between the law and the Gospel, so important for the understanding of his conception of the Divine revelation and of the relation of his system to Catholicism.

"We deem that the law was given by God, first that sin might be forbidden by threats and fear of punishment, next by the promise and announcement of grace and benefits. But all this has turned out badly because of the evil disposition which sin has wrought in man" (Art. 2, 1).

In fact the law has incensed some against it; and others have been, like the schoolmen, led astray to think that they could keep it in their own strength. Its proper office is, however, to reveal to man original sin and all its fruits.

"In this way he is terrified, hunted, cast down, despairs of himself, and anxiously desires help, nor knows whither to flee; he begins to be angry with God and murmur for impatience" (Rom. iv. 15, v. 20) (*ibid.* 4).

This office of the law continues in the New Testament: it causes passive contrition, which is the torment of conscience, the true suffering of the heart and fear of death (Art. 3, 2). "This is the beginning of true repentance" (*ibid.* 3).

“The New Testament immediately adds to this office (of the law) the consolation and promise of the grace of the Gospel, which we must believe” (Mk. i. 15) (*ibid.* 4).

“When the law alone exercises this its office without the Gospel, nothing but death and hell oppress man, till he altogether despairs” (*ibid.* 7). . . . On the other hand, the Gospel brings consolation and forgiveness, not in one way only, but by the Word, the sacraments, and so on” (*ibid.* 8).

The Gospel teaches us that God is infinitely rich and free in His grace and goodness. “First by the spoken Word, by which it bids the forgiveness of sins be preached in the whole world. And this is the proper office of the Gospel. Secondly by baptism. Thirdly by the reverend sacrament of the altar. Fourthly by the power of the keys, and even by the mutual intercourse and consolation of the brethren” (Mt. xviii. 20) (Art. 4).

The law then contains threats of punishment and promises of grace, which last have no application to man under sin. Its actual principal function is to convict of sin, while the Gospel has as its essence the message of the forgiveness of sins. The sacraments, of which Luther only retains three, viz. baptism, the Eucharist, and penance, gain the meaning of additional ways in which the Gospel is set forth.

We pursue the doctrine of these three sacraments by means of the Schmalkald Articles and the Smaller Catechism. The rest of the seven sacraments of the Mediaeval Church Luther rejects in his treatise, “De Babylonica captivitate ecclesiæ,” as unscriptural.

In the Schmalkald Articles (pars III. 5) Luther defines baptism as the Word of God together with immersion in water according to the Divine institution ;

and refers to Eph. v. 26, also to Augustine's saying : "Accedat verbum ad elementum, et fit sacramentum". He repudiates the Thomist view "that God has granted and implanted a spiritual virtue in the water to wash away sin". Yet he does not agree, on the other hand, with Duns "that in baptism sin is washed away by the assistance of the Divine will, and that this washing is made by the Divine will alone, and by no means by the word". His endeavour seems to be to steer between these two opposing views, or rather to carry back the doctrine of baptism into the more mystical, less analytic, atmosphere which prevailed in the patristic theology.

Much fuller light on Luther's conception of the meaning of the sacrament comes from the Smaller Catechism, where Luther teaches as follows (IV. 6) :—

"Baptism works the forgiveness of sins, delivers from death and the devil, and grants eternal life to all and each, who believe that which the words and the Divine assurances promise."

The promise is Mk. xvi. 16. Luther adds (IV. 10) :—

"It is not the water indeed that does such great things, but the word of God, which is in and with the water, and faith, which believes in the word of God added to the water."

As regards the Eucharist, the Schmalkald Articles (pars III. 6, 1) say : "Concerning the sacrament of the altar we deem that the bread and wine in the Supper are the very body and blood of Christ".

In attempting further to define the Real Presence of Christ in the sacrament Luther rejects transubstantiation, the doctrine of the schoolmen, and adopts as more Scriptural consubstantiation, which Occam and Biel had maintained to be the more rational doctrine, only

that authority taught otherwise. It is notable that at this point Luther does not go back to the mysticism of the patristic theology, but remains a scholastic theologian.

Again, however, the heart of Luther's view comes out in the Smaller Catechism, where he teaches (vi. 6) that the profit of eating and drinking in the Lord's Supper is indicated in the words: "*pro vobis datur et effunditur in remissionem peccatorum*". "Without doubt, through those words there are given to us in the sacrament the remission of sins, life, righteousness, and salvation. For where there is the remission of sins, there is both life and salvation." It is not (vi. 8) the eating and drinking but the words that have these results. "The words are together with the bodily eating the chief and sum of this sacrament. And he who believes these words, has what they say and just as they sound, without doubt, the remission of sins."

Luther's doctrine on Confession we may sufficiently take from the Schmalkald Articles alone. He says (pars III. 8, 1): "Since absolution and the power of the keys is a consolation and assistance against sin and an evil conscience, instituted in the Gospel by Christ Himself, confession and absolution are by no means to be abolished in the Church".

The confession of sins need not, however, be in detail; it is enough to confess oneself in general a miserable sinner (III. 8, 2).

Luther's view is further elucidated, however, by the extended criticism to which he subjects the mediaeval doctrine of penance (III. 3, 10 f.). It is at this point that his new doctrine reaches its sharpest practical divergence from the mediaeval system. Luther's doctrine of justification was primarily his answer to the practical question: How may the Christian, who has received the

forgiveness of sins at his baptism, be secure of the grace of God and of the forgiveness of post-baptismal sin?

In his criticism of the scholastic doctrine of penance Luther first of all complains of its externality, which he says arises from an insufficient doctrine of original sin and of the consequent sinfulness of the heart. The schoolmen limited the things to be repented of to the outward acts which the free will could do or omit. Luther further says that in the scholastic doctrine of penance the remission of sins is made conditional upon the sufficient performance of the three parts of penance, contrition, confession, and satisfaction.¹ "Thus in penance man is led to a trust in his own works" (12). Moreover, since none can know whether his contrition is sufficient, it is taught that a man must at least have an imperfect contrition, or *attrition*, as a substitute for contrition, and that this may suffice.²

"We see, however, how blind reason feels about and staggers in Divine things, and seeks consolation in its own works according to its own opinion, and altogether forgets Christ and faith. But if the essence of the matter is clearly considered, such contrition (i.e. attrition) is factitious, and is a fictitious thought or imagination proceeding from one's own strength without faith and the knowledge of Christ" (18).

In confession, again, none can know whether he has sufficiently confessed all his own sins.

"Here was no faith, no Christ. And the virtue of absolution was not explained to the penitent, but his consolation was in the enumeration of his sins and in his shame" (20).

Still worse is it with satisfaction. There was no certainty as to the necessary amount of satisfaction.

"And yet trust was always put in our work of satis-

¹ *Supra*, p. 226.

² *Ibid.* pp. 258, 316.

faction, and if satisfaction could be perfect, the whole trust would have been cast upon that, nor would there have been need of Christ and faith" (23).

It is the same criticism in every case. Faith in Christ is opposed to trust in one's own works, whether these be works of contrition or of confession or of satisfaction. In pars III. 3, 2, Luther distinguishes true repentance from false, as passive from active. The former is a state of mind, into which we are brought against our will by the law. The latter is a work, which we do with our will according to the law. For Luther repentance was but the reverse side of faith: we must despair of ourselves, in order to cast ourselves upon God in Christ. God casts us down in order to lift us up. In this sense Luther said, in the first of his Wittenberg Theses (1517), that the whole life of believers should be repentance.¹ Just as faith (*fidelia*) is the standing condition of the Christian life, so also is repentance. The whole elaborate machinery of the mediaeval penance, therefore, vanishes. If Luther retained confession, there was, as we have seen, to be no compulsory enumeration of all special sins; and the stress was laid on the absolution, or the assurance to the penitent of Divine mercy (pars III. 8, 2).

Luther has fundamentally altered the conception of all the sacraments, in so much as he makes their common content, not grace in the Catholic sense, but essentially *grace as the remission of sins*, as a gospel to be believed, i.e. trusted, by the troubled conscience. All other benefits flow out of this grace: "Where there is the forgiveness of sins, there is both life and salvation". In comparison with this great change as to the

¹ "Dominus et magister noster Jesus Christus dicendo: *pœnitentiam agite*, etc., omnem vitam fidelium pœnitentiam esse voluit" (see Gieseler's "Ecclesiastical History," E.T., V, p. 227, n. 13).

content of the sacrament, the fact that Luther retains elements of the patristic and even the scholastic theology of the subject is comparatively unimportant: they are counteracted by the telling words, in which the Smaller Catechism interprets the practical working of the sacraments. It is the practical view of the sacraments which sooner or later must determine the metaphysical theory of them: a metaphysic of them, which assumes more than is required by the doctrine of their operation, is destined to extinction by reason of the rule of parsimony of causes. By his doctrine of the gospel of remission as the fundamental content of the sacraments Luther has in essence broken with the sacramentalism of the Catholic Church.

This is true at least of Luther's drift, if not of his actual achievement. What emerges is in reality a fresh principle of interpretation in regard to the New Testament. The Pauline and Johannine doctrines of baptism and the Lord's Supper are in themselves capable of either a sacramentarian or an evangelical interpretation, according as stress is laid on the syncretistic vehicle of thought used by the New Testament writers, or on their new thought itself.¹ The question is essentially one of values; and the fundamental position of Luther consists in the fact that he is emphatically a creator of new values in the interpretation of the New Testament.

The fresh conception of the sacraments naturally corresponds to a fresh conception also of the ministry and the Church. The work of the ministry is to preach and teach and administer the sacraments (understood as Luther understands them).² The Church is the community of believers whose holiness consists in the Word of God and in faith.³

¹ Cf. "Man, Sin, and Salvation," p. 126.

² Schmalkald Articles, pars III. 10.

³ *Ibid.* 12.

After the doctrine of the sacraments, the ministry, and the Church, Luther returns in the Schmalkald Articles (pars III. 13) to the doctrine of justification, which we have already had by implication in the doctrine of the work of Christ (pars II.). Luther's system is thus seen to be a closed system, which returns into itself, the doctrine of justification being at once its beginning and end. This time, however, the doctrine of justification is stated, as is natural after the criticism of the scholastic doctrine of merit, with respect to the doctrine of good works. Luther says:—

“What I have thus far always and assiduously taught concerning justification, I cannot in the least alter, viz. that we by faith, as Peter says,¹ obtain another heart new and clean, and that God reputes us just and holy for the sake of Christ our Mediator. And although sin in the flesh is not yet clean taken away and dead, yet God will not impute that to us or remember it.

“This faith, renewal, and forgiveness of sins, is followed by good works. And what in them is polluted and imperfect, is not regarded as sin and defect, and that again for Christ's sake, and so the whole man, both as regards his person and his works, is, and is called, just and holy of mere grace and mercy, shed, spread, and abounding upon us in Christ. Wherefore we cannot boast of good works, when they are regarded apart from grace and mercy, but, as it is written, ‘He that glorieth let him glory in the Lord,’² that is, that he has a merciful God. Thus all things are well. We say, moreover, that where good works do not follow, there faith is false and not true.”

It may be added that Luther presupposed as the standard of good works the Decalogue, which moreover

¹ Acts xv. 9.

² 1 Cor. i. 31.

he takes to be naturally written upon the heart of man.¹ Moreover, he holds to the doctrine that good works are rewarded by God, but the consequence of reward does not imply the worthiness of merit, "seeing that those who do good, do it not from a servile and necessary principle in order to obtain eternal life, but they seek eternal life, that is, they are in that way in which they shall come unto and find eternal life".²

We see from the passage above quoted on justification and good works,³ that justifying faith involves regeneration, and regeneration has its fruit in good works. Otto Ritschl says:⁴ "Luther uses the expression *justificatio* even in his later writings now and again in so broad a sense that he includes not only the Divine imputation and the faith, in which man obtains a clean heart, but even the renewal of the whole life, beginning and progressing in this faith. In fact Luther speaks of 'duæ partes justificationis' in so far as this is, firstly, 'gratia per Christum revelata,' and, secondly, 'donatio spiritus sancti cum donis suis'."

Just here is perhaps the most fundamental antinomy in Luther's theology. It is faith that justifies and not works, and not even "fides caritate formata";⁵ yet faith that is without works is false faith. Again justifying faith is itself regeneration, yet again regeneration and indeed faith is the work of the Spirit.⁶ All indeed are one, and each depends on the other. Their ultimate unity is synthetic and intuitive. Otto Ritschl rightly points out that it is with these larger implications

¹ Larger Catechism, pars II. art. 3, 67.

² "De Servo Arbitrio," § 71, Eng. trans., p. 177.

³ Schmalkald Articles, pars III. 13.

⁴ "Dogmengeschichte des Protestantismus," II. 1, p. 148.

⁵ "Comm. in Gal." Erlangen ed. I. p. 191.

⁶ *Ibid.* III. p. 156.

that justification is to be understood, when Luther declares that all other articles are included in it.¹

How far, then, has Luther brought about the reduction of theology on a Scriptural basis desiderated by Occam? It is clear that by the principle of justification by faith, the whole elaborate system, built up by the schoolmen on the basis of Augustine in order to reconcile grace and merit, is brought to the ground. The new doctrine, however, which appears in its place is not to be described as simple. It is rather, in agreement with the fundamental irrationalism of which we spoke at the outset, in opposition to the analysis of the schoolmen, synthetic in character, combining within itself diverse elements in the unity of an intuition. This synthetic character comes out very clearly in such sayings as: "These two belong together, faith and God";² "those three things: faith, Christ, acceptation or imputation, must be joined together".³

We shall now, in conclusion, consider the reaction of Luther's doctrine of justification on his teaching as to the work of Christ. As we have seen, the systematic doctrine of this subject in the Schmalkald Articles and the Larger Catechism differs from that of the schoolmen, especially Biel, only in the angle from which it is viewed. In his sermons and exegetical works, however, Luther by no means kept within this comparatively narrow outline; but was led in the interests of his doctrine of justification to present a variety of views on the subject, in which he partly reverted even to the patristic type of doctrine, and partly developed new lines of doctrine.

In the first place I shall refer to a series of passages

¹ "Dogmengeschichte des Protestantismus," II. 1, p. 149.

² Larger Catechism, I. 1, 3.

³ "Comm. in Gal." I. p. 195.

from various works¹ in which Luther foreshadows the future doctrine of Protestant theology, viewing Christ's satisfaction, not like the schoolmen after the analogy of private law as directed to appease God's injured honour, but rather after the analogy of public law as intended to placate His offended righteousness and His violated decree. We have seen that Athanasius, Ambrose, and Hilary all more or less approach this point of view, which moreover appears, though somewhat indefinitely expressed, in various isolated passages in the schoolmen.² Still, on the whole, the idea as developed by Luther has a new precision and coherence. Gottschick (*loc. cit.*) sees in it a natural development from the view of the passion of Christ, as *contritio*, which we found in Biel.³ "With the emphasis on Christ's sufferings as such a way is made for the transition to the quite other thought, which becomes operative in Protestantism after the disappearance of the sacrament of penance and therewith of the condition for the understanding of the (mediaeval) idea of satisfaction—the thought that Christ, though voluntarily, has borne the punishment which God laid on Him as substitute, and which is the judgment of God upon our sins." The change from the mediaeval doctrine of Christ's satisfaction as essentially an active self-oblation to the Protestant view of it as fundamentally a passive endurance certainly runs parallel with the change effected by Luther in the doctrine of contrition, viz. that true contrition is not an active self-humiliation, but a passive sense of the terrors of the

¹ Quoted by Thomasius, "Christi Person und Werk,"² Pt. III, 1862, pp. 284-300.

² Cf. Ritschl, "Justification and Reconciliation," 1. Eng. trans. pp. 197 f.; Seeberg, "Dogmengeschichte,"¹ II. p. 252, n. 2; Gottschick, "Studien zur Versöhnungslehre des Mittelalters," IV., "Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte," 1903, p. 228.

³ III. Dist. 15, qu. un.; art. 2, pars 2, concl. 2.

Divine judgment. But, again, the forensic view of the Atonement has also a natural affinity with the forensic doctrine of justification; it has moreover, at least, one clear Biblical starting-point in Rom. III. 25-26, besides being easily construed from other passages such as Gal. III. 3 and 2 Cor. v. 21. Here, after all, is the most natural explanation of its appearance in Luther's theology.

Perhaps the most striking illustration of this form of theory in Luther's works is a passage from a sermon.¹

"If now indeed out of pure grace our sins are not imputed by God, He has not willed to do this without first His law and His righteousness receiving satisfaction before all things and superabundantly. Such gracious imputation must first be bought and obtained for us from His righteousness. Therefore, since that was impossible to us, He has ordained one for us in our place, who should take upon Himself all punishments, which we had deserved, and fulfil the law for us, and thus turn them from us and reconcile God's wrath."

Of this passage Seeberg says² that it may be taken as a classical presentation of Luther's view of Christ's work as a satisfaction to the Divine righteousness, which he takes to be Luther's fundamental idea as to the work of Christ. He says: "It is plain, how closely the view adheres to the conceptions, law, fulfilment, and punishment. The firm nexus, which is thus reached, presents an advance closely connected with Luther's general view." Whether this view is to be taken as Luther's fundamental idea, is, however, dubious, since we do not find it in any of the systematic presentations of his views already studied: again, it is hardly to be found in his great "Commentary on Galatians". Nevertheless he repeats it frequently. Many other passages illustrating

¹ Thomasius, op. cit. p. 287.

² D.G.¹, II. p. 257, n. 1.

it are quoted by Thomasius. I select the following examples:—

(Another passage from the sermon just referred to): “Christ . . . Who in thy place and for thee has made satisfaction superabundantly to every Divine command and to God’s righteousness” (Thomasius, *op. cit.* p. 287).

(From another sermon) “It could not come about, that God’s wrath, judgment, and all evil things should be removed and all good be won, without satisfaction having to be made to the Divine righteousness, sin having to be paid for, and death having to be overcome in accordance with justice” (*ibid.* p. 286).

We may note that the Thomist idea of a superabundant satisfaction recurs in the first and second above-quoted sermon passages: it is also to be found in “Comm. in Gal.” I. p. 195.

“He could have satisfied for the sins of the world by one least drop of His blood. But now He has satisfied abundantly.”

The remainder of Luther’s ideas on the work of Christ we may illustrate from the “Commentary on Galatians” alone. There is first the use which he makes of the Patristic doctrine of the death of Christ as a redemption from death and the devil. Luther develops along these lines a doctrine of our redemption, from the law, sin, death, the wrath of God, which doctrine he presents in most plastic forms. By including in the series the law and the wrath of God he moreover goes back behind the Fathers and reminds us of the Gnostics.

This Patristic-Gnostic form of doctrine may be illustrated from “Comm. in Gal.” II. pp. 18 f.

The doctrine of the Gospel speaks nothing of the works of the law, but of God’s mercy, Who, seeing that

we were oppressed under the curse of the law and unable to deliver ourselves from it, sent His only Son into the world, and laid upon Him the sins of all men, bidding Him pay and satisfy for them.

"Then comes the law, and says: I find Him a sinner, and such a one indeed as has taken upon Himself the sins of all men, and I see no sin anywhere but in Him, therefore let Him die upon the cross, and so he attacks Him and slays Him. By this means the whole world is purged and cleansed from all sins, and therefore also delivered from death and all evils" (p. 19).

Similarly Christ overcomes sin.

"He, I say, runs upon Christ, and will devour Him, as all others. But he does not see that He is a person of unconquered and eternal righteousness. Therefore in this combat sin must needs be conquered and killed, and righteousness conquer and live" (p. 20).

So again with death and the curse.

"Because life was immortal, even though conquered it came off conqueror, conquering and slaying death" (p. 21).

"So the curse which is the Divine wrath upon the whole world, has the same conflict with the blessing, that is to say with the eternal grace and mercy of God in Christ. The curse therefore fights with the blessing, and would condemn it and altogether bring it to nought, but it cannot do so. For the blessing is Divine and eternal, and therefore the curse must give it place" (*ibid.*).

Finally, here we have salvation (as Irenæus would have said) *in compendio*. As Paul says, Christ spoiled the principalities and powers, and triumphed over them in Himself.¹

"And this circumstance 'in Himself' makes that

¹ Col. ii. 15.

combat more wonderful and glorious. For it shows that it was necessary that these great things should be accomplished in that one only person of Christ (that is, that the curse, sin and death, should be destroyed, and the blessing, righteousness and life, take their place), and that so the whole creation should be transformed through Him. . . . In so far therefore as Christ reigns by His grace in the hearts of the faithful there is no sin, no death, no curse. But where Christ is not known, those things remain " (pp. 21-22).

Luther shows how well he understands the Patristic doctrine by pointing out how its very nerve is in the doctrine of the divinity of Christ.

" For to overcome the sin of the world, death, the curse, and the wrath of God in Himself is not the work of any creature but of the Divine power. Therefore He, who has overcome those things in Himself, must be truly and naturally God " (p. 22).

The divinity of Christ in fact, says Luther, is implied in the fundamental article of justification.

" Wherefore, when we teach that men are justified by Christ, that Christ is the conqueror of sin, death, and the eternal curse, we at the same time witness that He is by nature God " (p. 23).

The above passage is one of the most striking reproductions of the Patristic doctrine by Luther. We may note, however, before we leave this part of our subject, a remarkable passage, in which he (like Irenæus) passes on from the objective salvation of humanity by the Incarnation to its subjective salvation by the spiritual presence of Christ in the heart.¹

" As Christ came once corporally at the time appointed, abrogated the whole law, abolished sin, destroyed death and hell, so He comes to us spiritually

¹ " Comm. in Gal." II. p. 124.

without ceasing and daily quenches and kills these things in us.

“These things I say that thou mayst know how to answer, when the objection is made: Christ came into the world, and once for all took away all our sins, cleansing us by His own blood, what need therefore for us to hear the Gospel, what is the use of absolution and the sacraments? It is true, in so far as thou lookest on Christ, the law and sin are in very fact abolished. But Christ is not yet come to thee, or if He is come, yet there are still in thee the remains of sin, thou art not yet all leavened. For where there is concupiscence, heaviness of spirit, fear of death, etc., there still is the law and sin, and Christ is not yet come, who, when He comes, drives out fear and heaviness, and brings peace and quietness of conscience.”

We pass on to various fresh developments of Luther's (besides the doctrine of the work of Christ as the satisfaction of the Divine justice, already treated of), which he has formed with a view to furnish additional grounds for the doctrine of justification in one or other of its aspects. These in some cases so grow out of older views that it is difficult to say whether they should be classed as old or new.

In a noteworthy passage¹ Luther discusses the humiliation of Christ under the law. This passage again strongly reminds us of the Fathers, in that Luther adopts the argument of Augustine² only with the substitution of the law for the devil, while once more in agreement with the Gnostics he distinguishes the law as a subordinate power from God as the Highest Power.

Christ redeemed us by being made under the law, which held us captive.

¹ “Comm. in Gal.” II. p. 151 f.

² “De Trinitate,” XIII. 14, 18 f.

“What did He? He is the Lord of the law, and therefore the law has no authority over Him, it cannot accuse Him, because He is the Son of God. When, therefore, He was not under the law, of His own accord He subjected Himself to the law. Then the law exercised over Him all the same tyranny, as over us. . . . Finally, by its sentence it condemned Him to death, and that the death of the cross. This is indeed a wonderful combat, in which the law, a creature, thus joins battle with the Creator, and against all right exercises all its tyranny upon the Son of God, which it exercised upon us children of wrath.”

The law, therefore, stands condemned, and loses its right not only over Christ, but over all them that believe in Him. Christ says to them:—

“I could have overcome the law by the highest right, without my hurt, for I am Lord of the law, and it therefore has no right over me. But I have made myself subject to the law for your sake, who were under the law, taking your flesh upon me; that is, I have beyond all need (*per superabundantiam*) condescended to the same poison, tyranny, and bondage of the law, under which you were bound captive; I have allowed the law to lord it over Me, its Lord, to subject Me, as it ought not, to sin, death, and the wrath of God. Therefore, by a double right I have conquered, overthrown, slain the law; first as Son of God, the Lord of the law; then in your person, which is the same as if you yourselves had conquered the law, for my victory is yours.”

Two important points rise out of this passage:—

(1) Through the plastic quasi-Gnostic imagery may be descried the Scotist and Occamist doctrine that God is above all law (*exlex*).

(2) Accordingly, in agreement with the Fathers,

Thomas, Duns, and Biel, Luther here maintains that Christ might have overcome the law, and so redeemed us by His mere power.¹ Actually, however, He redeemed us by submitting to the jurisdiction which the law had over us, and was by it condemned as a sinner.

Luther, however, has further representations of the relation of Christ to the law. In another passage he speaks of Christ's obedience to the law as the condition of our redemption.²

"He was not made a teacher of the law, but a scholar obedient to the law, that by this His obedience He might redeem those that were under the law. . . . Christ, therefore, was related to the law passively, not actively." Luther does his best to refute, or at least to limit, the scholastic doctrine which made Christ a legislator, the second Moses, and the giver of the new law.

"Whereas Christ in the Gospel gives commandments and teaches the law, or rather interprets it, this belongs not to the doctrine of justification but to that of good works. Again it is not the proper office of Christ, for which especially He came into the world, to teach the law, but an accidental office."³

It was in fact an office like His working of miracles and one which He shared with others, who were men. His true and proper office was to overcome the law, which is possible only to God (pp. 156-157).

"Christ is accordingly no Moses, no exactor or legislator, but a giver of grace, saviour, and fount of mercy."⁴

He has in fact abolished for the Christian not only the ceremonial, but also the moral law (I. p. 229), as far as the conscience is concerned (p. 231).

¹ This appears to be Luther's view in general; cf. Seeberg, D.G.¹, II. p. 257, n. 2.

² "Comm. in Gal." II. p. 155.

³ *Ibid.* II. p. 156.

⁴ *Ibid.* I. p. 260.

On the one hand : " Outside of the matter of justification no one can sufficiently magnify the good works commanded by God " (II. p. 100). But on the other hand : " When we are in this concern, we cannot speak basely and hatefully enough of it (the law) " (II. p. 144).

Even the example of Christ belongs to the law, not to the Gospel (II. p. 331). To put on Christ, says Luther, is taken in two ways, according to the law by imitation, according to the Gospel by new birth (II. p. 126). Yet he admits the use of the example of Christ even for a Christian : " When we have put on Christ as the robe of righteousness and our salvation, then we must put on Christ also as the garment of imitation " (II. p. 128). But the example of Christ has nothing to do with justification (I. p. 356).

From these fresh ideas of the work of Christ in relation to the law we turn to corresponding fresh views of it as a revelation of God. Here Luther has developed far beyond anything in Augustine or Abelard the thought of the revelation of God's love in Christ. The point where he transcends these predecessors is the thoroughness with which he carries out this thought in opposition to the view of God as revealed in nature and the moral law. We have already seen this opposition in the early passages quoted from the Heidelberg Theses, and are now to find it again strikingly developed in the " Commentary on Galatians ".

The thought of the revelation of God's love in Christ is the natural immediate presupposition of Luther's view of faith as *fiducia*. If faith and God, and again faith, Christ and imputation, are one, then clearly Christ must be so exhibited in order to justification, as to awaken faith in God. For Luther the Incarnation with the consequent life, death, and resurrection of Christ is above all a revelation of God's love,

in which He is manifested as He is not manifested in nature and reason, through which He appears as a lawgiver.

“As many as know not the article of justification, take away from between Christ the Propitiator, and would apprehend God in His majesty by the judgment of reason and pacify Him by their works” (i. 47).

We are, therefore, in the matter of justification to seek God only in Christ.

“Wherefore when thou wouldst know and treat of thy salvation, setting aside all speculations on the Divine majesty, all thoughts of works, traditions, philosophy, and even the Divine law, run straight to the manger and the mother’s bosom, embrace that babe the little Son of the Virgin, and behold Him being born, sucking, growing up, having conversation among men, teaching, dying, rising again, ascending up above all heavens and having power over all things” (i. p. 50).

But if this is the true revelation of God, the question next arises: How then does the God of the law stand related to the God of the Gospel? One answer is contained in the following passage:—

“God’s nature is to exalt the humble, to feed the hungry, to enlighten the blind, to console the wretched and afflicted, to justify sinners, to quicken the dead, to save the desperate and damned, etc. For He is an almighty Creator, making all things out of nothing. But that most pernicious plague, man’s opinion of his own righteousness, which will not be a sinner, unclean, miserable and damned, but just, holy, etc., prevents God from coming to this His own natural and proper work. Therefore God must use that hammer, to wit the law, to break, beat, pound, and in a word reduce to nothing that beast with its vain confidence, wisdom,

righteousness, power, etc., that at length it may learn that it is lost and damned" (II. p. 70).

The law then is a minister of God which prepares the way for grace and justification; but the use of the law is not God's proper work, which is to show mercy. Luther elsewhere speaks of God's terrifying the conscience by the law as His *opus alienum*.¹ These are thoughts whose results, if worked out, must clearly carry us on to a new conception of God, and so prepare the way for a new understanding of the work of Christ, both synthetic rather than analytic like the doctrine of the schoolmen, and so properly corresponding with Luther's synthetic conception of justification.

The following passages from the "Commentary on Galatians," with their emphasis on the conjunction of contraries in Christianity, and with the suggestion in the last of them that the final reconciliation of the contraries must be through the absorption of one by the other, illustrate the tendency of Luther's thought in such a direction.

"Thus a Christian man is at once righteous and a sinner, a friend and an enemy of God. These contraries no sophists will admit, because they do not hold the true idea of justification" (I. p. 335).

"What can be more contrary, than to fear and dread the wrath of God, and yet to hope in His mercy. The one is hell, the other is heaven, and yet they must be most closely joined together in the heart. In speculation they are easily joined together, but to join them in practice is the hardest thing in the world" (II. p. 108).

"Nothing can be more closely conjoined than fear and faith (*fiducia*), law and gospel, sin and grace. For they are so conjoined that the one is swallowed up of

¹ Is. xxviii. 21. Cf. Köstlin, "Luthers Theologie," II. pp. 55, 64.

the other. Therefore no mathematical conjunction can be assigned that could approach to this " (II. p. 113).

We see that what Luther has in mind is an inner union of opposites, in which they remain no longer external to each other like bodies in mathematical space, but interpenetrate and permeate each other in the way that is the mark of the spiritual life. The scholastic synthesis of speculation, Luther would say, is after all at best an external union; what is wanted is a new synthesis based on experience, which shall be really synthetic. The criticism of Duns and Occam had dis-severed the parts of the scholastic synthesis, till they could no more be rejoined after the manner of Alexander and Thomas. If they were to be rejoined it must be in a new and more intimate way such as Luther suggests, being "so conjoined that the one is swallowed up of the other".

Luther thus suggests a new method of Christian theology, the principle of which is his doctrine of justification by faith with its *coincidentia oppositorum*. Hitherto two methods had prevailed. There was that of the Apologists, Origen and Erasmus, which was to simplify Christianity by reducing it to the Logos doctrine and the doctrine of merit, the Pauline gospel of redemption in all its forms being abandoned. Again there was that of Irenæus and Athanasius, which simply added to the framework of the Apologists an incomplete form of Paulinism, which method of addition was further employed by Alexander and Thomas, who built into the edifice also other Pauline or semi-Pauline elements, viz. Augustine's doctrine of grace, Anselm's theory of satisfaction, and Abelard's doctrine of the revelation of the love of God in the Passion. Luther, however, introducing into the traditional structure his new doctrine of justification by faith, introduces

it not as another block to be built in with the rest, but rather as a solvent, before which some elements of the older theology disappear as alien philosophical accretions not belonging to Christianity, while those that remain begin to be transmuted each into the other, and all into the doctrine of justification by faith.

“Luther,” says Harnack, “has so treated the traditional schemata, that he has found expressed in each of them, rightly understood, the whole doctrine.”¹

It is therefore a new theological method which Luther adumbrates. Christianity is to be neither so simple a thing as it is in the Apologists, nor yet the external union of many parts as with Thomas : on the contrary it is to be a higher form of organism, in which the whole is in every part, and every part is the whole. Whatever also in the traditional doctrine will not conform to the new principle and remains obstinately separate and individual, must be excised as no real part of Christian doctrine.

§ 2. ZWINGLI

Zwingli (A.D. 1484-1531), the father of the Swiss Reformation, who next comes before us, has on the one hand much in common with Erasmus, on the other much also with Luther. To the influence of Erasmus he directly owed the humanistic strain, which characterizes all his theological work, and markedly differentiates it from that of Luther, whose early training was in the Occamist scholasticism. What Zwingli has in common with Luther is his return from the mediaeval theology to the Pauline gospel of justification. Yet even here there was a difference ; Luther was led back to the Pauline gospel above all through his own subjective

¹ D.G.⁴, III. p. 835.

experience, and thus his final apprehension of it centred in the essentially subjective doctrine of justification by faith. Zwingli, who always emphasized his independence of Luther, came to Paul in the first place rather in the spirit of Erasmus than in that of Luther, in so far as his fundamental desire was to go back to the original sources of Christianity, and understand the Divine revelation in the Scriptures.¹ As the result of his search indeed he found in the sources, not a philosophy like Erasmus, but a gospel like Luther: nevertheless the difference of starting-point between him and Luther led him to make central not the subjective experience of justification but the objective gospel itself. No doubt justification and the gospel are only two aspects of the same thing, and the difference between Zwingli and Luther is only one of emphasis. Yet there is a difference, which difference was more accentuated still, when Zwingli in his later theology went back behind the gospel and made the sovereignty of God his fundamental theological principle.

Another difference between Luther and Zwingli lies in the fact that Zwingli was by nature, what Luther never was, viz. a systematic theologian. Throughout his life Zwingli made frequent efforts to formulate his views in more or less systematic form. In so doing, he appealed from his "Schlussreden" (1523) onwards to Scripture as the one true basis of Christian doctrine. Nevertheless, like Luther, he accepted the traditional creeds. The "First Sermon preached at Berne" (1528) is based on the Apostles' Creed: the "Fidei ratio" (1530) refers to the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds.

We shall take our account of the ideas of Zwingli from the "Commentarius de vera et falsa religione" (1525),² which is the completest systematic presentation

¹ See Gieseler, "Ecclesiastical History," E.T., V, p. 301, notes 17, 18.

² "Corpus Reformatorum," Vol. XC, pp. 570 ff.

of the Zwinglian theology. It is noteworthy that Zwingli's humanism leads him to begin (*loc.* 1. Of the word religion) with a philosophy of religion, derived from reflection upon the Ciceronian definition of *religio* from *relegere*.¹ Cicero says: "Such as diligently treated of and, so to speak, recounted (*relegerent*), all that belonged to the worship of the gods, were called religious from this recounting ('*religiosi dicti sunt ex relegendo*')". Zwingli then takes religion as that conception which includes the whole of Christian piety: faith, life, laws, rites, and sacraments. Christianity in fact is the true religion. Opposed to it is false religion or superstition. The superstition, which Zwingli has in mind, is Romanism. A definition of religion, not as before verbal, but material, follows (*loc.* 2. Between whom religion should exist).

"Religion includes two terms (*fines*); one, to Whom religion tends; the other, who by religion tends to Him" (p. 640).

These are God and man: to treat of religion we must then acknowledge God and know man.

What God is (*loc.* 3. Of God) is above human comprehension. The existence of God is, however, manifest to reason. God Himself in fact gave the knowledge of Himself to the heathen.² Those who believe in the one true Almighty God do so by His own inspiration. Since the infinite God is as much above man as man is above a beetle, God cannot be known by means of philosophy. If therefore certain philosophers have taught what was true concerning God, that was of God's doing, in that He scattered the seeds of Divine knowledge among the heathen. Since, however, God has spoken to us through His Son and His Holy Spirit much more clearly than He did to the heathen, we

¹ "De natura deorum," II. 28 (72).

² Rom. I. 19.

must hold to the Divine revelation in the Scripture (*divinis oraculis*).

Man's sin (*loc. 4. Of man*) lay in his self-love. Because of it he is evil by nature. This, however, he only realizes, when he believes. Zwingli, like Luther, attacks the schoolmen for allowing fallen man free will. In man's sinful state the existence of religion (*loc. 3. Of religion*) implies that God recalls errant man to Himself. On man's side religion is piety, adhesion, continual thought how to please God. To trust any other than God is false religion.

Zwingli has already, in his introductory paragraph on the term religion, identified true religion with Christianity. He now, therefore, goes on to this concrete embodiment of religion (*loc. 6. Of the Christian religion*). He insists on the religious unity of God and Christ. All that has been said of union with God is true of union with Christ, who is the God-man. Everything, however, cannot be treated at once, and the knowledge of God naturally precedes the knowledge of Christ.

"Just as grace is only rightly known, when guilt is established by the law, as Paul says,¹ that is, when guilt is known as measured by the law ; so also Christ, Who is the pledge of grace, nay, Who is grace itself, is only rightly taught and known, when we have seen our guilt and learned that through its intervention, the way of ascending to heaven is closed for us. . . . To know Christ rightly we must, therefore, first rightly know ourselves" (p. 675).

"Christ then is the certainty and pledge of the grace of God. This will be clear as follows: We said in our consideration of man, that his condition was so desperate, that he was dead, the slave of sin, and, in a

¹ Rom. vii. 25.

word, of such a nature as to care for none but himself. . . . Whence has arisen a continual despair of coming to God ; for how could he, who amidst daily evils felt himself to be liable to bodily death, and thus separated from God by fear of conscience, hope ever to be numbered among those above ? But God was good, and pitying his work formed a plan to undo such a terrible fate. And as His justice being sacrosanct must needs remain no less untouched and unshaken than His mercy, and man was, while in need of mercy, yet entirely liable (*obnoxius*) to the Divine justice, the Divine goodness found a way, whereby, while justice was satisfied, God's heart of mercy might allowably be freely opened without harm to justice. Not that in this matter He had to take precautions against our enemy, or that the Potter could not of the moistened clay make or refashion a vessel just as He pleased ; but that by His example of justice He might take away hesitation and sloth from us, and show Himself to us as He was, righteous, good, and merciful ; or lest we should say too much of His counsels, because it so pleased Him" (p. 676).

"Since then God is equally just and merciful, though He inclines to mercy (for His mercies excel the rest of His works), nevertheless His justice must be completely satisfied, that His anger may be appeased. That God's justice must be satisfied, theologians, even recent ones, have rightly taught : ' For if thou wouldst enter into life, keep the commandments '.¹ But in what way shall man satisfy the justice of God ? It is so pure, high, and separate from all blemish ; and on the other hand this man of ours is so much nought different from sin and stain, that no one can hope to attain to that measure, which can satisfy the Divine justice" (p. 677).

¹ Mt. XIX. 17.

Zwingli insists that the ecclesiastical satisfactions are insufficient. It is only lack of self-knowledge that prevents the recognition of this.

“At last, therefore, wishing to help our hopeless cause, our Creator sent, to satisfy His justice by sacrificing Himself for us, not an angel, not a man, but His own Son, and Him invested with flesh, that neither His majesty might prevent us from intercourse with Him nor His humility cast us down from hope. For that He is God and the Son of God, who has been sent as our Trustee and Mediator, supports our hope. For what can He not do or has He not, who is God? But that He is man, promises familiarity, friendship, yea necessity and community with us; for what can He deny, who is our brother, who partakes of our infirmity? Unheard of and unexpected as was the event, it was yet intended and ordained from the beginning of human misery. For as God created man by His Son, so by Him also He determined to restore him, when fallen into death, by the Same, that creation and restoration might be of One and the Same” (p. 681).

Christ then is the woman's seed, promised in Gen. III. 15, who should break the serpent's head. In the temptation the devil sought to overcome Him, but Christ won the victory. Having failed here the devil raised the Jews against Him.¹

Zwingli then draws a comparison between the first and the Second Adam. The Pauline name Second Adam shows how Christ restored man by contrary remedies, satisfying the Divine justice.

(1) Adam was placed in a pleasant garden, but was thrust out on his fall.

Christ voluntarily left His equality with the Father to become man, and rule men by His word.

¹ Lk. XXII. 53.

(2) Adam wished to become God, by knowing good and evil. Christ became man to lead us to the knowledge of Him, who alone is good, and alone knows good and evil.

(3) Adam was seduced by his wife to eat of the forbidden fruit. In Christ Deity overcame human weakness.

(4) Adam stretched out his hand to the forbidden tree, to become blessed and wise, in fact Divine (*deus*). Christ stretched out all His members on the shameful cross, that we by His poverty might become blessed, by His folly wise,¹ by his lack Divine (*dii*).

(5) The author of death stretched out his hand to the fatal tree; the Author of life stretched out His hands on the saving tree.

(6) The sweetness of the apple brought death, the bitterness of the cross life.

(7) The guilty Adam hid himself from God: Christ, to save us, bearing our guilt, manifested Himself to the world.

(8) Adam's tree brought bondage, Christ's freedom.

(9) Adam's transgression brought men down to the level of the beasts. Christ's obedience lifted us from the beasts to be sons of God.

(10) Adam's daring closed paradise: Christ's humility opened heaven.

There are besides, the contrasts drawn by Paul in Rom. v. 15-21, which all again show how our disease was cured by contrary remedies, and how the Divine justice was placated for us by the righteousness of Christ alone, Who is our righteousness, as He is our life. The Old Testament also contains many prophecies of Christ's advent, life, and death—some clear, some in type, and allegory.

¹ 1 Cor. i. 18.

Christ, then, at the fitting time became incarnate in the womb of a pure virgin by the fertilizing power of the Holy Spirit alone without the co-operation of the male. There were two reasons why He should be thus born of a virgin: (1) His Divinity could not bear contact with the taint of sin; (2) as a victim He needed to be pure from all stain.

The Virgin, therefore, according to prophecy bore Christ in Bethlehem, and laid Him in a manger. The Divine providence arranged that as Adam by sin had stripped himself, and exposed himself to need, so Christ, Who was to satisfy the Divine justice, should taste want, cold, and all the evils which man has incurred by sin.

“For this was justice, that He, by whom we had all been created, in whom there is no sin, from whom we had departed, should, though innocent, bear those things which we had deserved by sinning, but should bear them for us” (p. 688).

Zwingli illustrates this from the whole life of Christ from manger to cross.

“All of which things we have the more willingly touched upon, that every one who looks may clearly see the righteousness of Christ, which brought a remedy for the wound caused by Adam. For our fixed contention up to now is this argument: that Christ is our righteousness, our innocence, and the price of our redemption. For this He died for us and rose again, that He might declare the mystery of deliverance and confirm our hopes, which, while they see Him dead and not alive again by His own victory, cannot be certified of eternal life beyond this” (p. 691).

Such is Zwingli's account of the Christian religion. He now proceeds to treat of the gospel (*loc.* 7). It is, that sins are forgiven in Christ's name, the most joyful

news ever heard. "In Christ's name" means "by the power or might of Christ". The gospel, however, includes besides forgiveness the duty of repentance. The whole work of redemption would be purposeless, if man were not made better thereby. Christ's blood washes away our sin, but with the condition that we should become new creatures. Zwingli says, in verbal agreement with Luther:¹ "The whole life of the Christian man is repentance. For when is it that we do not sin?" (p. 695). This deeper view of repentance makes the ecclesiastical penance appear as hypocrisy (*loc.* 8). The true knowledge of oneself is incompatible with the idea of being justified by one's own or others' works. True repentance is inward self-examination, which can only end in drawing man to Christ. This process must go on as long as we bear the weight of the body. To sum up the whole situation:—

"All the writings of the Apostles are full of the assertion that the Christian religion is nothing else than a firm hope in God through Christ Jesus, and an innocent life, fashioned after the example of Christ, as far as He Himself grants. . . . That also is plain, that not repentance but hope in Christ washes away sins, and that repentance is watchfulness against falling back into what you have condemned" (p. 705).

Zwingli goes on to discuss the law (*loc.* 9). It is nothing but the eternal will of God. We are concerned not with the civil law, which changes with time and place, nor with the ceremonial law, which is abrogated by Christ, but with the eternal law written on the heart.

"Those, therefore, who merit under the rule of Christ are bound to those things which charity prescribes: what it does not prescribe, or what does not

¹ *Supra*, p. 371, n. 1.

proceed from it, are no commandments or are useless " (p. 708).

The power of the keys (*loc.* 12) is nothing but the Gospel itself. The false religion places the power of the keys in priestly absolution. A better view, still obtaining in the Church of Rome, is that the priest is only the instrument of the Divine absolution. The true view, however, is, that the power of the keys is merely a metaphorical name for the comforting of souls, when by the illumination of the Holy Ghost they understand the mystery of Christ.

The Church (*loc.* 13) is nothing but Christ's people. The sacraments (*loc.* 15)—Zwingli recognizes only Baptism and the Lord's Supper as instituted by Christ—are signs or ceremonies, which assure the Church, not ourselves, of our faith. Faith is a reality, and in it the spirit confides in the death of Christ, and requires no external assurance. Baptism is a symbol pledging us to a life in accordance with the rule of Christ. In the Lord's Supper we joyfully prove our trust in Christ's death and thank Him for our redemption.

The above abstract of the "*Commentarius de vera et falsa religione*," an abstract made of course from our particular point of view, gives Zwingli's doctrine of the work of Christ along with the practical setting, which enables a comparison of it with the Mediaeval doctrine. It will be observed that Zwingli's doctrine of faith and repentance agree essentially with those of Luther. In his doctrine of the law, however, there is none of the quasi-Gnosticism of Luther: on the contrary, the law is the eternal will of God. Accordingly Zwingli lays more stress than Luther on the positive aspect of repentance as life after the example of Christ. But the greatest divergence from Luther is in the doctrine of the sacraments. They are not for Zwingli pledges of

the Divine grace, but signs of association among Christians. We have already found this view in Alexander, "Summa," pars iv. qu. 1, m. 2, art. 2. Taken as it is by Zwingli to the exclusion of all other ideas, it reduces the sacraments to a much more inessential place than they have even in the doctrine of Luther. In modern phraseology we may say that Zwingli assigns to the sacraments only an ethical, not a religious, value. They belong to the sphere of social influence, not to that of the Divine revelation.

As regards Zwingli's doctrine of the work of Christ we note that, while he makes use of the Irenæan motive that creation and redemption must be by one hand, and while he develops ideas like those of Augustine on the contrary correspondence between the sin of Adam and the obedience of Christ, his main doctrine is a modification of the Anselmic doctrine of satisfaction of the same kind as we have already found in Luther. Zwingli in a very thoroughgoing way elaborates the thought of the need of the reconciliation of mercy and justice, and substitutes the Divine justice for the Divine honour as the attribute in God demanding satisfaction. On the other hand he lays great stress on the subjective aspect of the work of Christ, and its connexion with the Gospel: "Christ is the assurance and pledge of the grace of God" (p. 676).

It is to be observed that Zwingli, like Luther, abandons Anselm upon the point of the absolute necessity of satisfaction; the necessity was ultimately that of the Divine decree. God did not need to treat with the devil, and might have refashioned man by His sovereign power. Zwingli even suggests that His ultimate purpose, so far as we can understand it, was that of assuaging conscience. It is true that Zwingli has, except in the "Commentarius," nowhere spoken of

the necessity of satisfaction as less than absolute, or suggested that it was subjective rather than objective.¹ Yet it is to be observed that such views fundamentally agree with his doctrine of God, who is so absolutely infinite, as to be above all reach of man's understanding. On this showing, even though satisfaction be a rational necessity from the human, it need not be from the Divine, point of view.

We ask in conclusion: has Zwingli furnished the simplification of theology on the basis of Scripture demanded by Occam? There can be no doubt that on the one hand his doctrine is more Scriptural than that of Erasmus, whose method of simplifying theology is to leave out the idea of redemption. On the other hand, while Zwingli agrees with Luther in his general apprehension of Scripture truth, his theology is simpler than Luther's, in that he is more systematic and less paradoxical, witness his doctrine of the law. So far then Zwingli may be said to have fulfilled the demand of Occam, as neither Erasmus nor Luther had done. Nevertheless, while Zwingli is undoubtedly superior to Erasmus, because more Scriptural, his advantage over Luther in simplicity is at the expense of a real loss. Luther's paradoxes carry the promise of a final synthesis, completer than that of Zwingli. Luther has inherited the gains of the Scotist and Occamist criticism with its keen eye for the antinomies in Christianity, while Zwingli shows a tendency to return to the Thomist type of theology, which the Nominalist criticism has declared in the end to amount to no more than a unity of aggregation. Such a unity of aggregation is indeed plainly exhibited by Zwingli's doctrine of the work of Christ, which brings together patristic, mediaeval, and

¹ Cf. Ritschl, "Justification and Reconciliation," I. E.T. p. 204.

new evangelical material ; nor, although all is viewed in connexion with the doctrine that Christ is our righteousness, is the synthesis of the different elements with this doctrine so intimate as in the parallels in Luther.

CHAPTER II

THE THEOLOGIANS OF THE REFORMATION

§ 1. MELANCHTHON

WITH Melanchthon (A.D. 1497-1560) we pass from the Reformers themselves to the theologians of the Reformation. Melanchthon, like Zwingli, was a humanist; it was his work to unite the traditions of Erasmus and of Luther. He has great importance for the history of the Reformation itself, in that under the influence of Luther he drew up the "Augsburg Confession" (1530), and also published his great "Apology" for it (1531). In these works, says Loofs,¹ the gospel of the Reformation has obtained a masterly expression. They are actually earlier in time than the documents we have taken for our exposition of Luther.

The importance of Melanchthon for our doctrine, however, lies not in the "Augsburg Confession" or in the "Apology" but in the final edition of his "Loci Theologici" (1559), in which he has developed his own theology more independently of Luther. The first edition of this great work (1521), like the "Confession" and the "Apology," reflected more strictly Luther's ideas. The difference between the earlier and the later theology of Melanchthon is seen especially in the change of attitude with regard to the question of authority and reason. In the first edition he thoroughly shares Luther's irrationalism. Christian doctrine is al-

¹ D.G.⁴, p. 822.
(401)

together different from philosophy and human reason. Plato and Aristotle have been the ruin of theology in the times of the Fathers and the Schoolmen respectively.¹ In the last edition philosophy is, however, at least allowed a usefulness in the explication of theology,² and the general attitude towards reason is more favourable. It goes along with this difference that while in the first edition Melanchthon intentionally devotes attention only to the practical doctrines of the Reformation, in the last he enlarges his view to take in their metaphysical presuppositions, both theological³ and Christological. But this procedure again inevitably brings about a more favourable attitude to ecclesiastical tradition. Thus while in the first edition Melanchthon expresses his purpose as simply to offer a guide to the study of the Scripture, and tells us that the "*Loci Theologici*" grew out of lectures delivered on Romans (op. cit. pp. 56-58), in the last edition he says that his intention is to gather the doctrine of the Catholic Church on things necessary, as it is handed down in the apostolic literature and the received writers of the Church (p. vi). In other words there is an express harking back to ecclesiastical tradition. While Melanchthon originally said, "Besides the canonical Scriptures there are in the Church no genuine writings,"⁴ he later refers not only to the Epistle to the Romans, but to Origen, Cyprian, Augustine, John of Damascus, and Lombard. In a word, in Melanchthon's later theology the old landmarks submerged by the flood of Luther's revolutionary thought begin to reappear.

In order therefore to present Melanchthon not

¹ 1st ed., ed. Kolde, 1900, p. 65.

² Final ed., ed. Detzer, 1827, I. pp. xvi, 4, 5.

³ "Theological" in the strict sense, i.e. belonging to the doctrine of God.

⁴ 1st ed. p. 65.

merely as the interpreter of Luther, but in his own individuality, we take our account of his theology from the final edition of the "Loci". While the first edition is an important monument of the Reformation, the last is the form in which Melanchthon's ideas have worked in history.

The fundamental principle of Melanchthon's theology in all its stages is indeed one.

"There are two parts of Scripture in general, law and Gospel."¹ "The whole of Scripture should be distributed under these two chief titles, the law and the promises."² "These two (the law and the promise of the Gospel) are the chief titles and chief heads of Scripture, to which all other parts can be wisely referred."³

But while the first edition of the "Loci" contains the famous passage, "This it is to know Christ, to know His benefits, not, as they (the Schoolmen) teach, His natures, and the modes of the Incarnation" (p. 63), the last edition returns distinctly to the Scholastic view of the basis of theology. The doctrines of the Trinity and of the Incarnation are introduced as depending on the Scripture and the tradition of the Church (*loc.* I. Of God); while the doctrine of God as Creator has also a rational basis, in that it can be demonstrated from His work in the world (*loc.* II. Of the Creation).

The Son is the Eternal Logos, who has assumed human nature. God has sent Him to be a Redeemer and placate His wrath against sin (I. p. 20). His office also includes the work of teaching according to the command of the Father (p. 34). But Melanchthon does not expand the doctrine of Christ's office, but after a recognition of the Augustinian doctrine of

¹ "Loci," 1st ed. p. 140.

² "Apologia Confessionis," IV. 5.

³ "Loci," last ed. I. p. 172.

original sin (p. 86) proceeds to his central theme of law and gospel (*loc.* VI. Of the Divine law ; *loc.* VII. Of the Gospel).

“The law of God is a doctrine, delivered by God, ordaining, what we are to be and do, and what we should omit, demanding a perfect obedience towards God, and declaring that God is angry and punishes with eternal death those who do not render a perfect obedience” (p. 105).

The law has three species : the Divine law, the law of nature, human law. The Divine laws are those immediately given by God, and are to be found in Moses and the New Testament. The law of nature is a natural knowledge of God and of morals, divinely implanted in the human mind, just as are the principles of numbers. It agrees with that part of the law of God, which is called moral. The law of Moses contained, besides the moral precepts, ceremonial and judicial precepts also. The moral law alone, however, is the eternal and unchanging element in the law. It is summed up in the Decalogue. Altogether the law has three uses : the first is a political use, for the sake of keeping together civil society. Here human law, as based upon the Divine law and the law of nature, has its sphere of operation. The second use of the law is to convince of sin. The third is its use for the regenerate, who are free from the law as regards its curse, but not in so far as it represents the Divine will directing their obedience. The law is so absolute that it admits of no distinction between counsels and precepts. There is one law for all Christians.

The law and the Gospel stand in contrast with each other.

“The law, as was said before, is a doctrine demanding a perfect obedience towards God ; it does not freely

remit sin, it does not pronounce just, that is, accepted with God, except where the law has been satisfied ; and though it has promises, yet these require the condition of the fulfilment of the law. On the other hand the Gospel, though it preaches repentance and good works, yet contains the promise of the benefit of Christ, which is the proper and chief doctrine of the Gospel, and is to be distinguished from the law ; for it freely remits sins, and pronounces us just, even though we do not satisfy the law" (p. 165).

The law, Melanchthon repeats, has promises, but upon condition. But of the Gospel he further says:—

"Quite other is the promise proper to the Gospel. It has not as ground the condition of the law ; it does not promise because of the fulfilment of the law, but freely for Christ's sake. . . . Remission and reconciliation or justification are freely given us, that is, not in accordance with our worth ; and yet there needed to be a victim on our behalf, therefore Christ was given us and was made a sacrifice, that for His sake we might certainly conclude that we please the Father" (p. 166).

The Gospel was necessary, because after man's fall, though there remained some knowledge of the law, yet sin abides in human nature, and the conscience, if it knows only the law, cannot believe in God's will to forgive. Therefore the Gospel was revealed immediately after Adam's fall,¹ was renewed to Abraham,² and was continued by the line of psalm and prophecy.

The sum of the Gospel is contained in the doctrine of grace and justification (*loc. viii.*), which exhibits the proper benefit of Christ. To neglect it is to transform Christianity into philosophy, to extenuate sin in human nature, and to miss the essential difference between the Christian revelation and philosophy. Melanchthon goes

¹Gen. iii. 15.

²*Ibid.* xv. 1 f.

on to define justification, faith, and grace in a completely Protestant sense. The imputative view of justification, which we saw to be the controlling element in Luther's doctrine, is here the only view : Melanchthon justifies it on Scriptural grounds with the help of his humanistic learning.

"Justification signifies the remission of sins and reconciliation, or the acceptation of the person to eternal life ; for to the Hebrews to justify is a forensic word. . . . Paul, therefore, took the word justify in accordance with the custom of Hebrew speech in the sense of the forgiveness of sins and reconciliation or acceptation" (p. 177).

Justification is, moreover, of grace (*gratis*) : for, although when God forgives sin, He gives the Holy Ghost as the foundation of all virtues, the anxious conscience must not have regard to the virtues which accompany reconciliation. Paul says that we are justified not by works, but by faith in Christ. What does this mean ?

"To be justified by works signifies to obtain remission and to be just or accepted before God because of our own virtues and deeds. On the other hand, to be justified by faith in Christ signifies to obtain forgiveness not because of our own virtues, but because of the Mediator, the Son of God" (p. 178).

Faith, then, beholds Christ sitting at God's right hand and interceding for us, views Him as Mediator, and applies His mediatorship to our needs. Faith is, therefore, not merely a historical knowledge, though historical knowledge is implied : it is trust (*fiducia*).

"Faith looks upon Christ, Who must be acknowledged as the Son of the Eternal God, crucified for us, and raised again, etc. ; and the history is to be referred to the promise or effect, which is set forth in this article,

I believe in the forgiveness of sins. And again, this very article warns us that faith is to be understood as trust: for, for the man who does not trust that his sins are forgiven, these words, I believe in the forgiveness of sins, are said in vain" (p. 179).

Melanchthon again applies his humanistic knowledge to justify the interpretation of *πίστις* in the sense of *fiducia*. He next proceeds to define grace, once more defending the Protestant sense of the word by the help of the same resource.

"Grace is the remission of sins, or mercy promised for Christ's sake, or free acceptance, which is necessarily accompanied by the gift of the Holy Ghost. It is not difficult for those to determine the meaning of the word, who know the Hebrew expression; for the Hebrew word always signifies favour, sometimes also a gift" (p. 190).

What, however, further requires to be noted is that Paul in his definition of grace always emphasizes that it is free (*gratis*), entirely apart from our merit or virtue or deeds. There are four reasons for the exclusion of all these:—

(1) That due honour may be given to Christ. To transfer the cause of forgiveness to men's works is both to extenuate men's sins and to imagine that God can be placated, out of Christ. It is to take Christ as a law-giver or teacher, not as a sacrifice for sin.

(2) Without the exclusion there is no rest for the troubled conscience.

(3) To omit it produces a heathen doubt whether God will hear our prayers, instead of a Christian confidence that He undoubtedly will.

(4) It confuses the law and the Gospel. That forgiveness is free marks the essential distinction between them.

That justification is by faith alone means the same thing as that it is free: the word "alone" does not exclude contrition or other virtues, but denies that they are the causes of reconciliation with God, and transfers the whole causality to Christ. Justification by faith and free forgiveness are therefore correlative. Melanchthon denies that the figure of *synecdoche* here applies: viz. that we are justified by faith, in so far as it is informed by charity. Forgiveness is gratis, not on account of the fulfilment of the law, as *synecdoche* would imply; in fact the love to God cannot arise, unless first we see that God's wrath is appeased. It is moreover by faith that we receive the Holy Spirit.¹ The remission of sins is not for the inactive (*otiosis*), nor without a conflict and the consolation of the soul by faith.

"Since therefore the Holy Spirit in that consolation produces new activities and new life, this conversion is called regeneration,² and a new obedience must of necessity follow" (p. 200).

Thus we reach the subject of good works (*loc. ix.*). Christ clearly taught concerning repentance, and Paul says that we are debtors not to walk after the flesh.³ "We are therefore regenerated in reconciliation, that a new obedience may be begun in us" (p. 203). The works, which we must do, are those according to the Decalogue—they are made possible by the gift of the Holy Spirit. Though sin abides in us, and renders them imperfect, they please God for the sake of Christ, Who offers to God our prayers and worship, and forgives their infirmity. "Thus for Christ's sake first the person is reconciled, then the works also are accepted" (p. 215). We must do these good works to retain our faith, to avoid punishment, and because they

¹ Gal. III. 14.

² Jn. III.

³ Melanchthon further refers to 1 Cor. vi. 9; 1 Jn. III. 7, 8.

are according to the eternal will of God. God rewards them both here and hereafter, but for Christ's sake. Faith cannot rest on two supports, Christ and our merits. Sin remains in the regenerate against their will; if it remains with their will, the Holy Spirit and faith and grace are lost.

The doctrine of good works then completes the view of law and Gospel. Melanchthon turns now to discuss the subsidiary question of the difference between the Old and New Testaments (*loc. x.*). Both law and Gospel are contained alike in each Testament. The Old Testament, however, was most properly a political constitution under which the law and the promise of the Messiah were safeguarded in Israel. In the New Testament this political constitution is done away, and the ceremonial of the Hebrew law receives its fulfilment in Christ.

We pass on to Melanchthon's doctrine of the Church (*loc. XII.*) and of the sacraments (*loc. XIII.*).

"The visible Church is the company of those who embrace the Gospel of Christ and rightly use the sacraments, in which God works effectively by the ministry of the Gospel, and renews men to life eternal, in which company, however, many are not regenerate, but (merely) accept the true doctrine" (p. 285).

A sacrament is thus defined:—

"According to our present Church usage, sacrament is the name given to a ceremony instituted in the Gospel, that it may be a witness of the promise, which is proper to the Gospel, viz. the promise of reconciliation or of grace" (p. 303).

The doctrine that the sacraments are distinguishing marks of Christian profession Melanchthon holds to be a secular view. Though sacraments have many ends, their principal end is to be tokens of God's will of

grace towards us. Such were the sacraments of the Old Testament, and such are now these of the New Testament. Melanchthon accepts as sacraments proper, instituted by Christ, Baptism, the Lord's Supper, and Absolution, all of which signify properly the remission of sins. Next to these he reckons Ordination or the call to the ministry and its public approval. His interpretation of the sacrament of Absolution makes it simply the concrete application of the doctrine of justification by faith. Contrition is terror of conscience in view of the Divine judgment against sin. To awaken it, the moral law must be used; inasmuch as it is the eternal will of God denouncing judgment upon sin. The Gospel also must be applied to accuse the world of its contempt of Christ. Contrition must be followed by faith in Christ. A general, though not a particular, confession of sin is to precede absolution. For the mediaeval satisfaction, Melanchthon substitutes the patient acceptance of affliction and the cross as Divine chastisements, but not as in any way meritorious, which would be to dishonour Christ.

Melanchthon adds a section on the kingdom of Christ (*loc. xv.*).

"The Gospel clearly teaches that the kingdom of Christ is spiritual, that is, that Christ sits at the right hand of the Father and makes intercession for us, and gives remission of sins and the Holy Spirit to the Church, that is, to those that believe in Him and call upon God in trust upon Him; and that He sanctifies them, that He may raise them up at the last day to life and glory eternal. And that we may obtain these benefits, there has been ordained the ministry of the Gospel, by which men are called to the knowledge of Christ; and the Holy Spirit is efficacious, etc." (II. p. 58).

The above outline shows how well Melanchthon has

succeeded in clearly stating in opposition to Catholicism the fundamental position of Protestantism. His theology is undoubtedly founded on Luther's, and retains from him the synthetic view of justification, which is the characteristic and central Protestant doctrine. In detail, however, Melanchthon returns to the analytic methods of the schoolmen. Law and Gospel, contrition and faith, are not as with Luther moments of the same indivisible process, but are clearly separated from one another. Above all justification and regeneration, the forgiveness of sins and the gift of the Spirit, are carefully separated. A great deal of Luther's exuberance of idea has disappeared, and, the fundamental irrationalism of the doctrine of justification by faith once admitted, we are given a clear and rational analysis of what it involves. Not in vain has Melanchthon been called the *præceptor Germaniæ*; he has solved the problem of making Protestantism a teachable doctrine by reducing the paradoxical exuberance of Luther, and reintroducing the logical principle of distinction.

Compared with Zwingli, Melanchthon has on the whole the advantage both as regards matter and form; of matter, in so far as he reproduces Luther, who is superior to Zwingli; of form, in so far as his doctrine is clearer and more finished than that of the Swiss humanist.

By his success in stating the practical doctrines of the Reformation, to such a degree indeed that his outline, while improved in some points by Calvin, has remained the basis of all subsequent Protestant theology, Melanchthon has made the necessary preparation for a new Protestant doctrine of the work of Christ. To the new complex of practical doctrines a new conception of the work of Christ must correspond: to this new conception, however, Melanchthon himself has not yet

attained. In his "Loci" his references to the work of Christ are of the most general character, and are mostly introduced only with immediate practical reference to the doctrine of justification. Such references as there are, however, suggest a reduction of Luther's variety of doctrine to one fixed type. Though Melanchthon recognizes the work of Christ as a teacher and also refers to His reign and intercession, the principal point in His work appears to be that as a sacrifice or victim He propitiates the Divine wrath against sinners. In other works Melanchthon develops this last view into a doctrine like that which we have found in Zwingli, modifying the Anselmic theory of satisfaction, and laying great stress on the reconciliation of mercy and justice. Thus in his "Enarratio Symboli Nicæni,"¹ he treats on these lines of the impulsive and final causes of the Incarnation. He says:—

"This decree was made by the most free counsel of God, nor do we so repeat its causes, as if anything were thereby detracted from the freedom of will in God, but it is certain that this decree was made with an admirable wisdom and with the preservation of the order of justice and mercy. Consequently we inquire into its congruous causes whatsoever. Now the first is not obscure. Although God received the human race by His mercy for the sake of His Son's intercession, yet God, since He is just, willed that His justice should be satisfied. So by a wonderful harmonization of justice and mercy the reconciliation was established. And since the human race had sinned, it befitted the order of justice that one of the human race should pay the penalty, which was the ransom for the rest. It is therefore clear enough why this sacrifice should be a man. The second reason, why He should be God, is the infinite

¹ Thomasius, "Christi Person und Werk," III. p. 314.

evil of sin ; that He might be a ransom of infinite goodness and an equivalent, this Mediator is also God. Thirdly, no created power could alone have borne the wrath of God, and in so great stress of pains have given true praise to Divine justice. This is the secret and great cause, which the devout do not neglect to consider. For in the punishment, which must be a placation, the praise of justice must be rendered to the Punisher : a created power, however, could not have overcome death and restored to us righteousness and life eternal. And since the Mediator must needs be the perpetual guardian of the Church, hearing it at all times and present with the saints everywhere—it is evident that a created power could not be present nor see the groans of our hearts. These things belong only to the Mediator.”

It is observable from the above extract, that Melancthon, like Zwingli and Luther, rejects the Anselmic doctrine of an absolute necessity of satisfaction.

§ 2. THE “ FORMULA OF CONCORD ”

The period immediately following the Reformation was marked in the Lutheran Church by a number of theological controversies, which were brought to a conclusion by the “ Formula of Concord ” (1580).

The “ Concordia ” recognizes Holy Scripture as the one supreme authority in matters of religion. All other documents, whether ancient or modern, are only to be accepted in subjection to the authority of Scripture, as witnesses of the conservation of the true doctrine in the Church. As such witnesses are recognized the three Creeds, the “ Augsburg Confession ” of 1530 with the “ Apology,” Luther’s “ Schmalkald Articles,” and his two Catechisms. The “ Concordia ” then proceeds to

a determination of the controversies, which have arisen among those theologians, who recognize the "Augsburg Confession". There is a shorter statement (*Epitome*), and a fuller (*Solida declaratio*).

The points that concern us, are the doctrine of justification (III.), and the doctrine of law and Gospel (v.). In the articles on justification the theologians of the "Concordia" have before them the views of Osiander and Stancarus. Osiander (A.D. 1498-1552) had developed in a one-sided way just those points of Luther's theology which Melancthon had abandoned. While Melancthon made justification wholly forensic, Osiander followed the lines of the passage previously quoted,¹ where Luther answers the objection, Christ once and for all took away our sins, what need is there then of the Gospel, absolution, and the sacraments, by saying that in Christ the law and sin are indeed abolished, but that from us the law and sin, fear and heaviness, are not driven out, till Christ comes into us, bringing peace and quietness of conscience. Osiander accordingly maintained² that justification by faith takes place by the imputation to us of the righteousness of Christ, inherent in us. This inherence is, however, in principle independent of the historical Christ: it is the indwelling in us of the Eternal Word, that Inner Word of which the external word of the Gospel is only the medium.

Osiander held, like Rupert of Deutz, that the Incarnation of the Word in humanity was decreed independently of the Fall. Men were always intended to have the Incarnate Christ as their Head and King. Adam was made in the image of God, i.e. of Christ, not Christ in the image of Adam. That Adam was

¹ "Comm. in Gal." II. 124.

² Cf. Seeberg, D.G.¹, II. pp. 357-62; Baur, "Christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung," pp. 316-31.

thus made in the Divine image means that he was indwelt by the Word, and so partook of the essential righteousness of God. This was the original righteousness of Adam, by which he was justified.

By the Fall, however, this original righteousness of man was lost, until it was restored by the fresh indwelling of the Word, first in Christ, and then in those who believe upon Him. The Incarnation of Christ thus serves to mediate the indwelling of the Word in us; but the righteousness that comes to us through it is "no work, no deed, no suffering" of man, but the essential righteousness of God Himself. Osiander said that in this Divine righteousness human sin is lost as an unclean drop in the purity of the ocean.

The work of the historical Christ, however, was properly redemption, not justification. Osiander sharply distinguishes the two. Between them he says "there is a great difference, as can be understood from this, that men can redeem a thief from the gallows, but cannot make him good and just".¹

Redemption has two parts:—

(1) Christ bore for us in His Passion the wrath of God, and the punishment of sin, and obtained for us the forgiveness of sins.

(2) But, more than this, since, even after that we are born anew, we still sin, and thus would naturally lie open to the condemnation of the law, Christ, in order that the law may not accuse us, has "fulfilled it absolutely and perfectly for us and for our good, that it (our imperfect fulfilment) may not be reckoned to us, and that we may not be accused, in that we do not in this life perfectly fulfil the law".²

In these two points consists our redemption, which

¹ Baur, *op. cit.* p. 317, n. 1.

² Quoted from Osiander by Seeberg, *op. cit.* p. 358.

is a thing objective and finished long ago. Osiander says: "It is manifest that, whatever Christ, as a faithful Mediator, did for our sakes with God, His Heavenly Father, in the fulfilling of the law and in His Passion and Death, was done fifteen hundred years ago and more, when we were not yet born".¹

This work, moreover, avails for every one, who belongs to the Church of Christ, entirely apart from his subjective attitude. Redemption, however, is but the prelude to justification, and the negative presupposition of the positive grace of Christ's inherent righteousness, which justifies us. Redemption was accomplished once and for all in the life and death of Christ; justification takes place continually through the indwelling of the Word in fresh believers, as the Gospel is preached.

The agreement of the general outline of Osiander's doctrine with the above-mentioned passage in Luther's "Galatians" is apparent. Another interesting point is the close correspondence of the ideas of Osiander with these of Athanasius, "De Incarnatione". His doctrine of the original righteousness of Adam through the indwelling of the Word is essentially the doctrine of "De Incarnatione," III. 3, viewed from the standpoint of justification. So also his doctrine, that justification is by the essential righteousness of God, infused into mankind through the Incarnation, and imputed to them as their own, is the Greek doctrine of deification, regarded from the standpoint of justification. The theology of Osiander as a whole is in fact to be regarded as a reinterpretation of the Greek theology, made in order to meet the Reformation problem of justification. It has often been debated whether Osiander's theology is Protestant or Catholic. It is Catholic in virtue of its agreement with the Patristic theology; it has, however, little in common

¹ Baur, *op. cit.* p. 319, n. 1.

with the Mediaeval Scholasticism. It is Protestant in so far as there is no calculus of merits, and as justification is made to depend not on our new life nor on *caritas* (*gratia creata*), but on the righteousness of Christ Himself ; it is to be observed, however, that this righteousness is not, as in the usual Protestant view, His work. To sum up, Osiander has developed in a one-sided way some valuable thoughts of Luther neglected by Melanchthon, and is the herald of a second type of Protestant theology very different from Melanchthon's, a type of theology, it may be added, which, though it had no success at the time, is yet the precursor of a good deal of modern doctrine. Where, however, Osiander undoubtedly falls short of Luther and of Melanchthon also, is in his clean separation of redemption as a mere logical presupposition from justification as an experience. It is true that Luther alternates the points of view of salvation complete in Christ and salvation energizing in us ; but it is not in accordance with his fundamental synthesis (preserved by Melanchthon) to speak of redemption as a fact accomplished fifteen hundred years ago, while justification takes place by the imputation of the righteousness of Christ dwelling in us in present experience. In his preference for the Logos doctrine over the doctrine of the cross, Osiander runs counter to Luther's Heidelberg Theses, and becomes a *theologus gloriæ* rather than a *theologus crucis*.

Stancarus (d. A.D. 1574), the other theologian considered in the "Formula of Concord," was led, in opposition to Osiander, to go to the other extreme and assert that the righteousness of Christ, by which we were justified, was His righteousness solely according to His human nature. This was simply the doctrine of Augustine and the Schoolmen, that Christ is Mediator as man, viewed from the standpoint of justification. It

ran counter to the whole patristic current in Luther's theology.

The "Concordia" opposes Osiander and Stancarus alike.¹

"In opposition to both the remaining theologians of the 'Augsburg Confession' have taught with unanimous agreement, that Christ is our righteousness not according to His Divine nature only nor yet according to His human nature only, but according to both natures; inasmuch as He (as God and man) by His most perfect obedience delivered us from our sins, justified and saved us."

The doctrine of justification is further developed as follows (III. 10-15):—

"These blessings are offered to us in the promise of the Gospel through the Holy Spirit. But faith alone is the only medium by which we apprehend, accept, and apply them to ourselves. Such faith is the gift of God, by which we rightly acknowledge Christ as our Redeemer in the word of the Gospel, and trust in Him, to wit, that, solely for the sake of His obedience, we have by grace the remission of our sins, and are accounted righteous by God the Father, and are eternally saved. And so these propositions are equivalent and clearly mean the same, when Paul (Rom. III. 28) says: We are justified by faith, or (IV. 3) faith is imputed to us for righteousness, and when he teaches (v. 19) that we are justified by the obedience of the one Mediator Christ, or that (v. 18) by the obedience of one man justification of life comes to all men. For faith does not therefore justify, because it is so good a work and so excellent a virtue, but because it apprehends and embraces the merit of Christ in the promise of the Gospel; for that must be applied to us if we would be

¹ II. pars "Sol. Decl." III. 4.

justified by His merit. And so that righteousness, which of mere grace is imputed before God to faith or to believers, is the obedience, Passion, and Resurrection of Christ, by which He satisfied the law on our account and expiated our sins. For since Christ is not only man, but also God and man in one undivided Person, He was as far from subject to the law, as He was (by reason of His Person) free from liability to Passion and Death. For that reason His obedience (not only that, by which He obeyed the Father in His whole Passion and Death, but also that by which for our sake He voluntarily subjected Himself to the law and fulfilled it by His obedience) is imputed to us for righteousness, so that God on account of the whole obedience (which Christ by doing and suffering, in His life and death offered for our sake to His Heavenly Father) forgives our sins, accounts us good and righteous, and bestows on us eternal salvation. This righteousness is offered to us through the Gospel and in the sacraments by the Holy Spirit, and is applied and apprehended by faith: whence believers have reconciliation with God, the forgiveness of sins, the favour of God, the adoption of sons, and the inheritance of life eternal."

This classical passage is of the greatest importance for the following reasons:—

(1) It finally fixes the purely imputative view of justification adopted by Melanchthon as the only doctrine henceforward tenable in the Lutheran Church. (2) In so doing it reduces a number of Scripture views of justification to a common measure of interpretation. (3) In laying stress on the theanthropic character of the Mediator, it proceeds on lines already indicated in controversy with Osiander by Melanchthon's disciple Flacius (cf. Loofs, *D.G.* I.⁴, p. 872), to an important development of the doctrine of Christ's vicarious

obedience. This obedience includes not only the passive obedience of His sufferings and death, but also the active obedience of His life. Anselm had asserted that Christ as man owed God the obedience of His life, and hence could not offer it to the Father for us: the theologians of the "Formula of Concord" find in Luther's doctrine that Christ, the God-man, is *exlex* the possibility of taking the active obedience of His life also as vicarious. It is to be observed, however, that they insist that the whole obedience, active and passive, is one.¹ "Wherefore we believe, teach, and confess, that the whole obedience of the whole Person of Christ, which He offered to the Father even to the most shameful death of the cross, is imputed to us for righteousness." The great difference from Osiander is that this twofold obedience of Christ not merely serves for redemption in Osiander's sense, but is imputed to us in justification. (4) Faith, apprehending the Gospel in word and sacraments, is defined as the medium and instrument of justification. The "Formula of Concord," however, attributes faith, like Luther, to the work of the Holy Spirit, rather than the reception of the Holy Spirit to faith, as Melanchthon tends to do. It further teaches that renovation or sanctification is also a benefit of Christ the Mediator and the work of the Holy Spirit, but that it does not belong to the article of justification. On this point reference is made to Luther's "Galatians" (loc. cit. 28). The "Concordia" concedes to Osiander that there is an essential indwelling of the righteousness of God in us, in so far as the Holy Ghost, who is eternal and essential righteousness, dwells by faith in the justified. But this indwelling is not the righteousness of faith, for the sake of which we are justified: the latter is nothing but the remission of sins and the

¹ II. pars "Sol. Decl." III. 56.

gracious acceptance of the sinner for the sake only of the obedience and merit of Christ (*loc. cit.* 54).

The section of the "Formula of Concord" dealing with the doctrine of law and Gospel may be dealt with much more briefly; it will be sufficient to refer to the "Epitome" (I. pars v.). Here it is said that the distinction between the two is most important. The law is the Divine revelation, teaching us what is pleasing to God, and convincing us of sin. The Gospel is properly the doctrine of Christ's satisfaction and its fruits, especially the remission of sins: in a wider sense, however, it includes also the preaching of repentance. But the Gospel proper as well as the law convinces us of sin, inasmuch as Christ's Passion is a supreme exhibition of the Divine wrath against sin: yet it convinces of sin very differently from the mere law, which tends to harden sinners, while the Gospel, in so far as it convinces of sin, reveals to men the spirituality of the law, and impels men to Christ.

"Yet as long as Christ's Passion and death set before the eyes the wrath of God, and terrify man, so long they are not properly the preaching of the Gospel, but the doctrine of Moses and the law, and are the strange work of Christ by which He advances His own proper office, which is to preach concerning the grace of God, to console, and to quicken. These are the properties of the preaching of the Gospel" (*loc. cit.* 8-10).

In the above doctrine of law and Gospel we have an advance upon Melancthon, in that his scheme of law and Gospel is filled out with thoughts from Luther. The increased synthetic character of the doctrine is apparent.

The importance of the "Formula of Concord" as the authoritative standard of the developed doctrine of the Lutheran Church is very great. The Reformed Church

has no confession, which takes the place of a universal norm in the same sense.¹ What really occupies in the Reformed Church the place of both Melanchthon's "Loci" and the "Formula Concordiæ" in one, is Calvin's "Institutes". "Calvin is the most influential bearer of the common Reformed spirit."² It is to be observed that the final edition of Calvin's "Institutes" (1559) was subsequent to the Osiandrian controversy, but before the "Formula of Concord".

§ 3. CALVIN

Ritschl is said to have called Calvin's "Institutes" "the masterpiece of Protestant theology,"³ and they well deserve the name. Here first do we find a complete Protestant system of equal weight with the great mediaeval systems of Catholicism. Moreover, Calvin's system is Protestant through and through, and realizes much more adequately than Melanchthon's "Loci," the synthetic character of Luther's original intuition. For Calvin (A.D. 1509-1564), though he is the great doctor of the Reformed Church, creating the type of theology henceforward peculiar to it in contradistinction from the Lutheran Church, is nevertheless more dependent on Luther than on Zwingli. The very form of the first edition of the "Institutes" (1535) shows Luther's influence; it followed the lines of Luther's catechisms in treating successively of the Decalogue, the Creed, the Lord's Prayer, and the Sacraments. Calvin has, however, in common with Zwingli, in contradistinction from Luther, the inheritance of the humanistic tradition of Erasmus.

"Calvin, like Zwingli, was a humanist before he

¹ Cf. Müller, "Symbolik," 1896, p. 377.

² Müller, *op. cit.* p. 379.

³ Orr, "The Ritschlian Theology," p. 28, n.

became a Reformer, and what he was at first he never ceased to be. On the intellectual side, as a scholar and thinker, his affinities were with Erasmus, though on the religious side they were rather with Luther; indeed, Calvin can hardly be better described than by saying that his mind was the mind of Erasmus, though his faith and conscience were those of Luther."¹

Calvin assigns as the purpose of his "Institutes," to prepare for the study of Scripture.

"I have endeavoured to give such a summary of religion in all its parts, and have digested it into such an order, as may make it not difficult for anyone, who is rightly acquainted with it, to ascertain both what he ought principally to look for in Scripture, and also to what head he ought to refer whatever is contained in it."²

In the preface to the French edition of 1545 Calvin makes use of Erasmus' name of Christian philosophy in order to describe the matter of his summary. It is in fact a Christian philosophy which he offers, though its content is very different from that of Erasmus. True wisdom, he says (I. 1, 1),³ consists almost entirely of two parts: the knowledge of God and of ourselves. Each part, however, implies the other: here at once the synthetic character of Calvin's theology manifests itself. We cannot know ourselves without being led to the recognition of God as Creator and Redeemer. On the other hand, a true knowledge of self is only possible in the light of the knowledge of God. Calvin, moreover, insists that the true knowledge of God is not merely intellectual, but involves religion or piety. It has,

¹ Fairbairn, in the "Cambridge Modern History," Vol. II, p. 349.

² "Epistle to the Reader," 2nd ed. 1539.

³ This and the subsequent references are to the final edition of the "Institutes" (1559). The translations are from the version of Beveridge (1845), revised where necessary.

however, two degrees. There is first the simple and primitive knowledge of God as Creator, implied in the very course of nature, and which man would have had apart from the Fall. There is, secondly, the peculiar knowledge of God as Redeemer, which after the Fall God has made possible for us in Christ.

As regards the simpler knowledge of God as Creator, it is in the first place written on the heart of man ; next, it is taught us by the whole course of nature and providence. Man, however, is so blinded by sin that these natural means of Divine knowledge are insufficient. Hence God has met us with a fresh revelation in Scripture, confirming the prior revelation in nature, and also supplementing it with the further knowledge of Himself as Redeemer. The recognition of the truth of Scripture—it is necessary to receive the Scripture as the very oracles of God—depends not on the authority of the Church, but on the inner testimony of the Holy Spirit in the believer. This testimony alone gives certainty, though there are many other secondary proofs of the authority of Scripture, which result from the reflection of reason upon it. Such are the proofs from its harmony, dignity, simplicity, and efficacy, from the majesty of the prophets, the antiquity of Moses, the fulfilment of prophecy and miracles, the consent of the Church, and the constancy of the martyrs.

From the doctrine of God as Creator, Calvin passes on to the doctrine of man and the Fall. Like Luther, he insists on taking the doctrine of original sin with the utmost thoroughness : there is no free will to good in fallen man. Here then comes in the further knowledge of God as Redeemer (II. 6, 1).

“Since our fall from life unto death, all that knowledge of God the Creator, of which we have discoursed would be useless, were it not followed up by faith,

holding forth to us God as a Father in Christ. The natural course undoubtedly was that the fabric of the world should be a school where we might learn piety and from it pass to eternal life and perfect felicity. But after the fall, wherever we turn our eyes, above and below, we are met by the Divine malediction, which, while it seizes upon innocent creatures and involves them in our fault, of necessity fills our own souls with despair. For, although God is still pleased in many ways to manifest His paternal favour towards us, we cannot from a mere survey of the world infer that He is a Father. Conscience urges us within and shows that sin is a just ground for our being disowned, which will not allow God to account or to treat us for sons. In addition to this are our sloth and ingratitude. Our minds are so blinded that they cannot perceive the truth, and all our senses are so corrupt that we wickedly rob God of His glory."

Thus God is only to be savingly known through Christ the Mediator. It was so even under the Old Testament: the sacrifices, the kingdom, prophecy all pointed to the Mediator.

"If, then, the first step in piety is to acknowledge that God is a Father, to defend, govern, and cherish us, until He gathers us to the eternal inheritance of His kingdom; hence it is plain, as we lately observed, that there is no saving knowledge of God without Christ, and that consequently from the beginning of the world Christ was held forth to all the elect as the object of their faith and confidence" (II. 6, 4).

Calvin next shows how the law prepared the way for Christ. "By the law I understand not only the Ten Commandments, which contain a complete rule of pious and righteous living, but the whole system of religion delivered by the hand of God through Moses" (II. 7, 1). The ceremonies and the kingdom (as was said before)

pointed to Christ : the moral law also prepared for Him, inasmuch as its first use is to convince of sin. Calvin observes, however, that the moral law has also a civil use, and a third use for Christians, in that it instructs them in the Divine will, its curse being abrogated for them but not its precepts. Calvin recognizes in the Ten Commandments the eternal rule of righteousness naturally imprinted on man's heart. Man's sin, however, required a fresh promulgation, such as God has given in the written law (II. 8, 1).

Christ, however, though manifested in type and symbol under the law, is only clearly revealed in the Gospel (II. 9, 1). Calvin does not set law and Gospel in such extreme opposition as does Luther : his position at this point is nearer to that of Zwingli. He says :—

“By the Gospel I understand the clear manifestation of the mystery of Christ” (II. 9, 2). In a wider sense, indeed, it includes all God's promises, even those made in the law. “Still by way of excellence, it is applied to the promulgation of the grace manifested in Christ” (II. 9, 2). It is a mistake, however, to represent the comparison of law and Gospel as a comparison between the merit of works and the gratuitous imputation of righteousness. The comparison represents truth, but not the whole truth. The Gospel has not succeeded the law in such a sense as to introduce a different method of salvation ; when the whole law is spoken of, the Gospel differs only in clearness of manifestation (II. 9, 4).

The Old Testament and the New were, therefore, fundamentally one, though differently administered. The true hope of the Jews was not temporal prosperity. The covenant with them was founded not on their merits, but on the Divine mercy. Moreover, the Jews both had and knew Christ the Mediator, by whom they

were united to God and made capable of receiving His promises.

On the other hand there were these differences of administration. In the Old Testament the heavenly inheritance was exhibited under the type of temporal blessings and Christ was typified by ceremonies. In the New Testament types are done away with. Again, under the Old Testament spiritual conversion was the exception, under the New it is the rule. Moreover, the Jews under the Old Testament, being oppressed by ceremonies, had not the liberty belonging to the New Testament. Finally, the Old Testament was particular, the New is universal.

The way is now prepared for the doctrine of the Incarnation and of the work of Christ.¹ Chapter 12 is on the necessity of the Incarnation. It falls into two parts. The first (1-3) gives reasons why the Mediator needed to be both God and Man; the second (4-7) refutes Osiander's thesis that the Incarnation must have taken place even apart from sin. Calvin begins (1):—

“It deeply concerned us, that He who was to be our Mediator should be very God and very man. If the necessity be inquired into, it was not what is commonly called simple or absolute, but flowed from the Divine decree, on which the salvation of man depended. What was best for us, our Merciful Father determined.”

Calvin, therefore, rejects the Anselmic doctrine of an absolute necessity of the Incarnation. He continues, however, to give reasons for the Incarnation. What was necessary was one who could unite God and man. Even apart from sin “man was of too humble a condition to penetrate to God without a Mediator”. Much more than was a Mediator necessary after the Fall; obviously no sinful man could thus unite man and God,

¹ II. 12, and 15-17.

“All of the sons of Adam, with their parent, shuddered at the sight of God.” The angels themselves needed a head to unite them to God. “Thus the Son of God needed to become our Emmanuel, i.e. God with us ; and in such a way that by mutual union His divinity and our nature might be combined.”

Calvin proceeds (2) :—

“This will become still clearer, if we reflect that the work to be performed by the Mediator was of no common description, being to restore us to the Divine favour, so as to make us, instead of sons of men, sons of God ; instead of heirs of hell, heirs of a heavenly kingdom.”

For this cause especially, also, the Redeemer needed to be both God and man. Only Life could swallow up death. Only Righteousness could conquer sin. Only Almighty Power could conquer the powers of the world and of the air. But Life, Righteousness, and Almighty Power are alone found in God.

Christ’s manhood is, however, equally necessary (3) :—

“Another principal point of our reconciliation with God was, that man, who had lost himself by his disobedience, should by way of remedy oppose to it obedience, satisfy the justice of God, and pay the penalty of sin. Therefore, our Lord came forth very man, adopted the person of Adam, and assumed his name, that He might in his stead obey the Father ; that He might present our flesh as the price of satisfaction to the just judgment of God, and in the same flesh pay the penalty which we had incurred. Finally, since as God only He could not suffer, and as man only He could not overcome death, He united the human nature with the Divine, that He might subject the weakness of the one to death as an expiation of sin, and by the power of the other,

maintaining a struggle with death, might gain us the victory."

It is interesting to observe that in all this Calvin presents the fundamental outlines of the patristic doctrine, especially as we find it in Athanasius, Ambrose, and Hilary. He hands on therefore the tradition of the Ancient Church to the Church of the Reformation. In particular, the idea of satisfaction here taught is at once patristic and Protestant. The mediaeval or Anselmic mode of stating the question is quite passed over, and Calvin goes back for his connexions immediately to the Fathers.

In his refutation of Osiander (4-7) Calvin admits that Christ was, as the Eternal Word, the Head alike of angels and men. If man had continued pure, the Word might still have been the Head of the Church without an Incarnation. "As if indeed He could not, in the same way as angels enjoyed Him for their Head, by His Divine energy preside over men, and by the secret virtue of His Spirit quicken and cherish them as His body, until they were gathered into heaven to enjoy the life of the angels!" (7).

Scripture, moreover, always connects the Incarnation with the necessity of redemption, and we must not be wise above what is written. As to Osiander's argument that Christ was not made in the image of Adam, but Adam in that of Christ, Calvin says that Scripture nevertheless does not refuse to speak of Him as the Second Adam, thus clearly making the Incarnate Christ so far depend on Adam.

Chapter 15 is eminently noteworthy, inasmuch as it introduces us to a new and highly important point of view, viz. that of Christ's threefold office, as Prophet, Priest, and King. Calvin was thoroughly conscious of the importance of this point of view. He says (1):—

“In the present day, though the Papists have the words, Son of God, Redeemer of the world, sounding in their mouths, yet, because contented with an empty name, they deprive Him of His virtue and dignity, what Paul says of ‘not holding the head’ is truly applicable to them.¹ Therefore, that faith may find in Christ a solid ground of salvation, and so rest in Him, we must set out with this principle that the office which He received from the Father consists of three parts. For He was appointed both Prophet, King, and Priest; though little were gained by holding the names unaccompanied by a knowledge of the end and use. These two are spoken of in the Papacy, but frigidly and with no great benefit, the full meaning comprehended under each title not being understood.”

Calvin finds all three offices implied by the name Christ (2). Under the law prophets, priests, and kings were all anointed with holy oil. Similarly Christ was anointed as Prophet, Priest, and King. Is. LXI. 1, 2, speaks of His prophetic unction. As a prophet, Christ is a herald and witness of the Father’s grace, and that beyond all other teachers: His doctrine is perfect and ends the line of prophecy. Moreover, “the unction which He received, in order to perform the office of teacher, was not only for Himself, but for His whole body, that a corresponding efficacy of the Spirit might always accompany the preaching of the Gospel”.

The kingdom of Christ is spiritual; as such it is eternal (3). It assures the perpetual preservation of the Church against the assaults of the devil and the whole world. It also assures individual believers of immortality. Even in the present life it ensures them comfort and fortitude in their afflictions (4); Christ as King endows His people with all the gifts of the Spirit.

¹ Col. II. 19.

He imparts to them in fact His own royal unction (5), with which He was enriched, not privately for Himself, but as the Head of the Church.¹ His sitting at the right hand of God means that He is the vice-regent of the Father to rule and defend the Church, till at last, Christ's office having been completed, God Himself will be the only Head of the Church.² "For the same reason, Scripture throughout calls Him Lord, the Father having appointed Him over us for the express purpose of exercising His government over us through Him." As He is King and Shepherd of believers, so He will destroy all His enemies.³ This He does even now, but the full proof of His power will be given at the last judgment.

Calvin comes last to Christ's priestly office (6). He says :—

"With regard to the priesthood, we must briefly hold its end and use to be, that as a Mediator, free from all taint, He may by His own holiness procure the favour of God for us. But because a deserved curse obstructs the entrance, and God in His character of judge is hostile to us, expiation must necessarily intervene, that as a priest employed to appease the wrath of God, He may reinstate us in His favour. Wherefore, in order that Christ might fulfil this office, it behoved Him to appear with a sacrifice. . . . By the sacrifice of His death He wiped away our guilt, and made satisfaction for sin."

Moreover, the honour of the priesthood was for none other than Christ. He alone, at once Victim and Priest, could both become the fit satisfaction for sin, and be worthy to offer an Only Begotten Son to God. The benefit and efficacy of Christ's priesthood then begins with His death; but He continues to be a perpetual

¹ Is. xli. 2; Ps. xlv. 7; Jn. iii. 34, i. 16; Eph. iv. 7.

² 1 Cor. xv. 24, 28.

³ Ps. ii. 9.

Intercessor. Moreover, through His priesthood, we are not only reconciled to God, but are ourselves constituted priests,¹ and offer to God sacrifices of prayer and praise.

In Chapter 16 Calvin adds a further view of the work of Christ, arranging the material this time not logically but historically, after the manner of Aquinas, and taking as his guide in so doing the relevant sentences of the Apostles' Creed. After stating (1) in general that Christ is the one ground of our salvation, he proceeds (2) to discuss² as a prefatory question, how it can be said that God, who prevents us with His mercy, was our enemy, until He was reconciled to us by Christ. "For how could He have given us in His only begotten Son a singular pledge of His love, if He had not previously embraced us with free favour?" Here Calvin admits "there arises some appearance of contradiction". The solution offered points in the direction of Luther's doctrine of God's *opus alienum*.³ Scripture usually speaks of God as the enemy of men and of them as accursed, till their sin is expiated by the sacrifice of Christ. But "such modes of expression are accommodated to our capacity, that we may better understand how miserable and calamitous our condition is without Christ". These considerations are in fact adapted to convince us of sin, and so to compel us to fly to Christ for refuge. Calvin, therefore, here gives a psychological explanation of them, which is very noteworthy. He proceeds, however (3-4), to explain that these statements, though accommodated to our weakness, are not said falsely. He repeats after Augustine that God loves the sinner, but hates his sin. He, therefore, in love provides the means

¹ Rev. i. 6.

² After Augustine, "De Trin." XIII. 11, 15.

³ *Supra*, p. 386.

of reconciliation to Himself in Christ. Thus there is no real contradiction in the matter.

After this difficulty has thus been cleared up, Calvin comes (5) to the main subject of the chapter.

"When it is asked how Christ, by abolishing sin, removed the enmity between God and us, and purchased a righteousness which made Him favourable and kind to us, it may be answered generally that He accomplished this by the whole course of His obedience."

Our ground of pardon is the whole life of Christ, but especially His death. That salvation is peculiarly to be ascribed to Christ's death Scripture clearly shows and likewise the Apostles' Creed, "where a transition is admirably made from the birth of Christ to His death and resurrection". Nevertheless the obedience of the rest of Christ's life is not thereby excluded. It was this obedience, which included the voluntary humiliation of the Incarnation, that gave value to the sacrifice.

Calvin goes on to explain further the nature of this sacrifice. He lays great stress on the fact that Christ died a judicial death, while Pilate, his judge, at the same time testified to His innocence. Our guilt, then, is seen to have been transferred to Him, and He was a substitute for us. Calvin quotes (once more in the history of theology) Ps. LXIX. 4, "I restored that which I took not away".

The proper character of Christ's death appears further (6), in that "the cross was cursed not only in the opinion of men, but by the enactment of the Divine law".¹ The whole curse, which on account of our iniquities lay upon us, was taken from us by being transferred to Him. He was a propitiatory victim for sin, on whom the guilt was laid, so that it ceases to be imputed to us.

Calvin goes on to append (7) other explanations

¹ Dt. xxi. 23.

of Christ's death. By death Christ delivered us from death and the devil. His death is also the beginning of the mortification of our flesh.

Next follows (8-12) the discussion of the descent into hell. Calvin rejects the ancient and mediaeval view that Christ descended into hell to set free the souls of the patriarchs ; all that 1 Pet. III. 19 implies is, that the death of Christ was made known to the dead. What then is the true explanation of this article of the creed ?

“The Word of God furnishes us with one, not only pure and holy, but replete with excellent consolation. Nothing had been done, if Christ had only endured corporeal death. In order to interpose between us and God's anger and satisfy His righteous judgment, it was necessary that He should feel the severity of the Divine vengeance.” As sponsor and security for the guilty Christ undertook and paid all the penalties, which must have been exacted from them, except only that the pains of death could not hold Him. These penalties were, however, not only bodily but spiritual. Not only was the body of Christ given up as the price of redemption, but there was a greater price—He bore in His soul the tortures of a condemned and ruined man. If Christ's soul had not shared in the punishment, He would have been a Redeemer of bodies only. Calvin produces as Scripture proof for this new interpretation of the descent into hell, Matt. XXVI. 39, XXVII. 46.

In the creed next follows the Resurrection (13). Without this all else would be ineffective.

“Our salvation may be thus divided between the death and the resurrection of Christ ; by the former sin was abolished and death annihilated, by the latter righteousness was restored and life renewed, the power

and efficacy of the former being still bestowed by means of the latter."

Moreover, as the mortification of our flesh depends upon the death of Christ, so also His resurrection is the ground of new spiritual life in us. The resurrection of Christ is also the promise of our resurrection.

The Ascension (14-16) completes what the Resurrection began, and inaugurates the spiritual kingdom of Christ. He now sits at God's right hand as King. By His ascension Christ has opened for us the access to the heavenly kingdom, which Adam had shut. In heaven He intercedes for us, and thence He exercises His kingdom on behalf of His Church. The end of Christ's kingdom is His Second Advent to judgment (17, 18).

Finally (19), Calvin returns to the starting-point of the chapter. There Christ was declared to be the one ground of our salvation: the subsequent analysis has shown that every aspect of salvation is sufficiently grounded in Him.

Calvin closes his discussion of the work of Christ with a chapter (17) dealing with the supplementary question how the merit of Christ is consistent with the absolute grace of God. This chapter first appeared in the final edition of the "Institutes".

Calvin says (1):—

"I admit that were Christ opposed simply by Himself to the justice of God, there could be no room for merit, because there cannot be found in man a worth which could make God a debtor." He confirms this position by the authority of Augustine, who teaches that the man Christ Jesus was Himself assumed by the Word without merits of His own. The primary cause of our salvation was therefore the Divine decree; because of His mere good pleasure He

appointed a Mediator to purchase salvation for us. Still "principal and accessory are not incompatible"; and there is nothing to prevent the justification of man being the gratuitous result of the mere mercy of God, and yet being in a subordinate way due to the merit of Christ. There is no contradiction between the two: each stands in equal opposition to all human righteousness.

Calvin supports this conclusion (2-5) by Scripture passages, where our salvation is attributed now to the grace of God, now to the merit of Christ. Finally (6), he briefly touches the question raised by Lombard (III. 18), "whether Christ merited for Himself or for us". He says that the inquiry is one of foolish curiosity; but he decides all the same against the idea that Christ merited anything for Himself. Phil. II. 9 cannot be taken in this sense: no man can merit to become Judge of the world, and Head of angels and men. "The solution is easy and complete. Paul is not speaking of the cause of Christ's exaltation, but only pointing out by way of example to us how it follows as a consequence (upon His death)."¹

We pass on to a brief account of Calvin's treatment of the practical effects of the work of Christ. He lays down the following fundamental proposition:—

"So long as we are without Christ and separated from Him, nothing which He suffered and did for the salvation of the human race is of the least benefit to us. To communicate to us the blessing which He received from the Father, He must become ours and dwell in us" (III. 1, 1).

Accordingly Christ is called our Head, and we are

¹ It may be observed incidentally that this "easy and complete" solution is certainly a forcing of the passage, which was correctly understood by Lombard.

said to be engrafted into Him. Though this union takes place through faith, yet as all are not believers, we must go higher and attribute it to the secret efficacy of the Spirit, whose chief gift is faith (III. 1, 4).

Calvin defines faith as follows :—

“It is a firm and sure knowledge of the Divine favour toward us, founded on the truth of a free promise in Christ, and revealed to our minds and sealed on our hearts by the Holy Spirit” (III. 2, 7).

The true knowledge of Christ consists in viewing Him, as He is offered by the Father, namely, as invested with His Gospel (III. 2, 6). And, therefore, nextly :—

“Since faith embraces Christ as He is offered by the Father, and He is offered not only for justification, for forgiveness of sins and peace, but also for sanctification and as the fountain of living waters, it is certain that no man will know Him aright without at the same time receiving the sanctification of the Spirit” (III. 2, 8).

Both justification and sanctification, therefore, require to be treated of as results of faith. Calvin proposes to treat first of sanctification. Repentance and forgiveness of sins are equally parts of the Gospel ; but to treat of repentance first, best makes clear how a man is justified by faith alone, and yet holiness is inseparable from the imputation of righteousness by the Divine grace. Repentance always follows faith, and is produced by it. Since forgiveness is with a view to entrance into the kingdom of God, it is impossible to embrace the grace of the Gospel without repentance. Calvin insists that true repentance is not legal but evangelical, not caused by fear of punishment but by sorrow for sin. It is “a real conversion of our life to God, proceeding from sincere and serious fear of God ; and consisting in the mortification of our flesh and the old man, and the quickening of the Spirit” (III. 3, 5). In a word, repentance is

regeneration, the renewal in us of the image of God, all but effaced by the Fall (III. 3, 9).

The other great benefit proceeding from faith is justification.

"A man is said to be justified in the sight of God, when in the judgment of God he is deemed righteous, and is accepted on account of his righteousness" (III. 11, 2).

Justification by faith is opposed to justification by works. A man is justified by works when his holiness merits an attestation of righteousness before God.

"On the contrary a man will be justified by faith, when, excluded from the righteousness of works, he by faith lays hold of the righteousness of Christ, and clothed in it appears in the sight of God not as a sinner but as righteous. Thus we simply interpret justification as the acceptance with which God receives us into His favour and holds us for righteous, and say that this justification consists in the forgiveness of sins and the imputation of the righteousness of Christ" (III. 11, 2).

Calvin is not to be understood as defining forgiveness and the imputation of Christ's righteousness as two different parts of justification. "Justification by faith is reconciliation with God, and this consists solely in the remission of sins" (III. 11, 21). But reconciliation and forgiveness of sins take place through the imputation to us of Christ's righteousness, i.e. His expiation and obedience (22, 23).

We come last of all to Calvin's doctrine of the Church and the sacraments. Though God could perfect His people in a moment, He chooses only to bring them to manhood by the education of the Church (IV. 1, 5). The means is in the first place the preaching of the word, which God habitually accompanies with His Spirit; in the second place it is the instrumentality of the

sacraments. The preaching of the Word and the administration of the sacraments according to the institution of Christ are marks of the true Church. "These cannot anywhere exist without producing fruit and prospering by the blessing of God" (iv. 1, 10).

A sacrament "is an external sign by which God seals on our consciences His promises of goodwill toward us, in order to sustain the weakness of our faith, and we in turn testify our piety towards Him, both before Himself and the angels and also among men" (iv. 14, 1).

Because we are corporeal God leads us to Himself through earthly elements. But there is no sacrament unless the rite is accompanied with the word which explains its meaning, i.e. the promise (iv. 14, 4).

"Sacraments bring with them the clearest promise, and, when compared with the word, have this peculiar advantage, that they represent promises to the life as if painted in a picture" (iv. 14, 5).

Circumcision, purification, sacrifices, and other rites were the sacraments instituted by God under the Jewish dispensation.

"After these were abrogated, the two sacraments of Baptism and the Lord's Supper, which the Christian Church now employs, were instituted" (iv. 14, 20). All the sacraments have the same end, viz. to exhibit Christ. There is no essential difference in this respect between the sacraments of the Old and New Testament, only that the sacraments of the New Testament exhibit Christ more clearly.

Baptism attests the forgiveness of sins, not only past but future, teaches that we are united to Christ for mortification and newness of life, and also to be partakers of all His blessings. The Lord's Supper exhibits the great blessings of redemption and even Christ Himself.

“Christ once gave Himself that He might become bread, when He offered Himself to be crucified for the redemption of the world, and He gives Himself daily, when in the Word of the Gospel He offers Himself to be partaken by us, in so far as He was crucified, when He seals that offer by the sacred mystery of the Supper, and when He accomplishes inwardly what He externally designates ” (iv. 17, 5).

§ 4. THE EMERGENCE OF THE PROTESTANT SYNTHESIS

Ritschl's statement that Calvin's "Institutes" are the masterpiece of Protestant theology is justified, in that Calvin has in them brought the essential Protestant view to a complete and harmonious expression. This is seen especially when we compare him with his predecessors. On the one hand he has eliminated the mediaeval element from Luther's doctrine of the sacraments ; while on the other hand he has conserved Luther's religious view of the sacrament as a Gospel in act, and has not followed the merely ethical doctrine of Zwingli on this point. Again, Calvin has realized the synthetic character of Protestantism, as intended by Luther, better than Melanchthon. His view of the application of the benefits of Christ is less analytic than that of Melanchthon : the gift of the Spirit, faith, justification, and sanctification are seen to be all moments in an indivisible process, in which each implies the other. Similarly Calvin's view of Christianity as a whole is more synthetic than that of Melanchthon : law and Gospel are, while distinct, realized by him as a unity as they are not by Melanchthon. At this point, however, it is to be observed that Calvin, influenced by Zwingli, conceives the unity with a leaning towards making law the dominant idea, instead of following out Luther's

suggestion that the law is God's *opus alienum*, and another form of the Gospel. What, however, concerns us most of all in Calvin's theology, is the emergence of a new doctrine of the work of Christ, distinct from either the patristic or the mediaeval, viz. the doctrine of the threefold office. This doctrine, the really characteristic Protestant doctrine of the work of Christ, is highly synthetic in character. It has not merely the value of presenting the whole work of Christ in a single view, but also of presenting it in such a manner that it shows how it terminates in the production of faith (*fiducia*) through the Gospel. It is thus of an eminently practical character: the objective aspect of the work of Christ is here duly completed by the subjective aspect.

We have seen that Calvin was himself fully conscious of the advance made by his new doctrine and above all of its practical value for faith. The schema of the threefold office and the deduction of it from the title Christ seem to have originated from Eusebius;¹ but Calvin was the first to employ it in dogmatics. He admits that the titles prophet, priest, and king were spoken of in the Papacy, but complains that the full value was not drawn out of them. That he had right on his side in this matter may be seen by reference to Thomas, who, among the great schoolmen, most nearly approximates to the Protestant doctrine. In his "Summa Theologica," III. qu. 7, art. 8, prophecy is mentioned as one of the graces bestowed on the Incarnate Christ; but the gift of prophecy is here understood not in the broad sense of Protestant dogmatic, but simply with reference to prediction. The teaching of Christ is treated separately in qu. 42. Again the priesthood of Christ is dealt with in qu. 22. In art. 1, ad. 3, Thomas even almost anticipates the Protestant

¹ Cf. "Hist. Eccles." i. 3.

formula. "Christ, as the Head of all, has the perfection of all graces ; and therefore as far as pertains to others, one is lawgiver, another priest, and another king : but all these concur in Christ as in the source of all graces." But in the complete doctrine of Thomas neither Christ's prophetic nor His priestly office have the relative importance that they have in the Protestant scheme. In particular the doctrine of satisfaction is separately treated. As regards the kingly office, Thomas does not treat it under this name, but in qu. 8, art. 1, treats of Christ as Head of the Church, while His judicial power is treated of in qu. 59. To sum up, Thomas never uses the scheme of a threefold office as a conceptual unity, as does Calvin, who follows Eusebius in perceiving the unity of three offices in the name of Christ. The unity which governs the doctrine of Thomas is not conceptual, but is the intuitional or historical unity of the Apostles' Creed, and what mention of the offices of prophet, priest, and king is found in him is only of secondary importance. The adoption of the formula of the threefold office instead of the historical order of the creed marks a great theological progress. Heim says in "*Das Gewissheitsproblem in der systematischen Theologie*" :—

"As a matter of fact the origination of the dogmatic system has been from the beginning onwards a process in which the systematic impulse endeavours to become master of a mass of elements, which were already given by tradition in a certain historical order" (p. 6).

"The systematic thought, which broke into this existing scheme, was like a mountain-spring which seeks its way over a region where primitive stone-blocks lie all round. It has not the power to remove them from the spot, and is content therefore to pour through the gaps which remain free between them. Thus originates a

compromise between that general lie of things given by the Biblical narrative, and a tendency to a systematic arrangement of the whole, which proceeds from axioms to consequences" (p. 9).

This last quotation exactly corresponds to the doctrine of the Incarnation and the work of Christ in the "Summa" of Thomas. The systematic is interspersed with the historical element: the unity of the intuition has not yet been replaced by the unity of the concept. In Calvin's "Institutes," though the older mode of treatment still remains (III. 16), the new conceptual unity appears, which is presently to displace it altogether. There stands, however, in Calvin as yet a third form of doctrine, the old patristic scheme also (III. 12). How is the doctrine of the threefold office related to this? The Greek scheme of revelation by the Logos and of the destruction of sin and death by the Incarnation, is like the doctrine of the threefold office, conceptual. But the Greek Fathers were not able to control by their formulæ the whole historical material of the life of Christ: although the Logos doctrine is capable of a considerable utility in this direction. It was therefore a real advantage when first Alexander and then Thomas began to work into the theology of the Incarnation more of the historical details. By so doing they indeed made their doctrine less synthetic than the Greek, and ran the risk of making theology appear, as the Nominalists said, to be an aggregative science only. But they prepared thereby for a richer synthesis, conceptual like the Greek synthesis and indeed more of a unity than that, since all its elements run back into the one idea of the "Anointed" representative of God, —a synthesis, moreover, which could more fully than the Greek synthesis include and control the whole historical material of the Gospels. The Protestant

synthesis of the threefold office then includes the advantages of both the prior great stages of the doctrine of the work of Christ. It is worthy of note that it is altogether Calvin's own, even within Protestantism. Luther had, indeed, in his "*De Libertate Christianâ*," under the influence of 1 Pet. II. 9, treated of Christ as the King and Priest, who communicates His kingdom and priesthood to His people.¹ The Lutheran theologian Strigel had then made dogmatic use of the formula of a twofold office, treating the work of Christ under the two heads of King and Priest.² But it was Calvin who first in the "*Geneva Catechism*" and then in the "*Institutes*" added the head of Prophet, and thus brought the doctrine of the offices into a direct relation to faith through the Gospel.³

¹ Luther's "*Primary Works*," ed. by Wace and Buchheim, 1883, p. 114.

² Schmid, "*Die Dogmatik der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche*," ³, p. 285.

³ Ritschl, "*Justification and Reconciliation*," III. E.T. p. 417.

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